#?
#P[80]&#A*FAmerican^ Studies^ in^ China^ #FKVol.2#FS,^ 1995/_@#a$#P[100]
#J[-100]
#T3AMERICAN AIR FORCE IN CHINA$
AND CHINESE WAR OF RESISTANCE$
AGAINST JAPAN#t
#T4GU Xuejia __and__ YAO Bo#t
At the end of 1941, American Volunteers in Chinese Air Force#R
&led by Н
Clair Lee Chennault began to fight in southwest China and the nearby Н
areas in Burma, Vietnam and Thailand against Japanese Air Force, Н
which had the control of the air. From that year till the eve of VJ Н
day, this American Air unit had undergone great changes in terms of Н
organization, subordination, even name. But one thing remained Н
unchanged and that was they fought against the Japanese under the Н
command of Chennault and they had made contributions to the victory of Н
the Chinese War of Resistance Against Japan. However, for a long time, Н
Chinese historians did not give due attention to or make objective Н
assessment of this issue in Sino-US military relations. One reason for Н
this is that in the past, historians' attitudes toward this issue were Н
affected by the assessment of Chennault's personal political position, Н
that is, Chennault himself was always adamant in his support of Chiang Н
Kai-shek and opposition to the Communists. Another reason is that, the Н
positive contributions made by Chennault and the American airmen in Н
China during the Chinese War of Resistance Against Japan were often Н
overlooked by historians in articles commenting on the Stilwell Н
Incident because they were easily preoccupied by some of Chennault's Н
inappropriate strategies such as the view that a considerable air Н
force would be able to bring Japan to her knee. Therefore, this essay Н
will probe into the close relationship between American Air Force in Н
China and Chinese War of Resistance Against Japan from another point Н
of view. We sincerely invite criticism from other historians.$
#T4I. From American Volunteers in Chinese Air Force$
to American Air Task Force in China$
(August, 1941 -- March, 1943)#t
#M1American Air Force in China and Chinese War of Resistance Against Н
Japan#m
#M2American Studies in China#m
By the summer of 1941, Japanese invaders had already occupied more Н
than half of Chinese territory while the United States, on the other Н
shore of the Pacific, had not yet declared war on Japan. However, on Н
August, 1. the Chinese Government in Chongqing made formal Н
announcement in a Communique that the American Volunteers, composed of Н
American pilots, had been established and become a unit of Chinese Н
Armed Forces.#+[1] This marked the beginning of American participation Н
in China's war against Japan. But how did American Volunteers in Н
Chinese Air Force come into being?$
On the Chinese side, since the "September 18th Incident", the Н
Kuomintang Government, due to the ever-growing strength of Japanese Н
Air Force, realized the importance of strengthening the Air Force and Н
took many measures and efforts to catch up within a certain period of Н
time. However, air force development did not achieve much. Because old Н
China had a poor foundation for industry and lacked financial Н
resources and technology.#+[2] And the embezzlement and corruption of Н
government officials made it more difficult to develop Air Force НКwithin a short period of time. Chinese Air Force development, thus, Н
had to depend wholly on foreign countries while China itself could Н
only produce parachutes.#+[3] After the "July 7th Incident", under the Н
attack of powerful Japanese Air Force, the pitiably small Chinese Air Н
Force was further weakened. At the end of 1940, the number of combat Н
aircraft was reduced from 314 before the "July 7th Incident" to 65. Н
Wang Shijie, the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Kuomintang Н
Government held that the Air Force had completely lost its fighting Н
power.#+[4]$
On the contrary, in order to thwart the Chinese resistance materially Н
and psychologically, Japanese Air Force, starting from May, 1939, Н
intensified its air offensive and frequently bombarded the southwest Н
areas which had not been occupied by Japan with squadrons ranging from Н
10 planes to more than 100 planes for 2 or 3 years running. Since Н
China had already lost its air domination, except for a few Н
antiaircraft guns, few large squadrons of fighters took off to Н
intercept enemy planes. In July, 1941, the reckless Japanese planes Н
even dared to land on Taipingci Airport in Chengdu and grabbed the KMT Н
flag when they raided Chengdu.#+[5] Therefore the period from the Н
second half of 1940 to the first half of 1941 was called the "Darker Н
Era" in China Air Force history.#+[6] Facing the ever-growing air Н
crisis, the KMT Government had to take measures to ease the situation. Н
At that time, the only feasible way was to seek international aid yet Н
such aid was very difficult to obtain. The Soviet Air Force Н
Volunteers, who had rendered strong support to China, had returned Н
home due to changes in European situation. Requests put forward to Н
Britain had been politely rejected. Thus the KMT Government went all Н
out to secure aid from the United States.$
As early as January, 1940, the KMT Government had expressed the hope Н
that the United States could assign some pilots as coaches at Н
Kuomintang Aviation School. But the American Government was very cool Н
to the request because it wanted to maintain neutrality, despite the Н
sympathetic public opinion at that time. In June, 1940, when the Н
Chinese side intended to invite an officer in American Air Force to Н
act as the general coach at the Air Force Staff School, American War Н
Department did not give him the permission. Afterwards, in addition to Н
seek help through normal diplomatic communications, the KMT government Н
also tried private channels. On October, 18, Chiang Kai-shek met Н
Nelson Trusler Johnson, American Ambassador to China, and explicitly Н
raised the question of aid in planes. Chiang argued that American Air Н
Force Aid was necessary because it could boost Chinese Н
people's determination in fighting the Japanese, raise the morale of Н
the soldiers and, threaten the flanks of Japanese Force.#+[7]$
The American Government began, therefore, to consider the following Н
requests put forward by the Chinese: to obtain 500 to 1000 aircrafts Н
from the United States within one year and American Volunteers coming Н
to China to help fight against the Japanese. Through heated argument, Н
in order to gain time to arm themselves and also to prevent the Н
Japanese from expanding to the south at least before April, 1942,#+[8] Н
the American Government decided to take out, for the time being, Н
100 P-40 aircrafts from the supply to Britain and to transfer to China Н
these planes. In terms of Volunteers, President Roosevelt decided to Н
offer support in spite of the strong opposition from the military Н
circles. On Dec. 15, 1940, President Roosevelt permitted in an Act Н
