

A M E R I C A N S T U D I E S I N C H I N A

VOL.3

1996

Chief Editor

ZI ZHONGYUN

(Institute of American Studies, CASS)

Deputy Chief Editors

WU ZHAN

(Institute of American Studies, CASS)

HU GUOCHENG

(Institute of American Studies, CASS)

Editor

ZHAO MEI

(Institute of American Studies, CASS)

Published Yearly

by

CHINESE ASSOCIATION FOR AMERICAN STUDIES

and

INSTITUTE OF AMERICAN STUDIES

CHINESE ACADEMY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES (CASS)

EDITORIAL BOARD

CHEN BAOSAN , Institute of American Studies , CASS

CHEN YAOGUANG , Center for Social Science Information and Documentation ,
CASS

DAI WENBAO , Peoples Publishing House

DENG SHUSHENG , Peoples Publishing House

DONG HENGXUN , Institute of Foreign Literatures , CASS

FAN KANG , Institute of World Economics and Politics , CASS

LI DAOKUI , Institute of American Studies , CASS

LI SHENZHI , Chinese Association for American Studies

LIU XUYI , Wuhan University

LIU ZUOCHANG , Shandong Normal University

MAO YUSHI , Institute of American Studies , CASS

MEI RENYI , Beijing Foreign Languages University

TENG WEIZAO , Nankai University

WANG HUAINING , Institute of World Economics and Politics , CASS

WANG JISI , Institute of American Studies , CASS

WANG ZHIGANG , Nanjing University

WANG XI , Fudan University

WU FUHENG , Shandong University

WU JIXIAN , Wuhan University

YAN SIGUANG , Institute of American Studies , CASS

YUAN MING , Beijing University

ZHANG YOULUN , Nankai University

ZHU SHIDA , Institute of American Studies , CASS

? 1996 by the Chinese Association for American Studies and the Institute of American Studies , Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

All rights reserved

ISSN 1004-8006

CN11-3130/C

A M E R I C A N S T U D I E S I N C H I N A

VOL.3

1996

7 SINO-U.S.-JAPANESE RELATIONS FROM THE TURN OF LAST CENTURY TO THE TURN OF THIS CENTURY—FROM THE CHINESE PERSPECTIVE

Zi Zhongyun

The 20th century has seen complicated relations between China, the United States and Japan, with China the victim for most of the time. In the second half of the century, all three countries underwent great changes. The most fundamental ones took place in China and the three countries began to build their relationship on an equal footing. The author concludes that America and Japan should learn to be accustomed to a growing China and treat it with common sense and as an equal. China, on its part, should deepen its reform in order to catch up with the trend of the ever changing world.

25 FROM NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TO COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN

Wu Zhan

The author summarizes the nuclear disarmament process from the Non-proliferation Treaty to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and concludes that they are indispensable for the realization of a nuclear-free world no matter how unfair they are. As the only world superpower, the United States seeks to use its nuclear weapons to strengthen its global superiority. Aware of the threat of the spread of nuclear weapons to its own security, it has to agree to partial nuclear disarmament accords and a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

37 THE INTERNAL ECONOMIC FACTORS ACTING UPON CHINA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES

Zhu Shanli

The internal economic factors are classified into two categories. One is related to economic development and the other to economic reform. China experienced high economic growth while suffering from inflation in recent years. Both high economic growth rate and enter-

prise reform could bring about high inflation. As the Sino-U.S. trade is mutually beneficial, China will expand it and continue to open its financial market to the United States. China will take cautious steps in developing Sino-U.S. relationship, as undue foreign investment and trade could in turn damage China's economy.

63 ON SEVERAL QUESTIONS IN SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
DURING CHINA'S WAR OF RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN

Tao Wenzhao

In the early period of the Sino-Japanese War, the U.S. policy toward China gradually developed in the direction of containing Japan and supporting China. The U.S.-Japanese negotiations in 1941 fundamentally differed from the Munich Pact. Motivated by their respective needs, the Chinese and American governments formed a special relationship during the war. The change of U.S. policy toward China at the last phase of the war was the result of a number of events that took place from September 1944 to April 1945.

87 A CULTURAL STUDY OF THE AMERICAN EAST ASIAN POLICY

Zhu Shida

The author holds that if the United States attempts to enter into East Asia, it has to identify the differences between East Asian and American civilization and work to narrow them. So, it shall have to separate ideology from trade and depoliticize the human rights issue, establish close governmental and non-governmental contacts, recognize that all social changes hinge on the maturity of the forces in the society itself and that the social development in East Asia should be evolutionary, find common ground in the perception of value, and learn to make the two civilizations complementary to each other.

107 AMERICAN MISSIONARIES AND THE TREND OF "OPENING
EYES TO OBSERVE THE WORLD" IN CHINA AFTER THE OPI-
UM WAR

Wang Lixin

In the decade after the Opium War, a group of Chinese scholars began to pay close attention to the external world and compiled a number of books on foreign history and geography. This trend was known as "opening the eyes to observe the world". It exposed to their compatriots a civilization widely different from theirs. It was

American Protestant missionaries in China who provided the literature for Chinese scholars. The latter wrote the books that served as a window for the Chinese to observe the world. This had profound influence on China's modernization in the late Qing Dynasty.

138 AMERICAN FILMS IN CHINESE REVIEWS (1895-1949)

Wang Chaoguang

This article discusses the image of American films in Chinese movie reviews in the first half of this century and argues that Chinese movie reviews evolved from a sense of novelty to ethical and political criticism. They showed a general trend of pan-politicalization. This resulted from the impact of traditional culture, as well as the social environment of the day. Nevertheless, owing to its estrangement from both movie professionals and the audience, the pan-politicalized criticism failed to produce the desired effect.

BOOK REVIEWS

156 BROADENING THE INTERNATIONAL STUDIES Chen Leming

167 ORIGIN AND MANIFESTATIONS OF SINO-US HOSTILITY
Zhou Guiyin

173 FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE MODERN ECONOMIC SYSTEM
Liu Xiaoying

178 A FINE WORK IN U.S. URBANIZATION STUDY Huang Keke

ACADEMIC ACTIVITIES

186 INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON "CULTURAL FACTORS IN
THE U.S.-EAST ASIA RELATIONS" HELD

Zhu Shida

CONTRIBUTORS

ZI ZHONGYUN , senior fellow , Institute of American Studies , CASS

W U ZHAN , senior fellow , Institute of American Studies , CASS

ZHU SHANLI , professor , Economic Department , Peking University

TAO WENZHAO , senior fellow , Institute of American Studies , CASS

ZHU SHIDA , senior fellow , Institute of American Studies , CASS

W ANG LIXIN , assistant professor , History Department , Nankai University

W ANG CHAOGUANG , associate research fellow , Institute of Modern History , CASS

CHEN LEMIN , senior fellow , Institute of European Studies , CASS

ZHOU GUIYIN , History Department , Nanjing University

LIU XIAOYING , assistant professor , History Department , Beijing Normal University

HUANG KEKE , senior fellow , Institute of World History , CASS

AMERICAN STUDIES IN CHINA , an annual , is published jointly by the Chinese Association for American Studies and the Institute of American Studies , Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. The contents of the articles in this journal should not be construed as reflecting the views of either the Association or the Institute.

SINO-U.S.-JAPANESE RELATIONS
FROM THE TURN OF LAST CENTURY
TO THE TURN OF THIS CENTURY

——from the Chinese perspective

ZI Zhongyun

From the turn of last century to the forthcoming turn of this century , four major countries , namely , China , the United States , Japan and Russia have exercised decisive influence , in turn or concurrently , on the situation in the Asia-Pacific region and will continue to do so in the foreseeable future . This includes both the course of development of these countries on their own and the inter-relations among them . Leaving aside Russia for the time being , this paper mainly focuses on the relationship between China , America and Japan . The reason for talking specifically “from a Chinese perspective” is that , since recently , there have been discussions at different levels among elite opinion circles both in Japan and the United States on the question of how to deal with a fast-growing and changing China . A series of forums were also held between Japanese and Americans and much has been published on the subject . The views expressed thereby show a rather wide gap in perspective with that from China . Using this opportunity to take a look at the issue from a Chinese perspective to induce some discussions might help to promote mutual understanding . It is understood that the views explored here are neither official nor the result of quantitative research on Chinese public opinion ; but they do reflect by and large a prevailing consensus among broad social strata in China .

I. The First Four Decades from the Turn of Last Century

In order to better understand Today , it is necessary to make a brief historical review .

By the end of the 19th century , Japan was actively pursuing the “off Asia into Europe” policy , with the ambition of joining the power system centering around European imperialists and making aggressive attempts to expand its sphere of influence. The neighboring China both vast in area and weak in strength naturally became its first target. Just at this moment , the United States began to cast its eyes beyond the Pacific Ocean. Secretary John Hay's Notes on “open-door” principle in 1899 , could be regarded as the first US policy paper toward China (prior to this , from the “ Wangsha Treaty” to the participation in the Eight-power Allied Forces , America was only taking a “free ride” to China). While applying to all powers in China in principle , the “open-door” policy was specifically targeted at Russia and Japan , the two countries most covetous of North-eastern China. Soon afterwards , the Russo-Japanese war broke out , and as a result , Japan obtained dominant position in that area and with the rapid growth of its strength and the rise of militarism , its ambitions inflated to include conquest of the whole of China. Logically , for the American “open-door” policy , Japan became the main challenger .

Confronted with an aggressive Japan , the successive Chinese governments from the late Qing Dynasty , through Yuan Shikai , the Northern Warlords to the Nationalists were all too weak to protect themselves and invariably placed hope on the U . S . as a countervailing force against Japan , expecting that it would insist on its “open-door” policy . It is fair to say that throughout this period , with only a few short exceptions , “seeking alignment with America to counter Japan” remained the main line of diplomatic thinking of almost all the Chinese governments. But until shortly before the Pearl Harbor Incident , all these attempts had failed and the hopes pinned on the

United States proved to be chimerical. To cite a few examples : The “ Root-Takahira Agreement ” in 1908 shattered the Qing government's attempt to break the Japanese monopoly of Manchuria by inviting Americans to join in the development of the area , so that Tang Shaoyi , Special Envoy to Washington to negotiate loans , returned empty-handed. The “ Knox Plan ” (named after the then US Secretary of State) about building the Jinzhou-Aihui railway , a project which had been planned from the late Qing Dynasty to the Republic of China , fell through , due to combined opposition from Japan and Britain. The “ Lansing-Ishii Agreement ” signed between America and Japan in 1917 even went further to recognize Japan's “special interests” in China. What came as a shock to both the Chinese government and general public , and caused deep disappointment at the US was the “ Paris Peace Conference ” in 1919 , at which the most influential US delegation , following the personal directive of President Woodrow Wilson , conceded to Japanese imperialist claims against China's legitimate demands in the case of Shandong peninsula. This event precipitated the “ May 4th Movement ” which produced far-reaching impact on China's political life. For China , the Washington Conference in 1922 was a favorable turn. Under the US initiative , the “ Nine-Power Treaty ” and later the “ Briand-Kellogg Pact ” were passed , which , to some extent , exercised constrain on Japan , and enabled China to recover part of its legitimate rights. After the “ Northern Expedition ” in 1926 , the Nationalist government once hoped to establish good relations with America and Japan concurrently so as to develop China's economy with the help of both. But before long , the unprecedented Great Depression took place , hitting hard America and the entire capitalist world. Managing hard to fend for itself , the US even transferred the crisis to China through the silver policy. Against this background , the militarist forces swelled rapidly in Japan , and , never wanting to see China embarking on a road of healthy development , abruptly launched the “ September 18 Incident ” of 1931 .

After the Japanese seizure of Manchuria , Chiang Kai-shek , like his predecessors , was unwilling to put up resistance and instead ,

counted on international intervention from America and the League of Nations. Though not a member state of the League, Washington was a leading member of the Nine-Power Treaty, so its attitude carried much weight. This time, the U.S. took a relatively clearer position in the famous "Doctrine of Non-recognition" of Secretary Stimson. After the "January 28 Incident" in 1932, in which Japan bombarded Shanghai, the U.S. insisted on revising the "Lytton Report" of the League of Nations to the effect that the policy of non-recognition was maintained, and the Japanese aggressive acts denounced. But these were too late and too weak to curb Japan's aggressive momentum, and the Japanese government responded by announcing in 1933 withdrawal from the League of Nations. By then, the Japanese intention became crystal clear. However, as late as 1937, just on the eve of a full-scale Japanese invasion into China, the US Congress adopted the "Permanent Neutrality Act" which in effect was to the advantage of Japan.

The rationale for the American position in all these instances lay in the reality of the lopsided balance of strength between Japan and China, which made the United States feel not worthwhile to offend a strong Japan for the sake of a weak China. Balancing its limited power and interests in Asia, America was not prepared then for a head-on confrontation with Japan. The great economic depression of the late 1920s made Japan a more needed market. With an illusion that the civilian forces in the Japanese government would prevail over the militarists in the end, most of the influential figures in the U.S. related to policy-making towards Japan were in favor of accommodation rather than hard pressure. Moreover, there were bargaining counters between the two: America tolerated what Japan was doing in Korea and China in exchange for Japan's refraining from touching the Philippines and ignoring American exclusion of Japanese immigrants. From the Chinese perspective, however, in every round of wrestling with Japan, America stepped back from the "open-door" policy at the expense of China's rights and interests. These circumstances not only deepened the heartfelt pains of the Chinese people, feeling like "being meat on others chopping

block” , but also swept away the hopes cherished by many Chinese on the United States , seen as the last benign Western power , and accelerated the awakening of the Chinese national consciousness. Revolutionary leaders like Dr. Sun Yat-sen and Chen Duxiu , founder of the Communist Party , who had both been admirers of the United States , became completely disillusioned. This partly explained why large numbers of patriotic Chinese intellectuals embraced Marxism and turned to the Soviet Union during this period.

II. From Sino-US Alliance Against Japanese Aggression to U S-Japan Alliance Against China in the Cold War

In the early stage of the War of Resistance against Japan , the diplomatic efforts of the Chiang Kai-Shek government aimed at obtaining US help , and through the US influence , a joint constraining of Japan from the international community . Specifically , it aimed at getting the US to abolish the “Permanent Neutrality Act” and provide economic aid to China. But these efforts produced very little effect. After 1938 , the American public became increasingly sympathetic with China's war efforts , and the inclination of the US government also began to change , though gradually and slowly. Regular US aid did not come to China until March 1941 after the decision to include China in the “Lend-Lease Act” . After Pearl Harbor , the situation took a U-turn. America wanted China to pin down as many Japanese forces as possible so that itself could concentrate on the battleground in Europe , while Chiang Kai-shek took a great relief and counted on the US to fight Japan so that he could preserve his forces against the communists. This contradiction of intentions gave rise to the well-known “Stilwell Incident” . It is to be noted that in order to encourage China to hold out against Japan , the Roosevelt administration supported China's claim to recover all the Japanese-occupied territories after the war , and got this officially written into the “Cairo Declaration” and the “Potsdam Proclama-

tion". At the same time , it also actively promoted the recognition of China's status as a big power so that China became a founding member of the United Nations as well as a permanent member of the Security Council. This was the only period in history when China and America formed an alliance against Japan. During the war against Japan , the Communist Party of China grew into a force to be reckoned with , and for the first time in history , it came to the American attention on policy level. For a short moment , the Chinese communists had good impressions of the Roosevelt administration and cherished hope that : one , the U . S . would also provide aid to the communist-led anti-Japanese forces ; and two , the US would use its influence to prevent the Kuomintang from launching a civil war , or at least remain neutral in China's internal strife. But both hopes fell apart and the subsequent development of history was known to all , including the left-over of the "Taiwan issue".

After the War , America exclusively occupied Japan. General MacArthur , acting like an overlord , took in his hands the power which could determine Japan's destiny. Theoretically , America was occupying Japan on behalf of the Allies , with the responsibility of uprooting militarist forces from all areas and preparing for the peace treaty. In the early stage of the occupation , the U . S . was quite successful in transforming Japan along this line. The current Constitution of peace and the political system of Japan are , for example , the products of the transformation. But as the Cold War intensified and the victory of the Chinese Communist Party was in sight , there was a major shift in the U . S . Asia policy in 1948 towards making Japan a Cold War partner against the Soviet Union and China. The immediate consequence of this strategic shift was that China , which had contributed most to the war efforts and suffered the greatest sacrifice was not represented at the San Francisco Conference for Peace Treaty with Japan. As a result , China's voices were not heard and the atrocities of Japanese militarists not fully exposed. Since then , Japan became totally dependent on the US politically and on security issues ; but it also took the opportunity to develop a very strong economy and finally became a formidable competitor of the

US , so much so that trade frictions have become a part of Japanese-US relations today. A by-product of the American Cold War policy was that some militarist elements as well as their thinking kept their influence in Japan. This was very different from the way Fascism has been treated in Europe. In the post-war era , German leaders never defended the crimes committed by the Nazis. But until today , quite influential politicians and opinion circles in Japan are still ambiguous about its aggressive history in Asia. Every now and then , there were “slips of the tongue” by Japanese political figures which would arouse indignant protests from Asian peoples.

Regarding Sino-Japanese relations during the Cold War , it goes without saying that the Japanese government could not independently develop relations with China so long as US-China relations remained deadlocked. But things were different on non-governmental level. In late 1950s and early 1960s , anti-American sentiments were on the rise among Japanese public and opposition parties. Pro or anti-America became a demarcation line between Japanese right and left. Giving allowance to certain exaggeration in the Chinese propaganda about the anti-American movements in Japan , this phenomenon remained a fact. During the War with Japan , the Chinese Communist Party established an alliance with the Japanese Left and anti-war forces , which became the basic force in postwar Japan for the promotion of non-governmental relationship with the People's Republic of China. Trade relations with small and medium-sized Japanese enterprises progressed very well. At one stage , “America is the common enemy of the Chinese and Japanese people” became a common slogan. Japanese politician Asanuma Inejiro was even assassinated by ultra-rightists for his insistence on the slogan. Thus , when the opportunity came , normalization of Sino-Japanese official relations were realized rather smoothly because it had been promoted from under by non-official circles , and was therefore broadly based.

Looking back , Sino-US-Japanese relations in most part of the history had always been abnormal and unequal. It seemed as though America would always have to make a choice between China and Japan , and China saw itself as victim under whatever circumstances.

Fundamental changes did not take place until the 1970s.

