#?
#P[80]&#A*FAmerican^ Studies^ in^ China^ #FKVol.2#FS,^ 1995/_@#a$#P[100]
#J[-100]
#T3A BRIEF ANALYSIS$
OF THE "CONCENTRATION CAMPS$
OF SINO-AMERICAN COOPEATIVE$
ORGANIZATION (SACO)"#t
#T4DENG Youping#t
The term "Concentration Camps of Sino-American Cooperative Н
Organization" first appeared on the list of protected historical Н
relics published by the People's Committee of Sichuan Province on Н
August 16th, 1956.$
The former site of the "Concentration Camps of Sino-American Н
Cooperative Organization" refers mainly to a 5250-mu area between Н
Geleshan and Ciqikou in the northwestern suburb of Chongqing. The site Н
was named a provincial protected historical relic by the People's Н
Committee of Sichuan Province on the basis of the following facts: Н
according to the investigation conducted soon after liberation, it had Н
been the headquarters of Sino-American Cooperative Organization Н
(SACO); it had been a "secret agency of American imperialism and the Н
Jiang Jieshi bandit gang," as well as a "concentration camp where Н
revolutionaries were imprisoned and massacred. There were over 130 Н
types of cruel tortures here. Nobody knows how many communists and Н
progressives were murdered here." #+[1]It is proof of the crime Н
committed by the American and Jiang Jieshi reactionaries against the Н
Chinese revolutionaries.$
A large amount of historical materials that we have collected over the Н
years however, show that it lacks sufficient historical evidences to Н
assert that SACO was a concentration camp, a camp specially designed Н
to imprison, torture, and murder revolutionaries. The basic mistake of Н
this view lies in that it lumps together SACO and the Chongqing Н
concentration camps under the Statistical and Investigation Office of Н
the Military Commission (Jun-tong) which coincided in existence partly 
in time and space; and it links SACO, Н
rather farfetchedly, with many criminal Н
activities (e.g. the Nov.27 massacre on the eve of liberation) Н
committed by the Chongqing concentration camps under Jun-tong.$
This article will give a short account of the development and changes Н
of SACO and the Chongqing concentration camps under Jun-tong. The Н
author will draw his own conclusion from historical facts, and he Н
hopes to get valuable opinions and comments from other scholars.$
#M1A Brief Analysis of "Concentration Camps of SACO"#m
#M2American Studies in China#m
#T4I. The Founding of SACO: Background, Objectives,$
and the Major Activities of the Organization#t
1. A Specific Policy in the Specific Period$
The Japanese blitzkrieg on the American Pacific Fleet on December 8, Н
1941 smashed the Americans' wishful thinking of looking on at the war Н
and reaping third party profit. Fighting side by side with China against Н
Japan brought about new changes in Sino-U.S. relations: in addition to Н
the original relations between imperialism and semi-colony and between Н
strong power and weak power, a new element, relations between allies, Н
was added.$
In order to mobilize Chinese manpower to fight the Japanese and to Н
expand its own influence in China, the United States provided large НКamounts of economic, political, and military aids and support for the Н
Kuomintang (KMT) government. But in the face of the struggle between the two Н
biggest parties in China-the KMT and the Chinese Communist Н
Party, the United States feared that their aids and support would be Н
used by the KMT not to fight the Japanese, but to launch a new Н
civil war on a larger scale.$
From the American worries and dissatisfaction, we can draw the Н
conclusion that the general principle of the U.S. government toward Н
China during the Anti-Japanese War period was to unite all military Н
strength and to mobilize all resources in China to defeat Japan Н
rapidly.$
Against such a background and guided by such a policy, the  Н
establishment of Sino-American Cooperative Organization, could not be Н
for the purpose of setting up a secret service agency specially Н
designed to deal with the Chinese Communists and progressives.$
2. A Special Agency Serving a Special War$
The geographic positions of the United States and Japan decided that Н
the war between them mainly took place in the air and on the high Н
seas. Therefore the acquisition of meteorological, hydrologic, and Н
military intelligence in the Pacific ocean would guarantee American Н
