#M1Book Review#m
#M2American Studies in China#m
#?
#T3IMPRESSION OF$
THE HISTORY OF US DIPLOMACY$
AFTER WORLD WAR II#t
#T4SONG Yimin#t
#G[4]#G[-4]
#FSZi Zhongyun ed., #FKA History of US Post-World War II 
Foreign Relations: 
From Truman to Reagan#FF_ (Beijing: 
the World Knowledge Publishing House, 1994).$
$#FS
#V[2,2,0]
The end of the Cold War marked the conclusion of an age in the post-Н
World War II international relations. Both the promoters and main Н
participants of this war have to make some important readjustments of Н
their foreign policy. They have not quite finished the work, and the Н
dust has not yet settled. No matter what new status these big powers Н
will acquire in the post-Cold War world, and no matter what new Н
content their readjusted policy will contain, they can not be severed Н
from the historical legacy left by the Cold War, and their diplomatic Н
history in this period undoubtedly constitutes the basis for the study Н
of new changes in the contemporary world. #FKA History of US Н
Post World War II Foreign Relations#FS_ edited by Zi Zhongyun makes a systematic, Н
thought-provoking examination of US diplomacy in this important period, Н
and some of its arguments are bold and challenging. Н
The book offers significant background information for observing the Н
general trend of US diplomacy and its relationship with other big Н
powers and the main developing countries. It is very useful for the Н
study of new changes in the general international relations as well.$
This is the first elaborate book written by Chinese scholars on the Н
post-WWII US diplomacy. It covers about 50 years of US foreign Н
relations Н
under 8 presidents, from Harry S. Truman's assuming presidency in 1945 Н
to the expiration of Ronald Reagan's term at the end of 1988. As the Н
period of George Bush has been included in the introduction, the book can Н
be said to be a complete history of US diplomacy in the Cold War. Н
The authors of this book analyze important historical events in a Н
serious, scientific and unconventional manner and set forth new ideas Н
on a number of questions, such as how the USA viewed its own national Н
interests, what were the basic factors determining its policies toward Н
the former Soviet Union, allies and China and what was their sequence Н
of importance, and what were its economic considerations and long-Н
range aims in extending aid to developing countries. It is pointed out Н
in the 14,000-Chinese-character Introduction that the post-WWII US Н
diplomacy has 3 features different from the previous big power Н
contention and that the trend of rise and decline of US influence in Н
the world Н
can be described by two arcs running in opposite Н
directions. These are two examples of original ideas of Zi Zhongyun's Н
among others put forward by the book.$

The book takes into account the important determining factors in Н
US foreign policy, including the US interests in economic, security НКand ideological fields, popular sentiments, public opinion, strife Н
between the two parties, contradictions between the government and the Н
parliament and changes in external conditions, and makes a Н
comprehensive study of these factors together with its foreign Н
relations. Thus it is able to ascertain with considerable accuracy Н
what have and have not been changed in US foreign policy and the Н
degree of the modification.$
Though The History of US Diplomacy After World War II is arranged, Н
on the whole, on order of US presidencies (with two separate Н
chapters devoted to the Korean War and the Vietnam War), its Н
chapters are closely linked, and a clear line--the USA-USSR Н
contention, i.e., the main contradiction in the Cold War period--Н
threads the whole book. The first 3 chapters give a brilliant outline Н
of how the USA, in the initial phase of the Cold War, laid the Н
foundations of its post-WWII policies toward the USSR, Europe and Н
Asia. The subsequent chapters present an explicit account of how these Н
policies were carried on, altered or developed in the following Н
years.$
The authors spent a lot of time gleaning data for the book and quotes Н
many official documents and monographs, the number and varieties of Н
which are rarely seen in similar works. Some of the important data, Н
including some documents declassified only recently were collected by Н
authors of the book specially sent abroad for this purpose. The book Н
is amply footnoted with an index up to the standard of international Н
scholarly works, something rare in Chinese works of similar subjects.$Н
This book touches upon a number of old and new disputes in American Н
study, and some very serious ones at that. The question as to when the USA Н
and the USSR shifted their offensive and defensive postures should be Н
considered solved in this book. Differences still exist on many other Н
questions, such as the national strength of the USA, the degree of the Н
relative decline of its influence, and the status the ideological Н
factor occupies and the role it plays in US diplomacy. The views Н
and analyses submitted in the Introduction, I believe, will help bring Н
about a more deep-going and fuller discussion of these questions.$
#v
(Translated by Wang Huaiting)____#R#!
