#?
#P[80]&#A*FAmerican^ Studies^ in^ China^ #FKVol.1#FS,^ 1994/_@#a$#P[100]
#J[-100]
#T3&THE UNITED STATES ON THE WORLD ARENA$
OF THE LATTER HALF OF THE 20TH CENTURY#t
#J[-130]бкбкIntroduction to #FKA History of Postwar U.S.#C
Foreign Relations, from Truman to Reagan#FS#Z0The author is the editor Н
and chief contributor of the book published in 1994 by World Knowledge Н
Publishing House.$#z#C
$
#T4ZI Zhongyun#t

     February, 1945, at Yusupov Palace, Yalta, Marshal Joseph Stalin Н
was proposing toasts for the two honored guests:$
     To Winston S. Churchill:$
#G[2]#G[-2]#FF
	     "...the most courageous of all Prime Ministers in the Н
world, embodying political experience with military leadership, who Н
when all Europe was ready to fall flat before Hitler said that Britain Н
would stand and fight alone against Germany even without any Н
allies.... To the health of the man who is born once in a hundred Н
years, and who bravely held up the banner of Great Britain."#+[1]$
#FS
     To Franklin D. Roosevelt:$
#G[2]#G[-2]#FF
	     "...whose country had not been seriously threatened with Н
invasion, but through perhaps a broader conception of national Н
interest, and even though his country was not directly imperiled, had Н
been the chief forger of the instrument which had led to the Н
mobilization of the world against Hitler."#+[2]$#FS

     Churchill proposed a toast to Stalin:$
#FF#G[2]#G[-2]
	     "It is no exaggeration of a florid kind when I say that Н
we regard marshal Stalin's life as most precious to the hopes and Н
hearts of all of us.  There have been many conquerors in history, but Н
few of them have been statesmen, and most of them threw away the Н
fruits of victory in the troubles which followed their wars... I walk Н
through his world with greater courage and hope when I find myself in Н
a relation of friendship and intimacy with this great man, whose fame Н
has gone out not only over all Russia, but the world."#+[3]$
#FS
     Roosevelt remarked that the atmosphere of the banquet was one of Н
family gathering, which he would like to use to describe the relations Н
of the three allies.#+[4]$
#M1The United States on the World Arena#m
#M2American Studies in China#m
     A year later, in February 1946, Stalin in his address to the Н
constituents of the Stalin electorate of Moscow city, said that the Н
victory of the anti-fascist war showed that the Soviet system was more Н
vigorous, stable than "non-Soviet system" and superior to it.  In the Н
same speech the idea that capitalist economic system involves "general Н
crisis" was put forward.  Some in the West called the address "a Н
declaration of the Third World War."#+[5]$
К     On March 5 of the same year, Churchill delivered his famous Fulton Н
speech in which he put forward the term "iron curtain" and called on Н
the English-speaking countries to stand together to face "the Н
Communist parties or fifth columns" in their "challenge and peril" to Н
Christian civilization.$

       To this, Stalin responded on March 13 in an interview with a Н
#FKPravda#FS_ reporter accusing Churchill of standing in the position of a Н
war instigator. He said that the speech reminded one of Hitler and Н
his friends and that it was a call to war with the Soviet Union.$

     Another year elapsed and in March of 1947 the "Truman Doctrine" came Н
into being when President Truman declared that it must be the policy Н
of the United States to support "free peoples" against Н
"totalitarianism."$

     Much water had flown under the bridge since then. In May 1992, Н
Mikhail Gorbachev, the former leader of the now nonexistent Soviet Н
Union, appeared at the same Westminster College where Churchill made Н
his "iron curtain" speech 46 years ago and told his audience that the Н
end of the Cold War "is the victory of common sense, reason, democracy Н
and common human values." In his speech, Gorbachev said that both the Н
Soviet Union and the United States committed errors which led to the Н
Cold War.  The major error of Stalin was to equate the defeat of Н
fascism in World War II with the inevitable triumph of Communism, Н
while the United States and other Western nations erred grievously in Н
failing to realize that Stalin and the Soviet people did not have the Н
ability nor the intention to wage a new war, and based their whole Н
strategy on the possibility of Soviet military aggression against the Н
West. The #FKNew York Times#FS_ called the speech one that "buried the cold Н
war," and said that history came full cycle that day.#+[6]$

     So, in less than half a century, the current generation has Н
witnessed a big joke played on them by history of their own making.  Н
According to Gorbachev, all the waste of wealth, man power, Н
painstaking brainwork and sacrifice of innocent lives over almost half Н
a century were merely the result of wrong evaluation of the leaders of Н
both superpowers. Yet, for several decades, the expectations shown in Н
Yalta of the cooperation of the Allied countries after the war, Н
especially Roosevelt's optimism about reaching an understanding with Н
the Soviet Union received much criticism from both historians and Н
politicians in the West as wrong evaluation. There is no ready simple Н
answer as to which is right or wrong.  Anyway,  history in nearly half Н
a century provides inexhaustible resources for the posterity to Н
meditate and comment on.$
#T4I#t
     The period covered by this book, namely from Harry Truman to Н
Ronald Reagan Н
(1945-1988), coincides almost with the beginning and ending of the Н
Cold War.  Because of the special position held by the United States, Н
a history of postwar American foreign relations can also be regarded Н
as a history of the the Cold War, the guiding line of American foreign Н
policy being confrontation with the Soviet Union.  There were ups and  Н
downs, tension and relaxation as well as shift of defensive and Н
offensive positions in the confrontation of the two superpowers, yet НКone thing remained unchanged and that is each regarded the other as Н
its main rival.$