American pilots to leave American Air Force and go to fight in China НКand he also commanded the State, Army, Navy and Finance Departments to work out Н
detailed plans for the above proposal.$
Obviously, the establishment of American Volunteers in China's Air Force Н
was a product of Chinese consciousness of the air crisis and US Н
analysis of Far East situation. After fairly sufficient preparation, Н
on August, 1, 1941, the American Volunteers were formally set up and Н
Chennault was appointed Colonel commander-in-chief. Chennault, a Н
Texas-born ex-Captain of an air unit in the Army, had been the adviser Н
of Chinese air defense since 1937 and had devoted himself to China's air Н
defence and air force development. In spite of these, the Volunteers Н
at that time was far from being satisfactory either in staff or in Н
equipment. The Volunteers only had three fighter squadrons with 112 Н
airmen most of whom had never flown a fighter nor did they have any Н
experience in fighting against the Japanese Air Force. Some members Н
had to be relieved because they could not meet the requirements even Н
after the training. The cambat planes used by the Volunteers were Н
outdated Curtis P-40 aircrafts. Although this kind of fighter had Н
advantages in rectilinear flight and diving speed and better-equipped Н
armor to protect pilots, it was overshadowed by the Japanese major Н
combat fighters--Zero-type fighters in terms of #^climbing#^^ speed and Н
flexibility.#+[9] What's worse, at first, the P-40 fighters of the Н
Volunteers had no sighting device, bomb racks, auxiliary tanks and Н
lacked stocked spare parts. Therefore, quite a number of military Н
experts thought the Volunteers would last no more than 3 weeks in the Н
battles.#+[10] Even Chennault himself never expected to achieve much Н
by their efforts.#+[11] According to the current situation, the first Н
thing Chennault did was to borrow British airports in Burma as the Н
training sites for the Volunteers. He worked out new tactics which Н
suited the Volunteers based on the summary of his observations of Н
fighting with Japanese aircraft since he came to China. That is the Н
coordination of two fighters and "Hit-and-Run" guerilla tactics.$
When the Volunteers were founded, the situation in the Far East became Н
more tense. In late July, 1941. Japan and French Viche regime reached Н
an agreement, by which the Japanese secured the right to use 8 Н
airports and one navy base in Vietnam. In November, Japan allocated Н
245 fighters to the south of Vietnam and intended to invade and attack Н
Yunnan Province. Thus, Chiang Kai-shek asked British Air Force in Н
Singapore for help, and in the mean time, required the American Н
Volunteers to come back to defend Kunming. Just at that moment, the Н
Pacific War broke out and the Japanese forces in Burma were ready to Н
attack. The British forces asked the American Volunteers to Н
defend Rangoon. As a result, this small-size air force unit was Н
divided into two sub-groups. Two fighter squadrons flew to defend Н
Kunming while the other one stationed in Rangoon.$
Since June, 1940 (except Sundays), Kunming was almost daily bombarded Н
by the Japanese at 10 o'clock in the morning. Since China was in no Н
position to fight an air war, Japanese bombers never needed fighters Н
to escort them. However, it was no longer the case when the American Н
Volunteers came to Kunming on December, 19. On December 20, ten Н
Japanese bombers attacked Kunming as usual. The American Volunteers Н
took off to intercept. The battle ended in the total destruction of Н
the Japanese bombers and Kunming was unscathed.#+[12]$
The first victory of the Volunteers greatly inspired the Kunming Н
citizens, who suffered a lot from air raids. "The good news spread Н
quickly and everybody was delighted and excited." Five days later, the НКJapanese airplanes suffered another severe whipping. Since then, for Н
about one year, the Japanese could not raid Kunming.$
The third fighter squadron of the Volunteers in Burma was led by David Н
Olson. Strategically it was under the command of the British but Н
tactically it was directed by Chennault. It was comparatively weaker Н
in strength, and did not have as complete air defence information Н
network as the other two fighter squadrons in Kunming. Even under such Н
unfavorable situation, this squadron destroyed 7 and damaged 2 Н
Japanese planes in their first encounter with Japanese air force on Н
December 23. American pilots fought courageously during the battle. As Н
the Japanese later reinforced their attacks in Burma, this squadron Н
lost many aircraft. As a result Chennault sent another 17 P-40 Н
fighters to assist the third squadron. By the end of the Battle of Н
Rangoon in March, 1942, this squadron had participated in 31 air Н
combats and destroyed 217 Japanese fighters with another 43 listed as Н
being possibly destroyed. Their sacrifice for this achievement was 4 Н
pilots and 14 P-40 fighters. Although, Rangoon fell later, their Н
contributions were indelible. King George VI of Britain awarded the Н
American Volunteers fighting in Rangoon the Medal of Cross, the Н
highest honor in Britain.#+[14]$
After the fall of Rangoon, the third squadron also moved to Kunming Н
for a short rest and reorganization. And they joined the Chinese Air Н
Force to launch a series of sudden attacks on Burma. But these attacks Н
were small in scale and did not draw much attention of the Н
Japanese.#+[15] In May, 1942, north Burma fell into enemy hands, Н
so the American Volunteers shouldered the responsibility of preventing Н
the Japanese troops from crossing the Nu River and attacking Yunnan. Н
On May, 2, Japan's 56 Division captured Nankan on the Chinese Burmese Н
border. On May, 5, the Japanese main forces advanced to areas along Н
the Nu River. They had to stop advancing due to the destruction of Н
Huitong Bridge over the river. Since the situation was tense, Chiang Н
Kai-shek, through Madame Song Meiling, asked the Volunteers to go all Н
out to attack the trucks and ships in the area between the Nu River Н
and Longling. The American Volunteers at this time had already had the Н
ability to shoulder the task of bombing the enemy after a period of Н
rest and reorganization. The improved P-40 E-type fighters which had Н
recently been transferred from Africa also enabled the Volunteers to Н
throw bombs at the enemies. Since May, 7, under the command of Н
Chennault, the Volunteers overcame difficulties before the monsoon Н
and conducted bombing for five days running of the Japanese advance Н
troops, the warehouse of military goods and materials and vital Н
transportation lines, etc. As a result, with the long supply line of Н
the Japanese and the coming of monsoon, the Japanese forces failed to Н
cross the Nu River and thus it helped ease the tension in Kunming. At Н
the same time, the Japanese Air Force assigned two squadrons No.50 and Н
No.8 to Laxu Airport to attack Kunming, Yunnan Railway Station and Н
