#?
#P[80]&#A*FAmerican^ Studies^ in^ China^ #FKVol.2#FS,^ 1995/_@#a$#P[100]
#J[-100]
#T3THE ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC$
COOPERATION: CONCEPTIONS, CONDITIONS$
AND RELATIONS AMONG BIG POWERS#t
#T4WANG Yizhou#t
#T4I. Some Notions of the Asia-Pacific Cooperation#t
The Chinese sayings "Sleeping in the same bed but dreaming different Н
dreams" and "Different approaches contributing to the same end" can be Н
used to describe the Asia-Pacific cooperation. The countries around Н
the Pacific Ocean, due to difference in interests, have diverse Н
understanding and explanation of this cooperation while acknowledging Н
the necessity for collaboration. Most of them are contemplating or Н
formulating the plan for cooperation mainly to promote their own Н
economic development and advance their own interests. Here, I have Н
categorized such cooperation into four modes according to the stands Н
various countries have taken and the statements they have made. The Н
terms used are entirely my own induction.$
1. The "Butterfly Mode" of the United States:#+[1]$
With the disintegration of the former Soviet Union, the United States Н
has become the only superpower in the contemporary world. Its position Н
of strength decides that it will "look at the pot while eating at the Н
bowl," stretching its hands farther than any other country. The main Н
expression of this stance in the new period is, as I have put it, the Н
"butterfly" strategy. The "butterfly" has North America for its head, Н
the United States for its central nervous system, the North America Н
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) made up of the United States, Canada and Н
Mexico for the extension of its head and the Central and South America Н
for its body. The schemed "America Free Trade Area" will be the chief Н
force it relies on to contend with Japan and the European Community in Н
this age of regionalization. It will take flight with its wings, Н
Europe and the Asia-Pacific region, when it has grown strong enough. Н
That is to say, the United States, treasuring its cultural origin and Н
sentiments as well as the traditional political, economic and Н
diplomatic interests, will never sever its close ties with Europe. It Н
can not be imagined that the United States will withdraw from NATO and Н
the European security system it has created and controlled, especially Н
when the Russian bear may still extend its sphere of influence to Н
Middle and North Europe. Neither can it be conceived that US Н
corporations will willingly leave Europe, which boast the highest Н
productivity, the most skilled labor and the most identical cultural Н
psychology, and which has brought it, consequently, the greatest Н
returns. But on the other hand, the future of the United States lies Н
in the Asia-Pacific region, and, following the conclusion of the bi-Н
polar confrontation, it has to shift the center of its strategy to Н
revitalizing its domestic economy, set a greater store by the geo-Н
economy, seize the "vantage point" of science and technology and Н
partake the economic boom in the Asia-Pacific region. In the final Н
analysis, the "butterfly mode" proves a deep-rooted mentality of the Н
Americans: only the "big brother" has the right, need and ability to Н
"derive equal profit" in the contemporary world.$
#M1The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation#m
#M2American Studies in China#m
The new blueprint of the US Asia-Pacific strategy is based on this НКvery mode. This scheme, a correspondent of its European strategy, Н
consists mainly of three points: 1. Establishing an "open" (to the Н
United States, in essence) "Asia-Pacific economic and trade system" or Н
a "framework of Asia-Pacific integration." The system will use APEC as Н
its main arena of operation and NAFTA as its model. In other words, Н
the new Asia-Pacific trade system should be an expansion and extension Н
of the North America trade system. The United States is deadly against Н
any Asian or West Pacific regional economic body that closes its door Н
to it, no matter who is at its core and what form it takes. 2. Setting Н
up a "flexible and powerful regional security organization." The US Н
military presence in the Asia-Pacific region, #^aiming#^_ at containing the Н
former Soviet Union in the past, will play the function of a "balancer Н
in the geo-politics" and "remover of unstable factors" in the region. Н
It will gradually reduce its armed forces in the region in accordance Н
with the principles of having few but better troops, cutting Н
expenditure and ensuring high efficiency, and raise the troops' Н
quality and quick-reaction capability. The original security network Н
and bilateral treaties will be maintained, and Japan and its other Н
allies will be requested to share the defense responsibility and Н
expenditure. New ways will be probed to safeguard security in the Н
Asia-Pacific region, and a "multilateral consultation mechanism" will Н
be formed. 3. Striving to further the tendency of "democratization in Н
the Asian countries." Its purpose is to put an end to "anti-democracy" Н
(in human rights question, for instance) or "imperfect democracy" in Н
the region and enhance the "common values" of the Pacific Community Н
countries. The United States, while shouldering the main Н
responsibility, will urge Japan and other countries to pool their Н
efforts (to link, for instance, the government development loans with Н
the recipient countries' human rights performance or control of Н
military sales).#+[2] Considering the strength the United States Н
possesses, this "butterfly mode" may be the most practical and Н
influential pattern now and in a long period of time to come.$
2. The "Flying Geese Mode" of Japan:$
Unlike the United States, Japan is neither willing nor powerful enough Н
to act as the "global gendarme." (It lacks, particularly, the "soft Н
power" the United States has.) Standing now at the threshold of the Н
twenty-first century, this island country in the northwest of the Н
Pacific with an area of 370,000 square kilometers has every reason to Н
"leave America and join Asia" while maintaining its status of "a Н
member of the West," and to start a "Pacific-rim economic sphere" Н
headed by itself. It has seen clearly that to achieve its objective of Н
becoming a big political power (to be a permanent member of the UN Н
Security Council and take on more international duties, for instance), Н
it must establish itself in Asia and win the trust of the peripheral Н
countries, the "votes" having to come first of all from the region it Н
belongs to. Viewed from the economic angle, the growth boom in the Н
Asia-Pacific region is a very rare phenomenon in the world economy, Н
which, on the whole, is in a recession. The United States, Germany and Н
other big powers in the West all want to take advantage of this growth to Н
discard their "bad fortune." Japan, with very limited resources, a Н
small domestic market but a good geographical environment, can not Н
allow this opportunity to slip by. Besides, regionalization in Н
international economy has become a general trend. There is an EC in Н
Europe and a NAFTA in North America. Naturally, the Asia-Pacific Н
region should have a group of its own, and Japan with its exceedingly НКgreat economic strength should certainly not "decline" its Н
responsibility to play a "leading and exemplary role" in it. In Н
security matters, with the disappearance of the Soviet threat, the Н
United States may make less use of Japan, a "big aircraft carrier," Н
but will ask it to take up more responsibility in regional defence. Н
Japan can not go in for large-scale arms expansion because of the Н
various restrictions imposed on it, but this difficulty may be solved Н
through the establishment of an "Asia-Pacific security system" or an Н
"Asia-Pacific security community" in the future. Such an organization Н
can exercise a certain restriction on its member countries (forbidding Н
them, for instance, to solve regional disputes by force of arms and Н
violate international conventions on sales of weapons), and provide Н
Japan with a "reason" to exert influence in regional security Н