     On the American side, there were a number of objective and Н
subjective factors contributing to the motivation for global expansion Н
after World War II:  Firstly, American strength. By the end of the Н
war, the United States was by far the strongest country in the world Н
both militarily and economically.  It enjoyed monopoly of the atomic Н
weapon for four years and possessed the dollars and materials badly Н
needed by all other countries. It could therefore wield "carrot" and Н
"stick" with ease in its relations with other countries.  Secondly, Н
American economic necessity. The United States became more dependent Н
on international resources and market than any time in its history.  Н
For instance since 1944, it changed from an oil-exporting country into Н
one of net importer with the proportion of oil import increasing every Н
year.  Moreover, in the transition from wartime economy to peacetime Н
economy, how to avoid serious economic recession was a serious concern Н
for U.S. policy-makers at that time, hence the necessity to develop Н
international markets.  Thirdly, ideology.  This contains two Н
implications:  The first is the sense of superiority with which the Н
United States of America was born. Ever since the founding of U.S.A., Н
Americans have always considered themselves the embodiment of the Н
essence of Western civilization and the genuine inheritors of the Н
thought of John Locke. Hence the sense of the "mission" to change the whole Н
world in the American image.  The second is anti-communism which Н
started with the Russian October Revolution.  During the sixteen years Н
from the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks in Russia to the Н
recognition of the Soviet Union by the Roosevelt Government in 1933, Н
the "red scare" had exerted great influence upon American political Н
life and the thinking of the ordinary people.  Due to the temporary Н
alliance with the Soviet Union in the War and Roosevelt's more or less Н
liberal attitude toward the Left in the United States, "anti-Н
communism" somewhat receded, though far from being eliminated. After the Н
War, in the new situation, anti-communism began to rise again in Н
America.  As all other major Western countries had been exhausted by Н
the war, the United States with its inherited sense of mission Н
naturally took on itself the "mandate of heaven" of safeguarding the Н
Western civilization.$
     
     The external factors lie in the profound changes in the Н
international arena. Up to the First World War, the United States had Н
successfully kept itself from the entanglement of European power Н
politics and  had been able, under the umbrella of the "Monroe Н
Doctrine," to develop itself and expand in  the Н
American continents without disruption.  Н
It was shortly involved in the First World War at a later stage.  Н
However, after the War, President Woodrow Wilson's ideal of the Н
"League of Nations" was rejected at home and isolationism regained the Н
upper hand.  By the end of World War II, both vanquished and Н
victorious nations in Europe were devastated.  It so happened that Н
wherever the Soviet Red Army reached in the fight against fascism, the Н
area would immediately become the sphere of influence of the Soviet Н
Union.  Thus, one by one, the East European countries were relentlessly Н
brought under its tight control and a socialist system of the Н
Stalinist model was installed there.  Despite their opposition to it, НКthe United States and Great Britain knew that it was out of the Н
question to make the Soviet Union retreat from its occupied areas and Н
was compelled to let it go at that.  Thus, the Soviet Union, Н
stretching across Europe and Asia, became an overwhelming power in the Н
eastern hemisphere which the whole Western Europe put together could Н
not counterbalance.  Besides, there were newly independent nations and Н
those struggling for independence from the Western imperialist system.  Н
The Soviet Union could easily penetrate into these nations in the name Н
of supporting revolutionary struggles.  Especially in the Middle East Н
which was historically an area of contention between Russia and Great Н
Britain, it is quite natural that if one declined the other would Н
rise.  As early as in the l9th century, Alexis de Tocqueville Н
predicted the coming contention between America and tsarist Russia.  Н
Actually, America's "open-door" policy towards Asia at the turn of the Н
century had tsarist Russia as its immediate target.  Had Russia not Н
been defeated by Japan in the Russo-Japanese war, the struggle between Н
the United States and Russia would have begun earlier.  After the Н
World War II, under new circumstances, the two superpowers finally Н
confronted each other and this time the confrontation had a combined Н
geopolitical and ideological nature. On the one hand, under the banner Н
of "freedom" and "democracy," the United States attempted to use its Н
power so that the world would come under its influence and develop in Н
the direction of capitalism as it saw fit; on the other hand, under Н
the slogan of  "proletarian internationalism" and based on the logic Н
that "the interest of the Soviet Union represents that of the whole of Н
mankind," the Soviet Union strove to expand its influence wherever Н
possible and demanded, at least, other socialist countries and Н
revolutionary movements obey the needs of the Soviet interests of the Н
time.$

     This does not mean that both sides could expand unscrupulously.  Н
However tense the contention, there was a certain line to follow, and Н
that is the sphere of influence set at Yalta. The Yalta agreements in Н
fact are recorded acknowledgment of the #FKstatus quo#FS_ of the established Н
balance of power at the end of the War.  The Yalta Conference laid the Н
foundation for the postwar world framework and also left behind many Н
controversial issues.  The line was most clear in Europe.  Due to its Н
highly developed productive force and special position in modern Н
history, Europe naturally became the strategic center of contention.  Н
Despite their rhetorics, the United States and the Soviet Union had Н
all along in practice respected the dividing line between the West and Н
East Europe. The confrontation between NATO and Warsaw Н
Treaty Organization was in essence more defensive than offensive on Н
both sides.$

     In the postwar international relations there is a new factor Н
unknown to past history - the emergence of nuclear weapons Н
and hence the nuclear arms race between the two superpowers. By the Н
end of the 50's and the beginning of the 60's the stock of nuclear Н
weapons and their lethal power reached such a degree that the leaders Н
of both superpowers realized that there would be no victor in a Н
nuclear showdown.  Thus, nuclear weapons became actually a deterrent Н
rather than combat force. This accounts for the fact that both sides Н
had all along cautiously avoided a head-on clash and stopped short on Н
the brink in every crisis. The Cuban missile crisis was the one that НКbrought the two superpowers closest to the brink of war and it was the Н
last of its kind. This is why the Cold War remained cold.  This can Н
also explain why in Europe where massive forces armed to teeth Н
confronted each other, the situation was basically stable.  Clashes Н
usually happened in the vast intermediate zones where the boundary Н
line of spheres of influence was vague or changeable and where Н
hostilities would not lead to direct U.S.-Soviet conflicts.$