Dali, with the intention of assisting its ground forces. But they had Н
to admit that "since the fearless counterattack and tactics of the Н
enemies, our side also suffered great losses."#+[16]$
With the coming of the monsoon, the combat in Burma came to an end. Up Н
to then, along the China-Burma-Vietnam line, the American Volunteers Н
had involved in more than 100 air battles and destroyed 260 enemy Н
planes. After they succeeded in blocking the Japanese from crossing Н
the Nu River, the American Volunteers moved their main force to Н
Chongqing, Hengyang, Guilin, Lingling and other bases. When a squadron НКof the Volunteers first flew to Chongqing, citizens there, who had Н
long suffered from the Japanese air raids, were extremely excited. Н
"Large crowds could be found on verandas, in the courtyards and Н
streets. People are cheering and cheering, waving their hats, clothes, Н
flags and some raising their babies over their heads to show their Н
happiness. Their joyous shouts shook the city and could be heard Н
everywhere in the city. It was the first time for them to see planes Н
on their side."#+[17]$
While the American Volunteers were fighting in south and central Н
China, the force itself underwent an enormous readjustment since its Н
foundation. On the one hand, quite a number of the staff departed due Н
to the expiration of the contract. On the other hand, the United Н
States had long before declared war on Japan, so it was not necessary Н
for the Volunteers to keep its form and title. In addition, the Н
Chinese Government together with the press both in the U.S. and China Н
demanded and advocated the strengthening of U.S. Air Force aid to Н
China. The United States, with the approval of the Chinese Government, Н
disbanded the Volunteers on June, 27 and the decision became effective Н
on July, 4. The reorganized Volunteers and the newly arrived Air Force Н
officers formed the United States Air Task Force in China, under the Н
command of Chennault, who was then Brigadier General. The task force was Н
somewhat more powerful than the former Volunteers since it now had Н
under it the 23rd Fighter Group, the 16th Fighter Squadron and the 16th Bomber Н
Squadron.$
Although the United States Volunteer had disbanded, the contributions Н
they had made to the War of Resistance Against Japan were indelible. Н
This was not only shown in their outstanding achievement of defeating Н
a large and strong enemy with smaller and weaker force and destroyed Н
300 enemy planes within 11 months, but also shown in the fact that Н
their participation enabled the Chinese Air Force to go through a dark Н
era, and greatly inspired the Chinese people. The Communists Party Н
praised the Volunteers "for displaying the courage and determination of Н
the American air force to fight against the Japanese and their Н
excellent skill."#+[18] The KMT Government awarded the Volunteers with Н
medals for their bravery and great achievement.$
The Air Task Force in China, after reorganization, was a formal unit of Н
regular force, much stronger in equipment and staff. The core of the Н
force was still those former Volunteers. However, since many veteran Н
Volunteers had departed, the combat effectiveness was weakened for a Н
period of time. Under this circumstance, the Task Force started Н
fighting against Japan in southeast China. From the very beginning, Н
American fighters taking off form Hengyang base subjected Japanese Н
airports, warehouse, ships and military camps in Wuhan, Guangzhou, Н
Nanchang and Jiujiang to constant bombing. On July, 19, American Н
fighters even attacked the Headquarters of Japanese Ground Forces in Н
Linchuan. They also provided air protection for Chinese forces who Н
were fighting bitterly with the Japanese in the Linchuan Battle, which Н
changed the situation that the Chinese forces always had to fight Н
without air cover.$
All these constituted a great threat to the Japanese in the occupied Н
area in Central China so Japan decided to eliminate the Air Task Force Н
before it could get a firm foothold in the area. Since July 30, 118 Н
planes operated by experienced Japanese pilots succeeded in breaking Н
through Hengyang air defence network and took turns to bomb Hengyang Н
for 36 hours. The Task Force fought fiercely with the Japanese. As a НКresult, the Japanese not only failed in destroying the Hengyang base, Н
but lost 17 fighters and bombers.#+[20] In the following month, the Н
Task Force extended their front line to Burma and Vietnam. On August Н
12, bomber squadron first attacked Haifang, an area outside China, Н
which was occupied by the Japanese. Later, the other Japanese military Н
bases, arsenals, oil depots in Burma and Vietnam were frequently Н
bombed. According to the statistics of July and August, the Air Task Н
Force had attacked the occupied areas in China, military installations Н
and military positions in Vietnam and Burma for 23 times. The Japanese Н
lost 28 planes in the battles and 30 planes were destroyed on the Н
ground, while the Air Task Force only lost five planes and four Н
pilots.#+[21] By the end of October, the American task force also made Н
a raid on north China and bombarded a coal mine of Kailuan Company in Н
the east of Hebei Province. It was regarded as the "first air raid in Н
North China". They also attacked Hongkong, Kowloon. On November, 25, Н
the American planes made their first night attack on Hankou, where the Н
Japanese military installations and gunboats suffered damage. Although Н
these operations still fell under the "Hit-and-Run" guerrilla tactics Н
they revealed the tenacious spirit of the American Task Force and they Н
also showed that the Japanese Air Force could no longer have the air Н
control totally in its own hands as before.$
Although the Air Task Force had challenged the air control of Japan, Н
it still had a lot of difficulties to overcome before it could Н
completely seize the air control. This was not only due to the fact Н
that Japan had advantages in terms of the number of planes and Н
training, supplies, equipment and transportation,#+[22] but also due Н
to the fact that the Air Task Force had a great shortcoming: once Н
their planes were damaged, it took a long time for them to recover and Н
other supplies were also lacking because of the limited capacity of Н
the Hump transportation. Therefore, in the second half of 1942, both Н
American and Chinese press strongly demanded that American Air Force Н
in China be reinforced. One American newspaper stated that "in order Н
to make it possible to take over hard work, necessary supplies must be Н
provided as soon as possible."#+[23] General Chennault had a clearer Н
picture of the situation and proposed several times to the American Н
Government for further reinforcement. On October, 8, 1942, Chennault, Н
in his letter to Wendell Willkie, special envoy of the President, made Н
an assessment on the war situation. He asked the American Government Н
to provide 105 new model fighters, 30 medium-size bombers, and 12 Н