matters.$
The Japanese government has expressed this intention in some open Н
statements, which can be boiled down to what I call the "flying geese Н
mode." Very different from the United States, Japan finds it improper Н
to put forward any proposal on political and security questions and Н
can only advocate an "East Asian economic sphere" and a "Japan Sea-rim Н
economic area." This kind of setup, in fact, means the "flying geese Н
mode" of regional economic cooperation with itself acting as the Н
leading goose, the "four little dragons" as the second echelon and the Н
Asean nations as the third. Japan intends to use this "East Asian Н
economic sphere" as a base and expand northward to form a "Japan Sea Н
economic area" (utilizing the resources of Russia, the capital and Н
technology of Japan and ROK and the labor force of China and North Н
Korea to develop a Japan-led economic cooperation), from which its Н
influence can be spread to China's northeast, South and North Korea, Н
and the far-east of Russia. At the same time, it will move southward Н
to implement its "Indo-Chinese development plan" and, in so doing, Н
exert its influence on Viet Nam, Laos, Cambodia and southern China. It Н
hopes to form a deep division of labor and economic cooperation in the Н
region and boost finally economic development in entire Asia and the Н
Pacific region. This "flying geese mode" will quicken the chain Н
industrial restructuring and create an international division of labor Н
in which Japan produces high-tech products; the "four little dragons," Н
the ordinary run of technological and durable outputs; and the Asean Н
countries, China and Viet Nam, the labor-intensive products. (The Н
levels of products these countries turn out will not remain the same Н
forever; they will be uplifted at regular intervals.) The countries Н
participating in this cooperation will rely on one another and Н
"survive together and live in common prosperity."#+[3] The "flying Н
geese" strategy being the basis of Japan's overall Pacific strategy, Н
Japan can not play a more important role in the political and security Н
affairs of the Asia-Pacific region unless this strategy makes some Н
headway.$
3. The "Necklace Mode" of Malaysia:$
The United States has tried very hard to steer the Asia-Pacific Н
cooperation in the direction it wishes to go. Japan hopes to become a Н
leading power in this cooperation all right but dares not offend the Н
United States. Only Malaysia expresses in clear-cut terms that the Н
Americans are not welcome. Under the distinctive leadership of Prime Н
Minister Mahathir Mohamad, this country often puts forward views and Н
suggestions different from others in its capacity of an independent Н
developing country in Asean and Asia. The "East Asia economic group" НКadvanced by Mahathir in the early 90s constitutes the third mode of Н
this cooperation. According to this suggestion, the Asean countries Н
should make up the majority of the group's members, and the United Н
States and countries in Oceania will not be included. The objective of Н
this group is to promote the development of the intraregional trade in Н
keeping with the principles of Gatt. It should adapt itself to the Н
general trend of regionalization and strengthen the might of the East Н
Asian countries to contend with other groups in the Uruguay Round of Н
Gatt talks. The group as an organization should play a complementary Н
role and serve as an accelerating agent to the ministerial conference Н
on Asia-Pacific economic cooperation. In the first stage, a Н
coordinating body should be created among East Asian countries having Н
common interests, and, in the second, economic ties aimed at boosting Н
intraregional trade and investment should be established. In view of Н
the US concept of interdependence, Malaysian leaders pointed out that Н
interdependence is chiefly an economic notion and has no practical Н
significance for a number of weak nations, and that genuine Н
interdependence means not only interreliance but also a certain degree Н
of equality and support. In the eyes of the Malaysians, Asean as a Н
whole has irreplaceable superiorities: Its member countries are good Н
neighbors all along and have like geographical and climatic Н
conditions, similar economic basis and development level and many Н
interests in common. No one among them is big enough to dominate Н
others. In the early 90s, the Asean countries (not including Brunei) Н
had a total GDP of about USбч300bn, a consumer market of 300m people, Н
sufficient labor force, rich natural resources and an excellent Н
geographical environment. If proper use can be made of these Н
superiorities, Asean, made up of medium and small countries as equal Н
partners, may very well become the fetus or model of the future Н
Pacific economic sphere.#+[4]$
Let us call figuratively the Malaysian concept of the Asia-Pacific Н
cooperation the "necklace mode" for the time being. This is because: Н
1. The six Asean countries (Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, the Н
Philippines, Brunei and Indonesia) are all situated in the tropical Н
zone south of the Tropic of Cancer and north of 10 degrees southern Н
latitude and made up of a great amount of islands and lakes, looking Н
like indeed on map a necklace of pearls varying only slightly in size. Н
2. What's more, the member countries will be partners with equal Н
status; no "brain" exists among them, and no "leading goose" is Н
required. They are all pearls strung together on the thread of Н
association, relying on one another, sailing on the same track and Н
sharing weal and woe. 3. The philosophy of "The small ones are the Н
best" in business operations, which has prevailed since the 70s and Н
80s, is embodied in the proposal of the Malaysians as well. According Н
to this philosophy, it is the efficiency, not size, that counts, Н
what really matters is the rationality, rather than the scale, of the Н
allocation of resources. The Pacific epoch, likewise, will not come Н
through the conjuring of the big-power magicians, but by the down-to-Н
earth cooperation of the Asean nations. Though this "necklace" Н
proposal has not won extensive response so far due to various reasons, Н
it has presented a real ideological and theoretical challenge to the Н
modes advanced by big powers.$
4. The "Fan Mode" of China:$
Strictly speaking, the Chinese government has not declared so far any Н
systematic policies and principles about the Asia-Pacific economic НКarea or organization. But some of its views are known to all. 1. The Н
Chinese people have felt keenly the all-pervasive influence of the Н
global economic integration and regionalization, and the experiences Н
and gains obtained in the fifteen years' reform and opening up are Н
increasingly fortifying Chinese policy-makers' determination to go Н
with the tide. 2. The EC has been knocked into pretty good shape, and Н
NAFTA has started to operate formally. But the economic division and Н
organizational form of the region has not yet been properly Н
formulated, so China has to adopt an active but cautious attitude. 3. Н
In view of the diversity of the socio-cultural and political systems Н
and the multiplicity of the economic development level and condition Н
in the region, the Asia-Pacific economic cooperation should have a Н
number of flexible forms. No hard and fast binding rules should be Н
imposed on the participants, nor should pressure of one kind or Н
the other be brought to bear upon them. 4. China will never allow the Н
United States to dictate to others in any organization of the Asia-Н
Pacific economic cooperation that might be set up in the future, nor Н
does it wish to see any nation (Japan, for instance) act as the leader of Н
or dominate the region in its development. 5. Taiwan is an inseparable Н
part of the Chinese territory, and Hong Kong will be placed entirely Н
under the jurisdiction of the Chinese central government after its Н
return to China in 1997. Any attempt to link up the questions of Н
Taiwan and Hong Kong with the Asia-Pacific economic cooperation might Н
result in China's complete withdrawal from the regional cooperation.$