     Under such circumstances, American postwar diplomacy has Н
features different from those of big power politics in previous Н
periods of history:$

     l. A close combination of military with diplomacy. The famous Н
saying by Clausewitz that war is the continuation of politics is no Н
longer adequate to describe the U.S. relationship with the Soviet Н
Union.  As both sides strove to avoid a direct war, military affairs Н
as such were incorporated in diplomacy and relative military strength Н
would decide how far diplomacy could go.  The National Security Н
Council was created to coordinate the opinions and interests of Н
different agencies and make policy on the basis of an overall Н
consideration of strategy, security, political and economic factors.  Н
Arms race and disarmament talks became alternatively an important Н
content of diplomacy between the two superpowers and also the two Н
blocs.  So much so that every administration had its military Н
strategy, especially nuclear strategy, to go with its foreign policy.  Н
Therefore, the study of American foreign policy requires an Н
understanding of its concurrent military strategy.$

     2. Since the contention between the two superpowers was a global Н
one, a new definition was attributed by the United States to its Н
"national security" and extended its boundary of security far beyond Н
its territory.  Any corner in the world could be connected with the Н
U.S. security interest and revolutions, coups or any government's Н
major policy regarded unfavorable to the United States could be Н
regarded as threat to its security interests and therefore  target for Н
intervention.  This is the implication of "indirect aggression," a Н
term invented by the "Truman Doctrine." In this context, there is Н
hardly any purely domestic affairs of other countries in the strict Н
sense.  However, the limit of this concept of "security" was still Н
based on the established spheres of influence and interventions were Н
carried out mainly to defend the existing line.  Assistance to the Н
Greek and Turkish governments, interference in China's civil war and Н
the sending of troops to Korea, Vietnam and Cuba were all cases in Н
point.  When the Soviet Union sent troops to Hungary and Н
Czechoslovakia, the reorganized Soviet sphere of influence, the United Н
States did not take any action.  On several occasions of "Berlin Н
crisis," the U.S. actions were centered on the protection of West Н
Berlin.  Although the Reagan Administration was known for its tough Н
stand toward the Soviet Union, the point of departure of its Н
policy was still the recognition of the latter as a global superpower Н
and respect for its "legal security interests."$

     3. Postwar American global expansion was different from the past Н
models of big power conquest of the world.  The old ways of occupying Н
territories, enslaving peoples and seizing resources by means of force НКwas clearly outmoded in our century and the richness of the United Н
States made it unnecessary to do so.  Rather, it relies more on Н
"borrowed forces," so to speak. The military blocs and treaty Н
organizations over the continents are the bearing points whereby the Н
U.S. extended its influence and  formed an encirclement of its rivals. Arnold Н
Toynbee compared the United States with Roman Empire in their way of Н
ruling as he wrote:$
#FF#G[2]#G[-2]
	     "...conquest and annexation are not the only means, Н
or indeed the most frequent and most effective means, by which empires Н
have been built up in the past.  The history of the Roman Empire's Н
growth, for instance, is instructive when one is considering the Н
present-day American Empire's structure and prospects.  The principal Н
method by which Rome established her political supremacy in her world Н
was by taking her weaker neighbors under her wing and protecting them Н
against her and their stronger neighbors. Rome's relation with these Н
protegees of hers was a treaty relation.  Juridically they Н
retained their previous status of sovereign independence.  The most Н
that Rome asked of them in terms of territory was the cession, here and Н
there, of a patch of ground for the plantation of a Roman fortress to Н
provide for the common security of Rome's allies and Rome herself."
#+[7]$#FS

     The comparison can only explain some similarities in form but not Н
the essence.  For, U.S. global influence goes far beyond that of the Н
limited range of the Roman Empire; it is only a sphere of Н
influence without boundary and there is a loose relation between Н
the member nations which enjoy much more independence than those of Н
the Roman Empire.  In addition, after the World War II, relying on its Н
strong military and economic strength, the United States has adopted a Н
unique method to carry out its foreign policy goals by providing aid Н
to friendly nations. The "Marshall Plan" is a typical model of success in Н
economic aid and the Mutual Defense Act adopted in 1949 set down the Н
national policy of military aid to other nations as a means to Н
safeguard its own security interests.  Such a policy in peacetime is Н
unprecedented in history and is regarded as an American invention.$