victory over Japan. All those intelligence could be obtained only in Н
China. It was under such circumstances that Commander M.E. Miles of the Н
U.S. Navy was ordered to come to China in May, 1942, with the major Н
task of "collecting intelligence and harassing Japan."#+[2]$
With the introduction of Xiao Xinru, the Chinese military attache in Н
the Chinese embassy to the United States, Miles got in touch with Dai Н
Li, the chief of Jun-tong, as soon as he arrived in Chongqing. After Н
several rounds of negotiation, the two sides drafted a treaty entitled Н
"Agreement on Sino-American Cooperative Organization" in early 1943. Н
The Agreement was approved by President Roosevelt and Jiang Jieshi, Н
the paramount leaders of both sides, on April 15, 1943. "The American Н
representative who signed the Agreement was Secretary of Navy Knox, Н
the Chinese representative was Foreign Minister Song Ziwen. Then, Rear Н
Admiral Donovan, Colonel Xiao Xinru and 1 (Miles) signed. A blank was Н
left in the middle for General Dai Li. He signed on July 4 that year Н
in Chongqing, in celebration of the American Independence Day."#+[3]$
The Agreement first set forth its aim: "To enable China and the United Н
States to destroy their common enemy and to achieve military victory." Н
Article one stated: In order to deliver blows on our common enemy in Н
the coastal areas of China, and enemy-occupied areas in and out of Н
China, Sino-American Special Technology Cooperative Organization will Н
be established in China. The objective of the Organization is to base Н
itself in the China Theatre, to use American materials and Н
technologies to launch effective attacks on Japanese Navy, merchant Н
fleet and air force in the Far East and the mining sites, factories, Н
warehouses and other military facilities in the Japanese-occupied Н
areas." Article Three stated: "In order to guarantee the smooth Н
fulfillment of the tasks, the United States will provide materials Н
free of charge. The cooperation between the United States and China is Н
based on the friendship between the two sides. Therefore this program Н
will be named "friendly cooperation" in the United States, while its Н
English name in China will be "Sino-American Cooperative Н
Organization", the shorter form of which is SACO, with similar Н
pronunciation to the English word sock (meaning effective attack or Н
assault)."$КThe major tasks of the SACO were: "(1) To expand the collection and Н
exchange of intelligence for the reference of the supreme commands of Н
the two countries; (2) To arrange carefully the intelligence network Н
in the enemy's rear areas along the southeastern coastline, preparing Н
for the landing of U.S. forces; (3) To establish a network of Н
weather stations throughout China, and to provide weather forecasts to Н
be used as reference by the U.S. Navy and Air Force; (4) To intercept Н
and decipher the enemy's cables and to study the enemy's activities; Н
(5) To speed up the communication of intelligence in order to Н
forestall the enemy; (6) To expand the training of policemen and Н
secret agents in order to fight against traitors and spies and to Н
maintain public security; (7) to carry out psychological warfare; (8) Н
To step up sabotages in the enemy-occupied areas and to destroy the Н
enemy's military facilities and materials." #+[4]$
In accordance with those requirements, the secret agents of SACO soon Н
set up 165 weather stations and radio communication stations Н
throughout China. American secret agents held 22 training courses to Н
train more than 100,000 secret agents for Jun-tong; provided over Н
9,000 tons of ammunition, equipments and other military materiel and Н
organized a special troop of armed secret agents.$
What actually did this special troop do? Was their task to fight the Н
Japanese, or to help the KMT suppress the Chinese revolution? Н
Were their activities intercepting and deciphering military, political Н
and meteorologic intelligence, or arresting, imprisoning and murdering Н
political prisoners?$
Here are some statements written by people who had worked in SACO Н
which we hope can answer the questions mentioned above:$
$#FF#G[2]#G[-2]
"I was transferred from the interception station under the Special Н
Technological Department of the Military Commission to the 6th Н
(Interception and Deciphering) Group of SACO to be a monitor.... The Н