The views of China being such, its strategy for the regional Н
cooperation can be called the "fan mode." 1. China will keep a firm Н
foothold in the region, cement good relations with surrounding Н
countries, enhance friendship with them and promote common Н
development. It does not seek hegemony itself and opposes anyone Н
lording it over others, including in affairs of the Asia-Pacific Н
economic cooperation. 2. China will "keep the initiative in its own Н
hands, deal with things in a flexible way, maintain the liberty to go Н
forward or back out, and subject itself to no rigid control." It will Н
take a positive attitude to invitations for cooperation (such as to Н
take part in growth triangles, small area cooperation, free trade Н
areas and investment and processing zones) on the one hand, and avoid Н
direct confrontations and conflicts with the United States and Japan Н
like Malaysia on the other. This attitude of the Chinese government Н
has been reflected in President Jiang Zemin's speech at the Seattle Н
conference. "The development of the Asia-Pacific region," he said, Н
"has not been achieved through the backing of groups, either economic Н
or political ones, to say nothing of military ones, but through Н
opening up and cooperation, and by drawing on the strong points of Н
others to make up for one's own weak points and exchanging what one Н
has for what one has not and by adhering to the principles of mutual Н
respect, equality and common benefit. Proceeding from this view, we Н
maintain that the Asia-Pacific economic cooperative organization Н
should be an open, flexible and pragmatic forum and consultative body, Н
instead of a close, institutionalized economic group."#+[5] 3. In Н
regional cooperation, China will focus its attention on Southeast Н
Asia, where Chinese citizens residing abroad and foreign citizens of Н
Chinese origin concentrate, and where China has territorial disputes Н
with some nations over some island. If these questions are managed Н
well, capital and technology, especially capital, can be expected to Н
pour in; and if things went wrong, an intensification in the regional НКsituation might be resulted in. 4. China will not make a big fanfare Н
of the "Chinese Economic Sphere" advocated by some people, though it Н
is to its advantage; it would rather take a "wait-and-see approach" Н
and decides its new policy according to the actual course things will Н
take. In short, China will handle the affairs of the Asia-Pacific Н
cooperation the way it does foreign relations and "coolly watch the Н
developments of events, calmly cope with troubles, refrain from acting Н
the standard-bearer and keep a low profile." To put it metaphorically, Н
China is like a collapsible fan with its central hub in the north, and Н
the Asia-Pacific region in the southeast can be compared to the fan's Н
semicircular flat segments of paper. China maintains links with the Н
countries or alliances of nations in the region the way the hub does Н
with the segments of paper through the blades attached to it. The Н
ancient Chinese stratagems serve as the hand that agitates the fan. Н
Compared with other modes, this is the most low-keyed one. But with Н
the growth of its economy, China might gradually make its presence Н
felt.$
#T4II. Differences: Advantages or Disadvantages?#t
Difference in modes reflects difference in the conditions of countries Н
and in the starting points their leaders take in sizing up things. It Н
can be said without the slightest exaggeration that the Asia-Pacific Н
is a region typified by the biggest divergences. All major differences Н
present in other parts of the world can be found here. It can be Н
likened to a geometrical structure assembled with mosaic pieces of Н
different colors and sizes. The different strategic modes of the Н
principal powers represent but one front of this structure. Now let us Н
deal with some basic differences among them.$
Difference in geography, climate and natural resources can be easily Н
seen. The Asia-Pacific region, from South Asian sub-continent in the Н
west to the western coast of America in the east, and from Seattle of Н
the United States and the Kuril Islands of Japan in the north to Н
Wellington of New Zealand and Puerto Montt of Chile in the south, or Н
in the vast expanse of land and waters between 75 degrees E, 75 Н
degrees W, 45 degrees N and 45 degrees S, covers almost half of the Н
globe, 15 time zones from east to west and the cold, temperate and Н
tropical zones from north to south. The natural geographical Н
conditions being so very complicated, some countries in the region Н
have the richest natural and mineral resources, while certain others Н
possess nothing but birds dropping and corals. There is a state called Н
"a nation of thousands of islands," and there are also land-locked Н
countries like Laos. The area of the biggest nation is 2,000 times as Н
large as that of the smallest one, and the ratio between the biggest Н
and smallest population is as great as 10,000 to 1. In the most Н
densely-populated Taiwan, Hong Kong, Japan and Calcutta in India, each Н
square kilometer has to put up hundreds of people, while Н
scattered in Micronesia (not including Guam) are only a few hundreds Н
of thousands of natives.$
Compared with the difference in natural conditions, that in Н
nationality, culture and religion is even greater. A few states were Н
founded only half a century ago, whereas some have had a recorded Н
history of civilization for as long as 5,000 years. Some nationalities Н
resemble tribes and have a populace of only a few tens of thousands, Н
or just hundreds, living contentedly by themselves in very small areas Н
from generation to generation, while some nationalities themselves Н
consist of a number of nationalities and races, their spheres of НКactivity reaching all parts of the Asia-Pacific region and even the Н
world. The diversity of culture among countries is often baffling to Н
outsiders. Chinese characters, for instance, are used in China and, to Н
a large extent, in Japan as well, but the Chinese and Japanese do not Н
understand each other's spoken language. The Philippines is a member Н
of Asia, and citizens of Chinese origin have great influence in the Н
country's economic life, but the Filipinos believe in Catholicism, and Н
English is spoken in the parliament. Indonesia is far from the Holy Н
City, but it is the largest Islamic country. India, whose population Н
has reached 900m, is a nation with several cultures, races, religions, Н
languages and many internal contradictions, the scale and multiplicity Н
of which having no match anywhere in the world. A cursory examination Н
shows that five cultures, namely, the Confucian, Buddhist, Christian, Н
Hinduist and Islamic cultures, and five religions are present side by Н
side in the region or interlap one another in some areas. Some Н
countries have one culture and follow a single religion, whereas Н
others have dozens of cultures and sub-cultures and religions and sub-Н
religions. Mr. R. A. Scalapina, a noted American specialist on Asian Н
affairs, made an analysis of the cultural difference in Southeast Н
Asia, which can be applied to the whole of the Asia-Pacific region as Н
well. There is hardly any area in the world, he said, which can Н
outshine Southeast Asia in illustrating what difficulties one will Н
encounter in seeking unanimity among a thousand differences. One can Н
find here typical features of races and diverse cultures and economic Н
and political systems mankind has ever seen. Among its about 300m Н
believers, most of the main world religions have their Н
representatives, and so are the great cultures. At the same time, the Н
most primitive tribes live in its mountainous areas and jungles. This Н
shows that two uttermost extremities coexist here, and what's more, Н
innumerable levels of men, from those of the Neolithic Age to the Н
modern times, can be found in the area. And together with the multiple Н
cultures, a pretty strict economic hierarchy is functioning.#+[6]$
The greatest difference lies in perhaps the level of economic Н
development. Disparity in socio-economic development exists in the Н