     4. Since ideology plays an important role in American diplomacy, Н
cultural and information work constitutes a significant part of it, no Н
less than political, military and economic ones.  While normally all Н
nations would include cultural work in its external affairs, that of Н
the United States is unique in its sheer size of scope, its long and Н
continuous tradition and the attention and financial support it Н
receives from both the government and private sectors.  Soon after the Н
end of World War II, the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) was Н
established and carried out work on a tremendous scale all over the Н
world along the line of U.S. foreign policy. The "Fulbright Bill" Н
adopted in 1948 pioneered decades of efforts for the promotion of Н
educational and cultural exchanges. Besides congressional Н
appropriations, there are all kinds of foundations, various semi-Н
official or private institutions as well as universities and colleges Н
which contribute in their own way to America's cultural relations with Н
other countries.  All these efforts consciously or unconsciously, Н
directly or indirectly constitute an effective auxiliary means for Н
government diplomacy.   This situation stems from the following НКcauses: First, the United States has a tradition of attaching Н
importance to education and cultural activities both at home and Н
wherever it reaches in the world.  Quite a few foundations and academic Н
institutions take as their principle "for the increase and Н
dissemination of knowledge among mankind."  Second, as mentioned Н
before, the Americans regard themselves elites chosen by God with a Н
mandate of heaven to spread all over the world American Н
democracy,thinking and values which for them are the best and Н
therefore must be universally good. This is a kind of missionary Н
spirit related to religious belief and zeal. It would be hard to fully Н
understand the international behavior of the United States without a Н
deep-going understanding of this mentality of the Americans. Third, in Н
the context of postwar ideological confrontation, cultural and Н
information work has been used as an instrument for the cold war.  The Н
famous NSC68 paper adopted in 1950 contains a detailed program for Н
information work which, together with military and economic work and Н
resources, form a component part of "national security," and in which Н
the cold war purpose is most explicitly defined.  Fourth, the United Н
States possesses the financial, institutional, material and human Н
resources to be devoted  to this work, with which no other country in Н
the world could possibly be compared.$
#T4II#t
     In the forty-odd years from Truman to Reagan, the world was Н
undergoing great changes and one cannot say that contention between Н
the two superpowers ran through every corner of the world at all Н
times.  Before the drastic changes in Eastern Europe and the Н
disintegration of the Soviet Union, the world had already witnessed Н
traces of decentralization of power gravity which challenged the Н
bipolar pattern (the term in fashion is "multipolarization" which the Н
author has tried to avoid because of its inaccuracy).  The national Н
liberation movements reached its peak in the 1960's with the emergence Н
of a number of newly independent nations in Asia and Africa, the Н
nonalignment movement and later, the 77 countries group in the United Н
Nations. Revolutionary movements in Latin American countries with the Н
Cuba revolution as its climax constitute also a part of this trend. Н
This vast area which is generally called the "Third World" became Н
naturally the arena of contention between 
the United States and Soviet Union (for a short period of time China Н
was also involved). Yet, the course of events has increasingly gone Н
beyond the influence of both superpowers.  The Iran-Iraq war which Н
lasted for eight years is a case in point. Neither "fear" nor "favor" Н
of the usual U.S. tactics towards developing countries worked and U.S. Н
diplomacy appeared so ineffective that it ended up by antagonizing Н
both Iran and Iraq.$

     It is hard to make a general summary of the rise and fall or the Н
offensive and defensive postures of the U.S. in its foreign relations.  Н
To describe it graphically, there is one curve which runs along the Н
following direction: The "Truman Doctrine" set the tune for America's Н
interventionism with anti-communism as the guiding line; the Н
"Eisenhower Doctrine" - also called "power vacuum" doctrine - laid Н
foundation for U.S. entry into the Middle 
East and filling in spheres of influence from which Britain and France Н
were forced to withdraw; the frequently quoted high-sounding words in Н
Kennedy's inaugural address, that the United States would "support any НКfriend, oppose any foe" at any cost to safeguard the victory of Н
freedom, marks the height of U.S. arrogance and the "Johnson Doctrine" Н
implies authorization of bombing the Tonkin Bay and armed intervention Н
in Dominica.  All these doctrines and famous quotations with Н
presidential labels formed basis for expansion and intervention with  Н
Vietnam war as the climax. The turn started with the "Nixon Doctrine" Н
the core of which is to admit the disparage between U.S. capabilities Н
and ambition and the necessity to withdraw from overstreched fronts.  Н
The series of important measures taken under Nixon and Carter Н
administrations, such as SALT I and II with the Soviet Unions, Н
rapprochement and establishment of relations with PRC, the end of Н
Vietnam war and withdrawal of U.S. troops from Indochina, withdrawal Н
of the 7th Fleet from Taiwan Straits, the returning of Okinawa to Н
Japan and the signing of Panama Canal Agreement, all point to the Н
trend of retraction.  From Nixon to Carter, detente in its broad Н
sense was the main trend in U.S.-Soviet relationship. The Reagan Н
Administration intended to turn the tide and revitalize American power Н
and prestige in the world by strengthening U.S. military build-up and Н
toughening its attitude towards the Soviet Union.  At the same time, Н
the Soviet Union was encountering ever-increasing difficulties in all Н
fields.  So there seemed to be a shift of position from defensive to Н
offensive vis-ид-vis the Soviet Union. However, by the time President Н
Reagan left the White House, he had not been able to resume the kind of Н
supremacy the United States enjoyed before the Vietnam war.  Н
Meanwhile, world situation at large changed drastically. Facing Н
serious challenges and experiencing a relative decline in economy, the Н
United States found it difficult to continue the horrendous military Н
budget to keep the momentum of the arms race.  The difficulties of the Н
Soviet Union were even greater.  Though few, if any, foresaw its Н
disintegration several years later, Gorbachev in his "new thinking" of Н
foreign policy did make concessions which no previous Soviet leader Н
had ever done or would have been likely to do.  Under such Н
circumstances and out of need of both sides, there appeared a Н
situation of new detente. Therefore, if we follow this line of postwar Н
U.S. expansion, the curve rises steadily in the early period, reaching Н
its peak at the time of the Vietnam war, turns downward after that Н
until the Reagan administration, slightly rises again and then levels Н
off.$