III. After the Normalization of Relations

The normalization of Sino-US and Sino-Japanese relations began in 1970s with Mao Zedong's Ping-Pong diplomacy and Nixon's visit to China. Since then, for the first time in history a situation emerged in which the three countries could get along harmoniously with each other, and none would have to choose between the other two. Arising from common needs, this was in the best interests of all three countries. Among other things, two factors were most important: one, common interest in countering the perceived Soviet threat. and two, China's modernization drive. The first point was too obvious to need any elaboration here. With regard to the second point, in the late 1970s China resolutely took the road of reform and opening-up, with modernization as the national goal. For the fulfillment of this goal, America and Japan stood out naturally as the two most important countries for China to turn to not only in capital, technology and trade, but also in expertise, thinking and personnel training. In the early 1980s when the Chinese people talked about modernization, they would naturally think of America and Japan, placing high or rather excessive expectations on both countries. America and Japan on their part, welcomed, and even hailed, in America's case, the changes taking place in China. Out of strategic, economic and ideological considerations, they believed encouraging and helping China to stick to reform and open-up was in their own interests. At that time, trade friction had already emerged between Japan and America, while China was just starting its economic development and was far from being a competitor. So both countries would like to see a better relationship with China. Under these circumstances, the problems left over by the hostile history between China and the other two countries were relatively easy to manage either by reaching compromise or shelving them temporarily. Quite a number of Americans got excited again, forming unrealistic expectations on changes in China to their liking and over-estimating the ca-

pability of US influence on China's course of development.

After the 1989 political upheaval in China, the American views on China shifted dramatically. For the first two years, there was expectation that China would give up reform and open-up, and return to the rigid and secluded past. Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the drastic changes in Eastern Europe, there was anticipation or even hope for a collapse of the current regime led by the Communist Party and different policy proposals tantamount to a return to the "isolation and containment" policy were advocated. But this only lasted for a short while and did not become the mainstream of U.S. China policy, for American policy makers soon came to realize that China was different from the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc, that the current regime would not collapse, and that a stable China was in the interests of the US itself and world peace. Therefore, in spite of the chronicle MFN crisis created by the US Congress, reason always prevailed and finally a decision was made by the Clinton Administration to delink the issue from that of "human rights". In this respect, Japan's attitude was less dramatic because its diplomacy was not so heavily ideological as that of the U.S. Moreover, during that time it was caught up in serious trade disputes with America, while enjoying a favorable trade balance with China. Therefore, although politically Japan kept in step with the Western countries on human rights issues concerning China, it remained lukewarm towards measures of sanctions.

A turning point came in 1992 with Deng Xiaoping's speeches during his tour to southern China, in which China once again showed to the world its determination to march forward along the road of reform and open-up. At the same time, China's economic growth gathered momentum. Now the perceptions of America and other countries towards China took another big turn: from anticipating its collapse to worrying about its potential strength.

IV. Looking from the Present into the Future

Where is and whither Sino-US-Japanese relationship? A analysis

on this question can be approached on two levels : one is the objective and practical level as matters normally should be. On this level , the factors for the three countries to maintain fairly good relations outnumber the ones leading to conflicts and the situation of the 1980s should be able to be maintained. China's fundamental aspirations of stability , prosperity and development will stand unchanged. As facts since late 1970s have proved , the road of reform and open-up is irreversible , whatever twists and turns should happen domestically ; externally , China's behavior has been cautious and responsible and as a whole , ideological factor is on the wane. For China , the role that can be played by America and Japan in its modernization will become ever more important. To America and Japan , the repeated statements that a stable , prosperous and friendly China is in their interests are not just diplomatic cliché. Japan is particularly concerned about China's stability , and America has a greater need of China's co-operation in world affairs. The ever-increasing cross-border problems such as anti-drugs , anti-pollution and anti-terrorist activities and all kinds of common issues concerning human subsistence and health make co-operation among the three countries a great necessity. There are , of course , factors which might lead to frictions : trade friction , a major issue between U.S. and Japan , also occurs between America and China. In fact , for a long time to come China will lag behind America and Japan in the stage of development and will not constitute a strong competitor. There are other differences emerging regularly , which , if treated with reason and not to be affected by ideological and emotional factors or by domestic politics , could be approached appropriately and reach compromise through proper channels.

Here I would focus on the second level - - the level of perception. This is more problematic because there has been a wide gap between how China perceives itself and its relations with the outside world on the one hand and how it is perceived by the outside world on the other. (The theme of this paper being Sino-US-Japanese relations , "outside world" here mainly refers to the US and Japan , not including other countries). At present there is a variety of thesis

concerning China's role in Asia and the Pacific region. Out of these there is a general demonstration of misgivings, as if China were a "problem child" on the international arena who should be guarded against. As always, the United States is on the forefront and is accustomed to be the most outspoken. Recently American "Council on Foreign Relations" published a book on China whose title alone is meaningful: "Weaving the Net". Its theme is highlighted on the cover with a Chinese proverb: "better to go back and weave a net, than to covet for fish by the riverside". The subheading of the book is "Conditional Engagement with China". The following paragraph reads particularly representative of this school of thoughts:

"China may pose a serious problem for the rest of the world regardless of which trajectory it follows. If the PRC disintegrates, the mass social chaos and human suffering could well result in waves of refugees, rampant crime, weapons and nuclear arms proliferation, and staggering economic losses. If China remains united and strongly authoritarian, a coalition of party ideologies, state capitalists, and xenophobic People's Liberation Army (PLA) officers could gather the reins of power in Beijing while constructing a new legitimacy based on Han nationalism and an aggressive foreign policy. If China remains united and mildly authoritarian, it could well become a destabilizing force in the international system, and in any case would still be difficult to deal with - - as Washington has lately discovered. However, even a pluralist, quasi-democratic China, given its sheer size, the volatility of its domestic politics, and the depth of its aggrieved nationalism, would pose an enormous problem."¹

According to this line of logic, no matter how China evolves, the impact it creates would be negative. The existence of China itself would pose difficulties to the world. This is of course only one school of thought and there are other Americans who make more positive appraisals on the prospect of China. But the viewpoints as quoted above are by no means isolated and The U. S. Council on Foreign Relations which organized the discussion and published the book enjoys considerable authority. Besides, many other views differ from this one only in nuances not in essence. Concerns and misgiv-

ings about China's development are common. So, apart from the officially declared policy of "constructive engagement", there appears a proposed policy of "conditional engagement". Ostensibly all the conditions raised are those that all parties should abide by, such as: "no unilateral use of offensive military force", "peaceful resolution of territorial disputes", "freedom of navigation", "market access for trade and investment", "non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction", "respect for basic human rights" and so on. But given the context in which these conditions are raised and the problems in the practice of Sino-US relations over recent years, particularly China's reactions to Li Denghui's visit to America since last year, these conditions are apparently designed to constrain China.

Similar views are also held in Japan to a large extent only with different emphasis and forms of manifestation. Objectively speaking, some of the concerns are understandable: Any movement of a country with 1.2 billion population possessing nuclear weapons and developing at the present momentum would naturally draw attention from the outside world. This is particularly true when the Chinese society is in the process of a deep-going transformation with all the unpredictable and uncontrollable elements one would expect of a huge ship making sharp turns. It is quite normal for China to be an object of study and concern. But among the Chinese, there is a growing feeling of being treated unfairly. There are wide gaps in perceptions which can be summed up in the following:

(1) On the question of China's strength: As Chinese see it, for over a hundred years, this country was so weak and backward that it had been time and again bullied by foreign powers. A wealthy and strong motherland has been the deeply-cherished aspiration of the Chinese for generations. In the past, due to various factors, both imposed upon and self-inflicted, this goal remained a far off dream. The momentum of rapid growth only came in the last decade or so and even now China is still far behind not only the developed but some newly industrialized third-world countries and areas. At present, it is still confronted with many restrictions in terms of sustainable development. The road of development is by no means plain-

sailing and requires strenuous efforts. But the outside world is already feeling uneasy about its progress. They either over-estimate China's economy or, out of other considerations, refuse to treat China as a developing country. This is the fundamental reason for the protracted negotiations on China's membership of the World Trade Organization.

In the military field, though modernization of national defence is one of the declared objectives of the "four modernizations", in fact, China made economic development a top priority and defence expenditure has been kept at a very low level. In absolute figures, it is much less than that of Japan whose defence development is restricted by the Constitution; proportionately it is far below that of America and other developed countries. Authoritative American research reports also acknowledge that qualitatively Chinese military equipments are far from being modernized. But China's military strength has been a subject of concern and any slight increase in its defence budget would arouse suspicions.

(2) On territorial claims. From the Chinese point of view, China has never had territorial ambitions outside its boundary. On the contrary, it has always been losing territorial rights to foreign powers in modern history. The Taiwan issue is a legacy of this history. Therefore to reunify with Taiwan is the legitimate demand within China's sovereign rights. Peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue is the basic policy; but China does not commit itself to giving up other means under any circumstances. This position is interpreted as "having the intention of changing the status quo by force" and hence has become a major argument for the thesis of "China threat" and the "Taiwan Strait crisis" from last year to this year aggravated the allegations. From China's standpoint, however, the whole event had not been started by China which had never taken the initiative to change the status quo. On the contrary, the actions it had taken were only compelled by necessity in order to stop the move towards "two Chinas" which will change the status quo. It is also China's belief that Japan and America should not only be held responsible historically for the issue, but are also relevant today and America, in

particular , has still certain leverage on the issue. The difference over Taiwan is a difficult issue in the bilateral relations between China and America and is called by many a "time bomb". Japan basically shared the American position , only less visible , being not in the forefront.

(3) Frictions between China and Japan take place frequently over the question of how to look at the history of Japanese aggressive war. This is not only an issue between China and Japan , but also involves other Asian countries. A verdict had already been passed on this period of history , and this generation of Japanese leadership was not held responsible. They should , instead , turn this page of history over and establish a new relationship with other Asian countries on a new basis. However , there is always a strong force in Japanese ruling circles trying to deny the fact of aggression , hence the recurrent statements to this effect and "text book" incidents. So much so that even on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the victory of anti-fascist war , the Japan Diet failed to seize the opportunity to pass a clearly worded resolution so that this page could be turned once for all. The recent move of Prime Minister Hashimoto taking the lead to pay official tribute to the Yasukuni Shrine cannot but be regarded by the Asian peoples as a very serious signal of the orientation of Japanese political development. Japan has the legitimate right to wish to be an "ordinary country" in the international community and acquire a status that suits its present strength ; but the attitude of present leaders toward history , the philosophies advocated thereby as well as the education given to the younger generation constitute a constant concern for people of China and other Asian countries. The Chinese also feel that American opinion and the West as a whole approach this question differently from what they do to the atrocities of fascist Germany. Some even blamed China of digging up old historical scores , which deepened the Chinese sense of being treated unfairly.

(4) On integration with the international community. China has been striving to be a full participant in the international community and is trying hard to integrate with the outside world in every

aspect. America and Japan also believe that encouraging China to advance toward this direction would benefit all ; but there is a great difference over the terms of achieving this end. China's much-postponed development makes it a late-comer. The environment it finds itself in , with respect to access to technology-transfer and market for example , is much harsher than Japan and the "four dragons" of Asia at the time of their taking off. Added to this is outside pressure from ideological factor. The rules of many international organizations had been made in China's absence , without taking into account the specific conditions of China. Besides , many domestic factors are beyond control in the transition to a market economy. As China sees it , it has tried its utmost to meet the international requirements short of damaging its fundamental national interest ; yet other countries headed by the United States seem never to be satisfied. Thus , whatever the arguments put forward by the U.S. in the WTO negotiations , looking at the situation from the Chinese perspective , by raising conditions beyond China's capability , the United States is placing obstacles in practice in contradiction to its professed principle of encouraging China to participate in the international community .

(5) There are deep-lying theoretical differences too. While acknowledging the general trend of globalization and increasing interdependence between nations , the Chinese theoretical circles still take national sovereignty as the foundation of state relations , and hold that power politics and interference into other country's internal affairs are to be opposed. In the West , however , there is an increasing emphasis on the obsolescence of the old concept of national sovereignty , the respect for "internal affairs" is deemphasised and "nationalism" often carries a negative connotation. This difference of concept stems from difference in posture , with China on the defensive and America on the offensive. China sees itself in the process of growing to its full national stature while the United States , assuming world leadership , regards the measures of other countries to protect their national interests as obstacles to its wielding its influences. Having said this , it should be acknowledged that compared with a few years ago , nationalist sentiments mainly targeted against

America are on the rise both among ordinary Chinese and elite opinion circles. This is at least partly a repercussion to the U.S. way of dealing with China in the recent years seen by the Chinese as unequal treatment and playing power politics.

In sum, for Chinese themselves, the momentum of development has just started. The hope is seen on the horizon; but there is still a long way to go before China can sit as an equal with developed countries and secure a fairly comfortable life for its 1.2 billion people. It requires, on the one hand, the arduous efforts of the Chinese people themselves, and, on the other, a favorable international environment. To put it graphically: though Chairman Mao Zedong proclaimed in 1949 that "Chinese people stand up from now on", for a fairly long time, the Chinese people did not feel that they had stood straight up. Now that China has barely begun to stretch its back, the outside world is already warning against its growing too tall and talking of putting a ceiling on its head, as if the height China is allowed to grow differs from that of others. This leaves a feeling of unfairness and frustration on the part of the Chinese people, a mood which, in turn, is called "aggrieved nationalism" and regarded as a dangerous sign. How this vicious interaction is to be stopped is a question worthy of attention. What has been talked about above is not the decision-making thinking of the three governments; but it is at least representative enough to influence decision-making.

The current relationship between Japan and the U.S. is markedly closer than that between anyone of the two with China respectively. Trade frictions between America and Japan will continue to present themselves and sometimes may become quite acute; but they are unlikely to cause crisis. The contradictions between America and Japan are normal ones stemming from national interests with no ideological and sentimental factors attached. There has been much talk about China and Japan being part of the Confucian culture; but in fact, the value system that actually works in Japan is closer to that of the West. In addition, on security issues, America and Japan remained allies in this post-cold war era, and the recently renewed US-Japanese Security Treaty, especially associated with the

Taiwan issue , has caused justifiable concern on the part of the Chinese. America and Japan often consult with each other on their policies toward China in order to take concerted actions , whereas this mechanism does not exist in China's relationship with any of the other two respectively. So at present , the trilateral relationship is an unequal triangle.

If this article focuses more on differences so as to catch attention and promote communications , the author does not deny that there exists broad basis for common interests. Despite all the problems explored above , Sino- U S-Japanese relations in the run-up to the 21st century are enjoying much more dynamic and healthier basis than any time since the turn of this century. This is because all three countries have undergone great changes in the latter half of the 20th century , among which the most fundamental ones took place in China. For the first time in history , while discussing issues of the region , China's presence and opinions cannot be overlooked. This might be what the outside world is not accustomed to , but is precisely the basis upon which an equal and healthy relationship between the three countries can be built as well as a major factor for regional stability. No matter what contradictions may arise , a pattern in which two countries line up against the third will be unlikely to emerge. Policy makers of the three parties have realized that this is not only unwise , but infeasible. The positive significance of this situation has yet to be fully assessed. But we should not lose sight of the danger brought about by irrational factors caused by the gap of perceptions explored in this article and by the possible vicious circle it could trigger off. It is superfluous to stress the importance of Sino- U S-Japanese relations to peace and development of the Asia-Pacific region. Therefore , it is not only worthwhile but imperative for all concerned to make efforts toward a benign development of this relationship. Besides identifying each others real interests and trying to keep them co-ordinated , the United States and Japan should learn to be accustomed to a growing China and treat it calmly as an equal. China , on its part , should give more caution to the possible repercussions of its words and deeds , avoid sending signals which might

be misinterpreted , and try to make the positive impact of China's development on the Asia-Pacific region better understood. It is also of vital importance that China should deepen its reform along a healthy direction in order to catch up , both in perception and in practice , with the ever flowing trends of the world.

NOTES

¹ James Shinn , ed. , *Weaving The Net : Conditional Engagement with China* , (Council on Relations Press , 1996) , pp.5-6 .

FROM NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TO COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN

W U Zhan

I. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

Nuclear weapons have spread in the world since the two fission bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 . There are now five declared nuclear weapon states (N W S) and a number of threshold nuclear weapon states which have the intention , and are technologically capable , of making nuclear weapons. These threshold states , including India , Pakistan and Israel , may have already stocked up nuclear weapons covertly or may be just on the verge of doing so. Only South Africa admitted it had made six crude fission bombs which had been dismantled , however.¹ All states that operate nuclear reactors are potentially the proliferators (there are scores of them) , as plutonium can be extracted from the spent fuel.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (N P T) of 1968 is an international effort to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. It seems unfair and discriminatory because it allows the have s to keep and develop their nuclear arsenals while prohibiting the have-not s from building their own. Despite the inclusion of Article VI on nuclear disarmament² , it is vague in that no deadlines are set. Consequently , nuclear inequality may be extended indefinitely. This has often been used by some threshold states like India as a reason for refusal to join the N P T .

This is one aspect of the matter. The other is taking a first step towards the total elimination of nuclear arms , no matter how

ineffective it may seem. The NPT embodies the strong aspirations of all countries towards a nuclear-free world. As the nuclear weapon is perhaps the most lethal one of massive destruction, its large-scale presence in the world is a deadly threat to all countries. That is why the NPT receives strong world-wide support.

Denying the right of non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) to develop nuclear weapons while permitting a few big powers to retain their nuclear arsenals sounds as if power politics is in play. Yet we have no choice but accept this unfairness for the sake of world peace and security. Of the two evils we have to choose the lesser one.

Since the monopoly of nuclear weapons by a few big powers is an issue left over from history and can't be changed soon, we have to maintain the status quo for the moment. As there is no overriding authority that can dictate others, the international system will have to be governed by the "law of the jungle," i.e., the strong do what they will, while the weak do what they can. This inevitably entails a world wide nuclear arms race. The NPT was extended indefinitely in 1995 by an overwhelming majority vote at a review conference of treaty members in New York.³ However, the NPT is merely a transitional measure. Nuclear weapons will in the long run be eliminated.

In parallel with the NPT, regional arrangements for nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ) have been developed in the past four decades. The 1959 Antarctic Treaty, the 1967 Tlatelolco Treaty (for Latin American and Caribbean States), the 1986 Rarotonga Treaty (covering the South Pacific) have all entered into force. The Pelindaba Treaty (for African States) is now open to signing and ratification and may enter into force in 1997. In December 1995, 10 Southeast Asian countries agreed to create the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty. These arrangements have transformed most of the Southern Hemisphere into a zone free of nuclear arms. Nevertheless, Southern Asia and the Middle East are not able yet to join the NWFZ club, because India, Pakistan and Israel refuse to accede to the NPT. India says it is faced with nuclear threat both from China and Pakistan, while Pakistan declares that it will forgo

its nuclear weapon program if India will. Israel allegedly has a covert stockpile of nuclear weapons. It is my opinion that India's assertion of Chinese nuclear threat is groundless. China sticks to the "no-first-use" policy. It is committed to not using nuclear weapons first and not using them against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones. Hence it constitutes no threat to any other country. I hope nuclear-free agreements will be reached by relevant nations in these two regions.

II. Nuclear Deterrence and Economic Interdependence

When the two superpowers in the Cold War built up their gigantic nuclear arsenals which were roughly on a parity with each other, they entered into a position where a nuclear attack by either would result in mutual destruction, as each had the residual capability to destroy the other after absorbing a first strike. Thus neither side dared to launch a nuclear war during the past fifty years. Even a conventional war between them did not break out, as both were afraid of the consequence of escalating it into a nuclear war. Whenever a war was on the verge of break-out, one of the superpowers would give in to relax the tension. Therefore nuclear deterrence may be the major reason why a third world war has not happened in the past half a century, even though there had been so many crises.