major task of this interception station was to intercept the cables of Н
the Japanese navy along the Chinese coast."$
-- Lu Wangzhi#FS#+[5]____#R
$#FF#G[2]#G[-2]
"During my stay in the Intelligence Group, I deciphered intelligence Н
both within and without China, among which the largest part was on Н
areas south of the Yangtze, e.g. maneuvers of the Japanese troops, Н
maneuvers of the puppet troops, arms and munitions stored in a certain Н
warehouse, or some designation of Japanese units appearing somewhere, Н
etc. There was some intelligence about the New Fourth Army, but it Н
made up only a small portion--for example, a certain number of New Н
Fourth Army soldiers were found somewhere, etc."$
--Zeng Shenjie#FS#+[6]____#R
$#FF#G[2]#G[-2]
"(I) was a lieutenant colonel and a member of the Meteorologic Group Н
of SACO in Chongqing, from the winter of 1943 to December of 1945. ... Н
The major tasks of the Meteorologic Group were to collect weather Н
reports from various places, to draw weather charts, to make weather Н
forecasts and provide them for the then so-called 'Allied Forces', Н
i.e. the American imperialist navy and air force for references."$
--Xu Zhishan#FS#+[7]____#R
$#FF#G[2]#G[-2]
"At that time my job was to translate from Chinese into English the Н
intelligence reports collected by various groups and offices and send НКthem to the Americans. On each copy of intelligence was written: Н
'General Dai Li to Commodore Miles.'$
#G[2]#G[-2]
"The contents of the intelligence that I translated covered the Н
activities of the ships and places of the Japanese and puppet troops; Н
the logistics, transportation, and reserve of the enemy; and the Н
maneuvers, and concentration of enemy troops. There were some pieces of Н
information about the reactionary troops of Jiang Jieshi, but not Н
many. There also was a lot of meteorological intelligence."$
--Han Jingui#FS#+[8]____#R
$#FF#G[2]#G[-2]
"The major tasks of the Psychological Warfare Group were to write Н
propaganda materials and to distribute them in the enemy-occupied Н
areas, Japan proper and other war zones through secret distribution or Н
air-drop; to monitor the broadcasts of Japanese or puppet radio Н
stations and to jam them or engage in counter-propaganda through Н
secret radio stations. The contents of the broadcast were no more than Н
the propaganda trying to show that the Americans and the Jiang bloc Н
were fighting against the Japanese, the object of which was to lull Н
the people in the enemy-occupied areas."$
--Li Sikang#FS#+[9]____#R
$
Listed above are the activities of the major operational groups of Н
SACO: the Intelligence Group, the Meteorological Group, and the Н
Psychological Warfare Group. Now, let us take a look at the other two Н
operational groups: the Military Group and the Secret Operation Н
Group:$
Military Group: its director was Xu Handao, the commander of the Н
special task force of Jun-tong. "The major work of this group was to Н
organize SACO training courses in special technologies in Chongqing, Н
Guiyang, Xi'an, Lanzhou, Fujian and Xiongchi of Anhui Province. Each Н
training course was run three to five times. 800-1200 students were Н
trained for 6 months to 1 year each time. After graduation, the Н
students were issued arms and munitions provided by the U.S. Navy and Н
were sent to work in various war zones."$
Secret Operation Group: its director was Wang Yixin. "The so-called Н
secret operations of this group, were to send rangers to destroy Н
Japanese military vehicles near Hangzhou of Zhejiang Province and on Н
the Liuzhou-Naning Highway in Guangxi, and to destroy Japanese defence Н
works." #+[10]$
On the activities of SACO, many more materials can be provided, such Н
as "On the Sino-American Cooperative Organization" written by Major Н
General Cheng Ling, the director of the Meteorologic Group of SACO; Н
"The State of Affairs of Sino-American Cooperative Organization," Н
written by Shen Zui, the director of the General Affairs Department of Н
Jun-tong; "Materials on the Sino-American Special Technology Н
Cooperative Organization" written by Guo Xu, the director of the Н
Accounting Department of Jun-tong; as well as new materials obtained Н
from Hongkong and Taiwan: Wu Xiangxiang's "The History of the Second Н
Sino-Japanese War," Liang Xiory's "Biography of Dai Li," and Michael Н
Schaller's "The U.S. Crusade in China." Whatever the political Н