#?
#T3A COMMENTARY ON THE HISTORY$
OF SINO-US RELATIONS, 1911-50#t
#T4Niu Jun#Z0The author is with the Institute of American Н
Studies under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.$#z#t
#G[4]#G[-4]
#FSTao Wenzhao, #FKThe History of Sino-US Relations, 1911-50#FF_ Н
(Sichuan: Chongqing Publishing House, 1993).$
$#FS
#V[2,2,0]
#FKThe History of Sino-US Relations, 1911-50#FS_ (hereafter, the History) is Н
a general history written by Tao Wenzhao of the Institute of American Н
Studies under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. This latest Н
achievement of research in the Sino-US relations, consisting of Н
twenty-seven sections in eight chapters, expounds in a rather Н
systematic way the relationship of the two countries over a span of Н
more than forty years. One of the important contributions this book of Н
four hundred and forty thousand Chinese characters has made is that it has Н
enriched and developed the researches of the Chinese scholars in this НКfield.$
A comprehensive review of the history of international relations in Н
the first half of the present century shows that Sino-US Н
relationship, perhaps, forms the most unique part of it. From the Н
end of the last century to the 1930s, the two countries were cold to Н
and estranged from each other on the whole. Their relationship became Н
much closer in the 40s, only to be followed by a confrontation of over Н
twenty years, the problems generated in the decade still clinging to Н
them like a shadow to this day. What has caused such a peculiar Н
development? The works in this regard published by Chinese scholars in Н
recent years are, in a sense, all attempt to answer this question Н
wittingly or unwittingly.$
From these works, it can be seen that Sino-US relations in the Н
first half of the present century were very fragile. There lacked a Н
good basis and internal motivating force to develop this relationship. Н
The basic factor determining the direction this relationship moved and Н
its nature (whether it was a close or hostile one) was invariably the Н
existence of a "third party." To be more exact, the two countries Н
usually improved their relations to cope with the threat from a third Н
country, and when the strength of this country was on the decline or Н
the threat it posed was gone, their relationship would begin to Н
worsen. The second factor was the changing of the political situation Н
in these two countries, especially in China. These factors combined to Н
fashion their policy motivation and basic aims. The United States Н
often closed its ties with China and intervened in China's internal Н
affairs to contain another big power in East Asia, and the Chinese Н
rulers and various political factions, on their part, usually Н
#^based#^^ Н
their relations with the United States on two 
considerations -- uniting with it to resist aggression, and making 
use of or opposing it according to its attitude to the internal Н
political struggle of China at the time. The second consideration in Н
general decided the fundamental orientation of their US policy. The Н
History, endeavoring to give a detailed and extensive account of the Н
main events in Sino-US relations in a period of more than forty Н
years, is unique in the richness of content among works by Chinese Н
scholars. It traces faithfully the objective historical process in the Н
light of the two basic threads said above, which ran through all the Н
chief occurrences in the period.$
#FKThe History#FS_ can be divided roughly into five parts. The first part is Н
the "Preamble." It analyzes in detail the historical starting point of Н
Sino-US relations of this period. The author deals at some length Н
on the US "Open Door Policy," saying that "this policy was a Н
continuation of the traditional China policy of the United States and Н
an indication of the new phase this policy had reached," (p. 24) and Н
that it signified that "the United States would no longer just follow Н
others in dealing with China and would advance its own ideas to Н
influence and guide other countries." (p. 25.) The Qing government, on Н
the other hand, paid particular attention to utilizing the United States Н
in its efforts to resist Japanese pressure. (P. 29.) When it Н
relinquished China's national interests to induce the United States, a Н
political crisis was set off outright, which finally "brought about Н
the Chinese 1911 Revolution and the fall of the Qing Dynasty." (p. Н
39)$
The second part is made up of the first chapter. It covers the period НКbetween the founding of the Republic of China (1912) and the outbreak Н
of World War I (1914). Sino-US relationship developed against the Н
background of the successful conclusion of the Revolution of 1911 and Н
the United States and Japan beginning to dominate the central stage of Н
big powers' contention in China. The China policy of the United States Н
was evolving with the evolvement of US-Japanese relations.$
The author maintains that Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the champion and leader of Н
the 1911 Revolution "hoped to ally with Britain and the United States Н
and get a loan from them to support the Н
revolution." (p. 3.) But the United States would rather take concerted Н
