#?
#P[80]&#A*FAmerican^ Studies^ in^ China^ #FKVol.2#FS,^ 1995/_@#a$#P[100]
#J[-100]
#T3U.S. POLICY TOWARD CHINA:$
CONTAINMENT OR ENGAGEMENT?#t
#T4WANG Jisi#t
Since the end of the Cold War, Sino-American relations have been Н
characterized by recurrent crises. Time and again, American actions Н
triggered strong Chinese reaction and indignation. The latest of such Н
incidents happened when the White House decided in May 1995 to allow Н
Taiwan's Lee Teng-hui to visit the United States. In the few months Н
thereafter, the official relationship between Beijing and Washington Н
was at the lowest ebb after they established diplomatic relations in Н
1979.$
Suffice it to mention a few U.S. actions that indicate its attitude Н
toward China in the post-Cold War era. Following the Tiananmen Н
incident of 1989, Washington applied various sanctions against Н
Beijing. During the U.S. presidential election in 1992, President Н
George Bush announced the decision to sell F-16 fighters to Taiwan. In Н
1993, the controversy over China's Most Favored Nation (MFN) status Н
culminated in President Bill Clinton's declaration that the extension Н
of MFN would be conditioned on China's "human rights record." American Н
sanctions have been taken or threatened against China for its alleged Н
violations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Missile Н
Technology Control Regime (MTCR), or intellectual property rights. Н
Washington has set stringent conditions for China's reentry into the Н
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its membership of Н
the World Trade Organization (WTO). Since early 1995, an increasing Н
number of American politicians and media have directed their Н
criticisms against China's domestic and international behavior and Н
called for further American endeavors to "contain" what they see as an Н
emerging "threat."$

Meanwhile, in recent years American policy makers have recognized the Н
necessity of maintaining a working relationship with the People's Н
Republic of China. For its own strategic and economic interests, Н
Washington had to lift gradually its sanctions after Tiananmen and Н
restore high-level official contacts and military ties with Beijing. Н
In November 1993, Chinese President Jiang Zemin and President Clinton Н
held in Seattle the first summit meeting between the two governments Н
after the icy period. In June 1994, President Clinton stated that his Н
administration would delink China's MFN from the human rights issue. Н
On October 24, 1995, at the Sino-U.S. summit meeting in New York, Н
Clinton reassured Jiang Zemin explicitly that the United States seeks Н
engagement with China, not containment.#+[1] Despite the strains in Н
their bilateral relationship over the years, Sino-American trade and Н
American investment in China have been soaring. The two governments Н
have maintained effective cooperation over such issues as Asian Н
security, ecology, drug trafficking, and epidemic diseases. Н
Scientific, educational, and cultural ties have been steadily Н
strengthened. As a matter of fact, in great contrast to the official Н
difficulties, the depth and scope of interaction between the two Н
societies in the 1990s have exceeded those in the 1980s and continue Н
to move forward.$
#M1U.S. Policy Toward China: Containment or Engagement?#mК#M2American Studies in China#m
The attempts to keep high pressure on China and the needs to seek Н
cooperation with it combine to shape the dual character of post-Cold Н
War U.S. policy toward China. On the one hand, high pressure and Н
cooperation contend for primacy. The inner tensions between them are Н
reflected in the inconsistency and vacillation of policy making and Н
implementation. On the other hand, the pressure is exerted in the Н
course of keeping China engaged with the United States. Restraining Н
China's behavior and seeking its collaboration are not mutually Н
exclusive. To this extent, the duality itself provides certain degree Н
of consistency in U.S. policy. This article is intended to analyze Н
U.S. China policy by explaining this duality and looking at its Н
domestic and international backgrounds.$
#T4I#t
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the great change in the former Н
Soviet bloc deprived the United States of the central target of its Н
global strategy. During the Gulf War of 1991, President Bush Н
verbalized a lot of rhetoric about "the new world order" under Н
American leadership. But the invocation quieted down as quickly as it Н
had been voiced. Washington had failed to articulate a new foreign Н
policy doctrine until National Security Adviser Anthony Lake stated in Н
September 1993 that "the successor to a doctrine of containment must Н
be a strategy of enlargement, the enlargement of the world's free Н
community of market democracies."#+[2] After several revisions, the Н
"strategy of enlargement" has been refined as the "strategy of Н