standpoint of the material concerning Sino-American Cooperative Н
Organization, they have one thing in common: in terms of the nature of Н
the work, SACO is an intelligence agency or an intelligence and Н
training agency.$КThe Agreement on SACO provided:" SACO will end after the victory of Н
the war against Japanese." #+[11] Therefore "after the end of the war Н
of resistance against Japan in the autumn of 1945, the training units Н
of SACO at various places first wound up their activities... The Н
Shanghai office of SACO handled the formalities of the Americans going Н
back home. It was abolished in May 1946 after all work was Н
completed."#+[12]$
Such is the history of the Sino-American Cooperative Organization. No Н
matter whether in terms of the background and objectives of the Н
formation of SACO, or its major activities and the nature of its Н
operations, it is impossible to draw the conclusion that "the Sino-Н
American Cooperative Organization was a concentration camp specially Н
designed to arrest, imprison, and massacre communists and Н
revolutionaries."$
#T4II. Changes and Major Activities of the Chongqing$
Concentration Camps under Jun-tong#t
At the end of 1939, in the name of the Battlefield Services Corps of Н
the Military Commission, the Jun-tong Agency seized civilian houses at Н
Ciqikou, Wulingguan and Yangjiashan near Geleshan in the northwestern Н
suburb of Chongqing to establish its suburban offices. In the name of Н
handling official business, the Jun-tong Agency set up a secret nest Н
for itself--a "special zone" consisting of factories, schools, Н
hospitals, and a secret detention house.$
This detention house was named Chongqing Detention House under Jun-Н
tong. It was rebuilt under Dai Li's order from the Xiangshan Villa, Н
formerly belonging to a Sichuan warlord BaiJu, in the summer of 1939. Н
The first head of this detention house was Hon Zichuan, former head of Н
the Zaozibao Detention House under Jun-tong. Following the Н
establishment of the Sino-American Cooperative Organization, many Н
Americans came to China. Dai Li moved this detention house to the Н
nearby Zhazidong, and the Xiangshan villa was changed into the Third Н
Hostel of SACO.$
More changes took place by 1946. By that time, the war of resistance Н
against Japan had ended, the Sino-American Cooperative Organization Н
was dissolved, and the various units under Jun-tong were moved to Н
Nanjing one after another. Moreover, the Kuomintang authorities Н
"amalgamated the concentration camps under Jun-tong in the Southwest, Н
the Xifeng Prison, the Wanglongmen Detention House and the Zhazidong Н
Detention House into the Baigongguan Detention House,"#+[13] thus Н
making this "special zone" the jurisdictional area of the Baigongguan Н
Detention House.$
In 1949, following the extension of the civil war, Kuomintang stepped Н
up its suppression of the people under its rule. Many communists and Н
revolutionaries were arrested. Therefore in October, 1947 the Zhazidong Н
Detention House, once abolished, was reactivated by the Second Н
Department of Chongqing Field Headquarters and prisoners were held Н
there. Thus, from October, 1947 to the end of November, 1949, there Н
existed simultaneously in this special zone two immense prisons: the Н
Baigongguan Detention House directly under Baomiju (the former Jun-Н
tong Agency), the Zhazidong Detention House set up by the Second Н
Department of Chongqing Field Headquarters.$
According to statistic figures, the communists and revolutionaries Н
listed below were imprisoned or murdered in those two concentration Н
camps from 1939 to 1949.$
Those imprisoned:$КбдSeven persons including Zhang Luping and Zhang Weilin, Spring, 1940;$
бдLuo Shiwen and Che Yaoxian, arrested in March, 1940;$
бдXu Xiaoxuan and Tan Shenming, arrested in April, 1940;$
бдYe Ting, Song Qiyun and his wife Xu Linxia, his youngest son Song Zhenzhong, arrested in 1941;$
бдLiao Chengzhi, arrested in 1942;$
бдGeneral Yang Hucheng, transferred from Guizhou, July, 1946;$
бдOver 40 persons including Hu Zuolin and Zhang Xianhua, arrested in the "June 1" Arrest, 1947;$
бдPersons including He Xuesong and Li Zibo, arrested in the Xiaomin Н
Tea Party Case in 1947;$
бдOver 130 persons including Xu Jianye and Chen Ran, arrested in the Incident of the underground Tingjin Paper, 1948;$
бдOver 30 persons including Jiang Keran and Chen Yiwen, arrested in Н