actions with the big powers to support Yuan Shikai. W. Wilson, after Н
assuming presidency in 1913, went so far that the United States Н
ignored the stand agreed upon by the big powers and took the lead in Н
recognizing the Yuan Shikai administration, so that it could "carve an Н
image different altogether from other countries and secure a special Н
status" for itself. (pp. 10-11.) It did so to "expand its strength in Н
China" and soon met with the resistance of Japan. Its pigeonholing of Н
the Sarduao plan was a typical outcome of such resistance.$
After the outbreak of World War I, the European powers were too busy Н
to occupy themselves with the affairs of the East, so the United Н
States and Japan became the chief contenders in China. #FKThe Н
History#FS_ Н
describes in detail their main contests in this period and holds that Н
"the contention between the United States and Japan became sharper, Н
but the United States always made concessions to Japan at critical Н
moments." (p. 18.) That was because Japan had obviously gained the Н
upper hand and the United States was following "the general principle Н
of refraining from getting involved in international disputes over the Н
China issue." (p. 29.) What's more, it yearned to share the rights and Н
interests Japan extorted from China. Take its attitude to the "1915 Н
Treaty" Japan forced the Yuan Shikai administration to sign for Н
instance. "The United States demanded not only that its interests in Н
China would not be infringed upon ... but also that it could partake Н
Japan's fruit of aggression." (p. 29.) One can conclude from the Н
account of the History that the United States mostly made concessions Н
in its tussles with Japan on Chinese affairs, and compromises Н
outnumbered struggles and restrictions in this period.$
The third part consists of the second, third and fourth chapters. In Н
the period this part covers, the big powers had knocked up an Н
international arrangement about the post-World War I East Asia at the Н
Paris and Washington conferences in 1919 and 1921. But this pattern of Н
international relations in the region underwent a fundamental change Н
with the eruption of the September 18th Incident in 1931 and Н
especially the July 7th Incident in 1937. China, on the other hand, Н
was plunged into a series of wars among warlords and torn to pieces Н
after Yuan Shikai's death. It just Н
kept a facade of political unity before the outbreak of the July 7th Н
Incident.$
The pattern of East Asian international relations worked out at the Н
Washington Conference was the determinant of the United States' East Н
Asia policy and its approach to China's internal affairs. The History Н
points out that the United States sponsored the conference with the Н
purpose of "restricting the influence of certain countries (Japan, Н
apparently) that wanted to win some privileges expanded for themselves 
over the Chinese political situation through #^coordinating#^^ НКthe big powers' China policy." Н
(p. 68.) "The United States succeeded in containing Japan," (p. 67) Н
and the "Nine Powers Treaty" signed at the conference "dealt a blow on Н
Japan, checked its ambition to dominate China, and provided the United Н
States with an opportunity to expand its influence in China. The Н
development itself signified that the United States' political Н
influence had expanded." "The Washington Conference showed that a Н
change advantageous to the United States had taken place in both the Н
world political situation and China's relations with foreign Н
countries." (p. 82.)$
After the Washington Conference, the United States made safeguarding Н
the set pattern in East Asia its basic policy, and    the starting Н
point and final aim of its China policy. The History gives an analysis Н
of its relationship with the Revolutionary government in Guangdong, Н
the Zhili (Hebei) group of the Northern warlord clique, the Chinese Н
Great Revolutionary Movement and the Guomindang Nanjing government. Н
The book's account of the various Chinese political factions' opinion Н
of the US policy and their relations with the US administration has Н
contributed greatly to making good the insufficiency of research in Н
this respect.$
The Washington pattern rest on an equilibrium among big powers, Н
especially on one between the United States and Japan. Japan being the Н
restricted party, whether it was willing to recognize this pattern Н
still, whether this pattern could succeed in restricting it or not, Н
and whether the United States had the capability and determination to Н
conserve the pattern became the central issue in maintaining East Н
Asian stability. #FKThe History,#FS_ through analyzing Н
the "Stimson Doctrine," the cotton and wheat loans, the "Amau Н
Announcement" and Н
the silver agreement, laid bare the process of how the United States Н
#^switched#^^ from a passive check on, to a vigorous containment of, the Н
Japanese expansion, though both proved to be ineffectual on the Н
whole.$
The fifth, sixth and seventh chapters form the fourth part of the Н
book. In this part, the author expounds in an all-round way Sino-Н
US relationship during the period of China's War of Resistance Against Н
Japanese Aggression (1937-45), relating how the two treated each other Н