engagement and enlargement," which is articulated in the February 1995 Н
White House report, #FKNational Security Strategy of the United Н
States#FS.$
"Engagement" in this strategy refers mainly to the maintenance of U.S. Н
military capabilities to intervene in regional conflicts overseas, the Н
sustainment of its present security alliances, and the expansion of Н
overseas markets in order to promote prosperity at home. "Enlargement" Н
means "enlarging the community of democratic and free market Н
nations."#+[3] Putting these two concepts together, this strategy is Н
but another way of elaborating the three foreign policy objectives the Н
United States wants to achieve in the post-Cold War era, i.e., Н
bolstering American economic prosperity, enhancing security, and Н
promoting human rights and democracy in the world.$
From the "strategy of containment" in the Cold War years to the Н
"strategy of engagement and enlargement" in the post-Cold War era, the Н
unchangeable objective pronounced by American policy makers has been Н
the safeguarding of American national interest and the assumption of Н
global leadership. The most important distinction between the two is Н
that the Cold War strategy had a superpower -- the Soviet Union -- as Н
America's archenemy to be contained,#+[4] whereas the new strategy has Н
not designated any great power as America's rival. The open official Н
documents all point to regional conflicts, proliferation of weapons of Н
massive destruction, extreme nationalism, international terrorism, Н
drug trafficking, deterioration of natural environment, population Н
explosion, increasing numbers of refugees, etc., as threats to Н
America's strategic and economic security.$
The 1995 report on U.S. national security strategy pronounces that Н
America's "relations with the other great powers are as constructive Н
as at any point in this century."#+[5] This is probably a fair Н
statement. However, do all Americans believe that the United States НКwants no enemy among great powers? Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., a Н
leading American historian, noted in 1993:$
$
#FF#G[2]#G[-2]
Some say that Americans need an enemy to give focus and coherence to Н
foreign policy. Americans had Germany as the enemy in two world wars, Н
then the Soviet Union as the enemy in the Cold War. Who will be the Н
designated enemy now? Some nominate Japan; some nominate Islamic Н
fundamentalism; in due course other potential enemies will no doubt be Н
proclaimed.#FS#+[6]$
$
Unfortunately, some Americans now have proclaimed China as the actual Н
or potential enemy that could "give focus and coherence to foreign Н
policy." Especially in 1995, a number of noted American politicians Н
and journalists are directing their accusations at China. An article Н
carried by #FKTime#FS,_ an influential American magazine, argues that Н
"any rational policy toward a rising, threatening China" would need Н
two components. The first is to contain China by building relations Н
with China's neighbors, among them Vietnam, India, Japan, and Russia. Н
The second is to undermine China's "aggressively dictatorial regime" Н
by supporting "such dissidents as Harry Wu." The article contends that Н
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord lied when he insisted Н
that U.S. China policy was one of engagement not one of Н
containment.#+[7]$
Indeed, Mr. Lord and other American government officials frequently Н
and vehemently denies that America is trying to contain China, as the Н
essayist for #FKTime#FS_ notes. At the same time, Winston Lord himself Н
publicly warned in June 1995 that "the United States hoped to improve Н
its relations with China, but the possibility of the two countries Н
becoming long-term adversaries could not be ruled out, and the United Н
States might have to turn, with other Western countries, to a policy Н
of containment."#+[8]$
An actual or potential policy of containing China would be based on Н
the assumption that China is posing, or would become, a strategic Н
threat to the United States. In retrospect, China was not viewed as a Н
threat when the Cold War just ended in 1989-91. At that time, many Н
American observers held the illusion that China would follow the#OН
&Soviet Union to undergo dramatic political changes. Some even Н
predicted that the Chinese communist regime would soon collapse. When Н
these illusions are by and large cast away in the recent two or three Н
years, a variety of themes on which the "China threat" perception is Н
built have come to the fore in American political, media, and academic Н
circles. The following are a few salient rationales:$
--China continues to be ruled by a "repressive regime" that by nature Н
is hostile to American interests. One popular notion in the United Н
States is that "democracies do not go to war with each other," and Н
that China as an authoritarian state is likely to have a conflictive Н