heavy bombers in the following months. He held that it is essential to Н
keep an air force of this size. But loss was inevitable during the Н
war, therefore, he asked that 30% of fighters and 20% bombers should Н
be replenished.#+[24] In order to persuade the President, Chennault Н
emphasized that if his plan could be successfully carried out, it Н
could not only be beneficial to the development of General MacArthur and the Н
Navy in the Pacific Ocean, but also could make the Chinese permanent Н
friends of the United States. Besides, Japan could be driven out of Н
China within half a year.#+[25] Since Chennault's proposal was Н
supported by Harry Hopkins, Lauchlin Currie, advisers to President Н
Roosevelt, and Chiang Kai-shek was also actively lobbying, Roosevelt Н
turned to be positive on this issue.$
#T4II. From the founding of the 14th Air Force of the U.S.$
to the end of the air war over Chinese Territorial$
Space (March, 1943--March, 1945)#t
At the Conference of Casablanca held in January, 1943, President НКRoosevelt emphasized the political influence of the expansion of U.S. Н
Air Force stationed in China, pointing out that regular bombing of the Н
Japanese would "greatly encourage the Chinese people". In his telegram to Н
Chiang Kai-Shek after the conference, President Roosevelt promised to Н
immediately reinforce Chennault.#+[26] On March, 8, Roosevelt made his Н
final decision on America's major military plan in China in 1943: the Н
establishment of the 14th Air Force, the gradual increase of its Н
strength to 500 fighters; if conditions of equipment permitted, the Н
increase of the amount of China-India air lift to 10,000 tons a month. Н
On the 11th, the Task Force of American Air Force in China was Н
reorganized into the 14th Air Force. Chennault was designated Major Н
General Commander of the force. The 14th Air Force was independent of Н
the 10th Air Force, whose main tasks were to protect its own Н
transportation line over the Hump; to search out and destroy Japanese Н
planes and military camps; to bomb Japan's military installations in Н
China; to bomb Japanese ships along Chinese coast and nearby islands; Н
to destroy enemy's supplies and military installations in Indo-China, Н
Burma, Thailand and Taiwan; to encourage China's Anti-Japanese war and Н
to use all means possible to support ground forces.#+[27]$
However, though the 14th Air Force got support from President Н
Roosevelt, it did not mean that Chennault could carry out his military Н
plan smoothly. On the contrary, since the Yunnan-Burma road was not Н
yet open, the provisions of the 14th Air Force could only rely on the Н
air lift over the Hump. Though the transport division of American Air Н
Force had made great efforts, the goods and materials available were Н
limited. In addition, the 14th Air Force was still under the authority Н
of Stilwell, who was in charge of material distribution, so it did not Н
receive any priority in distribution of material. What's worse, since Н
the monsoon came ahead of time, the transport line over the Hump was Н
almost completely cut off in April, 1943. During the first 10 days in Н
April, the 14th Air Force received only 45 tons of supplies, instead Н
of 245 tons as planned. The Air Force had to stop its operation Н
temporarily. In fact, there was only one sortie in April, that is, on Н
the 24th, nine B-25 Bombers attacked a Japanese Base in Burma.$
By taking advantage of the situation of American Air Force in China, Н
Japan strengthened its air attack. At the end of March, No.3 Flight Н
Regiment of Japanese Air Force first attacked Guilin from Guangzhou. Н
At the beginning of April, American front bases in Hengyang, Lingling Н
and Jianou were also attacked. Since March 30, the Japanese made up Н
to 80 sorties on Lishui Airport for three days in succession; on Н
April 22, the Japanese attacked Lingling with a fleet of 44 planes. Н
They attacked Yimei airport in Yunnan on the same day, destroying 17 Н
American planes. On April 29, 31 Japanese fighters attacked Guilin Н
again, forcing American Air Force to retreat.$
This situation forced the Chinese government to suggest that Roosevelt Н
call Stilwell and Chennault back to Washington for consultation. At Н
the end of April, Chennault submitted to Roosevelt his military plan Н
for the second half of 1943 when he got back to the US. The main Н
contents were: the 14th Air Force planned to gain air control over Н
China within two months since July. Then it would carry out offensive Н
in three stages to destroy Japanese transportation line and Japanese Н
homeland, to destroy Japanese ships up to 600,000 tonnage in 6 months. Н
As far as supplies were concerned, from July to September, 4700 tons Н
were needed for each month. From September on, 7100 tons were needed Н
for each month.#+[28] Taking the above-mentioned plan into НКconsideration, especially the plight of the 14th Air Force, Roosevelt Н
decided to take measures to meet Chennault's demand. At the Trident Н
Conference in Washington in May, Roosevelt expressly held that every Н
month, out of the 7000 tons of materials air lifted over the Hump Н
4,700 tons should go to American Air Force in China. In order to Н
increase the airlift capacity over the Hump, Roosevelt Н
assigned another officer to take charge of the air lift after the Н
meeting. As a result, the airlift tonnage increased from 3,000 tons in Н
May to 5,500 tons in July.$
Due to these measures, the supplies of the 14th Air Force were Н
improved to some extent. It became active again in the air. On May 4, Н
six B-24 bombers flew to attack Hanoi, Vietnam. They also bombed Н
Sanya, a city on the southern end of Hainan Island occupied by the Н
Japanese. During the bombing of Hanoi, 75% of the bombs hit the Н
targets. Therefore this action was proclaimed by Henry Lewis Stimson, Н
Secretary of War, as "the most significant and the most destructive Н
air raid of the allied air force taking off from Chinese base."#+[29] Н
From May 6, the main part of American Air Force began to shift to Н
Guilin. On the morning of the 8th, 56 planes had been transferred. On Н
the same day 7 American planes air-raided the Tianhe and Baiyun Н
airports of the Japanese air force in Guangzhou, destroying 20 Н
Japanese planes.$
The bombing offensive of American air force in China soon aroused the Н
great concern of Japanese Military Headquarters. It warned the Н
Japanese Air Force of American bombers moving into Guilin. It asked Н
the reinforcement of air outposts in North Kyushu, Taiwan and occupied Н
territories in China. Meanwhile, it instructed the Japanese southern Н
army to cooperate in the air battle in China.#+[30]$
At the same time, to increase the capacity of transportation on the Н
Yangtze River and to eliminate Chinese army on the right bank of the Н
Yangtze River from Dongting Lake to Yichang, Japanese No.11 Army began Н
its "elimination battle on the Yangtze River" from early May to mid-Н