coldly at first, things warmed up gradually under the threat and Н
aggression of Japanese imperialism and an alliance was concluded Н
finally between them, and describing the features of this relationship Н
in the different phases of this process. This part can be divided into Н
two stages: from the July 7th Incident in 1937 to the Pearl Harbor Н
Attack in 1941 (Chapter V) and from the Pearl Harbor Attack to the end Н
of the War of Resistance (Chapter VI and Chapter VII).$
#FKThe History#FS_ is very successful in probing the policies of the Н
Chinese National government and the Chinese Communist Party towards Н
the United States in the Н
first stage. It was an important stage in that the United States began Н
to meddle in the Guomindang-Communist conflicts, and the triangular Н
relationship among the three, which would affect the Chinese political Н
situation later, was gradually taking shape. One can draw enlightening Н
conclusions from a comparative study of the US policies of the Н
Guomindang and the Communist Party. The shortcoming of the History in Н
this regard is that it stops at stating the policies of the three Н
parties and fails to go a step further to make an analysis of the НКtriangular relationship.$
China and the United States formed an alliance for the purpose of Н
coping with the threat of Japan, but their bilateral relationship Н
remained fragile due to disparity in the national strength, variance Н
in the government system and the glaring difference in historical and Н
cultural heritage. The war-time alliance built on this basis had met Н
with difficulties from the very outset; the two parties found it Н
difficult to understand each other's views. This was a consequence of Н
their unequal status in history, the dissimilar workings of their Н
governments and the different cultural background they had. What is Н
more, different strategic thinking had their share of influence on the Н
alliance. The United States wanted the alliance for the sake of Н
thwarting the Japanese threat, while China, on the part of both the Н
National government and the Communist Party, had to consider, in Н
addition, their interests in the domestic struggle in formulating the Н
policy towards the U.S. Through detailed description of a series of important Н
developments -- the Burmese campaign, the US-Chiang Kai-shek Н
disagreement over military strategy, the US Army Observer Н
Group's visit to Yanan, the Stilwell event, the mediation of P. J. Н
Hurley and the Yalta secret agreement, the History relates various Н
events that attended the commencement, evolution and end of the Н
alliance.$
The fifth part of the book is made up of Chapter VIII, which covers the Н
period between the victory of the War of Resistance (1945) and the Н
outbreak of the Korean War (1950). During this period, the US-USSR Н
confrontation replaced the US-Japan contention as the determining Н
factor in the international relations of East Asia and the Guomindang-Н
Communist struggle entered the final stage of fighting the decisive Н
engagements. The confrontation and struggle being closely bound up Н
with the global Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Н
Union and the global contest between the two great camps, the two Н
countries conditioned by these two basic factors were left really with Н
not much alternative in their choice of policy and of the direction Н
their relationship was to develop.$
#FKThe History#FS_ touches only briefly on this background; its attention is Н
centered on relating the developments of major events in the United Н
States' relations with China in the period. From the minute account Н
and analysis of the United States' policy adjustments and the causes Н
leading to them, one can see fairly clearly what internal Н
contradictions underlay its China policy, why it wanted to interfere Н
in the Chinese civil war but tried not to get directly involved in it, Н
and how the US policy-makers failed in their endeavor to extricate Н
themselves from China in the latter stage of the civil war. The book Н
also expounds on the inevitability of the Chinese Communist Party's Н
following the policy of "leaning to one side" and sets forth the Н
significant view that the confrontation between the United States and Н
China "was finalized" (p. 496) after the two countries were drawn Н
successively into the Korean War. As this chapter contains Н
comparatively less developments of the overall East Asian situation, Н
it gives one the feeling that it disunites more or less with the other Н
chapters.$
#FKThe History,#FS_ as has been said above, has indeed summarized in a fairly Н
comprehensive way the fruit of research in the history of Sino-US Н
relationship over the last decade or so. It reflects, at the same Н
time, the main weakness in this research -- insufficient exposition of НКChina's US policy in comparison with the United States' China policy, Н
which is supported by richer historical data and accorded with a more Н
systematic and deep-going analysis. Considering the special and Н
irreplaceable duty the Chinese scholars have in the study of China's Н
US policy, one will naturally hope that more attention shall be paid Н
to remedy this weakness in the History.$#v
(Translated by Wang Huaiting)____#R#!