relationship with the United States.$
--As a rapidly rising regional power, China is bound to challenge the Н
existing regional and global order and would not willingly accept the Н
international norms and regimes originally established by Western Н
powers. Regardless of any political transformation China may Н
experience, it will destabilize the international status quo that the Н
United States is trying to preserve.$
--China will become a major economic rival of the United States in the НКnear future. China has already enjoyed a large trade surplus with the Н
United States. It may continue to conduct a policy of economic Н
nationalism or neo-mercantilism that promotes exports and restrict Н
imports. Combining its low-cost labor with imported high-tech skills, Н
China will produce and export to the United States a wide range of Н
manufactured goods at the expense of American producers. In this Н
sense, China will become a "second Japan" with lower labor costs. In Н
addition, the Chinese mainland's economy is boosted by investors from Н
Taiwan and Hong Kong. Such a "Greater China" may constitute a greater Н
economic challenge to the United States.$
--China's Confucianism and its current political culture may reinforce Н
the radical tendencies in the Islamic world in a joint effort to Н
resist the Western civilization. Such a "clash of civilizations" will Н
threaten global stability.$
--With a larger military budget and stronger force projection Н
capabilities, China is becoming a menace to its smaller neighbors. Н
Some refer to the territorial disputes over the South China Sea Н
islands with the fear that China may use military forces to solve Н
these problems. Some others denounce the PRC for planning to settle Н
the Taiwan issue by military means and thus threatening regional Н
peace.$
All these assertions tend to mislead policy and reinforce 
calls for a strategy of containing China. To varying degrees, they Н
misrepresent Chinese realities and misconstrue Chinese actions. Н
Nonetheless, these arguments also reflect an important and inescapable Н
reality: The United States and China do have fundamental differences Н
in some areas where their respective vital interests rest. With the Н
disappearance of the Soviet threat, an overarching rationale for the Н
two countries to cooperate with each other is still lacking. All the Н
three U.S. foreign policy objectives in the post-Cold War era Н
mentioned above involve China in negative terms and will place China Н
under strong U.S. pressures.$
With the growth of its economic, political, and military power, China Н
will certainly assume a more important role in world affairs. American Н
suspicions of China's intentions and concerns about its behavior are Н
likely to deepen. In this context, proposals for changing the current Н
policy toward China into one of containment could in due course be Н
more appealing to America's political elite and general public. Should Н
U.S. policy move into that direction, it could lead to a period of Н
serious and protracted tension between the two countries.$
#T4II#t
After the Clinton administration enunciated the policy of engagement Н
with China in September 1993, whenever there was a crisis in the Н
bilateral relationship, high-ranking American officials would come out Н
to clarify this policy by reiterating that the United States wanted Н
comprehensive or constructive engagement with China, and that a Н
strong, prosperous, stable, and open China was in the national Н
interest of the United States.$
Seen objectively, the policy of engagement embodies two strategic Н
goals of the United States. First, the United States must seek a Н
cooperative relationship with China to deal with many regional and Н
global issues. This relationship has to be built on the maintenance of Н
engaging the Chinese government at all levels and in broadened fields. Н
After the Tiananmen incident of 1989, the first step of American Н
sanctions against Beijing was to suspend high-level official contacts, НКand the first step to lift the sanctions was to resume these contacts. Н
To carry out a policy of engagement implies that the Clinton Н
administration has admitted the failure of refusing to talk to Chinese Н
leaders. It also implies that Washington has accepted China's enhanced Н
status as a great power and the legal authority of the Beijing Н
leadership. Simply put, the policy of engagement is a reversal and Н
denial of the earlier American practices of isolating the Chinese Н
government.$
Another goal of American policy toward China is to influence Chinese Н
domestic and international policies, making them more favorable to Н
U.S. interests. This goal would presumably be reached more effectively Н
by means of engaging China extensively. The more deeply American Н
influences penetrate into Chinese society, the more instruments the Н
Americans could employ to restrain Chinese behavior.$