     However, there is another invisible curve which goes in an Н
opposite direction to the one described above. That is the curve in Н
terms of the influence of American thinking, or cultural influence in Н
a broad sense.  In the early postwar years, capitalism in terms of Н
ideology, was on the defensive. At that time, revolutionary movements Н
in various countries were on the rise and Marxism which was regarded Н
as the "wave of future" had considerable influence among oppressed Н
people and radical intellectuals. Apart from the socialist countries Н
which emerged in East Europe, there was a strong communist movement in Н
Europe with the French and Italian communist parties listed as the Н
biggest ones respectively in their own countries and holding the Н
greatest number of seats in parliament.  The victory of Chinese Н
revolution led by the Chinese Communist Party broke the line of Н
spheres of influence in the Far East as set down in Yalta and dealt a Н
heavy blow to the United States.  Moreover, the Chinese revolution had Н
great influence on the national liberation movements of ex-colonial НКcountries. And indeed, up until the 1960's, China took upon itself as Н
its internationalist duty the spread of Mao Zedong Thought and support Н
of anti-imperialist struggles waged by oppressed nations.  Under such Н
circumstances, the United States devoted its efforts to the defense of Н
capitalist system.  The policies of "containment" and "prevention of Н
the spread of communism" were in essence on the defensive.  In fact, Н
McCarthyism grew out of fear and a lack of confidence in the American Н
people at home. As late as 1959, in the famous kitchen debate, it was Н
Nixon who stressed noninterference in domestic affairs and opposition Н
to the imposing of social system on other nations, while Khrushchev Н
expressed confidence in the final victory of communism through Н
"peaceful competition" and argued that support to revolutionary Н
struggles could not be regarded as interference in others' internal Н
affairs.  But in fact, at that time the positions of the two sides in the Н
ideological struggle was already starting to change with the Soviet Н
Union increasingly on the defensive. The Berlin Wall built in 1961 was Н
clearly a demonstration of weakness and a defensive posture on the Н
part of the East.  During the Vietnam war, American system and Н
American values again encountered challenges with anti-American Н
sentiments running high in many parts of the world and the rising of Н
"counter-culture" trend among the younger generation at home.  At that Н
time, the Cultural Revolution in China had certain impact on radical Н
youth in the West who out of dissatisfaction with their own society Н
idealized and turned to the "unprecedented" experimentation taking Н
place in China. It is not hard to imagine how they were disillusioned Н
later by the reality.$

     After the 1960's, the West with the United States in the lead Н
clearly gained upper hand in the ideological contention.  The reasons Н
are complex.  The most fundamental one is the failure in economic Н
development of the socialist countries, making them visibly inferior Н
to the capitalist countries in the "peaceful competition." This led Н
to the great disparity between promises and expectations on the Н
one hand and reality on the other.  Besides, as far as the Third World Н
is concerned, if in the previous stage of struggle for independence Н
against imperialism and colonialism Marxism as a militant theory had Н
proved to be more attractive, now most of the newly independent nations Н
entered the stage of economic development, the United States and the Н
Western countries gained increasingly advantageous position in the Н
contention with the Socialist countries with economic and Н
technological assistance and model of development as the chief means.  Н
Moreover, in the cultural field, the United States has always taken Н
an aggressive approach which has by no means changed with the Н
strategic retraction after the Vietnam war. At the European Security Н
Conference which lasted from 1972 to 1975, the West had consistently Н
insisted on the free interflow of personnel and cultural exchanges Н
while the East finally agreed to it as a concession in exchange for Н
the West recognition of the existing boundary in Europe. This is a Н
clear demonstration as to which side is on the defensive and which Н
side on the offensive in the ideological struggle.  Since the 1980's, Н
world-wide anti-American sentiments began to subside.  Take China for Н
example, a country that used to take the lead in the struggle against Н
American imperialism and close its door to all Western ideas.  The Н
situation has obviously changed with the reform and opening-up policy Н
and the establishment of diplomatic relations with the United States.  НКThe Chinese leaders openly declared that China did not draw a line on Н
ideology and social system in its relationship with other countries. Н
Meanwhile, for better or for worse, the rapid spread of all-round Н
American cultural influence among the Chinese people which make up Н
one-fifth of the world's population is an undeniable fact.$

     Therefore, the curve of postwar American cultural influence runs Н
by and large in opposite direction to the first one mentioned above: Н
It has been rising very slowly in the early years, leveling off from Н
time to time, with a slight drop during the Vietnam war years, rises Н
steadily with a wide angle in the 1970's and surges abruptly and Н
definitely in the 1980's. Taking an all-round view, it is hard to judge Н
whether in sum the global influence of the United States during the Н
past 40-odd years has been strengthened or weakened.$
#T4III#t
     There were three big events worth mentioning during the four Н
years of the Bush Administration.  They are, first, the drastic change Н
in Eastern Europe and the disintegration of the Soviet Unions; second, Н
the Gulf War; third, the increasing difficulty and challenge Н
encountered by the U.S. economy which actually led to Bush's failure Н
in election.  All these events have bearings upon the global status of Н
the United States and its future diplomacy.  In the post-cold war era, Н
two questions in opposite directions are frequently asked by people of Н
the world: 1. Is the United States declining?  2. Will the United Н
States be more hegemonistic now that it has become the only superpower Н
in the world?  Both questions are well grounded. The basis for the Н
first question consists mainly of the economic problems confronted by Н
the United States which are known to all. In this respect, Americans Н
at home feel more keenly than outsiders the deterioration of the Н
situation and are nostalgic of the hey day when their country enjoyed Н
supremacy over the rest of the world. The second question is based on Н
the following arguments: As the United States emerges victorious from Н
the Cold War, the most powerful obstacle to its world ambition has Н
disappeared; the intense arms races that lasted for decades may come Н
to an end so that with forced and voluntary disarmament on the part of Н
Russia, the United States can reduce its own military budget in favor Н
of civil industry and thus readjusting its economy to strengthen its Н
position in world competition; the Gulf War proved that U.S. military Н
superiority still plays an important role and that it remains to be Н
the only country in the world that has both the will and capacity to Н
take large-scale military action abroad; the pattern of U.S. behavior Н
in the international affairs is still based on power politics and has Н
a strong inclination to impose its will on other nations.$