southeastern and northwestern parts of Europe, among different areas Н
of Africa and between South and North America as well, but not to such Н
a magnitude. In the Asia-Pacific region, one can at least see five to Н
six levels of development. At the very top are the United States and Н
Japan, which are among the world powers with the hugest GNP and per-Н
capita output value. Canada, Australia and New Zealand, the Н
moderately-developed countries, occupy the second level. Next to them Н
are the ANIEs, the most outstanding ones among which being the "four Н
little dragons." Further down are the developing countries that have Н
just begun their economic takeoff. China, Viet Nam and India have a Н
lower per-capita output value than the above category and can form a Н
level of their own. At the bottom are Bangladesh and Myanmar, the Н
especially impoverished countries classified by the United Nations and Н
the World Bank. As far as the countries' GNP goes, the disparity has Н
come to 100fold, the poorest nations having a per-capita national Н
income of less than USбч300, while the richest ones, over USбч30000. Н
However, there are problems one can not induce from these figures, Н
such as the road condition, quality of drinking water, percentage of Н
doctors in the population, degree of the spread of education, Н
creativeness in science and technology and rationality in industrial Н
structure. If an accurate analysis is made of the national НКcomprehensive strength, one will find the gap between the strongest Н
and the weakest Asia-Pacific countries may have surpassed 1000fold and Н
even 10000fold.$
Of course, difference and antagonism in political system and ideology Н
should not be neglected in our discussion. Though, with the vanishing Н
of the Soviet Union, the contradictions between the East and the West Н
in international relations have relaxed relatively, no one denies that Н
sharp, profound and long-range disagreements and conflicts still Н
remain between capitalism and socialism in the social system, ideology Н
and values (over such questions as human rights, abortion, information Н
control and government functions). These disagreements and conflicts Н
occur from time to time in other parts of the world as well, but Н
seldom to so serious a degree and in so long a duration in the non-Н
violent confrontation. This confrontation in the Asia-Pacific region Н
does not take the form of hot or cold war, but the unreconcilable Н
diplomatic quarrels, economic and trade retaliations, blockade in Н
science and technology and occasionally military threats. The region Н
boasts the biggest socialist and capitalist country, the largest Н
Islamic country and the bulwark of liberalism, the country adhering Н
most staunchly to the centrally planned economy and the nation with Н
the most typical market economy. In some nations, the Communist Party Н
is the only ruling party, while in some others Communist propaganda is Н
considered illegal. In some countries, various "isms" and political Н
factions coexist peacefully, while in some others different ideologies Н
are as incompatible to one another as water is to fire. Some countries Н
are in good terms with almost all countries, whereas some others have Н
virtually segregated themselves from the entire external world.$
What have the complicated differences in the region brought about? Н
Good results or bad ones, advantages or troubles? Analysis shows that Н
both may have been obtained. The point is how to handle them.$
The greatest advantage born of the differences is the immense Н
complementarity--first of all, in economy and trade. Some countries Н
have plenty of labor force but lack capital, while some are short of Н
manpower but have a great deal of capital; some have a big Н
#^population#^_ Н
but only a small territory and limited resources, while it is just the Н
other way round with some others; some have too big a percentage of Н
aged people, while some consist mostly of the young and able-bodied; Н
and some excel in agriculture, whereas some shine in modern industry. Н
In short, the need to complete one another economically forms the Н
first factor of the Asia-Pacific cooperation. Complementarity exists Н
in culture and ideology as well. Let us take a few simple examples to Н
illustrate this point. "In clothing design, one can see in modern Н
Japan people wearing trim Western-style clothes and up-to-date Н
fashionable dresses as well as the kimono modelled after ancient Н
Chinese apparels. In cooking culture, Japan has Western-style Н
restaurants, Japanese taverns and Chinese eating houses flaunting the Н
sign of `Chinese food.' Often, whisky, Western grape, Japanese liquor Н
and Chinese Maotai and Shaoxing rice wine are on sale side be side in Н
a wine-shop."#+[7] "In modern Japan, Buddhism, Christianity and Н
Japanese Shinto have long coexisted. These religions may set against Н
one another in other parts of the world, but they can exist peacefully Н
together in Japan, each playing its own role. In Japanese cities, the Н
Buddhist temple, Christian church and Shinto shrine may locate in the Н
same neighborhood, and many people, believing incredibly in two НКreligions at the same time, very often visit first a Buddhist temple Н
and then a Shinto shrine close by."#+[8] It can be easily ascertained Н
from the mode of conduct and thinking of the Japanese people that Н
several cultures have blended in this country.$
Differences may very likely generate advantage of hybridization. This Н
basic principle taught by biology can be applied to analyze the Н
tremendous potential in the Asia-Pacific region. In principle, there Н
should be much more combinations in the region than anywhere else due Н
to its multiplicity in nationality, race, culture, religion, economy Н
and social development. Even though rogues are created in cross Н
breeding sometimes, superior varieties are engendered in most cases. I Н
will use the Eastern written languages here to explain this question. Н
Some people asserted that it is not easy for the Easterners to achieve Н
modernization. To say the least, their characters are too difficult to Н
learn and use, and the improvement of the computer technology Н
(generally regarded as the invention of Europe and the United States) Н
presents additional difficulties to them. The achievements in Japan, Н
ROK and China's Taiwan, however, have proven that this judgment is Н
wrong. For, as a linguist has told me, complex characters are easier Н
to distinguish and better protected against interference, and, Н
therefore, software programmers knowing these languages can develop Н
better systems for them than those using Western alphabets, and Japan Н
employing Chinese characters (ideograph), hiragana, katakana and Roman Н
characters and ROK adopting a combination of Chinese, Korean and Roman Н
characters have come to the fore in the computer languages. The same Н
thing is happening in areas using the Chinese language. Obviously, in Н
the coming century, intelligence-based information techniques (such as Н
micro-electric, genetic code, aerospace and military guidance Н
techniques) will occupy the vantage point of science and technology, Н
and computer and the fuzzy mathematics capable of recognizing the Н
"boundary" techniques and grouping their functions will remain the Н
core and basis of science and technology. Here, the richness of a Н
language may become one of the decisive factors. Of course, potential Н
is not yet the actual capacity, and whether it can be tapped depends Н
on the presence of such factors as a proper system and environment, Н
sufficient capital and qualified personnel as well. But associating Н
this point with the subject under discussion, we can say at least that Н
the great diversity in these fields has furnished favorable natural Н
conditions to open newer and better prospects for the Asia-Pacific Н
region. It is precisely because some people have taken this point into Н
consideration that they launched the idea that the "Pacific Н
civilization" may create a new epoch in history.$
On the other hand, differences may mean difficulties. As many experts Н
have pointed out, difference in the social system, disagreements in Н