#?
#T3COMMENTS ON FROM YANAN$
TO THE WORLD#t
#T4Yang Yusheng#t
#G[4]#G[-4]
#FSNiu Jun,_ #FKFrom Yanan to the World: Origin of 
the Chinese Communist Party's Relations with 
Foreign Countries#FF_ (The Fujian People's 
Publishing House, Chinese edition, 1992), 
299 pages.$
#FS$
#V[2,2,0]
This is a book dealing systematically with the origin and development Н
of the relationship of the Communist Party of China (the CPC) with Н
foreign countries in the period between the mid-30s of the 20th Н
century to the founding of the People's Republic of China in October Н
1949. Basing himself on the rich Chinese and foreign literature and Н
the fruit of research available, especially on the large amounts of Н
dossiers and CPC documents he read first hand, Dr. Niu Jun, the author Н
of this colorful, unique book, traces the arduous course the Chinese Н
Communists took to advance step by step from Yanan to the world Н
against the complicated situation in the period centered on the Н
changing relations between the Guomindang and the Communists, among Н
the USA, the USSR and China, and between the USA and the USSR. The Н
chief concern of the book lies in relating how the CPC readjusted its Н
internal and international policies in the light of the prevaricating Н
domestic and international situation in general, and how it gradually Н
raised its understanding of the USA and the USSR (especially the Н
former) and modified correspondingly its policies towards them in Н
particular. Dr. Niu Jun, an associate research fellow with the Н
Institute of American Study under the Chinese Academy of Social Н
Sciences, is specialized in the contemporary relations between China Н
and the USA and the CPC history, and has written such influential Н
books as #FKFrom Hurley to Marshall: The Whole Process of the US Н
Mediation in the Guomindang-Communist Contradictions#FS_ (1989). The Н
present work, From Yanan to the World, has been well received among Н
academicians since its publication and was awarded in 1993 the Chinese Н
Book Prize of the China Book Review Society.$
The period this book deals with covers the Chinese people's War of Н
Resistance Against Japanese Aggression (1937-45) and the civil war Н
between the Guomindang and the CPC (1945-49). How to correctly Н
understand and properly handle its delicate relations with the USA and Н
the USSR in an extremely complicated situation was a problem the CPC Н
had to face and solve in the entire period.$
#FKFrom Yanan to the World#FS_ presents a fascinating probe in this regard. Н
It describes how the Communists, at the critical juncture when China Н
was faced with the escalating Japanese war of aggression, the Н
deepening peril of national subjugation and genocide and the НКconstantly #^changing#^^ international relations in East Asia, correctly Н
assessed the situation and took momentous decisions at the influential Н
Zunyi Meeting (1935) and Wayaobao Meeting (1936) and when the noted Н
American journalist Edgar Snow visited Yanan for the first time. The Н
CPC discarded for the first time the policy of "Opposing all Н
imperialism" and set forth a strategic line foreseeing the possibility Н
and necessity to take advantage of the contradictions among Н
imperialist countries and form a sort of alliance with Britain, the Н
USA and some other Western countries. This marked "a historic turning Н
point" (p. 24) in the CPC's understanding of the world problems and Н
formulating of foreign policy. The author points out that Edgar Snow Н
played a tremendous role in spreading the CPC's influence abroad; if Н
not for him, "the development of the CPC's foreign relations would Н
have been delayed, to say the least." (p. 28.)$
The important thing is, "The solid ice had been broken, the door had Н
been opened, and the Chinese Communists had at long last made the Н
first step towards the world." (p. 28.) In the national war of Н
resistance that began in 1937, the Guomindang and the CPC cooperated Н
once more to save the nation, and the CPC's relations with the USSR Н
and the USA started to undergo a great change. In September 1938 Mao Н
Zedong elucidated for the first time the CPC's basic principles and Н
policy in handling relations with foreign countries: China, having Н
linked up closely with the world, could not win victory in the war of Н
resistance #^fighting#^^ all by itself without outside help; the foreign Н
policy should be "relying mainly on our own strength while sparing no Н
effort to win foreign assistance," drawing a distinction between Н
different political forces in seeking foreign aid, and making Н
safeguarding the interests of the Chinese nation and persevering in Н
the war of resistance the starting point in dealing with all problems. Н
$
What warrants particular attention is that "The CPC's relationship Н
with the external world had a dual character. On the one hand, the CPC Н
as a legal non-ruling party had established relations with Н
international anti-fascist forces and was exerting influence on the Н