     If one were to take a view from formalistic logic, based on sheer Н
figures and in a simplified and static way, arguments for a Н
confirmative answer to both questions seem to be valid.  However, the Н
real world is not so simple. Moreover, it is in turbulence and Н
undergoing changes and there are a number of unpredictable variables.  Н
From what we can see so far, the answers to both questions seem to be Н
negative. That is to say, first, as far as comprehensive national Н
strength is concerned, the United States is by no means in the process Н
of "decline" - in the sense that the word was applied to the British Н
Empire; second, the ability and possibility for the United States to Н
influence world affairs have not been strengthened with the НКdisintegration of the Soviet Union, but rather weakened. If "Pax Н
Americana" was not realized in the Cold War period due to the Н
existence of a strong rival, it is even harder to realize from now on.$

     The question of comprehensive national strength is not the topic Н
of this article.  The publication of Paul Kennedy's book #FKRise and Fall Н
of Great Powers#FS_ in 1987 touched off a world-wide debate as to the Н
renewal or decline of the United States.  Arguments for each side have Н
been fully explored throughout the discussions which need not to be Н
repeated.  Yet, one aspect that is often overlooked by discussants of the Н
topic is worth mentioning here: the advantage of the United Н
States in the possession of talents. If international competition in Н
the future will be increasingly one of economic strength and this in Н
turn relies on high-tech and management talents, then the United Н
States has the incontestable advantage in its ability to attract Н
talents from all over the world, an advantage which leaves all other Н
countries far behind.  As a land of immigrants, America has been Н
unique from the very beginning.  No other country in the world started Н
with a population consisting of people with labor power and skill in Н
the prime of their life.  Their native lands paid the cost for their Н
birth and growth while they came to the New World to devote their most Н
creative years and talents to the construction of the United States of Н
America. This process has been going through the whole of American Н
history, not only in the founding and frontier years but is still Н
continuing today.  In the trend of internationalization of talents Н
today, it is an undeniable fact that the natural orientation of the Н
flow of talents from different parts of the world is towards America.  Н
It goes without saying that mass immigrants also create serious social Н
problems, which the United States can cope with by a selective Н
immigrant policy.  In balance, pros still prevails over Н
cons.  The flow of talents is not an isolated phenomenon.  It Н
not only indicates potential competitiveness in the future, but also Н
reflects an aspect of present relative strength.  A country with such Н
attraction and capacity for talented people all over the world can Н
hardly be regarded as on the decline.$

     This is not to overlook all the serious problems currently Н
confronted by the United States. What the author is trying to say is Н
that despite all the difficulties, the United States has not taken on Н
the road of inevitable decline, be it very slowly, and that American Н
society still has the ability to readjust itself and recover from the Н
present setback. In terms of comprehensive national strength, it is Н
still way ahead of all other countries and will not necessarily be Н
replaced by countries like Germany or Japan.  Lester Thurow in his new Н
book #FKHead to Head - The Coming Economic Battle among Japan, Europe Н
and America#FS_ concludes that Europe will be the victor over both Japan Н
and America in the future contention.  But by Europe he means both Н
West and East Europe including the European part of C.I.S. as a single Н
entity and the book sets two conditions for the realization of its Н
victory, namely, a real integration of West European economy which Н
should rapidly extend to Central and Eastern Europe and the Н
accomplishment of market economy in Central and Eastern Europe in Н
time.  It needs not much insight to see that the two conditions are Н
not likely to be realized in a short time.  Meanwhile, with Н
appropriate policies and measures, the United States still have a НКchance to readjust its economy and turn the tide in its favor.  The Н
time needed is probably shorter than the integration of the whole of Н
Europe, if ever it is to come. $

    So much for America's comprehensive national strength.  Now let's Н
have a look at its role in international relations.  Most of the Н
difficulties the United States encountered in the postwar era by Н
overstretching itself stems precisely from its superpower status. Н
There has always been a gap between its ambitions and obligations in Н
the world on the one hand and its actual ability on the other. This Н
situation has not changed with the disappearance of the other Н
superpower, but rather aggravated because of the complexity of the Н
post-cold war world.$

     Marked by the disintegration of the former Soviet Union, for the Н
first time in modern history a world framework of balance of power Н
established by the war was broken without a major war.  This can only Н
be the result of the inextricable internal contradictions of the Н
countries concerned and the popular will of these countries for a Н
change.  Whatever measures the United States and other Western Н
countries had taken to encourage this change in the Cold War, they did Н
not play a decisive role.  So it is not accurate to say that the Н
United States and the West "won" the Cold War.  With the old balance Н
of power broken, the gradual process of decentralization of power Н
gravity that has already begun takes a qualitative leap. Now that the Н
bipolar pattern no longer exists, the inherent contradictions among Н
nations that has been covered up or suppressed by ideological Н
differences have suddenly sprung to the surface in an evermore intensive Н
and acute way.  Some of them soon break into hot wars as is seen on Н
the land of former Yugoslavia. In face of such a world full of Н
complexities and with conflicts of all sorts breaking out in different Н
parts of the world, the United States would find it much more Н
difficult than before to manipulate in the capacity of "world leader" Н
and to influence the course of events according to its will.$

     Take, for example, the Middle East and Gulf areas which have Н
caused the United States so much headache.  These used to be Н
strategically very important areas in U.S.-Soviet contention.  Now one Н
side has pulled out of the game; but the other side is meeting with Н
even more problems. The Gulf War was a success for the United States Н
which entered it with the support of the international community in Н
the name of a just cause and won quick victory.  Yet two years has Н
passed and Houssein Sadam's power and arrogance  remain. When the Н
United States used force again, the international community including Н
some West European countries had more reservations and the result was Н
not so obvious.  Iraq becomes a chronic issue rather than the case Н
of a neat operation.  The whole of Middle East with all its old and Н
new contradictions remains a source of trouble for the United States. $