the Uprisings of Hua Yingshan, Liangping and Dianjiang, 1948.$
бдOver 10 persons including Pu Huafu and Hua Jian, the leaders of the Н
CCP's Special Committee of Sichuan and Xikang, arrested in Chengdu due to betrayal of the CCP's former secretary of municipal committee Liu Guoding, 1949;$
бдLi Youlin and Wang Baiyu, arrested for organizing underground armed Н
forces by the Revolutionary Committee of Kuomintang in Eastern Н
Sichuan, and over 10 persons including Zhou Conghua, arrested later, 1949;$
Those murdered:$
бдLou Shiwen and Che Yaoxian, murdered at Songlinpo in 1946;
бдXie Baozhen, killed in the "April 1" Hospital on Feb.7, 1947;$
бдA man from Hebei, shot in the Nangu Park in Chongqing in March, 1947;$
бдShang Chengwen, Zhang Changao and Zhu Niangun, murdered at Baigongguan on Sep. 13, 1947;$
бдLi Darong and Xu Jianye, shot in public at Xiaojiawan in Chongqing in July, 1948;$
бдWei Defu, shot at Baigongguan in July, 1948;$
бдLong Guangzhang, murdered at Zhazidong in Dec. 1948;$
бдPeng Rusong, murdered at Zhazidong in Feb. 1949;$
бдQin Yao, shot at Daping in Chongqing in Apr. 1949;$
бдWu Xuezheng, murdered at Zhazidong in July, 1949;$
бдDi Wenhai, murdered at Zhazidong in autumn of 1949;$
бдXiong Shizheng, shot at Baigongguan in Sep. 1949;$
бдYang Hanxiu, murdered at Jiangangpo in Sep. 1949;$
бд6 persons including Yang Hucheng and Song Qiyun, murdered at Daigongci in Sep. 1949.$
бдTen persons including. Chen Ran and Wang Pu shot in public at Daping in Chongqing, October, 1949;$
бд30 persons including Jiang Zhuyun and Li Qinglin, shot secretly at Songlinpo on Nov. 14, 1949;$
бдYan Jiming and Zhang Xiangmin, murdered on the roadside of the Meiyuan highway, Nov. 24, 1949;$
бдHuang Xiansheng and Li Yingyi, murdered at Buyunqiao on the afternoon of Nov.27, 1949;$
бд21 persons including Xu Xiaoxuan and Tan Shenming, murdered at Baigongguan on the evening of Nov.27, 1949;$
бд190 persons including Cai Mengwei and Yu Zusheng, murdered at Zhazidong on the evening of Nov.27, 1949;$
бд32 persons including Huang Xiya and Zhao Jing, murdered at Songlinpo on Nov.29, 1949.$
The figures above may not be comprehensive, but I think it appropriate Н
to say that they reflected the major criminal activities of the two Н
detention houses.$
Let us again review the time of the establishment and ending of Sino-Н
American Cooperative Organization mentioned in Part A: April, 1943, Н
and May, 1946.$
Those two dates are very important to our correct understanding of the Н
relations between Sino-American Cooperative Organization and the Н
concentration camps under Jun-tong. Compare these two dates with the Н
arrests and murders which we have listed above and we'll see at once Н
that Sino-American Cooperative Organization had nothing to do with any Н
of those criminal activities, of arrest, detention and murder because Н
those activities were carried out either before 1942 that is, before Н
the establishment of Sino-American Cooperative Organization, or after Н
1946 that is, after the ending of Sino-American Cooperative Н
Organization.$КA question may be raised here: Since Sino-American Cooperative Н
Organization and the Concentration camps under Jun-tong, had co-Н
existed from 1943 to 1946, then what kind of relations existed between Н
them, in those years? Were the concentration camps under Jun-tong Н
subordinate to Sino-American Cooperative Organization?$
#T4III. The Relationship between Sino-American Cooperative$ Н
Organization and the Concentration Camps$
under Jun-tong#t
We have proved that Sino-American Cooperative Organization was not a Н
concentration camp. But did it "run" the concentration camps? Our Н
answer is negative.$
Firstly, there was no organizational link between Sino-American Н
Cooperative Organization and the prisons. In our account of the Н
organization structure of SACO, we set forth the major operational Н
groups including the Intelligence Group, the Meteorologic Group, the Н
Military Group, the Secret Operation Group, and the Psychological Н
Warfare Group. But the task of the these groups had nothing to do with Н
prisons, that is to say, none of the groups ran the prisons. Who then Н
actually ran the prisons? In fact, "the detention house was directly Н
under the leadership of Dai Li, the chief and the Judicial Office of Н
the Jun-tong Agency during the Anti-Japanese War. After the winter of Н