Guomindang government's foreign policy through voicing its political Н
opinions and propagating them abroad. On the other, it was leading a Н
political power and an armed force independent in fact of the Н
Guomindang government, and, therefore, its relationship with foreign Н
forces had certain features common to all foreign relations. As the Н
war went on, these features became increasingly clear." (p. 39.) Since Н
the world situation was very complicated and changed rapidly, the CPC Н
must make use of all positive factors in the international arena to Н
win the support of the USA, the USSR and Britain for China's war Н
effort and their backing of China's internal peace and unity and the Н
Guomindang- Communist cooperation. For the same reason, the CPC Central Н
Committee and its leaders had to keep a vigilant eye on the USA and Н
Britain all the time and criticize their passive China policy and Н
attempts to appease Japan. At the end of 1939 and the beginning of Н
1940, misled by the USSR and the Communist International and Н
infuriated by the Guomindang-Communist conflicts, the CPC acted on the Н
slogan of "Opposing the second imperialist war" and denounced Britain Н
and the USA as the arch enemies. Niu Jun holds that "The views of the Н
CPC Central Committee on international affairs after October 1939 were Н
apparently not in conformity with the development of the situation. In Н
the summer of 1940, while overcoming the `Leftist' tendency, the CPC НКCentral Committee began to reassess the international political Н
situation." (p. 73.) In July 1940 it pointed out clearly that it Н
should take advantage of the contradictions between Britain, the USA Н
and France on the one hand, and Germany, Italy and Japan on the other, Н
and especially between the USA and Japan. In August of the same year, Н
it put forward the idea of supporting the National government to make Н
best use of the British and US foreign policy so as to befriend the Н
USSR, ally with the USA and reestablish ties with the USA and other Н
Western countries. At the end of December 1940, Mao Zedong, having Н
made an all-round summing up of the Party's foreign policy following Н
the signing of the Treaty of Non-Aggression between the Soviet Union Н
and Germany in August 1939, reiterated the basic principle of the Н
CPC's foreign policy in the war of resistance: "Make use of Н
contradictions, win over the many, oppose the few and crush our Н
enemies one by one." To be more specific, "The Communist Party opposes Н
all imperialism, but we make a distinction between Japanese Н
imperialism which is now committing aggression against China and the Н
imperialist powers which are not doing so now, between German and Н
Italian imperialism which are allies of Japan and have recognized Н
`Manzhouguo' and British and US imperialism which are opposed to Н
Japan, and between the Britain and the United States of yesterday Н
which followed a Munich policy in the Far East and undermined China's Н
resistance to Japan, and the Britain and the USA of today which have Н
abandoned this policy and are now in favor of China's resistance."$
However, the CPC still regarded the struggle between Britain and the Н
USA, and Germany and Italy "the second imperialist war," and even Н
maintained that the only difference between them lay in the fact that Н
the former "opposed the USSR, communism and Germany," while the latter Н
"opposed Britain and the USA." Not until June 1941, after the war Н
between the USSR and Germany broke out, did the CPC finally abandon Н
the slogan of opposing all imperialism and directed the spearhead of Н
its attack on the fascist, aggressive Germany, Italy and Japan. Mao Н
Zedong said on July 6 of the same year in a telegram to Zhou Enlai, Н
"All those opposing fascism, whether they are imperialist countries or Н
not, are good, and all those helping it are bad. No mistake will be Н
made in drawing a distinction according to this principle." After Н
that, the commentaries and declarations published by the CPC no longer Н
attached such epithet as imperialism on Britain and the USA and called Н
them "friendly countries" instead. The CPC held that Britain's war Н
against Germany, the USA' assistance to the USSR, China and Britain, Н
and the war the USA might wage against Japan and Germany were all just Н
causes. "We should express our welcome to, and support of, all of Н
them." In other words, the CPC, while throwing the theoretic fetters Н
of the "Soviet center," was determined to readjust its policy towards Н
Britain and the USA. This is #^something#^^ of uncommon significance, on Н
which Niu Jun sets a high value.$
"The determination shown by the CPC Central Committee to adjust its Н
policy towards Britain and the USA," he wrote, "in fact indicated that Н
it had changed on a higher plane the old way of construing China's Н
relationship with the USA and Britain entirely according to Lenin's Н
theory on imperialism and colony and was beginning to appraise the Н