June. Thus, in addition to the air battles over Yunnan, the 14th Air Н
Force also shouldered the task of air support for Chinese army in Н
Hubei Province. Chennault said, "during that time, it was common for a Н
pilot to strafe along the Yangtze River one day, and 48 hours later Н
attacked Japanese bombers in Yunnan."#+[31] During the first ten days Н
in June, the 14th Air Force continued to bomb in turn Yichang, Puxin, Н
Bailuoji and other places in west Hubei in large formation, which Н
damaged the miliary center and facilities of the enemy, and gave Н
effective cover to the Chinese ground forces. As a result, Japanese Н
army was defeated. Chinese and American forces gained a full victory Н
in west Hubei. Both Chinese and American sides highly praised the air Н
support from the 14th Air Force. An American Major remarked that Н
"Chennault's Air Force, though small, was such a great help to the Н
Chinese Army that I could not find another better example." Xinhua Н
Daily also commented in one short editorial that, "this victory was Н
achieved with the help of the Air Force."#+[32]$
Chennault began to think that the "Guerrilla Era" for American plane Н
was over. He decided to move his force from the rear to the advance Н
bases in the east as the first stage of his plan. From the 19th of Н
June, except for a fighter squadron and No. 308 Bomber Group still Н
stationing in Kunming, other squadrons flew to Guilin, Lingling and Н
Hengyang, so that the American Air Force in these three bases reached Н
considerable strength. The Japanese side was sensitive to the eastward НКmovement of American planes. Not only the invasion army in China Н
desperately needed to strengthen the air force. the Headquarters also Н
seriously felt that it was urgent to reinforce Japanese Air Force in Н
China to neutralize American air force. Therefore, on the one hand, Н
the Headquarters asked the southern army and its air force to assist Н
in bombing American bases in southwest China, on the other hand on Н
June, 7, it moved one fighter squadron from the Guangdong Army and two Н
heavy bomber squadrons from the southern Army and put them under the Н
Japanese Army in China.#+[33] By mid-July the air force of the Н
invasion army in China reached three fighter groups, two light bomber Н
groups and two heavy bomber groups.$
On July, 7, the 14th Air Force began to bomb Guangzhou; on the 8th, Н
they attacked Haifang; on the 9th, No.308 bomber group made a number Н
of sorties against Japanese ships in the Tonkin Bay, thus Н
ushering in the summer battle of 1943. In reaction to the American Н
offensive the Japanese air force launched a large scale counterattack Н
starting from July 23 in order to protect its transportation line. Н
More than 150 fighters and bombers took off from Wuhan and Guangzhou Н
bases on that day and bombed Hengyang, Lingling and Guilin airports, Н
which marked the beginning of the 9-day battle for the air control in Н
south China. On the first day, Japanese forces lost 8 fighters, 6 Н
bombers. For the following 8 days, they lost altogether 62 aircraft Н
while the Americans only lost 8 aircraft and 3 pilots.#+[34]$
When the air war turned violent, the 14th Air Force once again had the Н
support of Roosevelt. On August, 7, soon after George E. Stratemeyer, Н
the newly appointed air chief of the army in the India-Burma Theater, Н
arrived in India, he sent reinforcement to American air force in Н
China, thus increasing Chennault's power. Japanese air force, after Н
three weeks of rest and reorganization launched another counterattack Н
in mid-August. Bur even the Japanese acknowledged that, "nowadays Н
American Air Force in China are competent, and the pilots are better Н
qualified than those fighting in the south".#+[35] Therefore at the Н
end of August, the Japanese could not manage to neutralize the summer Н
offensive of the Americans. In September and October, the 14th Air Н
Force extended its range of activities to the whole of central and Н
south China. The force also assisted the Chinese army fighting in Н
north Yunnan and west Burma by bombing Japanese military installations Н
and camps. Since the Japanese were losing their air Н
control in China, their way and scale of fighting also changed. In Н
order to avoid interception of American planes, the Japanese air raids Н
on South China were seldom conducted in daytime, and most of them had Н
the characteristic of uncertain whereabouts and were small in size.$
The American Air Force in China were not satisfied with these Н
achievements. They were actively preparing for new offensive. On Н
November 4, "Chinese-American Air Force Composite Division", on the Н
suggestion of Chennault, was established and moved into their Н
respective airports. According to the American Intelligence officer in Н
the division, with the latest P-40 fighters and B-25 Bombers, the Н
Division was an unmatched offensive Air Force.#+[36] At that time the Н
Japanese army were mustering 100,000 ground Forces and 250 aircraft to Н
attack the 6th War zone, initiating the Battle of Changde. The newly-Н
setup composite division joined the 14th Air Force in the bombing of Н
the Japanese in Changde, Huarong with more than 200 planes since Н
November. According to Bai Chongxi, from November 10 to December 16, Н
280 sorties of bombers and 1476 sorties of fighters were made bringing НКdown 25 enemy planes and destroying 12 planes on the ground, and Н
sinking a great number of ships and bringing losses to the Н
army.#+[37]$
Besides, the 14th Air Force Chinese-American Composite Division Н
achieved considerable results in attacking Japanese ships along Н
southeast coast. In November, another important action of the two Н
groups was the air raid on Xinzhu airport in Taiwan. The Xinhua Daily Н
regarded it as "a historical sudden attack on Thanksgiving Day". On Н
the 25th, under the leadership of Colonel Tex Hill, Sino-US Air Force Н
raided Xinzhu airport which was only 660 miles from Japan, destroying Н
more than 40 Japanese planes. This was not only the best record of the Н
American air force in the Far East, but also the first bombing by Н
allied forces of Taiwan since the U.S. entered the war. Therefore it Н
greatly shocked the Japanese Headquarters and was the immediate cause Н
of the Yu-Xiang-Gui Battle launched by the Japanese Army in the spring Н
of 1944 with the direct purpose of destroying American bases on Н
Chinese mainland.$
When time moved into 1944, the 14th Air Force was further strengthened Н
with 254 fighters and bombers and material supplies which used to be Н
Chennault's headache, were improved. In the last few months in 1943, Н
the air lift tonnage over the Hump gradually increased. Since the Н
Transportation Division was better equipped with advanced Н
communication and navigation facilities and renovated B24DS aircraft, Н
it succeeded in making their slogan of "airlifting 10,000 tons by Н
Christmas" a reality.#+[38]$