The best illustration of this point is probably the explanation given Н
by U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry. He specified four reasons Н
for engaging China, especially the Chinese military: First, security Н
engagement would help the Americans influence China policies with Н
regard to the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Second, Н
engagement provides "opportunity to influence China to play a positive Н
role in regional instability such as that on the Korean peninsula." Н
Third, engagement opens lines of communication to the People's Н
Liberation Army (PLA), a major player in Chinese politics. Fourth, by Н
engaging PLA directly, the Americans could promote more openness in Н
the Chinese national security apparatus, including the military Н
institutions.#+[9]$
In the 1950s and 1960s, U.S. policy toward China could be defined as Н
one of "comprehensive containment," implemented by way of political Н
isolation, economical blockade, strategic encirclement, and, on some Н
occasions like the Korean War, military confrontation. During that Н
period, official contact between the two countries was minimized. As a Н
result, American influences on China's social life and domestic Н
politics were minimal. American policy makers today realize very well Н
that such a state of relations is neither desirable nor feasible. Only Н
American encouragement of China's integration into the international Н
system and American involvement in China's economic development can Н
American economic interests and political influences be maximized. Н
Even in the area of human rights where the two sides seem to hold the Н
greatest contentious positions, the Americans still want to keep China Н
engaged. As President Bill Clinton explained in 1994 when he defended Н
his decision to delink the human rights issue from MFN, "we must Н
pursue our human-rights agenda with China in a way that does not Н
isolate China. We can't help change human rights in China if we're not Н
there."#+[10]$
The concept of engagement with China is thus more than simply actions Н
of exchanging visits and negotiating with the Chinese.#+[11] It is by Н
no means a friendly gesture by itself. According to U.S. Secretary of Н
Defense William Perry, "We do not choose engagement as a favor to Н
China."#+[12]$ 
The implementation of a policy of engagement will by no means Н
necessarily bring about more harmony in the bilateral relationship. On Н
the contrary, more extensive engagement is likely to create more Н
frictions. In recent years, the two government have been interacting Н
in an unprecedentedly wider range of issue areas, which include trade, Н
investment, educational and cultural exchanges, nuclear НКnonproliferation, arms sales, human rights, construction of legal Н
system, immigration, anti-terrorist measures, drug trafficking Н
control, environment protection, technological transfer, intellectual Н
property rights, and epidemic diseases control. Cooperation and Н
dialogues at unofficial levels have an even broader agenda. As issue Н
areas increase, chances for friction increase accordingly. To use a Н
metaphor, the Americans now have more gears to interlock Chinese Н
gears. They attempt to make these two sets of gear wheels engage more Н
closely. Common interests of the two countries serve as the Н
lubricating oil. But when the Americans drive their gears hard without Н
taking enough consideration of Chinese interests and sensitivities, Н
tensions will certainly rise.$
Since the announcement of U.S. strategy of engagement, American Н
pressures on China in almost all the crucial issue areas, including Н
trade, security, human rights, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Tibet, have Н
increased. This policy has not restrained the Americans from demanding Н
an exorbitant price in the negotiations concerning China's entry into Н
GATT and WTO, from strengthening the U.S.-Japan security alliance and Н
making efforts in China's neighboring countries that are seen as Н
checking Chinese influence and power, from continuing arms sales to Н
Taiwan and upgrading U.S.-Taiwan relations, or from fervently Н
reproaching China in the international fora for human rights Н
violations.$
That a strong, stable, prosperous, and open China is in the interest Н
of the United States is a wise judgment of the reality. However, some Н
of the American actions in the past few years have led the Chinese to Н
question the sincerity of these vocalized American intentions. In Н
particular, whether the United States really welcomes a stronger China Н
under the current communist leadership is very doubtful. The Americans Н
could accept a stronger China only if it were regarded as acting, in Н
Secretary Perry's words, "as a responsible member of the international Н
community,"#+[13] i.e., if it behaved in accordance with the Н
international norms and regimes favorable to the United States. It is Н