Bernard Brodie, an American strategist who understood the role of nuclear deterrence at a very early time, argued in 1946 that nuclear weapons were "absolute weapons" designed not for use but for deterrence. He meant that the nature of war changed after both parties were in possession of nuclear weapons.⁴

If nuclear weapons can deter wars, is the world safer with more nuclear weapon states? No, of course not. No war in the last fifty years is on a world scale. In fact, there have been small wars on a regional level in any of the fifty years. Neighboring countries fought against each other owing to territorial, ethnic, ideological or economic disputes. Even big powers joined in under certain conditions (the Gulf War, for example). On the other hand, big powers nu-

clear deterrence seems rather ineffective in curbing regional hostilities, because few regional states believe big powers will use nuclear weapons against them in such contingencies. If some of the smaller nations possess a few nuclear weapons, one or two of them may not be able to resist the temptation of using these under certain circumstances. As their nuclear stockpile is very small in scale and will exert lesser global influence, it is more likely for them than for bigger powers to use it. I am not alleging that all big powers have strong sense of responsibility for global security, but we can not thus infer to the conclusion that increasing the number of nuclear weapon states will make the world safer. This is the *raison d'être* for the NPT.

Is nuclear deterrence indispensable for maintaining a global peace? The author argues that the need is diminishing. The world economy and trade are flourishing vigorously. They have already transcended national boundaries and are integrating nation-states into a common market. The economic interdependence, albeit still unequal in that stronger nations get more benefits, is creating a sphere of more or less common prosperity. Internationalizing the economy is becoming the common goal all nations strive for, because no country can make a fortune by closed-doorism. The economic integration of nations has become so close that they can hardly be separated from each other. Should a war break out, both parties would suffer heavily. So wars, especially nuclear wars, have become increasingly less likely. The European Economic Community and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are good examples of this economic interdependence. Here I do not mean that nationalism no longer exists. It does exist as the antithesis of interdependence, and it is sometimes very strong. It is manifested often as a reaction to inequality in bilateral relations in order to protect the national interests. Nationalism will not inhibit the development of economic interdependence as long as the latter is beneficial to all parties.

III. Nuclear Disarmament

With the end of the Cold War and the break-down of the Soviet Union , international relations have been greatly relaxed. The United States no longer feels seriously threatened by Russia (Soviet Union). The time is ripe for large-scale nuclear disarmament. In the process from nuclear weapon cut to its total elimination , the United States and Russia should take the lead because they own most of the nuclear arms in the world (over 95 %). START I (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I) and START II between the two states specify that their strategic nuclear warheads be reduced to 3000 to 3500 (two third cut) by 2003 .⁵ Tactical nuclear warheads will be mostly withdrawn. Despite these cuts , their nuclear arsenals will still be formidable , more than enough for mutual destruction. It is the common desire of the world that the two nuclear superpowers continue to dramatically cut their nuclear stockpiles , but the grim reality is that neither is ready to go further in the process now , perhaps out of remnant Cold War mentality. As American hawks strongly resisted further reduction , President Clinton approved the recommendations of the Pentagon s Nuclear Posture Review of 1995 which proposed a level of 3500 .⁶ Russia also has little incentive to make its nuclear arsenal less than 3000 , because nationalism is rising there.

Further nuclear cuts will depend on the United States for it is the only full superpower now . The 3000 - 3500 level is mainly determined by the need of a war-fighting strategy. The time may arrive someday when there is greater confidence between the two and it will no longer be necessary to resort to nuclear war-fighting to resolve their disputes. Then this strategy may shrink into one of pure deterrence. That is , the United States would be prepared only for a retaliation should Russia launch a nuclear attack against America. In this case , 1000 or less nuclear warheads will be adequate. At this level , other nuclear powers and threshold states may be induced into the talks on total elimination of nuclear weapons. Such talks will be possible when nuclear arsenals of states concerned are comparable.

Absolute equality is not necessary .

As a nuclear arms ban can't be realized in the near future , all nuclear weapon states should make a commitment that they shall never be the first to use nuclear weapons , nor shall they use or threaten to use them against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-free zones under any conditions. China has repeatedly made such a pledge since its first nuclear explosion in 1964 and has formally proposed a draft "no-first-use" treaty to the other four nuclear powers for consideration in 1994 . Such a commitment or treaty will contribute greatly to the prevention of nuclear wars and the safeguard of world peace , and may be the best arrangement we can make until a total ban treaty is signed. However , the United States has never agreed to adopt a full "no-first-use" policy. America did have a strategy of using nuclear weapons to thwart large-scale conventional attacks on West Europe by the Soviet military bloc during the Cold War. Now that the Cold War is over , no conventional forces are threatening the United States , so it is inadvisable to continue the Cold War strategy . American attitude constitutes a major obstacle to the no-first-use initiative. The Soviet Union has been pledging no-first-use policy unequivocally for many years , but Russia denounced the pledge in 1993 , giving no reason for the change. It is generally believed that Russia may consider using nuclear weapons to thwart conventional attacks with high-technology weapons (Russia lags behind in this area) by the United States. Russia should be urged to return to its former policy .

IV. Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban

The comprehensive test ban (CTB) is another important step towards the total ban of nuclear weapons and a complement to the NPT. However , it does not end nuclear weapon development. A nation with adequate nuclear technology is capable of making crude fission bombs without conducting nuclear tests , while for building highly effective nuclear weapons and developing advanced new types (third generation) of nuclear weapons , testing is still necessary . For

most of the world nations , CTB is unfair and discriminatory , too , because it helps the nuclear superpowers to maintain their nuclear superiority.

Nuclear test ban has become a world issue since 1954 when atmospheric nuclear explosions by the United States on Bikini Atoll in the Pacific created harmful radioactive fallouts and pollution . At that time , international pressure did not succeed in halting nuclear tests conducted by the superpowers , because they were engaged in improving and developing their nuclear weapons and were unwilling to stop all their testing. They , with the participation of Britain , concluded in 1963 the Limited Test Ban Treaty which prohibited all but underground nuclear testing and in 1974 the Threshold Test Ban Treaty which limited the yield of underground tests to 150 kt of TNT equivalent .

Up to the present , America has conducted 1030 nuclear tests and the Soviet Union 715.⁷ They have done enough to perfect their second generation nuclear weapons. Further testing will add little to the improvement of their existing nuclear weapons. The third generation , like earth penetrating bombs and X-ray lasers , needs more testing. But with the end of the Cold War , there is no longer immediate need for developing such sophisticated things. So in 1993 the United States started a testing moratorium which was subsequently joined by U K , France and Russia. China resumed nuclear testing in October of 1993 , declaring that it has conducted the smallest number of nuclear tests of the five declared NWS , that the present testing is purely for self-defense , and that it supports the early conclusion through negotiation of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) no later than 1996 when its testing will be ended. China's testing was finished at the end of July , 1996 . France resumed nuclear testing in June 1995 and stopped in January 1996 . Britain had to use U.S. test site , so could not conduct more tests.

A new round of negotiations on CTBT began early in 1994 in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and engaged representatives of 38 nations (later expanded to 60) , aiming at developing a draft of CTBT for the 51st UN General Assembly in September

1996 . There were a lot of heated controversies over the content and wording .

A major point is whether low-yield tests can be allowed . The issue arises from the concern over the safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons in stockpile . The safety problem is whether a nuclear bomb can be set off in a low-yield explosion at a single point accidentally in a crash or a fire (one-point safety) . People are worried about whether stockpiled nuclear weapons will become unreliable with time . Nuclear warheads contain organic materials and explosives that change with age , and also plutonium or uranium that corrode and have changing nuclear and chemical structures . They are assumed to have a life time of 15 - 20 years and those in stockpile in the United States are on the average 13 years old . It is a question whether they will be reliable for use in the coming decades . In the past , whenever there were problems , a few samples were taken from the stockpile for testing to ensure the safety and reliability of the whole arsenal . If a CTBT is concluded , will the U . S . nuclear laboratories be able to keep the nuclear stockpile safe and reliable for decades to come ? To ensure confidence , the U . S . Department of Energy initiated a Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program to predict , identify and correct problems affecting the safety and reliability of the stockpile , relying on scientific understanding and expert judgment , not on testing . The nuclear labs , nevertheless , could not feel at ease .

American representatives at the Conference on Disarmament insisted upon the right to conduct hydronuclear experiments of 4 lbs. of TNT equivalent⁸ which , albeit very small , means that the CTBT becomes a threshold test ban treaty . This caused difficulties in reaching agreement . Britain favored a level of 100 lbs . Russia wanted at least 10 tons , and France argued for 100 - 200 tons . The threshold dispute became a stumbling block in the way to CTBT . Moreover , the U . S . offered a highly controversial proposal of “easy exit” which means that a signatory can withdraw from the treaty 10 years after its conclusion . The proposal was finally retracted , but the U . S . Defense Department wanted a reciprocal exchange for

dropping the easy exit : raising the threshold yield to 500 tons which is the minimum yield for experiments on boosted-fission weapons.⁹ President Bill Clinton was thus in a dilemma : to support a CTB or just a threshold test ban . He was aware that nuclear tests would not be stopped if the United States did not take the lead in supporting a CTB .

In 1995 , the JASON Committee , an independent group of scientific advisors to the U . S . government , concluded that the United States can confidently maintain the safety and reliability of its nuclear stockpile under a “zero-yield” CTB through the stockpile stewardship and management program . The low-yield tests are of marginal use according to the JASON report.¹⁰ Basing on this conclusion , President Clinton announced on August 11 , 1995 , that the United States would seek “a true zero yield comprehensive test ban ,” but he also said he “would be prepared , in consultation with Congress , to exercise our supreme national interest rights under a comprehensive test ban to conduct necessary testing if the safety or reliability of our nuclear deterrent could no longer be certified.”¹¹ With the change of the U . S . attitude , a “zero-yield” formulation in the CTBT text was soon adopted .

Besides this issue , many others existed , but they were resolved one by one . A CTBT draft was finally formulated . However , India was displeased with the draft , because the language it proposed concerning the total elimination of nuclear weapons within a “time-bound framework” was not accepted and the draft contains a provision requiring the ratification by 44 states including India before the treaty enters into force . The objection of India and another state , Iran , prevented the draft from being sent to the UN General Assembly by the Conference on Disarmament for the lack of consensus . It was subsequently presented by Australia to the UN General Assembly which approved the draft and opened it for signature in September , 1996 . Soon , the majority of UN member states signed the treaty , but India declined to do so . The treaty will not enter into force without India , nevertheless .

India s attitude is a reaction to the unfairness of the CTBT . We

don't know exactly what will happen in the future. The matter may develop in three possible directions. First, India may change its mind and accept the treaty someday. Second, there may be a de facto test ban though India refuses to accede to the treaty, because it finds it very difficult to conduct tests in face of almost universal support of a global nuclear test ban. Third, India will conduct a few nuclear tests, then stop and sign the CTBT. It is very improbable that India will continue its testing indefinitely under a strong international pressure.

V. The Role of the United States

From the foregoing discussion, we can see a history of American hegemony in the nuclear arms control. As is the common practice in international affairs, the United States used to give its national interests high priority. As it is the only superpower in the present world, its international behavior inevitably bears hegemonic character. It often brandished its nuclear weapons to intimidate its opponents, as it did against China during the Korean War. When more nuclear weapon states were emerging, it initiated the NPT in an effort to stop the trend. When the nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union got out of control and became harmful to the United States, it began to engage actively in nuclear control negotiations. When the United States determined that it had conducted enough number of nuclear tests and further testing would only help other countries develop their nuclear weapons, it sought to achieve a global comprehensive test ban to guarantee its supremacy in nuclear arsenal. Therefore the world seems to be powerless at the mercy of the only superpower. Pending the establishment of an effective and just world government, the law of the jungle will continue to have a sway in international politics.

Fortunately, possessing the largest nuclear arsenal does not necessarily make a nation feel at ease. Owing to the ineffectiveness of the ballistic missile defense, smaller NWS can inflict heavy losses on a nuclear superpower. As more NWS are emerging, the superpower

seeks to achieve nuclear non-proliferation which requires the super-power to provide nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes as an exchange. The personnel trained for a nuclear power plant can switch over to nuclear weapons development without much difficulty because the two technologies are basically the same. Non-proliferation creates conditions for proliferation. This is where the United States feels helpless. To cut down the dangerous surplus of nuclear stockpile accumulated during the arms race, the United States and the Soviet Union (Russia) had to negotiate with each other and concluded arms control treaties which in turn placed restraints on the nuclear weapon development of both sides. In order to achieve a CTBT, the United States has to bargain with its partners in negotiations and finally give up its low-yield definition so that it will no longer be free to test once its nuclear stockpile's safety and reliability is in doubt.

The United States is the most powerful and influential one of the five declared NWS. Without its consent no international move in nuclear arms control can be successful, but it can not do whatever it likes to do. It has to negotiate with other countries, especially the five NWSs on nuclear arms control affairs. Although the results of talks are mostly more favorable to the U.S. than to other countries, it often has to make concessions to satisfy its partners in negotiations. In the process of negotiations, the common long-range goal for a world free of nuclear weapons will only be reached step by step.

In conclusion, the U.S. nuclear policy is of a dual nature. Being the only world superpower, the United States uses its military power, including nuclear weapons, to coerce weaker nations into submission to its will on the one hand, and on the other, it is afraid of being attacked by nuclear weapons. As is remarked above, the tremendous superiority in nuclear strength does not give the only superpower much assurance of security in a confrontation with a smaller NWS, let alone the threat from the huge Russian nuclear arsenal. In this sense, the United States is willing to negotiate on nuclear arms reduction, nuclear nonproliferation and comprehensive nuclear test ban, provided they are not very unfavorable to it self. Therefore

we should cooperate with the United States whenever its behavior is contributive to world peace and security. At the same time, it is also very important to combat its hegemonism, coerciveness, peremptoriness and whatever is harmful to a good international relationship, and strive for results more beneficial to the majority of nations.

NOTES

¹ Waldo Stumpf, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Deterrence to Dismantlement," *Arms Control Today*, Dec. 1995/Jan. 1996, pp. 3 - 8.

² *Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements* (United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington, D. C., 1980), p. 92.

³ "An ACA Briefing on Indefinite NPT Extension and on the Moscow Summit," *Arms Control Today*, June 1995, p. 14.

⁴ Bernard Brodie, *The Absolute Weapon* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1946), *passim*.

⁵ "START," *Arms Control Today*, Jan./ Feb. 1993, Supplement pp.5 - 8.

⁶ Bill Gertz, "The New Nuclear Policy: Lead but Hedge," *Air Force Magazine*, Jan. 1995, pp. 34 - 36.

⁷ "Fifty Years of Nuclear Testing: Part II," *Arms Control Today*, Sept. 1995, p. 38.

⁸ A fission (atomic) bomb is usually composed of a core of fissile material and a layer of highly explosive chemicals surrounding the core. When the highly explosive chemicals are set off by detonators, the core is compressed to supercritical mass and explodes. In hydronuclear experiments, cores contain only small amounts of fissile materials so that the resulting yields are as low as a few lbs, but are sufficient for learning the physical properties of the implosion process which can help develop a computer simulation code for reliable predictions.

⁹ Boosted-fission bombs are nuclear weapons with thermonuclear fuels such as deuterium or tritium added to their fissile material cores. The large amount of neutrons thus produced during the chain reaction serve to significantly enhance the yields of fission bombs.

¹⁰ "JASON Nuclear Testing Study," *Arms Control Today*, Sept. 1995, pp. 34 - 35.

¹¹ "U.S. Will Insist on Ban on All Nuclear Arms Test Explosions," (Text: Clinton August 11 statement) (560), *Bulletin*, (United States Information Service, Embassy of the United States of America, Beijing), EPF513 August 14, 1995, pp. 17 - 18.

THE INTERNAL ECONOMIC FACTORS ACTING UPON CHINA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES

ZHU Shanli

The economic factors influencing China's relations with the United States are many, but they can be classified into two categories: factors related to economic development and those associated with economic reform. I will deal with the two kinds of factors in this article and analyze how they affect Chinese policy-makers' formulation of policy toward the U.S..

I. Factors Related to Economic Development

China's objective is to achieve modernization in industry, agriculture, national defense and science and technology in the next century. Correspondingly, the main tasks of the Chinese economy in a fairly long period have been maintaining high-speed economic growth, reducing unemployment rate, controlling the general price level, effecting a coordinated economic and social development and finally raising the living standard of its people and the quality of their livelihood.

Speeding up economic growth was the most important economic objective the Chinese policy-makers determined following the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party convened in 1978. Since then, economic construction has replaced class struggle as the center of all work. The adoption of this new line became essential as a series of political campaigns after the founding of the people's republic, especially the cul-

tural revolution , had pushed the Chinese economy to the brink of disintegration , and the low efficiency resulting from the people s commune system had made it impossible to feed the ever increasing rural population , to say nothing of providing job opportunities to those urban inhabitants who could not find employment in the cities and were compelled to go to the countryside to do manual work. In fact , young graduates of secondary schools sent to the countryside , unable to earn their keep , had come back successively and swollen the rank of the unemployed in the cities. Only rapid economic growth can solve the question of employment and survival of innumerable residents. It was under this circumstance that China began the economic reform and opening-up , and improved and gradually strengthened its relationship with the United States and other countries with a developed market economy. The Chinese policy-makers realized that only by carrying out the market-orientated economic reform , implementing the opening up policy , increasing economic and commercial ties with countries and areas overseas and especially with countries having a developed market economy , can China develop its economy at a fast rate , increase job chances in the economic development and bring about step by step a change in people s livelihood - from striving to feed and clothe themselves adequately , to being fairly well-off , and then to attaining a modernized living.

China has adopted the gradualist approach in reform and opening up. That is to say , it has not introduced the market-oriented economic reform to all economic sectors. The reform of labor and financial markets , for instance , is rather rudimentary. Neither has it opened all fields to the outside world , a case in point being the numerous domains in finance. China s present status of economic growth and development objective , which decide that it should apply the step-by-step mode of reform and opening up , likewise condition its relationship with foreign countries , the United States included.

Then what is the present status of economic growth in China ? How will it condition China s relationship with the United States ? To understand the influence of China s economic development , employment and price level on the Sino-US relations , it is necessary to

know something about these factors themselves.

China's rate of economic growth, since the implementation of reform and opening up 17 years ago, has been high in comparison with other countries. Growing at an annual rate of nearly 10%, it managed to quadruple its 1980 GDP in 1995, and has solved the question of feeding and clothing its people and attained the well-to-do level in some regions.

However, things were not quite so good as far as employment went. According to the official statistics, China's population rose to 1.1985bn by the end of 1994 (and surpassed 1.2bn in 1995), in which the labor force came to 825 m, its portion in the total population being 68%. The employed population was 614.7 m, 168.16 m in the urban areas and 420.1 m in the countryside, and its percentage in the total labor force coming to 74.5%. The number of the unemployed in the cities, according to the statistics of the labor department, was 4.76 m that year, the urban unemployment rate being 2.8%¹; and the percentage for 1995 was 2.9%. No official statistics are available for the rural unemployed.