1946, it was directly led by the Sixth (Judicial) Department of Baomiju Н
(the Security Bureau)."#+[15] "There was no direct organizational link Н
between SACO and the Prisons at Baigongguan and Zhazidong."#+[16]$
Secondly, no material in the extant files can prove that the Americans Н
in SACO participated in the activities of the concentration camps. Н
"The major activities of the Americans in SACO were to collect Н
intelligence. They also helped Jun-tong train some secret agents, but Н
they did not take part in the arrests, tortures, and murders."#+[17] Up Н
to now, in the archives of the Geleshan Cemetery of Revolutionary Н
Martyrs in Chongqing, there is not a single document concerning arrest Н
and murder of revolutionary that was issued by SACO Н
nor one confession which pointed to the Americans for Н
getting involved in these activities.$
Thirdly, there was clear distinction between the personnel arrangement Н
of SACO and the prisons. "All the institutions of Sino-America Н
Cooperative Organization were made up of people from the Chinese and Н
American sides. The persons in charge were appointed through Н
consultation between Jun-tong and the American side."#+[18] But the Н
case with the Jun-tong prisons was totally different. From beginning Н
to end, the persons in charge of the prisons were appointed exclusively Н
by Jun-tong, and no American participated in the management of the Н
prisons.#+[19]$
Finally, let us review the account of the Fei Gong Case in "Inside Н
stories of the Sino-American Cooperative Organization," which may Н
throw light on one aspect of the relations between the Sino-American Н
Cooperative Organization and the prisons.
The incident runs like this: Fei Gong, a progressive professor of Н
Zhejiang University, disappeared at the Qiansimen Dock in Chongqing in Н
the spring of 1944. The incident drew the attention of the educational Н
circle in China. People believed that Fei Gong must have been Н
kidnapped secretly by Kuomintang secret agents. Over 40 people who had Н
studied together with Fei in Britain submitted a petition to Н
Wedemeyer, the American commander of the China-Burma-India theater of Н
the time, asking him to help rescue Fei. In order to establish the НКprestige of the United States in China, Wedemeyer decided to ask Miles, Н
the Vice-director of the Sino-American Cooperative Organization to Н
handle the matter, hoping to locate the whereabouts of Fei Gong Н
through the efforts of American secret agents. Knowing that it was a Н
knotty problem, Miles ordered Major Clark of the Sino-American Н
Cooperative Organization, a famous detective from New York, to Н
investigate the incident; and he asked Dai Li, chief of secret agents Н
for Jun-tong's help. Dai Li sent Shen Zui (Director of the General Н
Affairs Department of Jun-tong) to help Clark. Their careful Н
investigation, however, failed to get any definite clue. Finally, a Н
proposal was put forward that the prisons should be checked. Н
Therefore, an "interesting" dialog appeared in the material: (Shen Zui Н
to Dai Li) "What should we do in case Clark wants to have a look at Н
the Jun-tong detention houses situated in SACO?" He (Dai Li) at once Н
pulled a long face and answered harshly, "They want to curry favor Н
with these professors returned from abroad; on other things we may Н
listen to them, but if they mention our detention houses, tell them Н
simply that all the prisoners were arrested long before and there's no Н
one who has been arrested lately."$
The final result of this incident is irrelevant to this article. But Н
what we can see in the above dialog is that, being an American Major Н
in the Sino-American Cooperative Organization and under the Н
instruction of Miles himself, Clark could not even, in the course of Н
investigation, look into the prisons allegedly run by the Americans Н
(if the prisons were really under the jurisdiction of the Sino-Н
American Cooperative Organization). What does this imply? Doesn't it Н
show from another angle, that the Sino-American Cooperative Н
Organization had no power over the prisons, that is, during the period Н
of #^parallel#^^ existence of SACO and the prisons, the prisons were not Н
subordinated to SACO in terms of organization or operation.$
From the above description, we have come to know, that during the Н
Second World War, in order to obtain in China military intelligence Н