a more honest statement that "a strong China will inevitably present Н
major challenges to the United States and the rest of the Н
international system," and that "China is likely to act constructively Н
in the future if it is secure, cohesive, reform-oriented, modernizing, Н
stable, open to the outside world, and able to deal effectively with Н
its problems."#+[14]$
As Winston Lord admitted, "the challenge we face is to assure that as Н
China develops as a global actor, it does so constructively, as a Н
country integrated into international institutions and committed to Н
practices enshrined in international law."#+[15]  The real challenge Н
here is: What the United States will do if China does not act Н
"constructively" according to American standards?$
#T4III#t
A sound judgment of the direction of U.S. China policy must take into Н
consideration U.S. foreign relations in the post-Cold War world as a Н
whole as well as the domestic sources of U.S. foreign policy.$
In the next one to two decades at least, the United States will remain Н
the single superpower in the world. Contrary to some earlier Н
predictions, neither Japan nor Germany is remarkably narrowing its gap Н
with America in terms of economic and technological capacity. The Н
United States will also be the only nation capable of wielding Н
military power and political influence on every corner of the globe.$КHowever, the ability of the United States to intervene in the affairs Н
of other states is serious hampered by the absence of widely agreed Н
organizing principles for its global strategy. Global changes have Н
undoubtedly complicated the conceiving and conducting of American Н
foreign policy. The public is motivated by a pervasive sense that Н
domestic problems warrant the bulk of America's energies. Economic Н
interests, regional peace and stability, traditional security concerns Н
like nuclear nonproliferation and arms control, and human rights Н
considerations are vying for priority on the foreign policy agenda. Н
The Clinton administration has announced that bolstering America's Н
economic prosperity should be the number one objective in foreign Н
relations. But how this is translated into practice is often Н
problematic and controversial. Moreover, global issues like Н
environment, narcotics, and terrorism are becoming increasingly Н
prominent on American foreign policy agenda.$
This absence of policy focus is accompanied by the confusion in Н
America's foreign policy decision-making. President Bill Clinton's Н
leadership style, his dubious popularity, and the Republicans' Н
landslide in the 1994 midterm elections have contributed to the Н
weakening of presidential authority over foreign policy vis-a-vis a Н
more assertive Congress. Meanwhile, divisions within the Congress are Н
no less conspicuous than those between the Capitol Hill and the White Н
House. The net result is that domestic support for foreign endeavors Н
is contradictory, weak, and growing weaker.$
Within the administration, much disorder is observed as to "who makes Н
policy." As foreign policy issue areas are increasingly diversified, Н
decision-making mechanisms are more complicated than ever before. Н
Officials in charge of special issue areas such as nonproliferation Н
and human rights are taking power from those who deal with Н
geographical regions and individual countries.$
In addition, a variety of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and Н
interest groups at federal, state, and local levels are exerting Н
stronger influences on foreign affairs. What is called the Н
"globalization of American society" has localized its international Н
connections and concerns.$
The lack of focus and coherence in America's foreign policy forebodes Н
a diminishing role for it to play in world affairs. More Н
fundamentally, chronic domestic problems such as ethnic tensions, Н
social decay, immorality, distrust of government, and crimes are Н
eroding the edifice of American society within and damaging its image Н
without. American official rhetoric aside, the United States is unable Н
to assume the role of world leadership and arbitrator, even if the Н
other peoples were willing to accept it, which they are most unlikely Н
to do.$
Under these circumstances, two general observations can be made about Н
U.S. policy toward China. First, the American leadership is not in a Н
position to mobilize its domestic resources for going into a Н
confrontation with such a large country as the People's Republic of Н
China. This is true not only because of the domestic constraints Н
discussed above, but also because there are more serious challenges to Н
American security around the globe than those ostensibly from China. Н
Political instabilities and ethnic conflicts in the former Soviet Н
Union, former Yugoslavia, and the Middle East are attracting the major Н
attention and need more urgent action in American diplomacy.$