The state of employment in China is pretty good, judging by the statistics of employment and unemployment published by the government. The urban unemployment rate is lower even than those countries with a developed market economy. However, a careful study and analysis of the actual situation, including the statistics arrived at in non-official surveys and all employment-related official data, reveals that the official employment and unemployment figures do not reflect the entire situation; they fail to mirror at least two important questions.

The first question is rural unemployment. Absence of statistical data do not mean that this question does not exist. On the contrary, it is even worse than in the urban areas. According to official figures, the total number of the employed in the rural areas in 1994 was 446.54 m. About 70% of them worked in the primary industry (farming, forestry, animal husbandry, fishery and so on), and the remaining 30%, in the secondary and tertiary industries. However, the farmers in the primary industry included some surplus laborers.

The total rural surplus labor was estimated to be around 120 m , which amounted to one fourth of the farmers with work . About half of the jobless farmers left their native places to seek work outside . This has resulted in a great pressure on employment in the whole country .

The second question is redundant personnel in urban enterprises and institutions . Most of the 168 .15 m urban employees , 67 % to be more exact , work in the state-owned economic bodies (see Table 1 attached at the end of this article) . Seriously affected by the traditional planned economy , these bodies have more questions left over from the past . The most serious expression is the existence of a large portion of redundant personnel , at least 15 % or 16 m in 1994 according to the most cautious estimation . Though these people will not lose their jobs in the near future , they inevitably will as the reform deepens and especially when the state economic entities are transformed to adopt a modernized enterprise system . This question exists at a different degree in collective economic bodies and even in enterprises of other ownership , and these personnel must be cut as well . If this task is to be fulfilled in 15 years time , an average of 1 m , allowing for the legal retirement and natural reduction of workers and staff , will lose their jobs each year . This , undoubtedly , will mean an added pressure on employment .

In fact , replacing superfluous personnel has been the most difficult question encountered in the reform of the state-owned enterprises since 1995 . Difficulty in getting jobs for the workers of those enterprises who are running at a loss or whose assets can not cover their debts , once they are annexed or go into bankruptcy , is retarding the trial of optimizing capital structure in the selected cities . This question has become the main factor conditioning enterprise reform . It can be said that the deepening of the Chinese economic reform is out of the question if no proper solution can be worked out to handle redundant personnel .

If these people - those rural surplus laborers who have gone out to seek a job but have not got it so far and the workers and staff of the bankrupt enterprises in the cities who have been thrown out of

work and have not found new employment yet - are all counted as unemployed, China's unemployment rate will be around 10%. It can be easily imagined what pressure a contingent of 60 m unemployed means to the Chinese economy and society.

And that is not all. The rapid growth of labor resources also adds to the seriousness of the question. China's population surpassed 1.2bn in 1995. Though population growth speed has slackened since the implementation of family planning in the 70s, and the natural growth rate dropped from 2.583% in 1970 to 1.121% in 1994, the absolute amount of increase is enormous, as the base number was so big. If China's population is to grow at the 1994 natural rate, it will have a population of 1.28bn by the end of 2000. Counted at the average 1993 - 94 rate of 68.8% (the portion of workforce in total population), China will have an annual increase of almost 9 m laborers in the 5 years from 1996 to 2000. The question of employment is weighty indeed with this new addition and the 60 m unemployed.

The question of unemployment has always existed. Under the planned economy, it took the form of under-employment or invisible unemployment, that is, as people say, "Five persons did the work meant for three." In the shift from the planned economy to the market economy, the invisible unemployment has become visible. The release of large numbers of laborers from the land (as a result of the farmers attaining the right to freely employ their labor following the contracting of land), the gradual discharge of surplus personnel from enterprises and the increase of a considerable number of new laborers each year - all these demand that China must tackle this serious question in the economic reform and development. China can hardly agree to occurrences detrimental to its efforts to reduce unemployment in the diplomatic dealings with the United States, or any other country for that matter.

Now let us look at the question of commodity price. Since reform and opening up, a fairly high inflation rate has appeared together with the high economic growth rate. How to control inflation while endeavoring to ensure a high economic growth rate and reduce the unemployment rate is another difficult question the Chinese poli-

cy-makers have to solve. It is at the same time another important economic factor influencing their formulating foreign policies. For several years, a double-digit inflation rate has persisted. The reasons for this are many. In the transformation from the planned economy to the market economy, the invisible inflation has inevitably become apparent. Big demands for investment and export have also substantially pushed up commodity prices. Two factors, a big portion of China's capital being invested in the fixed assets and a swift increase in foreign direct investment in China, have led to the fast rise in the demand for investment.

For many years, especially over the last few years, China's investments in fixed assets have been growing at a very fast speed. The average rate of the first 4 years of the 8th Five-Year Plan (1991 - 95) was 37.5%, which surpassed that of the 11.8% of the 7th Five-Year Plan (1986 - 90) by 25.7 percentage points. This has led to a continuous rise of the portion of fixed asset investment in the GDP, from 27.2% to 33% in the same period. As China's fixed asset investment is controlled by the government and not determined through the workings of the market competition mechanism, huge investments have not brought about good efficiency, and the production capacity formed thereby has been low. As a result, the gap between supply and demand is widening, and the inflation has been intensified.

Direct investments from overseas have increased fast in recent years. As these investments have been made after carefully examining and assessing the projects concerned, they have usually brought in fairly good returns. These investments, while heightening pressure on demand, cause increase in supply capacity in the long run, and can therefore finally bridge the gap between a smaller supply capacity and a greater demand and help cut the inflation rate. But foreign investments have indeed aggravated inflation. The inflow of foreign capital influences prices mainly because it affects China's total money supply. To a large extent, expansion in money supply since 1994 has been due to increase in the funds in foreign exchange in the national banking system credit. Take the year 1994 for in-

stance. Money supply rose by 458.621bn, 34.5% more than in 1993. The central bank's asset structure (see Table 2) shows that the main items the increased money supply went to had greatly altered. They were the central bank's loans to the commercial banks, government overdrafts and loans to other departments before 1994. A series of financial and budgetary reform measures adopted that year changed the whole picture. As the central bank stopped government overdrafts on the whole, their percentage dropped from 9.3 in 1993 to 2.5 in 1994. The retrenchment policy incurred large cuts in the central bank's loans to the commercial banks, the portion precipitating from 78% to 20.1%. But the funds in foreign exchange, which had constituted just a small portion before, became major source of money supplied, the percentage soaring from 7 to 75.1. Sharp growth in foreign direct and indirect investments contributed to the great increase in foreign currency. Of course, expansion in export and enlargement of trade surplus due to the devaluation of the Renminbi yuan and the merging of the two foreign exchange systems were also important causes for the big increase in foreign currency. China's foreign exchange reserve at the end of 1994 was 52.5bn. A year later, it rose to 73.5bn, an increase of 21bn.² The portion for the funds used by foreign exchange in the national banking system credit is still rising.

China's present status lags far behind the demand of the coordinated economic and social development. China's GDP has grown considerably, but the mode of growth is basically an extensive one, and the economic growth has been accompanied by waste of resources and serious pollution. The theoretical circles and policy-making departments have come to see the gravity of the situation. The shift from the extensive to the intensive mode of economic growth has therefore become an important objective of China's economic policy.

Obviously, it is not so easy to bring into line such objectives as economic growth, reducing unemployment rate, lowering inflation rate and achieving coordinated economic and social development.

The aim of economic growth is identical with that of increasing

employment, and the positive correlation of the two has been proved by the histories of economic development of various countries. Japan, comparatively insufficient in natural resources, has suffered a shortage of labor, because its rapid economic growth has set a great demand on labor power, apart from the fact that it has a pretty low natural population growth rate. The low unemployment rate of the United States over the last few years has also been the result of economic development. Since the beginning of reform and opening up 17 years ago, China's GDP has been growing at an annual rate of nearly 10%, and in 1991 - 95, the average rate reaching 11.7%. It was this high-speed economic growth that enabled China to furnish employment to over 10 m new laborers each year. China's employed population rose at an annual rate of 2.7%, from 401.52 m in 1978 to 614.7 m in 1994, an increase of 213.18 m. Compared with the GDP growth rate of 9.4% over the same period, the employment growth rate was 4.5 times greater. In other words, an increase of 1% in employment necessitates a 3.5% rise in the growth rate of GDP. In recent years, thanks to the development of science and technology and the rise of labor productivity, the gap between the two growth rates has widened, to 5.8:1 approximately. From this year to the year 2000, China's labor resources will grow at the estimated annual rate of 1.1%. That means, to ensure the employment of new laborers alone, China's GDP rate must grow more than 6% each year. A two-digit increase is needed, if the vast urban and rural surplus laborers are to be re-employed.

To keep up a relatively high economic growth rate calls for a relatively high investment growth rate. This was one of the reasons why the GDP growth rate in the 8th Five-Year Plan period (11.7%) surpassed that in the 7th Five-Year Plan period (7.9%). But it should be seen at the same time that inflation rate in the latter period was far more serious than in the earlier period. Obviously, the high inflation rate was linked with the higher investment rate in fixed assets at the time.

China's economy has benefited from the development of its foreign economic relations in the last decade and more. The import and

export value has been growing at a faster rate than that of the GDP in this period. The average annual increase of import and export value was 12.8% ,10.6% and 19.7% respectively in the 6th ,7th and 8th Five-Year Plan period , while the GDP average annual growth rate came to just 10.1% ,7.8% and 11.7% , the portion of the import and export value in the GDP growing from year to year.³ After 1994 , this portion surpassed 40% . Though the statistical method used has some faults and the portion should not be as high as the national income accounts showed , there is no denying that the dependence of the Chinese economy on export is rising. The rapid development of China's economic and trade relations with foreign countries is one of the most important factors promoting its high-speed economic development. True , big increase in exports and in investment from overseas has aggravated inflation. But without this increase , China could not have maintained such high-speed economic development , and unemployment would have been even more serious.

China's relation with foreign countries , the United States included , has been established on the basis of such policy objectives as achieving fast economic growth , greater employment , stability of prices and coordinated economic and social development , as has been elucidated above. In developing its foreign ties , China will make an all-round evaluation of the influence its economic relations with foreign countries may have on these objectives.

II. Factors Associated with Economic Reform

The United States is the world's biggest country embracing the market economy and the biggest developed country , while China is the biggest developing country and had a highly centralized state power implementing the planned economy before reform and opening up. However , China's policy-makers are not copying the US-type market economy and are building a market-oriented economic system with Chinese characteristics in the present reform . This system will keep the dominant position of the state economy in the near future at

least ,so that the government will not lose control of the economy while introducing the mechanism of competition. As there is no precedence of such an economic system , China has been traversing an arduous road in the shift to the new economic system . In spite of the fact that pricing has been freed in the main and business is frisk , the deeper-level reform , such as the reform of the enterprise and financial systems , is difficult to advance further .

The lumping up of the functions of the government and enterprises , unclear delineation of property ownership due to the multi-level entrusting-agent relationship , and lack of a competition mechanism in the selection of managerial personnel have resulted in the low efficiency of the Chinese state enterprises , and most of them are running at a loss. Many state firms have long depended on raising loans from the specialized banks monopolized by the state for their survival , their debt ratio getting to as high as 75 % . The assets of many of these firms cannot cover their debts and they should have long gone into bankruptcy. But as there lacks a sound social security system , they have not gone into liquidation so far. Of course , some of them are capable of reducing losses and increasing profits through altering the capital and governing structure and changing the managerial personnel. At present , however , not much can be done to remedy the situation , as the enterprise reform along the line of the share-holding system advances too slowly and these firms structure of capital (contributed entirely by the state) is difficult to change.

Delay in financial reform has seriously affected the development of the financial market and conditioned the deepening of the enterprise reform .

China has tried to make some changes in the financial field , such as permitting the specialized banks or government departments to set up trust institutions so as to stop monopoly of credit by the state-owned specialized banks. In Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges have been opened , and in many big cities stock exchange institutions have been set up to deal in securities. The direct financing market has been organized as well. Especially since 1994 , a series of reform measures have been taken in this respect. They include :

1. Speeding up financial legislation. The Law on the People's Bank of China, the Law on Commercial Bank of China, the Insurance Law and the Bond Law have been promulgated and implemented.

2. Separation of policy finance and commercial finance and severance of connection between loans of policy consideration and base-money supply. Three banks, i. e., the State Development Bank, China Import and Export Bank and China Agricultural Development Bank, were successively founded in 1994 to handle business of policy considerations. They are now in normal operation.

3. Trying out the transformation of the state-owned specialized banks into commercial banks. The asset-liability management within the loan ceiling has been propagated, and a mechanism for self-restraint has been established through strengthening the internal management of the banks, so that the asset risk management can be enhanced and the modernized operational mechanism of commercial banks can be gradually introduced.

4. Expanding the function of the instrument of monetary policy and trying to use the indirect instrument of monetary policy. Since the latter half of 1995, the central bank has taken the lead in restructuring the monetary market. The first item tackled was the CHIBO market. After two months preparation, the CHIBO system was put into trial operation on January 3, 1996, and the central bank began to announce the CHIBOR on each business day. The second item was standardizing the bond market. In the 1996 state credit plan, a certain amount for rediscount has been set, and the rediscount interest rate, as a relatively independent interest rate system, becomes an intermediary means of the central bank to regulate the supply of money. The third item was fostering a stock buy-back market and developing the open market operation. On November 14, 1995 the central bank invited 14 commercial banks to attend a reception for the issuing of the financing certificates and set off the trial run of the financing certificate buy-back operation on 28th of the same month. On April 9, 1996 the open market operation formally began, and it has become one of the most important instruments of

the central bank for carrying out the monetary policy.

5. Achieving a smooth merging of the two foreign exchange systems and applying throughout the country the system of converting and selling foreign currencies. The China Foreign Exchange Trading Center was set up in April 1994. It has functioned normally over the last two years, and its business has developed at a fairly fast speed. A national unified foreign exchange market has taken initial shape.

6. Enlarging the scope of opening up and international contacts in the financial field. By the end of 1995, 519 agencies of foreign financial institutions and 137 foreign-funded financial establishments had come into existence in China, their gross assets reaching almost \$20 bn.⁴

In spite of the reform measures taken, the financial market is still underdeveloped, for reform in this field began later than in other fields and some deeper-level reform, such as placing the commercial banks on an enterprise basis, has not yet started.

With regard to the monetary market, some change has taken place in the bank management system and the use of the instrument of monetary policy, but the development of the monetary market lags behind the switch of the entire national economy onto a market basis. Interest rates, as the prices of the monetary market, are not regulated in the main by the demand and supply of money, but by the measures of the government. When the inflation rate is high and the nominal interest rates are low, the actual interest rates bring only negative interest, and interest rates do not play the role of regulating money supply. Economic growth and the switching of the economic system have caused a sustained demand of money that outstrips the supply. The government is still using the old method of numerical control and checks money supply through limiting the credit quota.

The scope of the bond, stock and capital markets is small, and their operations have not yet been standardized.

In the bond market, state bond occupies a monopolistic position, and corporate bond forms but too small a portion. The Chinese

government began to issue treasury bond in 1981 to solve the problem of budgetary deficits, and the amount has increased from year to year. By the end of 1990, a total of 261.915bn yuan of state bonds and financial bonds had been issued, the balance reaching 175.3bn. In 1995, over 150bn yuan of state bonds were issued, the biggest in size since 1981. By the end of the year, the balance had topped 330bn, constituting around 5% of the year's GDP. More is forthcoming in 1996, over 190bn yuan according to an estimation.⁵

Corporate bond is very small in amount compared with state bond, and almost all such bonds have been issued by the state enterprises. The quantities of bonds and their interest rates are all fixed by the government. In the 9 years from 1986 to 1994 only 73.734bn yuan of bonds were issued by enterprises at the central and local level (see Table 3), less than half of the 1995 state bonds.

Business in corporate bond was far less brisk than in state bond. As interest subsidy is given to long- and medium-term state bonds when the inflation is high, state bond, compared with other financial assets, has a lower risk and higher return and becomes the first choice of the public, the other forms of investment being all kept in check at the present stage. State bond is also an important item of transaction in the financial market. Against the background of increasing issues of state bond, bond business began to develop in the middle and latter half of 80s, and the trading market, correspondingly, has come into being. Business is good in the primary and secondary markets. The open market operation system went into operation formally on April 9, 1996. On the same day, the People's Bank bought back from the commercial banks 290m yuan of state bonds.⁶ But the same can not be said of the corporate bond. Higher risk and lower return have left the corporate bond market without much transaction.

The stock exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen held only over 270 listed enterprises, and most of the stocks they deal with, 65% and 80% respectively, are unfloatable institutional shares. The two systems of quotation in Beijing held merely 15 listed companies by the end of 1995, and they are subject to many policy restrictions, as

they have been classified as securities trading departments. Such a small number of listed companies are indeed nothing compared with China's 4,000 companies that can raise funds in the form of shares from targeted quarters and its over 6 million state and collective enterprises. Their influence on the entire economy is not worth mentioning.

The institutional shares of the incorporated companies being mostly state and collective stocks, they lack final trustees to concern themselves with the returns of the shares. Nor are there many people caring about the achievements of the companies, and no effective supervision over the companies is in existence. Where the institutional shares constitute the majority of the stocks, the operations are usually poor and ineffective. The 1995 report about the listed companies showed that the average per-share return in the Shanghai stock market was 0.27 yuan, 20% less than the previous year. The rate of the annual net asset income averaged 10.24%, a reduction of 26.5%. In the wake of low return, a sluggish stock market appeared. Take the Shanghai stock market for instance. The volume of transactions in the first half of 1995 came to only 180 billion yuan, half of the amount in the same period of the previous year.⁷ In the first half of 1996, the stock price index fluctuated slightly around 600 points. No big improvement can be expected, if the reform of the enterprise system can not go on in depth.

The funds market has been organized only recently, and its turnover is very small. Take Shanghai for instance. Most of its 12 funds have been established by trust companies attached to the financial institutions. Their shares total just 768 million yuan, in which 715 million yuan is made up of floatable shares.

Underdevelopment of the bond, stock and capital markets has made direct financing by enterprises almost impossible. They can raise funds only through the financial intermediaries. The state commercial banks constitute the majority of these intermediaries, and they finance mainly the state enterprises. Having no way to obtain sufficient capital, the non-state enterprises have great difficulties to develop themselves.

So, a strange phenomenon has appeared in China's economic

operations. Poor operations, improper management and low stock return plague most incorporated companies because of irrationality of the structure of stock rights; the inhabitants, with no other channels for investment, put huge amounts of money into the monopolistic state banks as savings or buy state bonds; the banks give these money to the state enterprises in the form of loans for their survival; the state enterprises run at a great loss as there are no restrictions on property rights and management to bind them; and the banks continue to issue loans to the state enterprises fearing that they can not get their money back if these enterprises go bankrupt. . . . This vicious circle goes on and on.