     West European allies naturally constitute the most important Н
power basis for the United States to play the role of "world leader." Н
Over the years, these countries which collectively possess the most Н
advanced productive force outside of America, despite frictions and Н
demands for independence from time to time, were able to mitigate Н
their differences and coordinate their interests with the United НКStates under the overall strategic framework of countering the Soviet Н
threat.  Things have changed now and American nuclear umbrella is no Н
more imperative for West Europe. So, the effectiveness of the Н
existing U.S. military superiority as a political leverage is greatly Н
reduced. If politically, there is less motivation for West Europe to Н
always toe the United States in international affairs, economically Н
increasing frictions are to be expected.  Thus the sphere of influence Н
which used to be most reliable has become uncertain and its boundary Н
has Н
blurred. This means that the region which the United States used to Н
take for granted is going to tax more on its attention and energy from Н
now on.$

     East and Southeast Asia is the region from which the United Н
States voluntarily withdrew its forces after the Vietnam war.  The Н
latest example is the close down of U.S. military bases in the Н
Philippines.  However, more serious challenge is confronting the Н
United States there in the economic sense. This is a region that Н
witnesses the most rapid economic growth in recent years and where Н
Japan has more advantage in its competition with the United Н
States, though an economic community with Japan at its core is not Н
likely to realize in the near future. Besides Japan, other newly Н
emerging industrialized countries and areas may also prove to be tough Н
competitors in international trade. In view of the setbacks in Sino-Н
U.S. relations in recent years, many Americans with insight call for a Н
wise handling of China policy on the part of the U.S. government.  One Н
of their arguments is that U.S. has enough trouble elsewhere in the Н
world to afford to be isolated from this thriving region of the West Н
Pacific Rim. Latest development indicates that the Clinton Н
Administration is beginning to attach more importance to this region.$

     Finally, the drastic political changes in East Europe and the Н
C.I.S. and their shift to market economy certainly conform to the Н
interests and wishes of the United States.  But these countries are Н
facing enormous difficulties in the transitional period. With both Н
American and West European forces joined together, it is no more Н
possible to carry out another "Marshall Plan" to help these countries Н
out of their plight.  Besides, the development of these countries is Н
uneven and conditions vary from one to the other.  The United States Н
has to deal with them separately on their own merit, thus adding to Н
the complexity of policy-making. Russia in particular poses a series Н
of dilemma for American policy-makers with its turbulent domestic Н
situation and complicated external relations with other Republics of Н
C.I.S. It will be a country causing much headache for the United Н
States for years to come, though not in the same way as the former Н
Soviet Union.         $

     Economic leverage has been one of the favorite instruments for Н
the United States in its foreign relations.  During the Cold War Н
period it was more effective in certain cases and less in others.  Н
Even then, economic sanction as a means of pressure hardly reached its Н
expected result.  In the present world where economic competition Н
becomes ever more intense while interdependence among nations is also Н
increasing, plus the fact that America no more enjoys visible Н
superiority, the use of economic leverage is more limited and high-НКhanded economic pressure on others can bear boomerang effects.$

     It seems that superior military force remains to be sure assets Н
that the United States can rely upon.  No other country in the world Н
can possibly compete with it and take its place in this aspect.  With Н
the danger of nuclear clash with the former Soviet Union gone, it Н
might be easier for the United States to make decisions when it deems Н
necessary to use force abroad.  Yet, past and present experiences all Н
show that the success rate of direct U.S. military intervention abroad Н
is rather low.  More than often the game was not worth the candle and Н
desired results were not reached despite overwhelming U.S. superiority Н
vis-ид-vis the country or area in case.  Most American leaders have Н
realized that it is easier to send troops abroad than to withdraw at Н
will.  Yet strategic considerations and sense of "leadership" often Н
put the decision-makers in dilemma. As far as domestic public opinion Н
is concerned, while there was consensus on one "enemy" in the past,  Н
there is now no clear line between "friends" and "foes" and Н
consequently it is harder to make justifications for and reach Н
consensus on major military actions, especially when it involves Н
sacrifice on the part of the American people.  The special conditions Н
that enabled the United States to win a quick victory in the Gulf War Н
may not occur again.  Therefore, the superior U.S. military force may Н
not play the role equal to its strength. $

     All the above analysis points to the strength of and constraints Н
on U.S. diplomacy in the new world situation.  On  balance, "Pax Н
Americana" will not be likely.$

#T4IV#t

     Whither, then, goes the U.S. diplomacy?$

     First, the Unites States remains to be a superpower and the Н
awareness that it is the only one whose sphere has gone beyond the Н
"free world" may strengthen its sense of "world leadership." Besides, Н
compelling turbulent events propping up in different parts of the Н
world make it difficult for the United States to remain indifferent.  Н
Whatever criticism the Bush Administration received during the Н
election campaign for its concentration on foreign affairs, any Н
successive administration cannot return to isolationism.  Despite his Н
promises and indeed, real intention to give priority to domestic Н
affairs, President Clinton after taking office has found himself busy Н
in coping with knotty crisis far away from home.  At a time when different Н
forces in the world are undergoing a process of change and Н
realignment, the United States naturally wants to exercise influence Н
on the course of events in the shaping of a new world order whatever Н
the term implies. In March 1992, American news media made public a Н
classified Pentagon paper prepared in February which is a memorandum Н
intended to help "set the nation's direction for the next century." Н
The paper calls for concerted efforts to preserve American global Н
military supremacy and to thwart the emergence of a rival superpower Н
in Europe, Asia or the former Soviet Union.  According to the paper, Н
the central strategy is to establish and protect a new order that Н
accounts sufficiently for the interests of the advanced industrial Н
nations to discourage them from challenging the U.S. leadership, while НКat the same time maintaining a military dominance capable of deterring Н
potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or Н
global role.#+[8]_  This document caused a strong repercussion both at Н
home and abroad and was regarded as a proof of American ambition for Н
hegemonism for which the American people are not prepared and which Н
justifies the worry and fear of other nations in the world.  In April, Н
another draft approved by the Secretary of Defense was leaked to the Н
news media.  Without changing the essence of the general goal, the Н
tone is more moderate than the first one.  The most important Н
change is that the new document stresses the need to take joint action Н
with allied and friendly nations rather than going it alone.#+[9]_  The Н
two documents may reflect the two tendencies within the policy-making Н
circles which used to be described as "hawk" and "dove." The Н
difference lies in means and tactics, while the overall goal that the Н
United States should remain the only superpower is unchanged.$