ideology and cultural and national estrangements passed down from Н
history make it difficult for the region to reach governmental Н
agreements similar to those of the EC and NAFTA in the near future, Н
and the process of integration will definitely be delayed. In fact, Н
many countries in the region do not think there is such a necessity at Н
all. The "integration" we are discussing does not refer to the "great Н
amalgamation" but a deep division of labor and cooperation. The extent Н
of integration has a direct bearing on the level of economic Н
development, as can be seen in the following instances. Viet Nam's Н
eagerness to join Asean has met with some hesitations. This, Н
obviously, can hardly be explained away by pure economic reasons. НКThe joint exploitation of the Tumen River Valley by China, Japan, Н
North and South Korea, Mongolia and Russia's far eastern area have Н
been hindered by differences in habits, customs, work efficiency, Н
legal norm and interests. Such differences will not get to so serious Н
a degree in West Europe. The historical feuds and present Н
contradictions between India and Pakistan have cast a shadow over the Н
cooperation of the sub-continent, though very favorable natural Н
conditions are present for such cooperation. The Asean countries have Н
very similar cultural and economic backgrounds compared with other Н
areas, but their differences in foreign-related economic policies, Н
resulted from their being the colonies of the United States, Britain, Н
Japan and Holland respectively, are more or less influencing their Н
multilateral and bilateral relations. In a word, though no fundamental Н
impediment of the regional cooperation has been wrought, these Н
differences have added many difficulties to the realization of the Н
"Pacific epoch."$
Besides, differences have also brought about inequality in the Н
interests, strength and geographical conditions of countries. The Н
rapid but extremely unbalanced economic development in the region has Н
been bringing unduly fast changes and too many variations, often Н
turning the allies of yesterday into enemies of today, or vice versa. Н
Japan and ROK supported each other in the face of the Soviet Union. Н
Discord has now arisen between them because of the nuclear question of Н
North Korea, and a quarrel may perhaps break out tomorrow over the Н
demarcation of their territorial sea. China and Viet Nam, once Н
"comrades," turned into "foes" in the bi-polar age, and they have Н
normalized their relations since the end of the Cold War. The South Н
China Sea was calm in the days of confrontation between the two Н
military blocs, but now, when one has disappeared and the other, Н
shrunk, there is a seaquake of conflicts brewing. The United States Н
and Japan have long been partners (though one is the leader, and the Н
other, the#O
&led), but the latter often says "No!" now in a louder and Н
louder voice, and The Coming War with Japan became a best-seller as Н
soon as it was off the press in the United States. While disarmament Н
has become a general trend in most parts of the world, a "counter Н
disarmament" has appeared in the whole of East Asia from the Korean Н
Peninsula to Southeast and South Asia. (This, to certain countries, is Н
an outcome of modernization in national defence, a logical follow-up Н
of the economic modernization. To a number of others, however, it is Н
an instinctive reaction to the absence of a traditional security Н
system and the muddled state in which one can not clearly tell friends Н
from enemies following the end of the Cold War.) While the world Н
situation on the whole remains relatively stable and the economy keeps Н
its momentum of growth, one can not deny categorically the existence Н
of some troubles and rule out possibilities of outbreak of conflicts. Н
Compared with the situation in West Europe and North America, such Н
instability and uncertainty have more or less diminished the Asia-Н
Pacific region's strength and say in world affairs and jeopardized the Н
prospects of the "Pacific civilization" playing the leading role, as Н
has been forecast above. Of course, like what has been said of Н
potential, the troubles and difficulties mentioned here have not Н
turned altogether into actualities. They will not dominate people's Н
attention unless they are accelerated by external or internal factors, Н
and even when they have become realities, they are not necessarily the НКforemost events of the time. This is something one must bear in mind. Н
What I want to emphasize in this section is that the tremendous Н
differences have given rise to potential advantages and difficulties Н
in the region that can not be seen in other parts of the world. Making Н
use of the advantages, avoiding difficulties and winning the greatest Н
possible benefits for themselves have become a subject the Asia-Н
Pacific countries, especially the major ones in the region, must Н
ponder on seriously.$
#T4III. The Quadrangular and Triangular$
Relations Among Big Powers#t
History proves that the shift of the center of civilization is often Н
the outcome of a tussle among big powers. Interactions among the Н
nucleus countries are the indispensable condition of the coming of a Н
new epoch. Reviewing the developments in modern history, one will see Н
that the complicated contention among Spain, Portuguese, Holland, Н
France and Britain resulted in frequent changes in the maritime Н
hegemony and the gradual ascent of the "Atlantic civilization."$
Likewise, the interactions of the main countries in the Asia-Pacific Н
region will play a pivotal role in the "Pacific epoch." By the "main Н
countries," I mean those more powerful and important than others no Н
matter from what angles you look at them and those having a greater Н
influence than most in their own region and in the world as a whole. Н
Using this as a yardstick, I have chosen the United States, Japan, Н
China and Russia for the Asia-Pacific region. No explanation is Н
necessary for the first three. The reason why Russia has been picked Н
is that its territory stretches over both Europe and Asia (though its Н
center is in Europe) and claims 11.4 percent of the world's land; its Н
military might is equal to that of the United States; its feelers in Н
the east have already extended to the Pacific and nurtured deep-rooted Н
interests there; and its actions there directly affect the stability Н
and development of the region. Some people may be perplexed by the Н
exclusion of India. Though it is the second biggest populous country Н
and has carried out successful economic reform in recent years, the Н
incessant racial riots and religious conflicts and the relative Н
weakness of its central government have reduced the country's Н
influence in international affairs to a degree quite unmatched with Н
the vast potential its big population promises. Besides, it is located Н
along the western edge of the Pacific civilization sphere, and, Н
according to the theory of the "westward shift of civilizations," not Н
until it reaches a certain period of time in the coming century, can Н
it play a leading role. It has at most a marginal influence in the Н
Pacific epoch.$
True, the strength and influence of these four countries differ Н
greatly. But whether they can be taken as world powers or not, they Н
are without doubt major countries in the Asia-Pacific region. These Н
countries have 90 percent of the region's GNP, half of its population Н
and land, 4 mightiest armed forces and 4 biggest budgets. It can be Н
said without exaggeration that no perfect Pacific epoch can be had Н
without the participation of, or opposed by, any of the four Н
countries. Their basic attitudes towards affairs in the region and Н
their relationship of inter-restraint and interdependence, in the eyes Н
of historians, will constitute an important feature of the Pacific Н
epoch.$
The overall USA-Japan-China-Russia relations form a geometric pattern Н
composed of four triangles (see the figures below). It can also be НКcalled a complex makeup of the USA-Japan-China, Japan-USA-Russia, Н
China-USA-Russia and Russia-Japan-China triangular relations.$
#!