The state revenue can not support all these state enterprises, as they form too great a portion in the total enterprises of the country. The enterprises need government input badly, but can rely only on the bank loans for the capital they require and are therefore up to their ears in debt. This state of affairs hinders not only the development of the enterprises and banks, but also the construction of such bottleneck sections as communication and telecommunications. The banks, with their funds tied up in the losing state enterprises, can not finance these and other infrastructure facilities, for they require large amounts of inputs and their period of cost recovery is longer than ordinary projects. As there lacks a multi-channel financing system, the bond, stock and capital markets can hardly raise so much money to finance projects of infrastructure facilities. As a result, the social infrastructure lags far behind the demand of economic development.

The problems China faces in the market-oriented reform oblige its policy-makers to determine the country's relations with foreign countries in the light of the overall objectives of the reform.

III. Sino-US Relationship in China's Economic Reform and Economic Development

The Chinese policy-makers have invariably determined their relations with foreign countries in accordance with the actual conditions of the economic reform and economic development. The same

is true in their handling of the relations with the United States. They can hardly be expected to develop relations with America at the expense of China's own interests.

In spite of the fact that China can not always achieve all the purposes of furthering the economic reform and development in its dealings with the United States, it is important to both countries that a stable cooperative relationship be maintained, no matter from what angle one looks at the question. True, the levels of economic development of the two countries differ greatly, their economies, however, are highly complementary. This can be seen from the commodities they exchange in the bilateral trade.

The harmonized commodity description and coding system groups the commodities into 22 categories. The goods China exports to the United States have been mostly labor-intensive products. They mainly consisted of textiles, clothing, toys and sports equipment before. In recent years the portion of mechanical and electric products in the total exports has risen, and these commodities have become the biggest category exported in 1995. But they were mainly home electric appliances with low added-value, and those for industrial use with a higher added-value occupied just a small percentage. The products China imported from the United States, on the other hand, consisted chiefly of such technology- and capital-intensive manufactures as mechanical and electric products, chemical products, vehicles, aircraft, ships and transportation equipment, among which the value of chemical fertilizer came to around 60% of that of chemical products. What merits our attention is that vegetable products became the second biggest category of China's imports from the United States, in which cereals products occupied 92.7% of the total vegetable products (cf. Table 5).⁸

The import and export structures of China and America show that developing a stable commercial relationship is important to both countries. US consumers can benefit from China's low-price labor-intensive commodities, while China can raise the technological level of those enterprises which import from America production equipment with a high technological content. Developing agriculture will

always remain a matter of first importance with China, and this means it can import large amounts of chemical fertilizer, agricultural insecticides and farm machinery from the United States. A vast population need importing agricultural products to make up their insufficiency, and this signifies that the United States can have an outlet for its surplus farm produce.

It is precisely the complementarity of the economies of the two countries which has brought about a swift development of their bilateral trade. The United States is now China's third biggest trade partner as far as trade value goes (see Table 6). The growth rate of the value of China's trade with the United States, however, surpasses that with Japan and Hong Kong (see Table 7).

Development of Sino-US trade is very important to China. Increase in exports to the United States promotes China's economic development, which in turn improve the country's employment. The foreign currencies China has earned from export have raised its ability to import advanced equipment and technology from the United States and other developed countries, thus enabling it to shorten the process of modernization.

China has to absorb large amounts of foreign capital, as sharp growth of demand for capital in the high-speed economic development has caused capital deficiency in the country, while the United States has an abundance of capital to supply other countries. China wants to get capital from the American financial market to further its construction, reform the state enterprises, improve capital and management structures and check the state enterprises from getting deeply in debt. It has imported advanced technology from the United States to speed up the modernization of its enterprises. China also hopes the American institutions will help develop its financial market. However, as the Chinese financial market is rather weak, China has been cautious in introducing foreign capital and learning foreign experience to build its financial market. It is even self-contradictory sometimes on many concrete questions. It invites foreign businesspeople to make investments but fears an overflow of foreign capital will push up inflation and affect its national industries. The

policy makers encourage foreign businesspeople to invest in infrastructure facilities with all sorts of preferential policies but restrict them to invest in those economic sectors its state enterprises maintain a monopolistic position. It draws on the American experience to develop its financial market but is anxious that the opening of its financial market will have a bad consequence. For this reason, the division of A share (sold exclusively to Chinese citizens) and B share (sold to foreigners) still remain in the Chinese financial market, and they are unlikely to be merged into one in the near future. China may open, to a certain extent and gradually, its financial market to the outside world, but it will impose some restrictions on foreign-funded financial institutions, such as not allowing them to engage in Renminbi and serving clients other than foreign organs and individuals in China.

Since developing relations with the United States can have both positive and negative influences on China's economic growth and reform, the Chinese policy-makers weigh naturally all the pros and cons of a policy before deciding whether it should be adopted. China and the United States have had great differences over China's re-entry into the GATT and joining the World Trade Organization (WTO). Some of them have been solved gradually through consultation in the talks, the others remain still and no solution is in sight. China made concessions, for instance, on the questions of transparency in the foreign trade policy, the opening of service trade, reducing tariff and cutting and finally demolishing non-tariff barriers. But it can not possibly make any concession on the question that it should join the WTO as a developing country. China is among the world's foremost nations in aggregate economic strength, but its per-capita GDP is very low, merely around \$500. The Chinese state enterprises, which have long enjoyed the protection of the government and played a dominant role in the economy, have generally lost their competitive edge. If China is denied the preferential treatments accorded the developing countries by WTO, its young industries in want of protection will perish in international competition, and the bankruptcy of large numbers of big enterprises will in-

inevitably aggravate unemployment and frustrate China's efforts to realize the aims of economic development. Therefore, it would rather stay outside WTO than join it as a non-developing country. As entering the world trade organization and enjoying the reciprocal treatment among its member countries is conducive to its economic growth, employment and market-oriented reform, China is striving as before to get into the organization. It will show flexibility on many questions, but can never be expected to promise that it will enter the organization as a non-developing country.

China takes the same stand in its overall relationship with the United States. It needs to strengthen economic and commercial cooperation with America to promote economic development, improve employment and stabilize commodity prices. To put it more concretely, China hopes to further expand its export to the United States for these considerations and earn more foreign currencies to buy advanced equipment and technology from America and other developed countries to speed up modernization.

The Chinese policy-makers hope to get loans from the US government and unofficial quarters in the building of infrastructure facilities and expect that the American businesspeople will increase their investments in China, as that will help lower the unemployment rate. A study of the employment situation in the economic sectors of different ownership shows that the state sector's capacity for absorbing laborers is on the decline, and only the non-public owned economic sectors can be counted on to reduce the unemployment rate. Take 1994 for instance. About 316.65 m people⁹ (not reckoning those engaging in farming) were employed in urban and rural economic entities of diverse ownership, 22.26 m more than the previous year. The public owned economic sectors increased only by 8.91 m people, while the nonpublic enterprises, including the foreign-funded enterprises, absorbed 13.35 m more.¹⁰ As the reform of the enterprise system deepens, many state enterprises will be annexed or go bankrupt. Large numbers of redundant personnel in the public economic departments will be cut, and these departments' ability to increase employment will dwindle still further. Only development in

the non-state economic sectors can mitigate the pressure of employment. Under the condition that large amounts of capital are tied up with the losing state enterprises, introducing foreign capital seems to be a realist alternative for the policy-makers. As investments in the tertiary industry can better raise employment,¹¹ China will step by step open finance, insurance and other branches of the tertiary industry to enterprises of the United States and other countries. It also hopes that America will help meet its great demand on agricultural insecticides, chemical fertilizer and farm produce in the economic development. Deterioration of Sino-US relations will incur great economic losses to both countries. For this reason, the Chinese policy-makers have attached great importance to the relations with the United States and take a positive attitude to solve disputes once they arise. An obvious case in point is how the disputes over the intellectual property have been resolved through negotiations each time this question propped up. With the internal development and reform in mind, the Chinese policy-makers will surely continue to work for a stable development of Sino-US relations.

Appendixes : Tables

Table 1

Workers Employed in Urban Economic Entities
of Different Ownership Unit :1 m persons

Total	State Economic Entities	Collective Economic Entities	Joint Economic Entities	Joint Stock Comp.
168.15	112.14	32.85	0.52	2.92
Foreign-Funded Comp.	H. K. -, Macao- and Taiwan-Funded Comp.	Other Kinds of Comp.	Private Comp.	Micro-businesses
1.95	2.11	0.09	3.32	11.25

Table 2

Central Bank's Asset Structure

(Percentage of Main Items in the year's Increased Asset Value)

	1993	1994
Loans to Commercial Banks	78.0	20.1
Loans to Non-Banking Financial Inst.	1.6	0.7
Funds for Foreign Exchange	7.0	75.1
Government Overdrafts	9.3	2.5
Loans to Other Departments	3.7	1.1

Source : The Financial Research Department of the Chinese Peoples Bank ,1995 .

Table3

Bonds Issued Between 1986 and 1994

Unit : 1bn yuan

Year	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
Central Enterprises					
Local Enterprises	10	3	3	1.483	4.933
Year	1991	1992	1993	1994	Total
Central Enterprises	7.410			7.410	
Local Enterprises	11.525	25.877	2.006	4.5	66.324

Source : Financial Times , January 12 , 1996 .

Table4

China's Six Biggest Categories of Exports to
the United States in 1992 - 95

Unit : \$1 000

Year	Total	First		Second		Third	
		Cat.	Amount (%)	Cat.	Amount (%)	Cat.	Amount (%)
1992	8593730	11	2090000 24.3 %	12	1575860 18.3 %	16	791640 9.2 %
1993	16964000	11	3303010 19.5 %	12	3125270 18.4 %	16	2926370 17.3 %
1994	21461478	16	4596283 21.4 %	12	3546295 16.3 %	11	3160925 14.7 %
1995	24711327	16	5530006 22.3 %	12	3748730 15.2 %	20	3504848 14.2 %

Year	Total	Fourth		Fifth		Sixth	
		Cat.	Amount (%)	Cat.	Amount (%)	Cat.	Amount (%)
1992		20	694650 8.1 %	5	607520 7.1 %	6	463400 5.4 %
1993		20	2156870 12.7 %	8	909860 5.4 %	15	679380 4.0 %
1994		20	3035465 14.1 %	8	1299321 6.1 %	7	908846 4.2 %
1995		11	3171714 12.8 %	8	1311841 5.3 %	15	1257257 5.1 %

Notes : (1) The number of a "cat. (category)" refers to one of the 22 categories of goods listed in The Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System. Cat. 5 are mineral products ; Cat. 6 , chemical and chemical related products ; Cat. 7 , plastics and rubber and their products ; Cat. 8 , leather , fur , bags and casings ; Cat. 11 , textiles and their raw materials ; Cat. 12 , shoes , hats , umbrellas , feather products , artificial flowers and hair products ; Cat. 15 , basic metals and their products ; Cat. 16 , mechanical and electric products , audiovisual equipment and their components and parts ; and Cat. 20 , miscellaneous products. (2) The percentage refers to the portion of Chinese exports in the total US imports of these manufactures.

Source : Customs Statistics (1992 -1995).

Table 5

China's Six Biggest Categories of Imports from
the United States in 1992 - 95

Unit : \$1 000

Year	Total	First		Second		Third	
		Cat.	Amount (%)	Cat.	Amount (%)	Cat.	Amount (%)
1992	8899840	16	2132950 24.0 %	17	1465730 16.5 %	6	1458140 16.4 %
1993	10688060	16	3858180 19.5 %	17	1949890 18.2 %	6	942740 8.8 %
1994	13970421	16	4525389 32.4 %	17	3330893 23.8 %	6	1446467 10.4 %
1995	16118233	16	5129573 31.8 %	6	2159306 13.4 %	2	1592234 9.9 %
Year	Total	Fourth		Fifth		Sixth	
		Cat.	Amount (%)	Cat.	Amount (%)	Cat.	Amount (%)
1992		18	592980 6.7 %	11	590640 6.7 %	2	509650 5.7 %
1993		18	708040 6.6 %	15	610730 5.7 %	7	542210 5.1 %
1994		11	864099 6.2 %	18	674368 4.8 %	7	660823 4.7 %
1995		11	1350839 8.4 %	17	1125134 7.0 %	7	814643 5.1 %

Notes : (1) The number of a "cat. (category)" refers to one of the 22 categories of goods listed in The Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System. Cat. 2 are vegetable products ; Cat. 6 , chemical and chemical-related products ; Cat. 7 , plastics and rubber and their products ; Cat. 11 , textiles and their raw materials ; Cat. 15 , basic metals and their products ; Cat. 16 , mechanical and electric products , audiovisual equipment and their components and parts ; Cat. 17 , vehicles , aircraft , ships and transportation equipment and Cat. 18 , optical and medical instruments , watches , clocks and musical instruments. (2) The percentage refers to the portion of US imports in China's total imports of these manufactures.

Source : Customs Statistics (1992 - 1995).

Table 6

China's Main Trade Partners in 1995

Area or Country	Amount (\$ 1bn)	Ratio in Total Imp. & Exp. Value (%)
Japan	5.74674	20.46
Hong Kong	4.45749	15.87
USA	4.08296	14.54
EU	4.03436	14.37
Others	9.76325	34.76
Total	28.08480	100.00

Source : Customs Statistics (1987 - 1995).

Table 7

Average Annual Growth Rate of China's Value of Trade with Some Countries and Areas (%)

Country or Area	1987 - 90	1991 - 95
China's Foreign Trade Value Growth Rate	11.8	19.9
Growth Rate of Value of Trade with USA	12.5	30.2
Growth Rate of Value of Trade with Japan	- 1.0	29.8
Growth Rate of Value of Trade with EU	5.0	25.3
Growth Rate of Value of Trade with H. K.	27.7	- 2.6

Source : Customs Statistics (1987 - 1995).

(Translated by Wang Huaiting)

NOTES

¹ Source : Chinese Statistics Yearbook (Zhong-Guo-Tong-Ji-Nian-Jian) , Chinese Statistics Publishing House , 1995 .

² Cf. "China's Economic and Financial Operations in 1995 ," Financial Times (JinRong-ShiBao) , January 21 , 1996 .

³ Cf. Chinese Statistics Yearbook , 1985 - 1995 .

⁴ Cf. Financial Times , April 28 , 1996 .

⁵ Cf. “‘Phnom-Penh Bonds’ (?) Having a Good Time,” *Financial Times*, May 11, 1996.

⁶ See Footnote 2.

⁷ See Footnote 5.

⁸ Source : Customs Statistics (1992 - 95) (Hai-Guan-Tong-Ji) , a Chinese quarterly and monthly published by the Editorial Department of Customs Statistics under the Customs General Administration of the People s Republic of China.

⁹ In the economic sectors other than agriculture , the enterprises can be classified , according to their ownership , into the state economic entity , the collective economic entity , the joint economic entity , the share-holding company , the foreign-funded company , the company with fund from Hong Kong , Macao or Taiwan , other kinds of companies , private company and micro-business in the cities and towns , and township enterprise , private company and micro-business in the countryside.

¹⁰ The public economic sector includes the state economic entities , collective economic entities and township enterprises in the urban and rural areas. Other enterprises are all classified as the non-public economic sector. This classification is not very scientific , as the public shares of some stock companies make up a great percentage. These companies should have been categorized into the public economic sector. However , there are also many township enterprises which hang the signboard of collective economy but are actually privately owned , for the collective economy enjoys greater policy protection than the private economy.

The figures in the text have been arrived at from the data published in *Extracts from Chinese Statistics (1995)* (Zhong-Guo-Tong-Ji-Zhai-Yao) , Chinese Statistics Publishing House , 1995.

¹¹ An estimation shows that to employ one person in the tertiary industry requires much less investment in fixed assets than the amount invested in the secondary industry. Take 1994 for instance. The investment in the fixed assets of the secondary industry was 494 . 13bn yuan , and the net increase in employment was 4 . 44 m people. In the tertiary industry , the figures were 443 . 37bn yuan and 13 . 86 m people. This means that employing one more person in the secondary industry needs averagely an investment of 124 , 000 yuan in the fixed assets , and only 32 , 000 yuan is required in the tertiary industry. Though the amount of new employment each year has not been decided entirely by the scale of investment in fixed assets , statistics show however that such is the general rule all these years. It can be concluded that the same amount of money invested in the tertiary industry can get more persons employed than invested in the secondary industry.

ON SEVERAL QUESTIONS IN SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS DURING CHINA'S WAR OF RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN

TAO Wenzhao

Sino-American relations had a prominent place in China's wartime diplomacy. Speaking in general, the United States was the country that gave China more assistance than any other one; it was China's most important ally during the Pacific War; never in modern Chinese history had a foreign country involved so deeply in China's internal affairs as the United States did at the end of the war, and the special relationship between the two countries formed during the war gave a great and profound influence on the postwar political development in China. This short essay will concentrate on three big issues rather than discuss some detailed historical facts.

I. The Development of US Policy Toward Assisting China and Curbing Japan in the Earlier Period

The United States was a country that had important interests in the Asian and Pacific region. The advocating of the open door doctrine at the end of the 19th century clearly demonstrated that it could not tolerate other powers' division of China into spheres of influence, excluding U.S. interests. During the first twenty years of the 20th century Japan expanded its influence in China tremendously, using the so-called "god-given-opportunity", when the European powers were busy with the First World War. The United States, nevertheless, uniting with European powers, was successful in con-

taining Japan's expansionist momentum in China at the Washington Conference. Japan's ambition, however, was to gain the hegemony in China rather than to be an equal partner among powers in dominating China. It launched the Manchurian Incident in September 1931 and openly challenged the Washington system. A few years later it started the full-scale aggressive war against China.

As the initiator of the Washington system and the Nine Power Treaty, the United States took a weak position vis-a-vis Japan. On July 16, 1937, the Chinese Government handed over a circular memorandum to all signers of the Nine Power Treaty, revealing the truth of the Lugou Bridge Incident, accusing Japan of violation of the integrity of China's territory and sovereignty. Incidentally on the same day, after consultation with President Roosevelt the U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull issued a formal statement on the U.S. position, which was full of vague and empty words on abstinence by all nations from using force in pursuit of policy, faithful observance of international agreements, equality of commercial opportunity and treatment, and so on and so forth. The most weighty words were :

Any situation in which armed hostilities are in progress or are threatened is a situation wherein rights and interests of all nations either are or may be seriously affected. . . Realizing the necessity for maintaining armed forces adequate for national security, we are prepared to reduce or to increase our own armed forces in proportion to reductions or increases made by other countries.¹

Ironically enough, sixty countries, including Japan, Germany and Italy, immediately expressed their approval of the principles proclaimed in the statement because there was no single word in it to condemn the aggressors.

The July 16 statement was the openly declared policy of U.S. . The United States stuck to the position at the conference of the League of Nations and the Nine Power Conference, unwilling to go a step further. Even when the U.S. gunboat Panay, anchoring in the Yangtze River, was sunk by the Japanese troops, attacking

Nanjing , the response from the U . S . public and Congress was relatively mild in general . Japan made an apology and paid 2.2 million as indemnity , and the incident was over . The weak and compromising position of the U . S . can be explained by the following reasons .