As early as in October 1943, Chennault worked out a plan for 1944, Н
which divided China into two battle theaters along the 108 east Н
longitude. The actions in the first half of the year were mainly on Н
the west battle theater due to the weather, supporting battles in Н
Burma, safeguarding the airlift over the Hump; in the second half of Н
the year, they would conduct air battles in east China, aiming at Н
destroying Japanese Air Force and transportation capacity. In order to Н
realize the plan, Chennault demanded that the supplies in the first  Н
half of the year be increased from 1,900 tons in January to 6200 tons Н
in June in east battle field, whereas in the west battle field, the Н
supplies be decreased from 6900 tons, in January to 2700 tons. Since Н
he was especially concerned with the actions in the east, Chennault Н
also demanded that 20,000 tons of materials should be stockpiled Н
before July in the east theatre. As far as combat planes were Н
concerned, Chennault#O
&hoped by autumn he could have 6 fighter Н
squadrons, 2 medium-size bomber groups and 3 heavy bomber Н
groups.#+[39] However, since the American air force planners in the Н
army had already proposed to air raid Japan proper by using long-range Н
bomber taking off from Chinese bases, Chennault's plan did not obtain Н
support. In addition, the supplies that Chennault demanded were so Н
immense that it was reasonable for General Stratemeyer to refuse him Н
from the position of rear-service. In fact, Chennault's plan was too Н
subjective itself. He did not pay enough attention to movements of the Н
Japanese Army. In spite of this, it was proved later that his demand Н
of stockpile of supplies in east battle theater was of strategic Н
wisdom.$
With the strengthening of American Air Force in China since the summer Н
of 1943, the Japanese Army realized that the past tactics of "joint Н
attack of fighters and bombers" did not work effectively. In addition, НКAmerican Air Force's attack on Japanese transportation along Chinese Н
south-eastern coast and along the Yangtze River area had to be taken Н
into consideration. Since November Japanese began to try to work out a Н
plan which would completely solve the problem of air control in China. Н
At the beginning of November, Japanese General Chief of Staff Shanshan Н
first pointed out, "if it was difficult to neutralize American Air Н
Force in China, ... why can't we occupy the railway from Canton to Н
Wuhan so that the American Air Force could not use the bases in Н
southeastern China?"#+[40]_ On January 24, 1944, the proposal was Н
approved by the Emperor. Thus the last large scale action plan in Н
Chinese Territory -- No.1 Battle Plan was formulated. The main Н
objectives were tactically, to eliminate American Air Force in China; Н
strategically, to open Railway from Canton to Wuhan, so that all the Н
railways in China would be connected, which would help support the Н
Japanese army in southeast Asia through transportation of materials Н
and troops. For this purpose, Japanese army planned to use more than Н
10 infantry divisions and 2 Divisions from the 5th Air Force.$
At first the allied force knew nothing about this plan and the 14th Н
Air Force did not readjust their activity at the beginning of 1944. Н
However, the assembly and progress of Japanese army in the winding Н
place of the old Yellow River course and along the Yangtze River Н
gradually aroused the attention of the 14th Air Force. Chennault began Н
to warn Stilwell that the deployment of Japanese army in Henan Н
Province was the most dangerous action after the Pearl Harbor Н
Incident. He suggested that 5000 tons of materials be air-lifted to Н
China in May; a reserved air force be set up, etc. Meanwhile, Н
Chennault sent bombers to attack the ships on the Yangtze River and Н
the transportation line around Jiujiang and Yueyang. In March, the Н
purpose of the movement of Japanese army became obvious, so Chennault Н
began to make his battle plan and to carry out preparation work. He Н
first ordered four fighter squadrons and one medium bomber squadron Н
from Chinese-American composite Division to move into airports in Н
Liangshan, Enshi, Hanzhong, Ankang and other places in Sichuan-Н
Shaanxi area, trying to destroy the iron bridge across the Yellow Н
River before the Japanese army crossed the river. However, the Н
Japanese army first ushered in the Henan Battle on April 17. Н
Ironically, on the same day, Stilwell demanded that the primary task Н
of the 14th Air Force was to protect the B-29 Bombers' Base in Н
Chengdu.$
In order to coordinate with the attack of the ground force, Japanese Н
air force assembled more than 90 planes in Xinxiang, Henan, and Н
Yuncheng, Zhangde to bomb the position of the Chinese army. On April Н
19 alone, the Japanese army flew more than 200 sorties, dive bombing Н
Chinese army for scores of times. The air control was completely held Н
by the Japanese. It was not until the 28th that the Chinese-American Н
Air Force began to bomb the iron bridge on the Yellow River. 
However, since the Japanese army had already set Н
up several substitute bridges, these bombardments could not prevent Н
the Japanese army from moving forward. On that very evening, the Н
Japanese army began to attack Xuchang.$
In May, American fighters began to be active in the battlefield, and Н
gained certain results. For example, on May 5, according to the report Н
from Stilwell's Headquarters, under the cover of American fighters, Н
bombers raided Xinyang marshaling yard and warehouses, the percentage Н
of hits reached 80%, which destroyed many lorries and military tanks. НКThe number of casualties of the enemy reached 300 to 400.#+[41]$
On May 27 the Battle of Hunan broke out. The vanguard of the Н
Japanese army spearheaded towards Changsha and captured it on June 18. Н
At that time, the 14th Air Force encountered difficulties in every Н
aspect. In terms of combat planes, 350 planes were used to fight in Н
the Nu River and to defend the B-29 Base in Chengdu, so there were Н
only 150 planes available in the defence of the east line, out of Н
which only 90 planes could really be engaged in fighting. The Н
provisions for an all-round attack could only last 30 days. What is Н
more dramatic, Stilwell demanded to remove Chennault's commanding Н
power on the day that the Japanese army began to invade Hunan. Finally, Н
at that time, the weather in Hubei and Hunan was very bad. Despite Н
this, from the beginning of June, American planes still frequently Н
carried out offensives. Sometimes they flew as many as 50 sorties a Н
day to effectively attack enemy's airports, ships, troops and Н
installations. But all these could not stop the Japanese from advancing Н
south. After the fall of Changsha, the Japanese army continued to move Н
towards Hengyang. On June, 22, American Air Force had to abandon its Н
first front base in East China--Hengyang Airport.$
At the beginning of July, though the Japanese army progressed smoothly Н