     To assume world leadership, the first priority for the United Н
States is still to maintain close relationship with its European Н
allies, though the original target that the alliance was aimed at has Н
#^changed#^. Thus, NATO is to be maintained and, together with other Н
arrangements like the European Security Conference and G-7 Summit Н
Conference, provides proper occasions for coordination.  In Н
international organizations like the UNO, IMF, World Bank, GATT, etc., Н
it is still the usual practice for the United States to seek agreement Н
first with European allies and Japan before taking a formal stand on Н
major issues.  This is an invisible loose alliance which is going to Н
function for a considerable time to come.  Since the allies are no Н
more obliged to comply with the U.S. wishes as before, the latter has Н
to be more considerate of and show more respect to their opinion and Н
interests.  Hence the need for more negotiations and coordination. Н
This is why President Bush put emphasis on "multilateralism" as Н
different from President Reagan's "unilateralism."$

     Militarily, massive disarmament is not to be expected.  The Н
United States may feel necessary to maintain a powerful military force Н
way ahead of any other country in a post-cold war world full of Н
unpredictable conflicts.  Because the "enemy" is not so certain and Н
hot spots are scattered, readjustment in deployment and in the Н
development of different species of arms are inevitable.  The emphasis Н
has changed from intensive arms race with the former Soviet Union in Н
the past to exercising pressure to enforce nuclear nonproliferation Н
and control of arms sales by other countries.  In case of arms Н
intervention abroad, shared burden by other countries will be urged Н
increasingly.$

     Economically, both American government and people are keenly Н
aware of the weakening of U.S. competitiveness internationally.  Н
Therefore, to reinforce and revitalize its economy will be the core of Н
government policy.  While in principle, the United States always Н
stands for free economy, protectionist measures will not be excluded Н
in practice depending upon the situation.  But main efforts will be Н
made to pressure other countries out of their policies which the Н
United States regards as protectionist.  In face of the tendency of Н
regionalization and the forming of economic zones, it continues to Н
strive to maintain an integrated world market.  Meanwhile, НКit is also making its own regional arrangement in the form of NAFTA.  Н
If successful, NAFTA will provide the United States with a reliable Н
base to lean on in its competition with other regions and give it more Н
leeway.  But it will be wrong to draw the conclusion that the United Н
States is preparing to retreat to the Americas.$

     Currently, the strong point of the United States, or, the aspect Н
in which it has the greatest self-confidence is in the ideological and Н
cultural field.  Here it will continue to take an offensive posture.  Н
Moreover, traditionally the Democratic Party takes pride in its Н
emphasis on "human rights" diplomacy.  It is to be expected that for a Н
certain time to come, the United States while carrying out pragmatic Н
foreign policies in the main will stress the principle of "human Н
rights" and promote American values of freedom and democracy.  In Н
reality, however, there is limitations to the validity of these Н
principles, so in dealing with different countries double or multiple-Н
standards will be employed. 
The region where the United States is to meet with greatest Н
frustration in this respect is the Middle East.  Apart from other Н
causes, Islamic fundamentalism is an important factor for the troubles Н
America constantly encounters.  There, the U.S. "human rights" Н
diplomacy is impotent and it has to be highly pragmatic in its Н
policies.$

     In sum, while the United States is undoubtedly changing and Н
readjusting its strategy as well as specific policies to cope with the Н
drastically changing world, there will be more continuity than  Н
variability in its foreign policy thinking which is deep-rooted in  Н
historical tradition and formed by its postwar superpower status,  and Н
also in the basis for policy-making and mode of behavior guided by Н
this thinking. However the degree of success or failure of the U.Н
S. diplomacy in the decades to come will depend upon its sensitiveness Н
to the reality of the outside world and its ability to readjust its Н
thinking and behavior  in conformity with this reality.$
$    
#T4NOTES#t
##[D1J100P80]
_#+[1]_
Winston S. Churchill, #FKThe Second World War,#FS_ Vol.12, #FKTriumph and Н
Tragedy,#FS_ Cassel гж Company, London, 1964, p.29.$
_#+[2]_
Charles E. Bohlen, #FKWitness to History (1929-1969),#FS_ W.W. Н
Norton гж Company, Inc., p.182.$
_#+[3]_
Churchill, op.cit., p.29$
_#+[4]_
Herbert Feis, #FKChurchill, Roosevelt, Stalin, The War They Waged and Н
the Peace They Sought,#FS_ Princeton University Press, 1957, p.557.$
_#+[5]_
Arthur Schleisinger, #FKDynamics of World Power,#FS_ Vol. II, Н
p.191.$
_#+[6]_
#FKNew York Times,#FS_ May 7, 1992, p.A1.$
_#+[7]_
Arnold Toynbee, #FKAmerica and the World Revolution,#FS_ London, Oxford НКUniversity Press, 1962, pp.29-30; Ronald Steel, #FKPax Americana,#FS_ The Н
Viking Press, New York, 1967, p.17.$
_#+[8]_
#FKThe Washington Post,#FS_ March 11, 1992, p.Al.$
_#+[9]_
#FKIbid.,#FS_ May 24, 1991, p.Al.$#E