global megatrends, the world politics and China's national interests Н
from a broader angle and follow the principle of seeking truth from Н
facts in formulating its foreign policy. It can be said that, in Н
comparison with the change in the CPC's Britain and US policy, the НКtransformation of the CPC leaders' comprehension of the international Н
questions, like their discarding the old way of deciding foreign Н
policy according to the principles laid down by the `Soviet center,' Н
has a much greater, far-reaching significance." (p. 105.)$
After the outbreak of the Pacific war in December 1941, the CPC Н
Central Committee decided further that a broad, sincere anti- Japanese Н
and anti-German united front with the British and US governments Н
should be set up and developed, and "a guerrilla war could be Н
organized jointly" with the two countries; China should conclude a Н
military alliance with Britain and the USA, coordinate with them in Н
actions and create a united front of all anti- Japanese nations in the Н
Pacific region; and China should "earnestly and frankly give full Н
cooperation to British and American personnel" on all occasions, and Н
the Liberated Areas should "go ahead boldly" with their cooperation Н
with the British and American personnel in intelligence and military Н
work. Before this, the CPC had little contact with the USA and Н
"virtually no relation with its official quarters." (p. 109.) In the Н
days following the issuance of this decision, the CPC's liaison office Н
in Zhongqing worked hard to build a united front with the USA so as to Н
ensure an international environment favorable to China's war of Н
resistance and to the CPC's development in the future. At the same Н
time, the CPC became more and more independent in handling affairs Н
with the USSR, unwilling to be ordered about by Moscow.$
Under the new historical condition, the CPC came to realize that Н
developments in the USA-USSR relationship would be the main external Н
element affecting and conditioning China's political situation during Н
and after the war of resistance. It began to set a greater store by Н
its relations with the USA and take, even more conscientiously, Н
advantage of the international factors to create conditions conducive Н
to the solution of China's internal question. By the summer of 1943 Н
the USA had become "the most influential power in China." (p. 136.) In Н
July 1944 the US Military Observation Group arrived at Yanan, and thus Н
"a quasi-official relationship was finally established between the USA Н
and the CPC." (p. 145.) The CPC Central Committee, in its open Н
advocation of a coalition government, gradually formed a more vigorous Н
US policy and endeavored to turn the unit publicizing its views to Н
overseas audience into a quasi-diplomatic office, and the ties between Н
the US troops in China and the armed forces under the CPC were swiftly Н
enhanced in the summer of 1944. On August 18 of the same year, the CPC Н
Central Committee further urged in its "Directive on Foreign Н
Relations" "to go all out to cooperate with the US forces and show our Н
sincere welcome on all occasions," hoping to forge a military Н
cooperation with the US forces and develop on this basis a Н
relationship of all-round cooperation. However, this basis was largely Н
ruined by Ambassador P. J. Hurley, US president's personal Н
representative, who carried out a policy of supporting Chiang Kai-shek Н
and containing the CPC in the first half of 1945. This "resulted in Н
not only the deterioration of the political relations between the USA Н
and CPC but also a standoff in the military cooperation between the US Н
forces in China and the armed forces under the CPC. The Chinese Н
Communists, therefore, could not but reconsider the relationship with Н
the USA and the role this country would play in China in the post-Н
World War II years." (p. 159.)$
From the summer to the end of 1944, the CPC set to strengthen its Н
relationship with the USSR while actively developing diplomatic ties НКwith the USA. In April 1945 the CPC issued a directive, pointing out Н
that from then on the CPC troops should support mainly the Soviet Army Н
in its coordination of military operations with the USA, Britain and Н
the USSR, and the unrealistic view on the USA should be corrected. On Н
May 31 Mao Zedong said in an internal report at the CPC's 7th Н
Congress: The Party must be on the alert for a new foreign Н
intervention. China might be reduced to a semi-colony under the Н
Guomindang dominated mainly by the USA after winning victory in the Н
war of resistance. This would be a long-term affliction, and the Н
Party's senior cadres must pay attention to study the American Н
situation and prepare themselves for the agony. In the subsequent Н
months the CPC Central Committee gradually abandoned the policy of Н
uniting with the USA followed for some time in 1944 and shifted the Н
center of its foreign relations to fighting the Japanese troops in Н