on the ground, American force in the air seemed to increase greatly. Н
Since the weather became well, American airplanes increased sorties, Н
which brought great difficulties to Japanese rear service. According Н
to Shanshan's reminiscence after the war, the raid of the 14th Air Н
Force, in addition to the flood, caused damage to the railway south of Н
Hankou, which was difficult to repair. Before the defeat of Japanese Н
first attack on Hengyang, the Japanese army did not receive any Н
supplies. On July 2, only very limited supplies reached Japanese Н
front.#+[42]$
However, at this critical moment, American Air Force faced a severe Н
shortage of gasoline. During the first week in July, Chennault had to Н
order B-24 bombers to retreat to Kunming. By July 13, the shortage of Н
gasoline became even worse. There were altogether only 12,500 tons in Н
Guilin and Liuzhou airports. To avoid being attacked at the airport Н
some more planes flew back to Kunming. For five days American planes Н
were grounded. On the east front, only the 5th Fighter Group could Н
take off to fight. Thus at a critical moment, American air force not Н
only lost its opportunity to support Chinese ground force, but also Н
suffered attack from Japanese air force. On July 23, 90th Division of Н
Japanese air force shifted to Guangdong, the main targets of which Н
were the American bases in Guilin and Liuzhou. On the same day, Н
Japanese planes destroyed 18 American planes during their raid on Н
Lingling airport. Five days later, they destroyed 36 American planes Н
in Liuzhou. Japanese planes also raided airports in Zhijiang and Н
Guilin later. At the same time, Japanese ground forces intensified Н
their attack on Hengyang under air cover. When sufficient gasoline was Н
brought to American front base the Japanese had already taken Hengyang Н
on August 8.$
After the fall of Hengyang, the situation in East China became more Н
serious. The American air force, after being replenished, returned to Н
the east front and conducted fierce booming raids. Estimated by the Н
Japanese army, more than 1000 sorties in 171 groups took place in Н
Central China. All these finally helped American Air Force to gain air Н
control in the battle field. For the period after that, American Air Н
Force tried to stop the Japanese from advancing southward through air НКattack and achieved some results. For example, on September 4, the Н
58th Division of the Japanese army was raided by American air force Н
several times near Baidi city. The Japanese army acknowledged that, Н
"the troops suffered great losses and the advance was halted."#+[43] On Н
the same day, troops under the 13th Division of the Japanese army in Н
Qiyang all suffered considerable casualties due to the air raids. Н
Nevertheless, though the bombing of American Air Force could slow the Н
speed of advance of the Japanese army temporarily, it could not change Н
the situation totally. On September 6 the Japanese army occupied Н
another front base of the American air force--Lingling airport.$
After that the Japanese army began its preparation for the last stage Н
of No.1 plan--the Battle of Guangxi. During this period, the Н
Headquarters of the Japanese army were still worried about the Н
American air force which would fly eastward to threaten Japan proper Н
and the sea transportation between important places in the south. So Н
it demanded that the Japanese army in China remove this threat.#+[44] Н
However, they did not reach this goal even after the Japanese occupied Н
Guilin and Liuzhou on Nov.11. That is because except for 7 airports Н
and 6 auxiliary runways that were occupied by the Japanese in the Yu-Н
Gui-Xiang Battle, the main strength of American Air Force did not Н
suffer any severe loss. On the contrary, as Chennault remarked, all Н
these "did not stop the 14th Air Force from fighting or diminishing Н
our intensity of fighting." In fact, the 14th Air Force had made new Н
deployment under the leadership of Chennault after the fall of front Н
bases in southeastern China. The Deployment was as follows: (1) to Н
reinforce the airports in Xi'an, Ankang, Hanzhong of Shaanxi Province Н
and various airports in Sichuan Province. The air force's major task Н
there was to defend Chengdu airport, cut off Tongpu, Longhai, Jinpu Н
and Jingsui railroads; (2) to enlarge and strengthen Laohekou and Н
Zhijiang airports northwest and southwest of Hankou. The Chinese-Н
American Composite Division was to station here and their main task Н
was to destroy bridges over the Yellow River and the Japanese Н
facilities along Jin-Han railway, and to attack the Nanjing-Shanghai Н
area; (3) to divide the 68th Wing of the air force into two parts. One Н
part including the Wing Headquarters and two squadrons stationed at a Н
series of new airports 100 li east of Kunming. Their task was to Н
support the Chinese forces along Guangdong-Hankou railway and cut off Н
the transportation line between south China and southeast Asia. The Н
other two squadrons moved to areas east of the Japanese occupied Н
regions. They stationed at Yichuan, Ganzhou and Nanxiong airports and Н
established East China Mobile Air Force. Chennault demanded that this Н
mobile force should guarantee the security of airports in east China Н
and attack ships in Shanghai, Nanjing and on the Yangtze River. In Н
this way, the 14th Air Force succeeded in setting up a new battle line Н
almost parallel to Guangdong-Hankou railway from south to north and Н
coordinating with Chinese ground forces.$
During this period, the supplies and equipment of the 14th Air Force Н
had been greatly improved. In the last three months in 1944, it could Н
receive 9274 tons of gasoline and lubricant each month.#+[45] Besides, Н
combat planes also increased both in quantity and in quality. Н
Therefore, American Air Force in China had the ability to launch air Н
attacks in every region. East China Mobile Air Force got involved in Н
attacking fortresses and strongholds from November 1944 to February Н
1945 with the help of the provisions line between Zhijiang, Ganzhou Н
and Suizhou. They flew 747 sorties and dropped 110 tons of explosives НКand damaged 312 Japanese planes.#+[46] The Chinese-American air force Н
in central China bombed Hankou on December 18, giving the major Н
Japanese air base in central China a devastating blow. On January 17, Н
they air raided Shanghai and made Japanese air force in Shanghai lose Н
65 aircraft. In February, American air force in China concentrated all Н
their forces on cutting off transportation lines. They destroyed 37 Н
bridges and 142 vehicles.#+[47]$
The American attacks forced Japan to readjust their air army in China. Н
But Japanese forces could not retrieve themselves from an inferior Н
position. In addition to this, the Japanese also had to defend their Н
homeland. So they had to recall some air divisions. The Japanese air Н
force was incapable of taking care of battles on mainland China and Н