1. The USA-Japan-China Triangle:$
There has never been any completely identical strategic interests Н
among the three countries in modern times. During the Sino-Japanese Н
War of 1894, China and Japan became enemies, and the United States Н
stood by with folded arms. After World War I, the United States and Н
Japan participated in apportioning China and established their spheres Н
of influence. In World War II, the United States cooperated with the Н
Chinese government under Chiang Kai-shek, and Japan became their Н
enemy. During the Cold War, the United States and Japan formed an Н
alliance, and China was regarded a devil or a stranger to be used now Н
and then. At present, when the bi-polar pattern has collapsed, the Н
three sides have to review their relations with the other two, so as Н
to fix their new pivotal points and bearing in the political manoeuvre Н
in the new period. To the United States, the disintegration of the Н
Soviet Union means a decline in China's strategic importance and an Н
ascent in Japan's sense of independence. The vital strategic interests Н
of the United States at present and in the near future lies in Н
ensuring that no country in the Asia-Pacific region can challenge it Н
the way the former Soviet Union did. That is to say, selling weapons Н
to Taiwan for the sake of checking China and refusing Malaysia's Н
proposal so as to keep a tight rein on Japan conform to the United Н
States's long-term interests. To Japan, the new period means that the Н
time for it to embrace the "post-hegemony pattern" has come and it Н
should handle its relations with the United States and China, Н
neighbors in the West and East, like a grown-up, criticizing what Н
should be censured and say "No!" outright when it is called for. Н
Considering it is not yet a permanent member of the UN Security Н
Council, it must work on the other two in a certain period of time and Н
make necessary concessions. As to China, having at long last walked Н
out of the shadow of the "northern threat" that had been over it for Н
decades and shaken off the specter of internal riots, it is faced with Н
a task of top priority--developing its national economy and improving Н
the people's livelihood. It needs, therefore, a comparatively stable Н
and peaceful peripheral environment. The fact that the United States Н
is the world's strongest country and Japan is its richest neighbor Н
decides that it must not worsen its relations with them in a fairly Н
long period of time to come and must even put up with some of the Н
troubles and harassment they impose on it. The United States pick Н
fault with China and Japan right and left, and the latter two counter Н
the pressure and challenge from that quarter in "the Easterners' way"-Н
-this will be the basic strategic stance in the triangular relations Н
among the three of them. In economic matters, the USA-Japan-China Н
relationship forms "the first triangle" in the Asia-Pacific region. Н
The three countries playing the leading role in economy, whether they Н
have a growth boom or slump will directly affect the overall economic Н
situation in the region. The three all take the other two as the main Н
markets, and only the United States has an additional one in Europe. Н
It sets a great store by some of Japan's high technologies and China's Н
growth boom and is anxious to cut down its USбч80bn of trade deficits Н
with Japan and China, which have the biggest and the second biggest Н
shares respectively. Japan, while counting on the United States' Н
comprehensive national strength and China's consumption potential to НКmaintain its economic prosperity, has to resist at the same time the Н
former's pressure for it to completely open its market and the Н
latter's efforts to seize its market of traditional products. China Н
has been following primarily the tracks of the US and Japanese economy Н
and deriving benefits from them ever since its opening up, and its Н
industrial structure and the direction its market is taking decide Н
that this situation can not be altered in the next ten to twenty Н
years. Never before has the interdependence among the three countries Н
reached so high a degree, though not to the point that one can not go Н
without the other two for a single moment even at very special times. Н
As to the security matters, the three countries are modifying their Н
military principles and security policy. The first consideration of Н
the United States is to see that the military strength of Japan and Н
China in the Asia-Pacific region will not be so weak that the Russian Н
bear thinks nothing of them, and that their strength should neither Н
become so strong that the two countries can pit against itself. Its Н
another concern is that its military presence in the Asia-Pacific Н
region can serve to check outbursts of potential crises connected with Н
the region. The biggest worries of the Japanese strategists is the so-Н
called "threats eventuated from the swift growth of China's military Н
strength" and the latent crisis lurking on the Korean Peninsula in the Н
next few years. "Using the United States to keep China in check," Н
"using the United States and China to restrain North Korea" and Н
enlisting the help of the shrunk US military force to defend "the Н
lifeline of resources" on the islands of Japan--these will be the key Н
problems claiming Japan's foremost attention in working out its Н
defence strategy. The prior objective of China's security strategy is Н
to procure a more stable international environment (especially the Н
peripheral environment) for its reform and opening up drive. As it has Н
territorial disputes of different magnitudes left over from history Н
with Russia, India and some countries in the vicinity of the South Н
China Sea (such as Viet Nam, Malaysia and the Philippines), it must Н
maintain good relationship with the United States and Japan and avert Н
unnecessary troubles as best it can, for, "In military strategy, Н
employing stratagems is the best of tactics, then comes using Н
diplomatic manoeuvre, and engaging in open hostilities, attacking Н
cities is the worst of all approaches."$
2. The Japan-USA-Russia Triangle:$
Compared with the USA-Japan-China triangle, the Japan-USA-Russia Н
relationship is characterized by less elasticity and greater rigidity. Н
It is a realistic relationship and has been perpetually interfered by Н
political factors. What's more, it is a long-range relationship, in Н
which disagreements invariably outnumber accords. Japan is always the Н
center of attention in the triangular relations in the Asia-Pacific Н
region (we will leave out their relations in the global affairs here): Н
Moscow often plays the Japan card in his contention with Washington, Н
and the United States frequently strikes the Japan ball at the Н
billiards table in order to knock Russia into one of the pockets. The Н
Russians are perhaps regretting that they had not sent troops to Н
occupy Japan after World War II before General Douglas MacArthur Н
could; otherwise, the present political and military picture of the Н