Second, domestic complications will certainly make a stronger impact НКon U.S. China policy. As the United States and China are engaged with Н
each other more extensively, an increasingly number of American Н
political, economic, and social institutions are involved directly or Н
indirectly in the decision-making process of China policy. On the Н
positive side of the constellation, the bulk of American participants Н
in Sino-American cooperation and exchanges tend to realize the Н
importance of this relationship and will oppose policy scenarios for Н
isolating or containing China. Many American entrepreneurs, educators, Н
scientists, and other professionals now have their own interest in Н
promoting a constructive relationship with China. One classic example Н
in this regard was the positive role played by American business Н
circles in the extension of China's MFN status. They had the tacit Н
support from leaders in U.S. Department of Commerce and Department of Н
Finance.$
However, the domestic input of China policy is on balance harmful to Н
the bilateral relationship, at least in the short run. Take a look at Н
the Congressional Record and one can find far more negative remarks Н
than positive ones on the PRC made by U.S. congressmen since the Н
1970s.#+[16] Since 1989, an even more negative image of China has been Н
portrayed in Congress. The Republican control of both chambers of Н
Congress that resulted from the 1994 midterm elections is certain to Н
aggravate institutional friction between the legislature and the Н
executive regarding China policy, especially as a few Republican Н
leaders with hostile attitude toward Beijing are taking charge of the Н
foreign relations of Congress. Their interference in China policy has Н
already been considerable. For instance, the attitude of Congress was Н
the decisive domestic factor that drove the Clinton administration to Н
allow Lee Teng-hui's visit.$
The resurgence of conservatism in American domestic politics is also Н
contributing to the difficulties in U.S.-China relations. Narrow-Н
minded nationalistic sentiments are reflected in American media and Н
find their outlet in China-bashing articles. Conservatives with Н
ideological zeal make assaults on China in order to earn political Н
credits. Right-wing religious forces criticize China's policy toward Н
religions in an effort to advocate "religious freedom" in China and Н
encourage the Dalai Lama's political activities regarding Tibet. Н
China's birth-control practice is singled out as a target for those Н
anti-abortion groups. Although the "neo-isolationist" elements tend to Н
curb America's overreached international commitments, they may give Н
rise to trade protectionism against China, and their attitudes toward Н
immigration policy and multiculturalism might have unfavorable Н
implications for U.S.-China relations as well.$
On balance, the current political atmosphere in the United States and Н
the social trends underneath it make it fashionable for Americans to Н
charge China with various actions of "wrongdoing." Meanwhile, those Н
who provide objective and sober-minded assessments of China as well as Н
policy proposals based on long-term American interests find themselves Н
depressed, unpopular with the press, and in a difficult position to Н
get their voices heard.$
The domestic determinants add inconsistency and unpredictability to Н
U.S. China policy. During the presidential election campaigns in 1996, Н
partizan struggles and legislature-executive tensions may become Н
acuter. Clamors about "the China problem" might be more assertive. As Н
a result, relations with China could be neglected or sacrificed in the Н
Clinton administration's political calculation and bargaining, НКalthough the China issue is unlikely to be a central issue on Н
America's political agenda.$
#T4IV#t
Post-Cold War U.S. policy toward China has experienced several years Н
of readjustment at various levels of government. Governmental and Н
nongovernmental institutions in the Unite States have also produced a Н
number of reports to reevaluate its China policy. With understandable Н
reasons, some people argue that the United States has not yet Н
formulated a clear-cut policy or strategy toward China. However, if Н
"policy" is defined as a set of general principles which guide Н
government action rather than being defined as a strand of consistent Н
political activities, three features or principles can be discerned in Н
Washington's present policy toward Chinas. First, the mainstream of Н
policy is to engage China in international affairs, not to isolate it. Н
Second, the United States must seek Chinese cooperation to promote its Н
strategic and economic interests. Third, the United States is exerting Н
measured but heavier pressures on China in order to persuade or force Н
China to accept the international norms and values championed by the Н
Americans.$
American policy makers have generally concluded that long-term change Н