"could only fight at minimum degree".#+[48] In March, 1945, the Н
Japanese aircraft on mainland China reduced in sorties and had no Н
ability to counterattack American air force. Thus, the Japanese army Н
finally lost their air battle capability and stopped their air Н
operation in reality five months prior to formal surrender.$
Through the brief review, it is not difficult for us to conclude that Н
during the four years' air battle against the Japanese, American air Н
force staff effectively cooperated with Chinese ground forces in Н
combats, captured air control in China and helped the Chinese air Н
force tie over its "dark era". Furthermore, American participation Н
greatly inspired the Chinese people. Nevertheless, during WW II the Н
U.S. adhered to the strategy of Europe first, so the development of Н
this unit of the American air force in China was limited and may not Н
be satisfactory at all times. However, only by taking all difficulties Н
into consideration could we understand its precious contributions to Н
China's anti-Japanese war. We should also be positive in evaluation of Н
General Chennault's contribution to the anti-Japanese war, for he had Н
led and directed the air force from beginning to end. Finally, we Н
should also point out that the achievement of the American air force Н
in China not only resulted from their own efforts, but also from the Н
great efforts of the broad masses of the Chinese people. This was not only Н
shown in the construction of airports, defence of airports, and Н
provision of air defence intelligence which was praised by Chennault Н
himself, it was also shown through the cooperation of the Chinese air Н
force.$
#T4NOTES#t
##[D1J100P80]
_#+[1]_The U.S. State Department ed., #FKRelations Between China and Н
the U.S.#FS_ (Wenhai Publishing Company Ltd., Taiwan, 1984), p.25.$
_#+[2]_According to the research done by Liu Fu, an American Chinese, Н
the annual output of crude iron in 1936, was only 870,000 tons, daily Н
production of oil was several hundred jins. There were only 200 medium Н
and small-size electric appliances factories, the majority of which Н
were located around Shanghai. Liu Fu, #FKChinese Modern Military Н
History#FS_ (Dongda Books Share-holding Company Ltd., Taiwan), 1986, Н
p.172.$
_#+[3]_Xu Tongye, "Thirty Years of Air Force Development," #FKOrient Н
Magazine#FS, No.1, Vo1. 38 (1941), p.12.$
_#+[4]_Institute of Modern History, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Н
ed., #FKCorrespondence of Hu Shi as Chinese Ambassador to the U.S.#FS_ 
(Chinese Book Company, 1978), p.80.$
_#+[5]_Li Chengde, "Chennault and Chen Xiangmei I Have Known," Н
#FKSelected Data on History,#FS_ Nanjing, Jiangsu, Vol.5, p.87.$К_#+[6]_Tao Xiong, "Five Years of Resisting against Japan of the Н
Chinese Air Force," #FKDa Peng Monthly,#FS_ Vo1.1, No.8, (January 1942), Н
p.13.$
_#+[7]_#FKForeign Relations of the United States (FRUS),#FS Far East, Н
1940, Vo1.4, p.674.$
_#+[8]_#FKBabara Tuckman, Stilwell and His Experience in China#FS_ Н
(Commercial Press, 1984), Vo1.1, p.305.$
_#+[9]_Don Moser, #FKWorld War II, China-Burma-India#FS_ (Morris Town: Н
Time-Life Books, Inc., 1980), p.60.$
_#+[10]_Ding Hao, "Manda Cornelius and Thayne Short," #FKAmerica's Air Н
War in China 1937-1945#FS_ (Pelican Publishing Company), 1980, p.120.$
_#+[11]_#FKFRUS, 1941#FS, Vo1.5, p.548.$
_#+[12]_Gerald Newman, "A German's Experience in China," #FKWorld Н
Vision#FS, No.7, 1987.$
_#+[13]_Xi Qiu, "Kunming Air Victory on December 20th", #FKYouth Air Н
Force#FS, Vo1.4, No.2 (January 1942)$
_#+[14]_#FKXinhua Daily#FS, Jan.8th, 1942.$
_#+[15]_Research Institute, Japanese Defence Ministry ed.,#FKBurma Н
Battle#FS_  (Chinese Book Company, 1983), Vol.1, p.154.$
_#+[16]_#FKBurma Battle#FS, Vo1.1, p.156.$
_#+[17]_Gragham Baker, #FKOld China in the Eye of an American#FS_ Н
(Sanlian Bookstore, 1987), p.342.$
_#+[18]_"Congratulation on the Victory of the Flying Tigers," Н
#FKXinhua Daily#FS, July 3rd, 1942.$
_#+[19]_Ibid.$
_#+[20]_Air Battle in Hengyang," #FKXinhua Daily#FS, Aug.4th, 1942.$
_#+[21]_"Stilwell announced the glorious achievements of America's Air Н
Force in China," #FKXinxin News#FS, Sept.20, 1942.$
_#+[22]_J. Baldon, General Chennault in the China Theater, #FKChinese Н
Air Force#FS, Vo1.2, No.12, (December 1942), p.370.$
_#+[23]_"American Press Opinion Emphasizing Aid to China," #FKXinhua Н
Daily#FS, July 24th, 1942.$
_#+[24]_General Clair Lee Chennault, #FKA Guide to His Papers in the Н
Hoover Institution Archives#FS_ (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, Н
1983), p.18.$
_#+[25]_Chennault, #FKGeneral Chennault and China#FS_ (Biography Н
Publishing Press, Taiwan, 1978), p.225.$
_#+[26]_Robert Dallek, #FKRoosevelt and American Foreign Policy#FS_ Н
(Commercial Press, 1984), Vol.2, pp.550-551.$
_#+[27]_Ding Hao, #FKAmerica's Air Force in China, 1937-1945#FS, Н
pp.290-291.$
_#+[28]_Liang Jingchun, #FKThe Stilwell Incident#FS, Commercial Press, Н
May 1973, pp.123-124.$
_#+[29]_#FKXinhua Daily#FS, May 8th 1943.$
_#+[30]_#FKCollected Data of Invasion of Japanese Militarism in Н
China#FS (extract translation from #FKArmy Department of the Н
Headquarters#FS), Vo1.2, p.765.$
_#+[31]_#FKGeneral Chennault and China#FS, p.361.$
_#+[32]_#FKXinhua Daily#FS, June 7th and 22nd respectively.$
_#+[33]_#FKCollected Data of Invasion of Japanese Militarism in Н
China#FS (extract translation from #FKArmy Department of the Н
Headquarters#FS), Vo1.2, pp.794-795.$
_#+[34]_"The Glorious Achievements of America's Air Force in China", Н
#FKXinhua Daily#FS, Aug.10th, 1945.$
_#+[35]_#FKXinhua Daily#FS, Aug.21st, 1943.$К_#+[36]_#FKXinhua Daily#FS, Nov.6th, 1943.$
_#+[37]_Su Zhirong and others trans. ed., #FKMemoir of Bai Chongxi#FS_ Н
(People's Liberation Army Press, May 1987), p.266.$
_#+[38]_Edwin Lee White, #FKTen Thousand Tons by Christmas#FS_  Н
(Florida: St. Petersburg, 1977), p.236.$
_#+[39]_Charles E.Romanus and Riley Sunderland, #FKStilwell's Command Н
Problems#FS_ (Washington, D.C., 1956), pp.22-23.$
_#+[40]_Research Institute, Japanese Defence Ministry ed., #FKFirst Н
Stage of No.1 Battle Plan, Henan Battle#FS,_ (Chinese Н
Book Company, 1982), Vol.1, p.4.$
_#+[41]_#FKXinhua Daily#FS, May 8th, 1944.$
_#+[42]_#FKStilwell's Command Problems#FS, p.400.$
_#+[43]_#FKSecond Stage of No.1 Plan, Battle of Hunan#FS; Vo1.2, p.138.$
_#+[44]_#FKCollected Data of Invasion of Japanese Militarism in China Н
(extract translation from #FKArmy Department of the Headquarters#FS), Н
p.367.$
_#+[45]_Charles E.Romanus and Riley Sunderland, #FKTime Runs Out in Н
CBI#FS_ (Washington, D.C., 1959), p.172.$
_#+[46]_Research Institute, Japanese Defence Ministry, ed., Н
#FKJapanese Army in China in 1945#FS_ (Chinese Book Company, Oct. 1982), 
Section One of the first volume, pp.139-140.$
_#+[47]_#FKJapanese Army in China in 1945#FS, Section Two of the first Н
volume, p.32.$
_#+[48]_#FKJapanese Army in China in 1945#FS, Section One of the first Н
volume, p.143.$#E