region and even the world would have been entirely different. The Н
United States, while complaining about Japan's "hitchhiking," may be Н
congratulating itself for remaining an "all-round champion," as Japan Н
can not but rely on it in the face of the powerful Russian armed НКforces. And Japan, like a younger brother having not yet come of age, Н
has to move carefully between the two big brothers and listen to their Н
unreasonable lecturing, while it is growing up all the time and has Н
become cleverer and stronger than the two in some respects. Such Н
unpleasant interactions have determined the basic strategic positions Н
the constituent countries of the triangle take. Japan, demilitarized Н
and denuclearized in accordance with its constitution drawn up after the Н
end of World War II, has to rely on the United States, but the latter Н
is after all a "distant relative" on the other side of the ocean and Н
has an entirely different culture and religious belief. "Living under Н
other people's thumb," it has to keep a cool head; its way out lies in Н
either building a strong force for national defence, or residing in a Н
more peaceful and rationalized world. (Both views have their Н
supporters in the country.) Japan has to keep Russia at arm's length Н
and resolutely voices its opinions, such as "No economic aid and Н
assistance in science and technology is possible before the thorough Н
solution of the northern territory question." The United States will Н
benefit from this mutual-restraining relations between Russia and Н
Japan, but the pivotal point of the US strategy is to keep this mutual Н
restraint within a certain limit and avoid possible destabilization of Н
the situation in Northeast Asia due to the deterioration of the Russo-Н
Japanese relations. The United States requires this to indicate that Н
it stands firm on its duties to the allies and keeps its word and to Н
caution Russia that the spheres of influence can not be encroached Н
upon. The US strategists have always thought highly of the geo-Н
politician H. J. Mackinder. His theory teaches that the "Mainland" and Н
its surrounding areas will always be the pivotal region to control the Н
world with. Even in its sleep, the self-styled "global gendarme" keeps Н
an eye on the Russian empire, which was and may still be an antagonist Н
of its. Russia believes that handling its relations with Japan Н
properly, like what it is doing with Germany, is essential in striking Н
a strategic balance with the West, mainly with the United States, in Н
the post-Cold War era. The region is a buffer zone, a "big economic Н
space" and also a datum of power politics, and a powerful nation Н
should be good at handling and making use of the relations with such Н
important countries. Russia's strategic interests in the far east and Н
the Pacific region, therefore, demand that it firmly grasp its Н
relations with Japan and the United States that stands behind it and Н
is even more difficult to deal with. So far, Russia seems to lack a Н
well-considered, systematic long-range Japan policy, as has been borne Н
out by the repeated changes in the arrangements of President Boris Н
Yeltsin's visit to Japan and the indecision of its stand on the Н
question of the Kuril Islands. In economic matters, the three Н
countries have invariably subjected their needs to diplomatic and Н
political requirements. Japan, for instance, makes the return of its Н
"northern territory" a precondition for giving loans to Russia; the Н
United States bases its plan of aid to Russia on the changes in the Н
latter's international situation; and the Russian Pacific Fleet often Н
pops up before the Japanese fishermen at the delicate moments of the Н
Russo-Japanese relations. In trade, apart from the long-established Н
USA-Japanese relations, one can seldom see any animated ties between Н
the United States and Russia, and between Russia and Japan. They are Н
"neighbors but not friends."$
3. The China-USA-Russia Triangle:$
The China-USA-Russia triangle in the post-Cold War period and the НКChina-USA-USSR triangle of the bi-polar era have both similarities Н
and dissimilarities. The similarities lie in the fact that none of the Н
three was, is, can be or is willing to be a genuine friend of any of Н
the rest. In the early period of the bi-polar era, the Soviet Union Н
and China, proceeding from practical interests instead of ideological Н
necessity, joined hands to deal with the United States. In the middle Н
period, the Soviet Union and China fell out, and the United States Н
changed its policy and befriended itself with China in its effort to Н
contain the Soviet Union. In the last period, China and the Soviet Н
Union normalized their relations, and about a equal distance was kept Н
among the three. The distance between Russia under Boris Yeltsin and Н
the United States has been shortened somewhat, but their "honeymoon" Н
came to a sudden end after reaching a degree of warmth in their Н
relationship. Each of the three big powers has to turn to the other Н
two for help in one way or the other, but what is even more Н
significant is that they all keep a vigilant guard against the other Н
parties at the same time. The dissimilarities lie in the fact that Н
Russia and the United States have stopped open hostilities and the Н
Cold War; the need for economic cooperation between China and Russia Н
has grown as never before; and China and the United States are neither Н
"bitter enemies" nor "allies without an alliance." The three countries Н
are trying to found a new relationship in the Asia-Pacific region, Н
whose chief tie is the sustained economic prosperity in the region. It Н
is becoming increasingly clear that the ideological factor in the USA-Н
China relationship is facing the challenge of the geo-economic factor, Н
though it is hard to tell which will prevail. Russia pins its hope Н
mainly on China (not Japan), aspiring to profit from the Asia-Pacific Н
boom. China has chosen the far-east of Russia as one of its chief Н
border trade partners and has made up its mind to surpass Moscow, its Н
"elder brother" at first and "No. 1 threat" later, in the competition Н
of economic reform and development. This is not a "momentary" but a Н
genuine "strategic" triangle. China yearns to prove to the two world Н
giants its new strategic importance with actions and records. Russia Н
is currying favor with China so as to gain economic benefits and pin Н
down the United States (and Japan) politically. The United States Н
hopes China and Russia will restrain each other and is augmenting its Н
ability to sway this mutual restraint. The three countries all crave Н
for using the international prestige of the Asia-Pacific region in the Н
contemporary economic development to achieve their own aim. The main Н
weakness of China is it has not many trump cards to play, with the Н
only exception of its two-digit economic growth rate (which ranks in Н
the world). Another force it can count on is about 100,000 hard-Н
working, capable and rich people of Chinese ancestry living overseas Н