concerning Japan, the United States set up with the KMT authorities Н
an international agency of intelligence--Sino-American Н
Cooperative Organization. However, in the name of mutual resistance Н
against Japan, the two sides made use of each other, collaborated with Н
each other and committed some shameful criminal acts.$
1. The Infamous "Special Police Training Program"$
Even before the establishment of SACO, Dai Li and Miles were thinking Н
of establishing police training school. Soon after the establishment Н
of SACO, officers of SACO went back to the United States to recruit Н
police instructors and to obtain equipments. In the end they recruited Н
about 50 instructors and the equipments were mainly things like lie Н
detecters and police-dogs."#+[20]$
On Sep.1, 1943, the Chongqing Training Course of Special Police was Н
set up at last. All the students were the cream from other training Н
courses of Jun-tong. This training course consisted of two Н
departments: criminal police and public security. Besides subjects Н
such as surveillance, interrogation, dactylography, psychology and Н
disguise, the students must also undergo practical training in Н
shooting, motor vehicle driving, police dog using, etc. By the end of Н
the Anti-Japanese War, the Special Police Training Program of SACO had Н
turned out 800 secret agents, and was planning to train another 1200. Н
"Almost none of them accepted any training that could be used to deal Н
with the Japanese and ordinary criminals. The course concentrated on НКhandling political prisoners and effective repressive methods."#+[21]$
About this training program Miles confessed in his report to the U.S. Н
Department of the Navy: "A new school was set up this morning to teach Н
scientific methods in criminal investigation. The importance of Н
carrying on this school. I can never overexaggerate: it consists of a Н
complicated political meaning that can not be fully expressed in Н
written form."#+[22]$
At the crucial time of the War of Resistance against Japan the Н
Americans in SACO spent large amount of man power and resources on Н
training and equipping Jun-tong troops that had nothing to do with the Н
war. And after the ending of SACO in 1946, the Kuomintang Baomiju Н
(security Agency, new name for Jun-tong Agency) relied upon those Н
"elite" secret agents trained and equipped by the United States to Н
arrest and murder cruelly communists and revolutionaries. Thus we hold Н
that, though Americans did not participate directly at that time in the Н
activities of arresting, torturing and murdering communists, their Н
Special Police Training Program was to help indirectly the Kuomintang Н
Jun-tong Agency to repress the revolutionary movement after the Second Н
World War, just as Dai Li said: "We are not asking Americans to do Н
such things: their work is to train Chinese to do so."#+[23]$
2. Helping Kuomintang Seize Fruits of Victory$
Miles, the vice-director of SACO, boasted that he "hated all communists Н
and they should be wiped out in China; he himself is ready to lend a Н
hand in this cause." In July and August of 1945, when the War of Н
Resistance against Japan was approaching its end, Miles thought it was Н
time for him to "lend a hand." First he ordered the troops in the Н
training camps under SACO to march towards Nanjing, Guangzhou, Shanghai and other big Н
cities. On August 12, he cabled the Americans in SACO and informed Н
them that Jiang Jieshi and Dai Li had ordered their troops to take part Н
in the fighting in order to prevent communist troops from entering Н
Japanese-occupied areas. Miles ordered:$
$#FF#G[2]#G[-2]
"The Americans in the Sino-American Cooperative Organization... should Н
set out together with the commanders of the Chinese troops appointed Н
by them. Keep fully armed and take complete sets of radio equipments. Н
Do not divulge the secret to any of your outside friends. Transfer all Н
usable arms and munitions as fast as possible to the 'Zhongyi Н
Salvation Troops'... and continue to provide logistic supports."#FS$
$
Several hours later. Miles reiterated the instructions and admonished, Н
with a guilty conscience, his subordinates who had received his Н
order, "after strictly guarantee that your troops would keep the Н
secret, burn this order."#+[24]$
Even after the surrender of Japan, Miles went on issuing orders to the Н