First , the deep-rooted isolationism and pacifism in the country . Isolationism was a tradition in American diplomacy . American involvement in the First World War broke this tradition . But it did not bring any practical benefit to the United States , and the idealism advocated by President Woodrow Wilson during the war was shattered after the war . Isolationist trends , therefore , flooded again.² The “quarantine” speech made by the President in Chicago met a strong attack from the isolationists , who insisted that the President s whole approach to the international situation was entirely unacceptable as it was based upon the “ angel-devil theory” , that is to say , on the assumption that the world was divided into “peace loving ” and “bandit” nations . And the President was pointing to the “ American people down the road that led to the World War” .³ When the country was enveloped in such isolationist atmosphere , the government could not but took this do-nothing position .

Second , though the desperate situation of the great depression was basically reversed after several years of the New Deal , the American economy , however , was still in rehabilitation . Foreign trade was an important incentive to the economic recovery . The export to Japan was rather important to U . S . economy as its ratio in the total American export was 8.4 % , 9.9 % and 8.6 % in 1932 , 1934 and 1937 respectively .⁴ The United States obviously did not want to offend Japan in order to avoid damage to U . S . -Japanese economic ties .

Third , the appeasement to fascism was a common practice in the international politics at the time . After Mr . Neville Chamberlain had taken the office of the British Prime Minister in May 1937 , the appeasement tendency went further . Chamberlain held that “our position in the Far East was a vulnerable one , and that if we were attacked by Japan in strength , we were not in a position , at all events at the outset , to defend ourselves .” The British Government , there-

fore, came to the conclusion that one of the major goals of the British diplomacy was to avoid hostile activities in the Far East.⁵ At the League of Nations conference in September and October held to discuss the Sino-Japanese conflict, at the Nine Power Conference in November the British and French delegates looked to each other hesitantly and dared not condemn the aggressors. Even before the Nine Power Conference Chamberlain clearly declared the British position in his address to the House of Common on October 21 :

I suggest that it is altogether a mistake to go into this conference talking about economic sanction, economic pressure and force. We are here to make peace, not here to extend the conflict⁶

Britain, France and America influenced each other in their attitude toward the Japanese aggression and no country was willing to take the lead to stop the aggression and to do the justice.

Fourth, having won quickly the first victories, the Japanese troops attempted to conquer China within a few months while China did not yet change its image of being humiliated for a whole century, and the Chinese Government took non-resistance policy after the Manchurian Incident. Even after the full scale war of resistance had begun, the Nationalist Government's leading group was not determined to resist. Their tactics were "to make peace through war", "to help bring about peace through war", that is to say, the resistance was a compelled action, and its purpose was to bring back Japan to the negotiation table. In such circumstances most foreigners lacked confidence in China's resistance and just stood by as onlookers. Many observers held that China's final defeat was just a matter of several months. In the Shanghai Campaign from August to November 1937 the Chinese side plunged a large number of troops and suffered heavy losses, the Chinese air force was almost completely annihilated, and Nanjing fell into the hands of the Japanese soon after. At that time few foreigners thought that China would recover from this serious defeat.

The Chinese nation, however, under the banner of the anti-Japanese united front on the basis of the cooperation between the

Guomindang (GMD) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), stood firmly and indomitably, miraculously enduring all the defeats and hardships, and smashed the Japanese plan to finish the war by sudden and concentrated attacks. And the Japanese aggressors deeply sank into the mire of the war with China, being unable either to retreat or to advance. In March 1938 Franklin D. Roosevelt's special intelligence agent Evans F. Carlson reported:

The Chinese army is improving by leaps and bounds. The Chinese soldier continues to be superior to the Japanese soldier, but the officers need training in staff work and leadership. They are getting it... A spirit of quiet optimism prevails at present. The Chinese are winning victories...⁷

The U.S. military attaché's office also pointed out in its report in May that the Chinese appeared successful in blocking the Japanese on all the fronts, that the Japanese front was overspread and they could not launch a heavy blow that was able to smash the resistance, while China could withstand the Japanese attack, depending on its superiority in manpower.⁸ Gradually, foreigners began to look at China with new eyes, and some people of insight started to ponder over the strategic significance of China's War of Resistance.

Following the Panay incident U.S. Ambassador of China Nelson Johnson sent several messages to the State Department. He feared that the Japanese were driven by a vision of eliminating "all western influence among the Chinese". He held that the United States should stand firm in getting a proper settlement of the matter or more trouble would occur in the future. In the face of what appeared to be American indifference, Johnson suggested, Nationalist leaders might move toward an accommodation with Tokyo or, alternatively with Moscow since the Soviet Union had begun to extend credits and equipment to the KMT. "We must be prepared to fight", he concluded, "if we want to be respected".⁹

The Commander of the Asiatic Fleet Admiral Harry E. Yarnell repeatedly stated his view since the very start of the War of Resistance. He warned that the fate of China, the Philippines, and the

future of economic opportunities throughout Asia were all a single issue, that to permit Japanese conquest of China was tantamount to abandoning the mainland of Asia and control of the Pacific Ocean. He believed that China was America's most important ally, that the only way to frustrate Japan's scheme was to aid China, and that, if Japan were not stopped, "the white race would have no future in Asia."¹⁰ Yarnell's reports caused attention from the military. The Chief of Naval Operations Admiral William Leahy, who became the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff after the outbreak of the Pacific War, circulated Yarnell's reports among high officials of the State and War Departments, and among the President's staff. Some reports were sent directly to the President himself.

In mid-1938 the voice advocating assisting China and curbing Japan among the U.S. officials became stronger. John Carter Vincent from the Office of Far East Affairs, the State Department, in his memorandum of July 23 asserted:

American interests and rights may not be preserved unless China's sovereignty is preserved. China's sovereignty may not be preserved unless Japanese militarism is defeated, and from the long viewpoint our involvement in the Far East may not be avoided unless Japanese militarism is defeated.

Because once Japan conquered China, it would inevitably expand in Southeast Asia, and fell into a direct clash with Britain and the United States. So his conclusion was: "The chances of our involvement, were Japanese aggression in China to prove successful, would be measurably greater than would be the chances of our becoming involved in the present conflict were we now to render reasonable assistance to China."¹¹ A little later the Secretary of Treasury Henry Morgenthau expressed similar view. In his letter of October 17 to the President. He wrote that German, Italian as well as Japanese fascists could never be content with their gains, that

A victory in one part of the world is followed by outbursts of aggression elsewhere... We should learn the lesson which the history of the last seven years has to teach us.

Let us not repeat the short-sighted mistakes of Britain and France... Let us while we can peacefully do so try to check the aggressors... By risking a little more than the cost of one battleship we can give renewed vitality and effectiveness to the Chinese... what greater force for peace could there be than emergence of a unified China ?²

Because the U.S. policy makers came to believe that China was able to withstand a protracted war, and realized the importance of China's War of Resistance to the U.S. interests, the U.S. Government began gradually to take measures to aid China and curb Japan. The first step to curb Japan was the moral sanctions against Japan implemented in June 1938. The State Department advised 148 American manufacturers producing and selling Japan airplanes and spare parts not to sell Japan any planes and aviation equipment in order to protest Japanese bombardment on peaceful inhabitants. The first step to aid China was the tung oil loan promulgated in December 1938 and concluded in February 1939. The U.S. Government gave U.S. \$25 million to China, and China would return by selling tung oil to the United States. After that the U.S. Government once and again announced new measures to support China at the critical and dangerous moments. On July 24, 1939, Britain made a compromise with Japan on the Tianjin concession issue and so-called Arita-Craige Agreement was concluded. Two days later, the U.S. Government proclaimed the abolishing of the commercial treaty between the U.S. and Japan. Just before the puppet regime came forth in Nanjing, America released news on March 7, 1940, about a new loan to China with Chinese tin as mortgage. On July 17, 1940, Britain declared to close the Burma Road for three months under Japanese pressure. A week later, the U.S. made an announcement that licence system would be introduced in the export of aviation fuel, lubrication oil and scrap iron and steel to Japan. On September 25, 1940, two days after Japanese advance into Indo-China, America released news about a new loan to China secured by tungsten ore from China, and at the same time the complete sanctions were enforced against Japan with reference to exporting scrap iron and steel.

And President Roosevelt was able to announce new financial assistance to China on the same day, November 30, 1940, when Japan and the puppet regime promulgated so-called Treaty of Basic Relations and China-Japan-Manchugo Common Declaration.

It is appropriate to note that the orbit of the development of American policy toward assisting China and curbing Japan was not a straight line. It went a zigzag way, and with relapses. A most significant event was the U.S.-Japan negotiations before the outbreak of the Pacific War, which lasted for more than half a year. Some scholars hold that "The Memorandum of the Japanese-American Understanding" was a plan to compel China to surrender, a "Far East Munich" conspiracy.¹³ Surely, the United States did want to make a compromise with Japan, sacrificing some Chinese interests, including conditional recognition of so-called Manchugo, "to cooperate in preventing Communism", advising Jiang Jieshi to collaborate with Wang Jingwei, etc. Nevertheless, there are two fundamental differences between the U.S.-Japan negotiations and the Munich Incident. First, in the Munich Incident Britain and France attempted to avoid conflict with the fascists and safeguard themselves by sacrificing a small country's interests. While the U.S. purpose in its talks with Japan was not to avoid the war, but to delay the war and break up the tripartite alliance. As early as in September 1940, when Japan, Germany and Italy formed the alliance, Roosevelt summoned the Secretary of State and the military leaders to consult. The consensus of the meeting was that the tripartite alliance was a gun aimed at the United States, that the major threat to world peace came from Europe and fascist Germany was the major enemy to western civilization. Therefore, the U.S. global strategy should be "Europe first, Atlantic first", that is to say, to take offensive in the Atlantic toward Germany and to take defensive in the Pacific toward Japan and try the utmost to delay the conflict with Japan so that it could concentrate its strength in the Atlantic and have more time to get prepared for the war in two oceans.¹⁴ It was under the guidance of this principle that the U.S. conducted its talks with Japan. In his letter of July 1, 1940, to the Secretary of Interior Harold L. Ickes

Roosevelt stated :

It is terribly important for the control of the Atlantic to help to keep peace in the Pacific. I simply have not got enough Navy to go round - and every little episode in the Pacific means fewer ships in the Atlantic.¹⁵

Even until November 1941 , when both Roosevelt and Hull had no more doubt that the war with Japan was inevitable and imminent , the American military leaders , including the Army Chief of Staff General George Marshall and the Navy Chief of Operation Harold R. Stark still felt that they were not yet prepared for the war in both oceans and greatly wanted “to try to delay this break to the last moment”.¹⁶ In short , the U.S. purpose of negotiating with Japan was to make preparations for the forthcoming war with Japan rather than to appease Japan.

Second , before and after the Munich Britain and France constantly made concessions to Germany , allowing it to annex Austria and occupy Czech , while in the U.S.-Japan talks both sides followed the same guideline , namely , to do what it should do regardless of the talks. Japan did not slow down its aggressive steps , while the United States implemented its policy of assisting China and curbing Japan without hesitation. It was during the talks that the U.S. Government announced the freezing of all Japanese assets in the United States , thus actually severing its trade relations with Japan . And the comprehensive sanctions against Japan , including oil sanctions were soon followed after this. It was also during the talks that Roosevelt signed the order in April to allow American servicemen to resign and join the American Volunteer Group headed by Claire Lee Chennault , declared in May that China was eligible to receive the Lend-Lease assistance from the United States , and sent a military mission headed by Major John Magruder to China in July to make an investigation on various problems relating to the Lend-Lease assistance. If we listen to American words and watch its deeds , we should be able to make distinction between the U.S.-Japan talks and the Munich Incident.

II. The Making of the Special Relationship

There has been a popular argument that the special relationship between the Nationalist Government and the United States was soon made after its establishment in Nanjing in 1927. It was not the case actually. The leading group of the Nationalist Government was composed of various factions. Judging by their attitude toward foreign countries, there were factions pro-American, pro-British, pro-Japanese, and Pro-Russian. Jiang Jieshi kept a certain kind of balance among these factions, attaching importance to certain faction one time and to another faction the other time. It is hard to say that one faction was constantly in the dominant position. The special relationship was made during China's War of Resistance Against Japan, especially after the outbreak of the Pacific War.

After the War of Resistance broke out, the Nationalist Government tried hard to neutralize Germany and succeeded in doing so for the first half year. Nevertheless, Germany and Japan were all fascist countries, and the relationship between China and Germany at the time was entirely a tactical, expedient one. France, facing direct German threat in Europe, was even unable to fend for itself and to protect its interests in Indo-China. It was far beyond its capacity to take an active policy in China. The Soviet Union was the only country that gave China substantial assistance at the initial stage of the war. But there existed great ideological differences between the two governments and discrepancies between the two social systems. What is more, there existed two political parties in China, which had been adversaries for more than ten years. These conditions could not exempt the Nationalist Government from deep doubts and anxiety. "The perils and threats China is facing," Jiang Jieshi concluded, "are different. Those from Japan are obvious and easier to deal with, while those from Russia are hidden and more difficult to prevent."¹⁷ Britain had substantial interests in China and Asia. But since the Opium War in 1840-42, Britain was a country that took the lead in foreign aggression against China and grabbed a lot of in-

terests and privileges. Moreover, the British Government did not even think of changing its colonialist policy toward China as well as Asia. And in Europe Britain was carrying out appeasement policy toward Germany. So Britain was certainly not reliable. After so many considerations and analyses, roughly in mid 1938, the Nationalist Government came to the conclusion that the United States was the only country that China could rely upon, and that China's foreign policy should be based on its close relations with the United States.

Consequently, the Nationalist Government took a number of steps. In September 1939 Wang Zhengting, who was not so much welcomed by the United States, was recalled, and Dr. Hu Shi was sent to the U.S. as the ambassador. As a prominent liberal intellectual, having educated in the U.S., Dr. Hu enjoyed high prestige in the U.S. Besides doing official business, he travelled all over the country, participating in various public meetings, making speeches there, accusing outrages committed by the Japanese troops in China. His activities gained some sympathies from the American public for the Chinese people. In June 1940 T. V. Soong was sent to Washington, D.C. as Jiang Jieshi's personal representative in order to establish direct contact between Jiang and the White House. And the Nationalist Government did not let slip opportunities to express its willingness to follow the U.S. lead. In February 1941 Roosevelt's Administrative Assistant Lauchlin Currie visited China. Jiang Jieshi had a number of talks with him, and the time of conversations put together amounted to twenty seven hours. Jiang Jieshi asserted in their talks:

Peace in the Far East can be achieved only by the two belligerent parties attending the peace conference presided over by the United States;

I am certain what President Roosevelt is now thinking is not only the United States present and future, but also the world's present questions and the questions of profound and lasting importance to the world after the end of the war. In the world today President Roosevelt is the only figure who is able to take the great responsibility to clear

up the messy situation left by the war. I will be happy to be his assistant and to make my contribution to our common cause ;

The cooperation between China and the U.S. during the war was just the first step of closer cooperation between the two countries after the war.¹⁸

These expressions were tantamount to tell the United States that China would follow the U.S. leadership both during and after the war. After the outbreak of the Pacific War the United States became China's major ally, and, naturally, the relations between the two governments grew closer and more intimate.

It was also in America's interests to establish the special relationship between the two countries. "Toward China we had two objectives," Cordell Hull summarized in his memoirs. "The first was an effective joint prosecution of the war. The second was the recognition and building up of China as a major power entitled to equal rank with the three Western Allies, Russia, Britain, and the United States, during and after the war, both for the preparation of a post-war organization and for the establishment of stability and prosperity in the Orient."¹⁹

The first objective does not need much explanation. The U.S. grand strategy during the war was "Europe first, Atlantic first", and the U.S. concentrated its major forces on fighting the Germans. On the Eastern front China's resistance did not become less important after the U.S. and Britain's joining the war. The U.S. policy makers were aware of the importance at least because of the following reasons.

First, the China Theater contained a great number of Japanese troops during the whole process of the war and thus lightened the military pressure on the U.S. and Britain. "Without China", Roosevelt told his son Elliott, "if China goes under, how many divisions of Japanese troops do you think will be freed - to do what? Take Australia, take India - and it's as ripe as a plum for the picking. Move straight on to the Middle East..."²⁰

Second, in the fall of 1943 the U.S. changed its grand strategy

to defeat Japan. Before that China was the base for final attack on Japan in the U.S. strategic thinking; China was a base for American air attack on Japan during the whole process of the war.

Third, China's resistance was of vital importance to the Asian people's anti-Japanese struggle. The people from some South and Southeastern Asian countries had been longed for casting off the yoke of Western colonialism. Using this nationalistic feelings, the Japanese advertised themselves as "the liberators" of East Asia and claimed as if the war they conducted were aimed "at the aggression of Britain, the United States, France, and the Soviet Union, and the purpose of the war is to liberate East Asia and to establish the lasting peace in East Asia".²¹ Influenced by the deceiving propaganda, a number of nationalistic leaders of some Asian countries cooperated with the Japanese for a time. In view of this China's resistance appeared even more important. As The U.S. Joint Intelligence Committee pointed out in its report of August 4, 1944: "Above all, the significance of the Asiatics resisting the encroachments of other Asiatics is of tremendous political and psychological importance."²²

With regard to the second objective it is necessary to discuss Roosevelt's considerations of the postwar world. There were two major themes, namely, to liquidate the old colonial empires and to establish a new system of great power cooperation.

Roosevelt predicted that the victory of the anti-fascist war would certainly be accompanied by the surge of the nationalist independent movement, and that the British, French and Dutch colonial empires could not survive or be restored after the earth-shaking world war because the people of the colonies and semi-colonies could not reaccept the the British, French and Dutch rule after expelling the German, Italian and Japanese aggressors. He held that Britain, France and the Netherlands should treat their former colonies as Americans treated the Philippines.²³ Objectively, this position was in accordance with the will of the people of the colonial and semi-colonial countries and with the trends of the times, on the one hand, and on the other, the United States could expand its influence to these countries and regions to fill in the political vacuum while the

British , French and Dutch were withdrawing.

Roosevelt also envisaged that the cooperation between the allies would continue after the war , and a single international organization would be set up in order to preserve peace and solve the international issues. This organization was the major place for great powers to cooperate , and the four “police men” , the United States , Britain , the Soviet Union and China should play the dominant role in it.

The great powers were not in complete accord with regard to their considerations about the postwar world. During the war Britain and the Soviet Union did not oppose the postwar cooperation and the establishment of an international organization. Nevertheless , Britain was disgusted with the U.S. proposition of decolonization. Winston Churchill and other British policy makers made their position very clear :“ Never would we yield an inch of the territory that was under the British Flag”²⁴ The Soviet Union’s major concern was about its spheres of influence. In December 1941 , when Anthony Eden visited the Soviet Union in order to normalize the British-Soviet alliance and review the military situation , Stalin insisted that the Baltic countries and parts of prewar Poland , Finland and Romania be annexed to the Soviet Union.²⁵ The Soviet Union also intended to build a breakwater along its eastern border. Besides Mongolia , which it had regarded as its sphere of influence for long , this breakwater should be built also in China’s Xinjiang and Northeast. To sum up , the great powers all tried to preserve and expand their own influence and to avoid being weakened.