(a fairly large part of them in East Asia). One of the problems Russia Н
confronts is that its center is far away in Europe, and its far Н
eastern part is weaker in comparison in technology, personnel and Н
industry. Pitting a weak force against stronger ones, it has naturally Н
found itself incapable of achieving its ambition. Its another problem Н
is instability in internal situation, which dulls the confidence of Н
foreign cooperators. The United States has a fair chance to profit Н
from the conflicts between China and Russia, but its strategy is far Н
from perfect. Its attitude towards the ideological aspect of China's Н
policy may impair its chances of gaining greater access to the Chinese Н
market and lessen its prospects of making profits (especially when Н
compared with Japan). Contrary to what has been asserted by some НКmembers of the US parliament, ideological scuffles and market Н
extension can not be achieved at the same time without confliction; Н
they are mutually exclusive, and a gain in one means a fall in the Н
other. Its vacillation on Russian affairs and the frequent empty Н
promises it has made of aid to Russia have effaced the image of this Н
"victor in the Cold War" in the eyes of the Russian public and led to Н
its failure in #^playing#^_ the Russia card. Like the relations of the Н
China-USA-USSR triangle in the bi-polar era, the China-USA-Russia Н
triangle of today may produce many variations at every interval and Н
give rise to new features of the triangular interactions.$
4. The Russia-Japan-China Triangle:$
Last but not the least is the Russia-Japan-China triangle. Compared Н
with the three triangles discussed above, this one is conspicuously Н
smaller in size, and its interactions are limited to the northwestern Н
part of the Asia-Pacific region. The three countries waged wars Н
against one another in history and have many contacts now to safeguard Н
their interests. They are three powerful nations in the present world. Н
None of them has the habit of attaching itself to any other nation, Н
and all prize their independence and status of a big power. Their Н
national spirit of making unceasing efforts to improve themselves is Н
particularly striking. They can all be counted as world powers, but Н
have to suffer some kind of despotism from the No. 1 superpower: Н
Russia in political affairs, Japan in military affairs and China in Н
economic affairs. However, as far as the solution of the Asia-Pacific Н
questions goes, the three countries can restrain the big power on the Н
other side of the ocean too: China in the region's political affairs, Н
Japan in economic and trade relations and Russia in military matters. Н
The interdependence and inter-restraint among the three are mostly Н
exhibited in Northeast Asia. On the one hand, the exploitation of Н
Russia's far eastern area needs China's labor and commodities and Н
Japan's technology and capital; China has to make use of Russian ports Н
and take advantage of the geographical proximity to Japan in the Н
reform and opening up of its three northeastern provinces; Japan Н
regards China's northeast and Russia's far east the biggest and Н
nearest virgin land waiting to be fully reclaimed; and China, Japan Н
and Russia all have great hopes for the large-scale exploitation of Н
the Tumen River Valley. On the other hand, there are unsolved disputes Н
over some border, territory, islands and continental shelf between Н
Russia and Japan, Japan and China, and China and Russia, which have Н
influenced to various degrees the flow and rational allocation of Н
labor force, capital, technology and products among them. Besides, the Н
rising in recent years of the ultra-nationalist force in Russia Н
(represented by Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the notorious chieftain of the Н
Liberal Democratic Party), the frequent change in the political Н
leadership of Japan over the last two years, and the worry of the Н
"Chinese threat" abroad set off by China's rapid economic growth and Н
development in the national strength--all such developments in one Н
country have caused big or small backlashes and corresponding policy Н
readjustments among the other two. Up till now, the three countries Н
all maintain that theirs is an "equal and guarded neighborhood" and Н
have declared openly that they "will not judge according to the Н
judgment of a third party and capitalize on the contradictions Н
between the other party and a third party." From these words one can Н
see how vividly their cautiousness has been revealed. Due to the above Н
reasons, the Russia-Japan-China triangle has become the least dynamic НКamong the four triangles in the region and has little hope to be Н
activated in the foreseeable future.$
$
#T4NOTES#t
##[D1J100P80]
_#+[1]_I got this idea from a conversation Mr. Li Shenzhi had with me.$
_#+[2]$#J[-100]
_Cf. Ha Mei, "The United States New Asia-Pacific Strategy and Н
Policy Readjustments," The Modern International Relations, 1992, No. Н
2; Chen Jiehua, "President Clinton's New Asia-Pacific Concept," #FKThe Н
International Outlook,#FS_ 1993, No. 14; and Robert B. Oxnam, "Asia-Н
Pacific Challenges," #FKForeign Affairs,#FS_ Vol. 72, No. 1, 1993, pp. 58-Н
73.$
_#+[3]_Cf. Zhang Dalin, "My Superficial Analysis of Japan's Strategy Н
of Returning to Asia," #FKThe International Studies,#FS_ 1994, No. 1; Wang Н
Yajun, Gao Zhenying and Jiang Bo, #FKThe Twenty-first Century: The Asia-Н
Pacific Region Will Emerge into Prominence#FS_ (China International Н
Broadcasting Publishing House, 1993), pp. 156-7; and Li Jian and Н
others, #FKJapan: Creating Another Miracle in the Twenty-first Н
Century?#FS_ Н
(China International Broadcasting Publishing House, 1993), pp. 154-8.$
_#+[4]_Cf. Tian Zhongqing, Liu Ping, Yu Lijun and Zhang Hongbin, Н
#FKAsean: A New Galaxy in the Asia-Pacific Region,#FS_ 
(China Н
International Broadcasting Publishing House, 1993) 
Chapter 3 and 4; and Dang Dajian and Н
Sun Weidong, #FKChina: In the Face of the Asia-Pacific Challenges,#FS_ Н
(China Н
International Broadcasting Publishing House, 1993), p. 130.$
_#+[5]_Cited from Li Changyong, "The Rise of East Asia and the New Н
Asia-Pacific Epoch," #FKThe World Development Studies,#FS_ No. 47. For Н
China's reflections on its functions in the Asia-Pacific region, see Н
also Pan Rui, "An Important Page in the Sino-US Relations--the Seattle Н
Meeting of the Heads of State of the Two Countries and the Current Н
Sino-US Relations," #FKThe International Outlook,#FS_ 1993, No. 23; Zhang Н
Haiming, "China's Strategy of `Cut-Up, Multi-level Function' in the Н
Economic Cooperation of the Asia-Pacific Region," #FKThe Asia-Pacific Н
Commentary,#FS_ No. 3, January 18, 1993; and Yang Yunzhong, "The Trend the Н
Sino-US Relations Are Taking After the Meeting of the Heads of State Н
of the Two Countries," The Asia-Pacific Commentary, No. 7, February Н
14, 1994.$
_#+[6]_R. A. Scalapina, #FKAsia and Its Future,#FS_ (The New Н
China Publishing House, 1983) Chinese edition, p. 18.$
_#+[7]_Wang Yajun and others, op. cit, pp. 120-21.$
_#+[8]_Ibid.$##[R]
(Translated by Wang Huaiting)#R#E