conjunction with the Soviet Army and making use of the Soviet attacks Н
to create the external conditions for solving China's internal Н
question. But the CPC leaders perceived shortly before the victory Н
over Japan that no direct assistance could be had from the USSR Н
either. Under the circumstances, Mao Zedong defined on August 13, 1945 Н
the basic principle the CPC was to apply in the post-war years: 1. Н
"Regeneration through our own efforts." That is, rely on the Party's Н
own strength to win victory in the Chinese revolution; 2. "Defying Н
laws human and divine." In other words, the Party was not to be bound Н
by those international treaties which impeded the development of the Н
Chinese revolution. From mid-September to mid-November, the CPC, Н
"leaning its back on the USSR" and "neutralizing the USA," was in fact Н
in a state of hostility against the USA. It was precisely because the Н
CPC took advantage of the contradictions between the USA and the USSR Н
in the Far East and implemented the strategy of "moving northward to Н
develop itself and repelling attacks from the south" in the political Н
struggle within the country that it managed to win great successes. Н
When the contradictions between the Guomindang and the CPC Н
accelerated, and the two conducted negotiations while locked in bitter Н
fighting, the CPC leaders made best use of the contradictions between Н
the USA and the USSR and between the USA and Chiang Kai-shek and Н
avoided the US intervention in the Chinese revolution. Beginning from Н
1946, the CPC no longer believed that the contention between the USA Н
and the USSR would have a decisive impact on the Chinese situation and Н
started to break the bonds generated from the USA-USSR relationship, Н
posing a challenge to the big powers. It finally embarked on the Н
independent road of wrestling a complete victory in the Chinese Н
revolution.$
The author points out at the end of the book that the Chinese Н
Communists, in their struggle against imperialism and foreign Н
intervention, grew out of childishness, reached maturity and gradually Н
formed such principles guiding its foreign relations and foreign Н
policy: "Acting independently and with the initiative in our own Н
hands," "relying mainly on our own efforts while seeking assistance Н
from abroad" and "making use of contradictions and crushing our Н
enemies one by one." It was from the Yanan days that China began to Н
extricate itself from the diplomatic quagmire it had been sucked down Н
in the last century. "The course the Chinese Communists followed from Н
Yanan to the world was one in which China reestablished its national Н
standing and dignity in the global family of nations and one embodying Н
China's hope to end the national humility of one hundred years and НКsymbolizing China's national pride and confidence." (p. 289.)$
This book has a pleasant cover and layout and was well printed. One of Н
the characteristics of the book is that it contains a huge amount of Н
citations from the dossiers and literature of the CPC. This is part of Н
the fruit of the author's painstaking research and does its job in Н
documenting his arguments. From these citations, one can see that some Н
literature have been published (included in #FKThe Selection of Documents Н
of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China,#FS_ for Н
instance), and the others are not up till now. The question is Н
practically no note has been added to show where these citations come Н
from. As notes with set items are required of academic works, it is Н
regrettable that this book should go without them.      And this is Н
not the only point to be regretted. "There is another big regret," as Н
Mr. Wang Jisi said recently. "We have to depend largely on US files Н
for details of the histories of Sino-US and Sino-Soviet relations. Н
A sizable part of the archives of the former Soviet Union has been Н
made known to the public in recent years. As to the utilization of Н
Chinese dossiers by Chinese scholars, one can only say that `some Н
headway has been made, but the basic situation remains unchanged. Н
True, some new facts have been divulged in the last few years about Н
China's relations with foreign countries. Those in a position to cite Н
them first hand are either people having access to archives denied to Н
others or archive and documentation officers. It is impossible that Н
researchers using undisclosed information would write papers according Н
to the set academic norms. As nobody can check the citations against Н
the original documents, there is no academic equality between Н
researchers having access to such documents and those having not, and Н
neither is there a proper yardstick for fair academic criticism, to Н
say nothing of adding notes with set items." $
These words merit the attention of all researchers.$
June 11, 1995#R
#T4NOTES#t
##[D1J100P80]
_#+[1]_See American Studies, Chinese edition, 1995, No.1, p.135.$
#v##[R]
(Translated by Wang Huaiting)____#R#E