The United States needed an ally to carry out its design about the postwar world as it did during the war. A China , stable , united and friendly to the United States , was its major ally in the Asian-Pacific region. Roosevelt had no doubt that Jiang Jieshi supported his conception about the postwar world. And he was fully aware of the differences between China and Britain with regard to the questions of India , the Burma Campaign , the Sino-British treaty in January 1943 , and the British loan to China. And it was also clear to Roosevelt that Jiang Jieshi cherished “deep distrust” about the Soviet intention toward China. Jiang doubted very much about “Russia’s

desire to communize China and perhaps for a complete conquest and annexation to Russia of a portion of China.²⁶ It was Roosevelt's firm belief that China would be sided with the United States in any political dispute between the United States and Britain, or between the United States and the Soviet Union over the Asian-Pacific questions, that China would be able to cope with risen Japan, that China would also help the United States to establish the international trusteeship over the colonies broken away from their former suzerains, that, consequently, China would play a very important stabilizing role for the peace regime in Asia dominated by the United States. Obviously, China and the United States needed each other, and the establishment of the special relationship was a natural matter.

Therefore, it was in American interests to raise China's international status. The U.S. did make continued efforts in this regard. It was mainly because of Roosevelt's advocacy that China, as one of the leading powers, signed The Declaration of the United Nations together with the U.S., Britain and the Soviet Union, which was published on January 1st, 1942. In October 1943 the United States insisted that China join the other three powers and sign The Four-Power Declaration on General Security, which laid the foundation for the forthcoming United Nations. At the Cairo Conference in November 1943 China's position as a great power was again confirmed by Roosevelt, who also concurred with inclusion of the returning of the Chinese territory stolen by Japan to China after the war, which was extremely important to China's sovereignty and territorial integrity. In September and October 1943 the Chinese representatives participated in the Dumbarton Oaks Conference for preparing for the establishment of the United Nations. In the spring of 1945 China together with the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union initiated the San Francisco Conference to work out The Charter of the United Nations and became one of the permanent members of the Security Council. In all these activities the United States gave China its full support.²⁷

No doubt, China, as a major ally in the anti-fascist war, hav-

ing fought for longer than any other country , made so many sacrifices and so great contributions to the victory over the fascists , deserved the great power status. This is a different matter from Roosevelt s efforts to promote China to one of the four great powers out of his military and political considerations.

III. The Change of the U . S . China Policy at the End of the War

The U . S . China policy during the war can be summarized as supporting Jiang Jieshi and tolerating the CCP in order to resist Japan. This policy acknowledged that the Nationalist Government with Jiang Jieshi as its leader was the only legitimate government representing China. Nevertheless , it was a government ruled by one party , and it should be democratized , should overcome and avoid fascist tendencies. The policy also held that different political parties and factions should eliminate their differences and unite for a common cause of resisting Japan , that the CCP was one of the anti-Japanese forces and had grounds to exist and to develop to certain degree. This policy was in accordance with common interests of allies in their anti-fascist war.

On the basis of this policy the United States opposed the G M D diehards military attack on the CCP because the internal split would certainly weaken the efforts in the war. One month after the New Fourth Army Incident Roosevelt s Administrative Assistant Lauchlin Currie came to China , bringing Roosevelt s message :

There are more common grounds between the G M D and CCP than their differences. I sincerely hope that the two parties will eliminate their differences and strengthen their solidarity for the common purpose of resisting Japan . . .

This was the U . S . Government s first clear statement about China s internal problem , and Roosevelt did not conceal his sympathy with the Communists , saying that “the Communist Party s attitude toward peasants , women and the Japanese deserves our commendation.”²⁸ In mid 1943 Jiang Jieshi attempted to launch a new military attack on the CCP , and the relations between the two parties be-

came very strained. On August 19 in a long conversation with T. V. Soong Stanley Hornbeck, senior Political Advisor to the State Department, reminded T. V. Soong of their talk soon after the New Fourth Army Incident and confirmed that the State Department's attitude remained the same, that China should avoid the civil war. General Stilwell went even further, suggesting that General Hu Zonnan's troops that were blockading the Communist troops and the Communist troops that were being blockaded be all sent to the front to resist Japan.²⁹ The GMD was compelled to listen to some of the U.S. advice, while rejecting the other. Any way, this U.S. attitude was certainly a plus for preserving the anti-Japanese national united front in China.

On the basis of the policy the United States from time to time advised the Nationalist Government to carry out democratic policies. Being an economist, Currie discussed more about China's economic, financial questions during his first visit to China. Meanwhile he asked Jiang Jieshi several times: "What is the effect of your practising democracy?" He also asked Jiang to place the same importance on democratic politics, economic and social policies as on military matters.³⁰ In his public speech before leaving Chongqing Currie claimed that China need complete democracy from bottom up and fundamentally change the corruptive political structure.³¹ American diplomats in their many talks with the GMD officials expressed the same opinion. Charge d'Affairs George Atcheson in his talk with the Secretary General of the GMD Central Committee on September 12 criticised "apparently increasing Fascist trends and consequent weakening of practical democracy".³² And General Hurley also told the Communist representatives in Chongqing Lin Boqu and Dong Biwu that the present government was not democratic and needed reform.

On the basis of this policy many American diplomats and servicemen had quite a lot of connexions with the CCP and got rather favorable impressions about the Communists. Among the guests who visited the Communists in Chongqing were the U.S. embassy officials like John Carter Vincent, John P. Davis, Jr., John S. Service, Everett F. Drumright, O. Edmund Clubb, Military Attache David

D. Barrett , Assistant to the Military Attache Morris B. Depass and others. Currie and Wendell L. Willkie during their visit to China all met Zhou Enlai and had long conversations with him. Zhou left a good impression on them. Many American diplomats and servicemen made comparison between the CCP and GMD and came to the conclusion that the Communists were making sincere efforts to resist the Japanese , that they were dynamic and full of vigor and vitality , and that China's future belonged to them rather than the GMD.

Nevertheless , it is important to keep in mind that the very basic point of the wartime U. S. China policy was to support Jiang Jieshi's leadership. Roosevelt was not satisfied with Jiang. He told his son Elliott during the Cairo Conference that Jiang's troops were not fighting. And he was also unsatisfied with Jiang's rejecting Stilwell's proposal to train the Chinese army and keeping "thousand and thousand of his best men up in the northwest , up on the borders of Red China".³³ And also in Cairo in a conversation with Stilwell and Davis he asked anxiously how long Jiang could hold on. And he might even have an idea of "changing horse".³⁴ But Roosevelt after all believed that there was no man in China who could be better leader than Jiang. In 1943 , when Marshall and Stilwell , having had so many difficulties with Jiang in the military cooperation , suggested quid pro quo tactics toward Jiang , Roosevelt wrote an unusually long letter to Marshall on May 8 . He said :

Thank you for letting me see the copy of Stilwell's letter of February ninth. . . I have read this letter with a good deal of care and my first thought is that Stilwell has exactly the wrong approach in dealing with the Generalissimo Chiang. . .

All of us must remember that the Generalissimo came up the hard way to become the undisputed leader of four hundred million people - an enormously difficult job to attain any kind of unity from a diverse group of all kinds of leaders - military men , educators , scientists , public health people , engineers , all of them struggling for power and mastery , local or national , and to create in a very short

time throughout China what it took us a couple of centuries to attain.

Besides the Generalissimo finds it necessary to maintain his position of supremacy. You and I would do the same thing under the circumstances. He is the Chief Executive as well as the Commander-in-Chief, and one cannot speak sternly to a man like that or exact commitments from him the way we might do from the Sultan of Morocco.³⁵

It is hard to say that this was entirely Roosevelt's true thinking. But one thing is clear that he truly thought that there was no leader in China more capable than Chiang. Having elaborated his thought in a letter to the Chief of Staff so seriously, he actually proclaimed this formally as his policy toward China and asked his subordinates to implement it in their practice. A few months later, in a talk with his close friend, Deputy Secretary of State Sumner Welles, he expressed the same idea:

The Generalissimo, limited as his military vision might be, and badly as his troops were fighting, was the only Chinese leader who could keep the Chinese armies in the field against the Japanese and who would be able after the war to hold the Chinese people together.³⁶

In Cairo he restated the same idea to his son and said: "But at the moment who is there in China who could take Chiang's place? There's just no other leader. With all their shortcomings, we've got to depend on the Chiangs."³⁷

With the war approaching to a close, the American policy makers became increasingly worried about GMD-CCP contradictions and the direction of postwar China's political development. In his talk with Sumner Welles Roosevelt expressed his deep anxiety about it. He said that no spot was more likely to create difficulties in the post-war years than China, that the civil war in China, which was likely, would get the Soviet Union and the Western powers involved, and that there would be very much the same situation one had witnessed in Spain during the civil war, only on a far greater scale, and with graver dangers inherent in it.³⁸ Obviously, once the civil war in

China broke out , China was certainly unable to play the stabilizing role. Moreover , it would damage the post war great power cooperation. To Roosevelt s mind , the way to avoid this scenario was to form a G M D-CCP united government while the war was still being fought. He made a proposal to Jiang in Cairo , and the latter agreed contingently.³⁹ When Vice President Henry Wallace visited China in June 1944 he again mentioned this and brought Roosevelt s message :

As much as the Communist and the members of the Kuomintang were all Chinese , they were basically friends and that nothing should be final between friends . . . if the parties could not get together they might call in a friend and . . . he [Roosevelt] might be that friend.⁴⁰

Evidently , Roosevelt on his own initiative suggested to mediate between the G M D and CCP. Jiang readily accepted the proposal and asked Roosevelt to send a personal representative to China.

It is appropriate to note that neither Roosevelt , nor the Department of State had any clear conception about G M D-CCP cooperation and the “ united government” . It was the American diplomats in China who first put forward a more concrete idea. The Chinese army s defeat in the “ Ichigo Operation” in 1944 caused great anxiety among the officials from the U.S. embassy in Chongqin. At the end of June and the beginning of July they discussed in the embassy the possible ways to save the situation and envisaged a preliminary scheme : to form a war council or high command with Jiang Jieshi as its leader and including all major parties and factions of the country , and collectively assume the war responsibility , with Jiang s promise not to play political tricks in the military command. Councillor Atcheson in his talks with Sun Fo on July 4 , August 9 , and Ambassador Clarence E. Gauss in his talks with T. V. Soong on July 11 and with Jiang Jieshi personally on September 4 repeatedly advocated this recommendation.⁴¹ Gauss reported in great details about this to the State Department. The President and the Secretary of State after careful considerations instructed Gauss on September 9 :

It is requested that you inform Chiang that the President

and I feel that your suggestion is practical and timely and deserving of careful consideration. . . . that we are not interested in Chinese communists and other dissident elements as such , but that we are anxious on our own behalf and on the United Nations behalf , as well as on behalf of China , that the Chinese people develop and utilize , under the leadership of a strong but representative and tolerant government , the physical and spiritual resources at their command in carrying on the war and in establishing a durable democratic peace. . . . We feel that a council or some body representative of all influential elements in the country and with full power under Chiang s leadership would be a most effective organ for achieving this end.⁴²

It is evident that at the time the United States had just a kind of desire rather than a concrete plan. After Hurley came to China as the President s personal representative he became the key person in handling G M D-CCP contradictions.

Much research has been done in China in recent years about the Hurley s mediation and the major facts about it are now quite clear to us. Therefore , it is unnecessary to redescribe the process of the mediation. Consensus has been reached on the following three points.

First , Hurley s trip to Yan an was not a deliberate political fraud. He sincerely accepted the CCP s five point proposal because he held this was the only way to let the Communists to hand over their control of their troops. He changed his position and turned to support Jiang s three point counterproposal because he believed that it was his task to back Jiang unconditionally .

Second , Hurley did implement Roosevelt s policy in his mediation. It is true that he did not report everything to the President. The latter , however , was aware of the process of the mediation. What is more , Roosevelt supported him in his debate with the career diplomats. So it is groundless to conclude that it was Hurley who led the U .S. China policy to the wrong track.⁴³

Third , the U .S. China policy at the time was not to support

Jiang in launching military attack on the CCP. Rather, it was the policy to support Jiang unilaterally, to put pressure on the CCP to compel them to accept Jiang's conditions and abandon their independent armed forces and abolish their independent government. The CCP at the time still hoped that the U.S. decision makers would one day correct their wrong policy, and their criticism was aimed at Hurley personally. In the period immediately after the war the major expression of the U.S. China policy was to support the Nationalist Government to monopolize the right to accept the Japanese surrender and exclude the CCP in receiving the surrender of the Japanese and puppet troops.

It is necessary to emphasize, however, that many researchers have often neglected one thing. The change of the U.S. China policy at the end of the war was a gradual process. The process took place from September 1944 to April 1945. The major events in it included the recall of Stilwell, Wedemeyer's investigation of the U.S. servicemen and OSS officials' exploration of the possibility to cooperate with the Communists, the reorganization of the U.S. Army Observer Section in Yan'an, the failure of the Hurley's mediation, the debate between Hurley and the career diplomats. Hurley's mediation was the central question, but not the only one. Hurley's press conference in Washington at the beginning of April 1945 can be regarded as an indication that the change of the U.S. China policy was principally completed. The change can be described more clearly only when one studies the various questions in Sino-American relations during the period and pays full attention to the connexions among them.

Notes

¹ The U.S. Department of State, ed., *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers* (hereafter FRUS), 1937, Vol. I (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,), pp. 699-700; Cordell Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull* (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1948), pp. 535-536.

² William L. Langer, S. Everett Gleason, *The Challenge to Isolation, 1937 - 1940* (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1952), Chapter I.

³ Dorothy Borg , *The United States and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1933-1938* (Cambridge , Massachusetts : Harvard University Press , 1964) , pp.389-391 .

⁴ Warren Cohen , *America's Response to China* (New York : John Wiley and Sons , 1980) , p. 147 .

⁵ W . N. Medlicott , Couglas Dakin and others , eds. , *Documents on British Foreign Policy , 1919 -1939* , (London : Her Majesty s Stationary Office , 1984) , Second Series , Vol. XXI , pp.788-789 , 810-812 .

⁶ Herbert Feis , *The Road to Pearl Harbor* (Princeton University Press 1950) , p.14 .

⁷ Donald Schewe , ed. , *Franklin Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs* (New York : Clearwater Publishing Company , Inc. 1969) , Second Series , Vol. IX , p.290 .

⁸ Paul Kesaris , ed. , *United States Intelligence Report , China , 1911-1941* (microfilm) Vol. 10 , No. 0694 .

⁹ Russell D. Buhite , Nelson T. Johnson and *American Policy toward China* (East Lansing : Michigan State University , 1968) , p.135 ; Michael Schaller , *The U . S. Crusade in China* (New York , Columbia University Press , 1979) , p.18 .

¹⁰ Schaller , *The U . S. Crusade in China* , pp.19-20 .

¹¹ FRUS , 1938 , Vol. III (GPO , 1954) , pp.235-237 .

¹² Donald Schewe , ed. , *Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs* , Second Series , Vol. XI , pp. 390-392 .

¹³ See The Editorial Board on Compiling the Series of the History of Sino - American Relations , eds. , *Selected Papers on the History of Sino-American Relations* (Nanjing University Press , 1991) , Book III , p. 291 .

¹⁴ See Tao Wenzhao , *A History of Sino- American Relations , 1911 -1950* (Chongqing Publishing House , 1993) , pp.213-214 .

¹⁵ Elliott Roosevelt , ed. , *F. D. R. His Personal Letters , 1928 -1945* , (New York : Du- el , Sloan and Pearce , 1947) , Vol. II , pp.1173-4 .

¹⁶ Herbert Feis , *The Road to Pearl Harbor* , p.300 .

¹⁷ Keiji Furuya , Translated by Central Daily Publishing House , *President Jiang's Confidential Records* (Taipei : 1977) , Vol. 11 , p. 100 .

¹⁸ Committee on Party History of the Central Committee of Guomindang , eds. , *Important Historical Documents of the Republic of China— The Period of the War of Resistance against Japan* , Vol. III : *Diplomatic Relations during the War* (hereafter *Diplomatic Relations*) (Taipei , 1981) , Book I , pp.593-551 , 559 .

¹⁹ Cordell Hull , *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull* , p.1583 .

²⁰ Elliott Roosevelt , *As He Saw It* (New York : Du- el , Sloan and Pearce , 1946) , p.53 .

²¹ Translated by Tianjin Political Consultative Conference Editorial Board , *The Memoirs of Takeo Imai* (Beijing : China Culture and History Publishing House , 1987) , p. 350 .

²² RG 218 , Records of Joint Chiefs of Staff , Box 563 , NARS .

²³ Elliott Roosevelt , *As He Saw It* , p. 165 ; Sumner Welles , *Seven Decisions That Shaped History* (New York : Harper and Brothers Publishers , 1951) , pp.150-151 .

²⁴ Sterndale-Bennett to Seymour , April 24 , 1945 , FO 371/46325 , Public Record Office , London .

²⁵ William H. McNeill , *America , Britain and Russia. Their Cooperation and Con-*

flict ,1941 -1946 (London : Oxford University Press ,1953) ,p. 167 .

²⁶ The U.S. Department of State ,ed. , Foreign Relations of the United States. Conference at Cairo and Teheran (GPO ,1961) , p.102 .

²⁷ See Tao Wenzhao , Yang Kuisong and Wang Jianlang , China's Foreign Relations During the War of Resistance Against Japan (Beijing : The CCP History Publishing House , 1995) , Chapter VIII .

²⁸ Diplomatic Relations , Book I , p.543 .

²⁹ Charles Romanus and Riley Sunderland , Stilwell's Mission to China (GPO ,1953) , p. 368 .

³⁰ Diplomatic Relations , Book I , pp.550 -561 ; See The Documentation Research Institute of the CCP Central Committee , ed. , A Chronicle of Zhou Enlai ,1898 -1949 (Beijing ,1989) , p.492 .

³¹ The Documentation Research Institute of the CCP Central Committee , A Biography of Zhou Enlai ,1898 -1949 (Beijing ,1989) , p.491 .

³² FRUS ,1943 , China (GPO ,1963) , p.334 .

³³ Elliott Roosevelt and James Brough , A Rendezvous with Destiny : The Roosevelt of the White House (New York : G.P. Putnam's Sons ,1975) , p.348 .

³⁴ Michael Schaller , The U. S. Crusade in China , pp. 151-152 .

³⁵ Charles Romanus and Riley Sunderland , Stilwell's Mission to China , p.279 .

³⁶ Sumner Welles , Seven Decisions That Shaped History , p.151 .

³⁷ Elliott Roosevelt and James Brough , A Rendezvous with Destiny , pp.348 -349 .

³⁸ Sumner Welles , Seven Decisions That Shaped History , p.152 .

³⁹ Elliott Roosevelt , As He Saw It , p.164 .

⁴⁰ The U.S. Department of State ,ed. , United States Relations with China. With Special References to the Period 1944 -1949 (GPO ,1949) , p. 549 .