in China in its present direction will favor American interests. But Н
American China-watchers hold divergent views in assessing China's Н
political future. As a result, Washington is also making preparations Н
for dealing with other possible situations in China. Looking ahead, Н
the Americans are likely to express more concerns about the growing Н
Chinese power and harbor more suspicions of Chinese behavior. The Н
United States may take advantage of its status as the only superpower Н
to coordinate multilateral international endeavors to restrain China. Н
The elements of containing or deterring China in American policy are Н
gaining importance and spreading out in American political circles, Н
although the U.S. government may never openly declare a policy of Н
containment.$
Nonetheless, American efforts to deter China are seriously impeded by Н
domestic and international factors. The U.S. government remains Н
preoccupied with domestic tasks. American economic stake and Н
opportunity in China have been so great that the cost of disruption Н
with China for political reasons would be almost unbearable. Moreover, Н
to cite William Perry, other Asian-Pacific nations like Japan, South Н
Korea, the Philippines, and Australia, "are extremely unlikely to join Н
(the United States) in a containment policy, leading to a rupture in Н
(American) regional alliances."#+[17]$
The future relationship between China and the United States will Н
continue to be characterized by a mixture of cooperation and friction, Н
a combination of compromise and dispute, and an alternation between Н
relaxation and tension. Resurgent crises without total rupture are Н
likely to become the normalcy of Sino-American relations.$
The maintenance of regional peace and order in Asia depends largely on Н
whether United States and China will be able to avoid confrontation. Н
It would not be in China's interest to have the only remaining Н
superpower as its enemy. In turn, as historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. Н
argues, "the search for a new enemy cannot save Americans from the Н
much harder job of rethinking the U.S. role in the new era."#+[18] A Н
hostile American attitude toward China would be bound to backfire and Н
make it impossible to secure Chinese cooperation on any of the global Н
issues. Only a unified and effectively governed China can fulfil the Н
commitments that the United States wants from it.$К#T4NOTES#t
##[D1J100P80]
_#+[1]_
"Clinton-Jiang Meeting Was `Significant Step Forward'," Transcript Н
of a White House Briefing by Winston Lord and Robert Suettinger on Н
October 24, 1995, circulated by U.S. Embassy in Beijing, p. 12.$
_#+[2]_
Cited in Richard N. Haass, "Paradigm Lost," #FKForeign Affairs#FS_, Н
Vol. 74, No. 1, January/February 1995, p. 44.$
_#+[3]_
The White House,  #FKA National Security Strategy of Engagement and Н
Enlargement#FS,_ February 1995, p. 22.$
_#+[4]_
One should be reminded that from the founding of the PRC in 1949 to Н
the early 1970s China was also a state to be contained by the United Н
States.$
_#+[5]_
Ibid, p. 1.$
_#+[6]_
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "America's Role in the Post-Cold War Н
World," #FKThe World Almanac 1994#FS,_ Mahwah, N.J.: FunkгжWagnalls, Н
1993, p. 31.$
_#+[7]_
Charles Krauthammer, "Why We Must Contain China," #FKTime#FS,_ July Н
31, 1995, p. 72.$
_#+[8]_
Cited in David Shambaugh, "The United States and China: A New Cold Н
War?", #FKCurrent History#FS,_ September 1995, p. 245.$
_#+[9]_
William Perry, "Engagement Is Neither Containment Nor Appeasement," Н
Transcript on October 30, 1995, of Perry's remarks at the China Н
Relations Council in Seattle, Washington, provided by the U.S. Embassy Н
in Beijing, pp. 3-4.$
_#+[10]_
Bill Clinton, "Isolating China Wouldn't Improve Human Rights," Н
#FKLos Angeles Times#FS,_ May 31, 1994.$
_#+[11]_
There is no accurate Chinese translation of the word "engagement." Н
The commonly used translations are #FKjiechu#FS,_ which means contact, Н
and #FKjiaowang#FS,_ which means interaction. The more active meaning Н
of "involving" or "drawing into" is missed out in the translations.$
_#+[12]_
Perry speech, op. cit., p. 3.$
_#+[13]_Perry speech, op. cit., p. 2.$
_#+[14]_Kenneth Lieberthal, "A New China Strategy," #FKForeign Н
Affairs#FS,_ Vol. 74, No. 6, November/December 1995, p. 3.$
_#+[15]_Winston Lord and Joseph Nye, "Engagement with China Will Aid Н
Regional Security," Transcript on October 11, USIA Wireless File, Н
October 13, 1995, p. 2.$
_#+[16]_For an analysis of U.S. congressional attitude toward China in Н
1979-1989, see Zhang Yi, "U.S. Congress and Sino-U.S. Relations in the Н
Last Decade," in the Institute of American Studies, Chinese Academy of Н
Social Sciences, ed., #FKTen Years of Sino-U.S. Relations#FS,_ Н
Nanjing: Yilin Press, 1990, pp. 168-197.$
_#+[17]_Perry, op. cit., p. 5.$К_#+[18]_Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 31.$#E