Americans of SACO asking them to help Dai Li. At the same time, he and Н
the Americans in SACO brooked no delay to organize a fleet of armed Н
sailing boats to seize port areas in order to help KMT recover Н
coastal cities. Of course, though the Americans in SACO exhausted Н
their brains and strength to seize fruit of victory for the Н
Kuomintang, their wishful thinking came to nothing after the Н
enlargement of the Civil War in the middle of September.$
If in the "Special Police Training Program" SACO was indirectly Н
rendering assistance to the Kuomintang in its repression of the Н
Communist Party, then the activities of "helping Kuomintang seize the Н
fruit of victory" proved that SACO had directly involved itself in НКChinese politics and acted as KMT's accomplice in destroying Н
revolutionary movement.$
Through the analysis and provision of evidence we can see the Н
political duality of Sino-American Cooperative Organization (mutual resistance Н
against Japan on one hand, helping Jiang Jieshi clique in its struggle Н
with the Communists on the other); but that is not the point under Н
discussion in this article. The focal point of this article is: what Н
activities reflected the reactionary nature of Sino-American Н
Cooperative Organization or in terms of its operation was it an agency Н
of intelligence and training or a concentration camp engaged in Н
activities of arresting, torturing and murdering? Therefore the Н
appropriateness of the name "Sino-American Cooperative Organization Н
Concentration Camps." Comes in question for no matter whether the Н
explanation of "Sino-American Cooperative organization as a Н
concentration camp," or "concentration camps under the leadership of Н
Sino-American cooperative Organization," cannot hold water because Н
neither is based on sufficient historical facts.$
#T4NOTES#t
##[D1J100P80]
_#+[1]_"Inscriptions on the Monument to the Martyrs" written by People's Н
Committee of Chongqing, Sichuan Province, April 1955.$
_#+[2,3]_Miles, #FKA Different Kind of War#FS_ (Taiwan Xinsheng Daily Н
Publishing Department, 1969).$
_#+[4]_Wu Xiangxiang, #FKHistory of the Second Sino-Japanese War#FS_ Н
(Taiwan Zonghe Monthly Publishing House), p.889.$
_#+[5]_Lu Wangzhi (former monitor of the Interception and Deciphering Н
Group, SACO), "Interception and deciphering (6th) Group, SACO", Н
written in 1959. See File No.B-341 of Chongqing Geleshan Martyrs Н
Cemetary.$
_#+[6]_Zeng Shengjie (former P3 translator of the Analysis and Н
Research Group, SACO), #FKSACO Operational Group-Intelligence Group-Н
Analysis and Research Group#FS_ written in 1959, op. cit.$
_#+[7]_Xu Zhishan (former colonel director of the Communication Н
Station of Meteorological General Station SACO), "Information on the Н
Meteorological Group, SACO," written in 1959, op. cit.$
_#+[8]_Han Jingui (former English translator at the Editing and Н
Research Section, SACO), "Translation Work," written in 1959, op. cit.$
_#+[9]_Li Sirang (former English translator at the Psychological Н
Warfare Group, SACO), "Situation in SACO", written in 1957, op. cit.$
_#+[10]_Wang Yixin (major general, former director of the Secret Н
Warfare Group, SACO), "Information on SACO", written in 1959. See File Н
No.B-340 of Chongqing Geleshan Martyrs Cemetery.$
_#+[11]_Shen Zui (major general, former director of General Affairs Н
Group, SACO), "Inside Story of SACO," #FKSelection of Н
Wenshiziliao,#FS_ (Wenshiziliao Publishing House 1962), Vol.32.$
_#+[12]_Cheng Ling (major general, former director of Meteorological Н
group, SACO), "Information Concerning SACO", written in 1960. See File Н
No B-135 of Chongqing Geleshan Martyrs Cemetery.$
_#+[13]_Xu Yuanju (former director of Southwest Special Zone of Н
Kuomintang Baomiju Security Bureaus), "Baigongguan Detention House Н
of Baomiju".$
_#+[14]_File Nos. A-1 to A-312 of Chongqing Geleshan Martyrs Н
Cemetery.$
_#+[15]_Chongqing Security Bureau, "Jun-tong Chongqing Baigongguan Н
Detention House", written on the basis of materials of confession of НКrelated personnel in 1956. See File No B-14 of Chongqing Geleshan Н
Martyrs Cemetery.$
_#+[16,17]_"Minutes of Interview with Shen Zui in 1983", See File Н
No.B-147 of Chongqing Geleshan Martyrs Cemetery.$
_#+[18,19]_Same as [11].$
_#+[20,21,22,23]_Michael Schaller, #FKThe U.S. Crusade in China,#FS_ (The Н
Commercial Press, 1982).$
_#+[24]_"Miles Letter to the Units under SACO", Ibid, p.247.$#E