⁴¹ FRUS ,1944 , Vol. VI , pp. 116-117 ,124-126 ,138-139 ,544-545 .

⁴² FRUS ,1944 , Vol. VI , pp.567 -568 .

⁴³ Generally speaking , Chinese scholars have different opinions from their American counterparts on the point. See , for example Michael Schaller , The U. S. Crusade in China , p. 170 ; John S. Service , The Amerasia Papers : Some Problems in the History of U. S. - China Relations (Berkeley : University of California press ,1971) , pp. 103-104 ,95 .

A CULTURAL STUDY OF THE AMERICAN EAST ASIAN POLICY

ZHU Shida

I

East Asia , driven by the Chinese huge market with a 1.2 billion population and the economic dynamism with a double-digit growth , is becoming the growth center of the world economy. The growth rates of the East Asian countries averaged 8% during the past twenty years , while the average growth rate of the developed nations registered 3% . The average growth rate of South Korea , Taiwan , Hong Kong and Singapore — the “Four Dragons” — and China during the past fifteen years amounted respectively to 8.5% and 9.3% . The Chinese Gross Domestic Product increased by 11.8% to US \$4 ,380 billion and its trade volume rose by 20.9% to US \$236.7 billion in 1994 . The growth rate of East Asia is three times that of the developed countries. The GNP in East Asia totalled US \$5 ,000 billion in 1992 , while it was US \$6 ,000 billion in the United States of America. As the direct investment in Asia by Asian nations rose , the Japanese investment in Asia accounted for 18.4% of the total foreign direct investment in the major Asian markets from 1986 to 1992 , while investment by firms of South Korea , Taiwan and Hong Kong made up half of foreign investment in the region.¹

The total trade volume of the Greater China Area including the Chinese mainland , Taiwan and Hong Kong , is listed sixth , only second to the U . S . A . , Japan , Germany , France and Britain. Ac-

According to the report by the Asian Development Bank on Oct. 22, 1993, the growth rate of GDP chalked up as high as 8.2% in the Greater China Area in 1993, while it was 13% in the Chinese mainland. The report said that its absolute increase of exports will exceed that of Japan in the coming three years if exports of the Greater China Area will continuously grow as during the past fifteen years. According to estimation by Harry Harding, the GNP of three Chinese economic entities totals US \$2,000 billion if calculated in accordance with the purchasing power parity, while it was US \$2,400 billion in Japan and US \$5,600 billion in the U.S.A. Their trade volume with the rest of the world amounted to US \$480 billion, while it was US \$561 billion in Japan and US \$1050 billion in the United States.

The report from ADB held that if calculated in accordance with the international purchasing power parity instead of with the official exchange rate, the total output value of the Greater China Area will be ahead of that of Japan and Germany and close to that of the United States of America in 2002.

The World Bank predicts that the net volume of imports of the Greater China Area will register US \$639 billion in 2002, while it was US \$521 billion in Japan. In terms of the comparable international prices, the GDP of the Greater China Area will reach US \$9,800 billion, while it was US \$9,700 billion in the U.S.A. In other words, if these predictions are reliable, the Greater China Area will become an economic pole and the largest one.

Daniel Bell, the professor emeritus at Harvard University, notes that if population, economic power and military power are counted as the three pillars to back the national strength, the 21st century might be an Asian one in terms of the first two. The unprecedented growth in East Asia and its prospect will trigger a series of changes in international politics, strategy and trade. Just as Zbigniew Brzezinski said, with the Asian economic success, people will have to focus more attention on their political implication and influence.

I think that the most outstanding economy-driven political

changes run as follows :

1. The United States will strategically pay greater attention to the Asia-Pacific region. The motive force behind the eastward shift of its strategy is economic interest.

The eighteen member nations of APEC with a 2 billion population ,boast half of the world s total GNP and 40 % of the world s total trade volume. The American trade volume with the Asia-Pacific region chalked up US \$ 348 billion in 1992 , while it was US \$ 220 billion with Europe. The American direct investment in the Asia-Pacific region has increased by 400 % from 1989 to 1992 . US \$ 92 billion have been pumped into Asia. The United States has become the largest foreign investor in East Asia and the most important trade partner and the largest market for Asian exports. The U . S . A . has doubled its exports to Asia from 1988 to 1992 , to US \$ 132 . 2 billion , which had created 2 .5 million domestic job opportunities. The United States exported 26 % of its commodities to West Europe , 29 % to its North American partners , and 30 % to the Asia-Pacific region in 1992 . It is predicted that the American exports to the Asia-Pacific region will grow at an annual rate of 9 .4 % in the late 1990s and the American exports will be double by the end of this century.² The annual American trade volume with Asia exceeds US \$ 374 billion , accounting for 40 % of its global trade volume. Warren Christopher , the Secretary of State , said that in terms of American interest , no place is more important than the Asia-Pacific region .

The American exports to Asia accounted for only 23 % of its total in 1985 , while it rises to one-third now . The American trade volume with Asia has reached US \$ 400 billion , making up 40 % of its global total. According to the statistics from the Chinese Customs , the Sino-American trade volume soared from US \$ 2 .45 billion in 1979 to US \$ 35 .04 billion in 1994 , increasing by 14 times. China has become the fourth largest American trade partner , while the U . S . A . has been the second largest Chinese trade partner in exports and the third largest partner in imports. The American direct investment in China grew from US \$ 2 .06 billion in 1993 to US

\$2.49 billion in 1994, amounting to US\$8 billion in total. These figures indicate that the United States has very important economic interests in East Asia, particularly in China. Just as Dr. Henry Kissinger said, the United States provides the major market for all Asian countries and plays a role in the Asia-Pacific region that should not be overlooked.

As the United States of America focuses on its strategic and economic interest after the Cold War, it shows an unprecedented enthusiasm in establishing the Asia-Pacific Economic Community. The existing APEC will perhaps become a vehicle in the multilateral contact between the U.S.A. and East Asia for economic cooperation and political dialogue.

President Clinton said at the press conference of the first Summit Conference of APEC that APEC will become a real community with common interest, common target and common responsibility for mutually beneficial cooperation. When commenting on the idea, Winston Lord, the Assistant Secretary of State in charge of East Asian and Pacific affairs, said that the framework as planned by President Clinton covers the common security, common prosperity, and the common sense of value. Emphasis on "common" is very appropriate here, he added, because it is a community.³ President Clinton unequivocally indicated at the conference on Nov. 19, 1994 that with the end of the Cold War, the United States of America will focus its efforts on Asia for the economic reason. APEC offers America a vehicle to expand its market in the Asia-Pacific region. He maintained that with the continuous increase in economic power in Asia, the region will take the place of Europe as America's priority partner in a long run. In this world, national security has an ever closer relation with economy, he said, adding that it is no longer only military factors that count. As American attention has shifted to economic challenge, the U.S.A. shall focus on the Pacific as well as on the Atlantic. The bulletin of the USIA on Oct. 10, 1993 indicated that the Clinton Administration regards APEC as an important center of American economic strategy in the Pacific Rim. President Clinton said that as the 21st century is envisioned, no place is more

important than the Pacific Rim for America's economic prosperity and stability. Ronald Brown, the late American Secretary of Commerce, also held that America should give top priority to the Asia-Pacific region in its export strategy.⁴

2. East Asia will be one of the three large centers in the world structure after the Cold War.

Just as Kishore Mahbubani said, the significant difference between the 21st century and the preceding centuries is that there will be three centers of world power (Europe, North America, and East Asia) as opposed to two in the 20th (Europe and North America) and one before that (Europe).⁵

The GNP of Japan and East Asian countries and regions accounted for 4% of the world total in 1960, while it was 37% for the United States, Canada and Mexico. Today, the two groups have the same share of the world GNP, about 24%.⁶

It is precisely based on economy and geo-politics that East Asia will become one of the world centers just as some scholars of international politics indicate. It will usher in a new multi-polarized era and will be a severe challenge to the United States politically, economically and diplomatically.

3. East Asia beefs up its confidence.

The Asian self-awareness is a direct outcome in the world political arena after the Cold War. Just as is said above, the Asianized awareness, to a large extent, roots in the weakened influence of the West, the United States in particular, as a result of the increased internal trade in Asia. As the United States is gripped by a series of social, racial, moral and economic problems inherent in its political and cultural structure, American society is no more an ideal model to assimilate in the minds of the Asians though it is still very attractive to them. The effort to focus more attention on its own culture and find the rationale and positive factors in the Asian culture has enhanced the Asian self-awareness.

With the East Asian economic growth and growing integration, the East Asians begin to form an understanding of their own. Mohamed bin Mahathir, the Prime Minister of Malaysia, holds that A-

sia and its people and culture shall be regarded as an important part of the world, as the Asians, Americans and Europeans enjoy the same rights. They shall not be seen as a group of people who must abide by the Western sense of value and culture. Such a new Asian awareness has its social, cultural, economic and political meanings.

Yoichi Funabashi maintained that the Asian awareness and the new Asianization is just the result of the globalization of the Asian economy and media.⁷

The East Asian miracle of economic growth in recent years and the mutual economic dependence have strengthened the East Asian confidence in the rationality of its own culture, therefore, East Asia has developed independent ideas on a series of issues such as human rights, democracy, economic development, security and the relations between the individual and society and between society and the state. Some East Asian leaders and scholars put forward the view of "Asian moral standards" to contend with the Western moral standards. For instance, in criticizing the West, Mahathier said that the West has no right to impose its own moral and immoral standards on other countries. It seems to them, he contended, if people do not have sexual freedom they do not enjoy freedom at all. As a matter of fact, he said, such freedom refuses traditional and religious taboo and the taboo of matrimony and the family as a social system.

Whether the United States can sober-mindedly understand the Asian awareness and assertiveness and build constructive relations with East Asian countries and regions is very important for its own interest.

4. The world has a better understanding of Confucian culture and comes to believe that it is necessary to draw on wisdom from Confucian culture to solve human problems in the 21st century.

The economic growth in East Asia is, essentially speaking, the manifestation of the shock and fusion between Eastern and Western culture. East Asia assimilates the knowledge and experience of the Western developed nations in economy, banking, trade and management, gives full scope to the positive Western life attitude of individual aggressiveness and handles well the relations between man and

nature. In the meantime, it fuses all these with the moral strength of modernized Confucianism to define the social and individual behavior. It is deemed by some scholars that East Asian success, especially that of the four dragons, stems from a cultural environment, mentality and spirit, self-discipline in particular, provided by the quintessence of Confucianism.

Some scholars hold that Asian growth-oriented dynamism is a hybrid of Western modernity and traditional Confucianism. Kishore Mahbubani said, "If the Pacific has emerged as the most dynamic region of the world, it is because it has drawn on the best practices and values from many rich civilizations, Asian and Western. If this fusion continues to work, there could be explosive creativity on a scale never before seen."⁸

There are other political scientists who do not believe that East Asian economic miracle stems from Confucian culture. They hold that Confucianism, a fairly restrictive and self-denial idea of feudal China, can not provide the inspiration or stimulus for modern capitalism.

I think that the East Asian economic miracle is precisely the final manifestation of the Neo-Authoritarian assimilation of the rational, positive and aggressive facets of Western civilization, American civilization in particular. It is the passion for growth inherent in East Asian society that drives it all along. The early-stage passion has been well-defined by Confucianism and traditional ideas. In East Asia, individualism and the freedom impulse are rationally tackled from the very beginning of modernization drive and American-style over-individualism and excessive freedom are well guarded. This precisely shows the vitality of modernized Confucianism — Confucianism in modern language and discourse — and its implication for other cultures. What I mean by modernized Confucianism denotes the best spiritual heritage of Confucianism — the harmony of man and the heaven, the harmony of men and the harmony of man and nature — without its feudal legacies and the school of thought that is best adapted to modern society.

II

If it attempts to enter into East Asia , the United States shall first have a culturally correct attitude and strategy , that is to say , it has to identify the distinctive differences between East Asian and American civilization as well as their sense of value. It may be said that with the end of the Cold War and the change of the international political structure , these differences are more manifest in the process of their interaction ; in the meantime , as the economic growth of East Asian countries and regions is accelerated , these differences endow them with new cultural assertiveness and the urge to look into their own history and culture and traditions for answers to modern problems.

In terms of cultures , such recognition on the part of the Americans is very important. The American and East Asian culture both have their traditional rationality , i.e. their own rational elements ; for a healthy culture , it should not downright refuse all these rational elements , but assimilate what is rational to enrich its culture. The American and East Asian culture , including Sino-American culture , should be complementary to each other. It is very important for a more rational world. In a broad sense , the improvement of the relations between America and East Asia , including the Sino-American relation , is , to a large extent , determined by the depth and width of such cultural exchange and fusion.

The United States regrettably takes a post-cold war imperialist posture in its East Asian policy. American centrism rises when there is only one superpower in the world. American centrism makes the American mainstream perception of value as the only criterion for world politics and social conduct and imposes it on others , regardless of the concrete historical and social scenario. Innumerable historical facts prove that it will come to no good end to impose a system of government and value of one country on other civilizations and cultures. The United States fails to recognize that the fusion of civilizations calls for historical opportunities and it is a long socio-historical

process. In the meantime, it is imperative to emphasize, too, that on the issue of the fusion of American and East Asian civilization, the East Asian countries and regions shall be on guard against post-colonial mentality, i.e. an attitude to repel American civilization indiscriminately.

The United States faces unprecedented challenges on the question of how to handle its difference with East Asian culture. I think the major differences between them lie in the following:

1. Human rights

(1) If we delve into the nucleus and depth of the question we will find the understanding of man in each culture is essentially different.

In Confucian culture, there is not such an idea as "Men are born equal". A disciple of Confucius once asked Confucius what benevolence is. Confucius replied: "It is the love for man." Menfucius also said, "Benevolence is love for man." The Confucian concept of man is not pan-cosmic. It denotes a given group of people one loves and respects just as there is the Confucian idea of "There is difference in love." In the Confucian mind, it denotes, first of all, the love for those who are most close to one. In the Confucian philosophical system, men are divided into the high (big men) and the lowly (small men), gentlemen and wild men; they are never equal. The high are virtuous and righteous while the wild men are solely bent on interest. Confucius is a philosopher who thinks that morality is the most important thing in life. So, he believes that man is born with virtue; in his philosophical system, it means that the gentlemen are born with virtue. He never thinks of the question of man's born right in its universal application.

(2) The understanding of right is different.

In Confucian culture, right is a heavenly endowment, a force of terror from on high. It is the heaven that protects the lowly. In the mind of the populace, right is mysterious and it is something not every body may have. The concept of human rights never appear in Confucianist discussions. The Three Cardinal Guides govern the relations between the ruler and the subject, the father and the son and

the husband and the wife. The rights of all social strata and their relations of dependency are thus clearly marked. Such an approach exists in the depth of thinking in the East Asian countries with Confucian traditions. So, people lack the spirit to struggle for individual rights. The Confucian idea of "benevolent rule" is an alm and grace bestowed from on high; it is not based on the principle that every man enjoys equal rights.

(3) The countries with centralized authority and the capitalist democratic countries are different in social system. The countries with a tradition of centralized power set great store by unity and consensus either in economy or in political thinking. The capitalist democratic countries believe in the Newtonian principle and make power diffused so as to protect individual freedom. This difference in the attitude of rule leads to differences on a series of issues.

(4) The rule by man and the rule by law are different. In a society where the rule by man has the political sway, people traditionally have a sense of dependency without independent personality.

We will have to recognize that universal human rights are but a lofty common ideal of human race yet to be accomplished. So far, no country can boast that their human rights record is perfect. Democracy is a long historical process. It took the United States respectively 94, 144 and 172 years to let the African Americans, women and American Indians have the right to elect by eliminating the restrictions on race, sex, property, education, age and period of residence.

The countries with strong Confucian traditions should not and will not copy American democracy. They will have to find a way for themselves for social development and human rights approach. You can not expect that the evolutionary transition will take place overnight.

As a matter of fact, changes are indeed taking place. It is necessary for the United States to take a full stock of such changes and pay due attention to them. Take China for example. Any fair-minded man will recognize the progress of human rights since the inception of the open-and-reform policy in China since 1979. The living

standards of the Chinese have since markedly improved. An average Chinese in the street may freely voice his criticism of the government and the leaders in private. The press is enjoying greater freedom and exposing all kinds of social problems, including official corruption. The Oriental Horizon, a TV daily magazine show, makes sharply-worded comments on every aspect of Chinese life which is attracting audiences in tens of millions. There are now well over one thousand newspapers. The majority of them are the so-called "small newspapers", the blooming unorthodox newspapers that report what they deem is news-worthy. The South China Weekend News, Nan Fang Zhou Mo, is one that covers such news as three policemen in Fangcheng city of Guangxi taking liberties with and illegally detained the waitresses of a small restaurant (June 14, 1996), the corruption and factional fights in the election by 45 People's Deputies of a township head in Lengshuijiang city, Hunan province (June 28, 1996), the concentration-like working conditions in a quarry in Longdou Town of Zhanjiang city, Guangdong province (June 14, 1996) and disturbances by nearly a thousand club-holding villagers who overthrew the local authorities in Sijihong Town, Yuanjiang city, Hunan province (June 14, 1996).

The Institute of Sociology of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences made two surveys from 1988 to 1990. The first survey covered 4,000 young people and the second 600. In answering a question "Freedom of speech does not mean permission of expression of reactionary ideas", 51.9% of the respondents agree, 24.3% somehow agree and 7.7% disagree. If the first category of people are added to the second, three fourths fairly agree with the official stand on the question of freedom of speech.⁹

What is noteworthy is that improvement of human rights is fairly strongly conditioned by development. Human rights are first of all the rights to survive and develop. The East Asians set great store by development, for human rights can be guaranteed only when the living standards are guaranteed. You may find this mentality even in every day greetings. When meeting a friend on the way, an average Chinese may say, "Have you had your meal?" — a

greeting an average American may presume that he is invited to a dinner. The Chinese attach greater importance to their rice bowls than to rights.

To this end, domestic political stability and social order and a congenial international economic environment are important. In the latter, the United States has a lot to do to win the confidence of the East Asians. I have taken heed of an article by the USIA on May 20, 1996 about the American human rights policy which has come to recognize that "the means by which human rights progress can be achieved necessarily must vary depending on circumstances currently prevailing in each country" and that "how difficult a task it is to achieve real and lasting human rights progress."¹⁰ This is fairly positive in American approach which smacks less of American centrism.

2. The concepts of value

On the relations between the individual and the collective, the first and second surveys of the Institute of Sociology, CASS, show that 70% of the respondents think that the collective is more important than the individual.

Asked to choose what means a good rule, 28.8% of respondents say social stability, followed by living standards (28.2%), national strength (23.2%) and international prestige (14.3%) in the first survey and the figure jumped to 48.9%, followed by economic strength (38.6%), living standards (22.9%) and democratization (12.5%) in the 1990 survey.¹¹

This is in conformity with David I. Hitchcock's study. According to his survey, 71% of Asians stand for orderly society as the first priority while only 11% of Americans believe so. 78% of Americans deem individual rights as very important while 29% of Asians think in this way.¹²

Between democracy and social stability most of the East Asian countries choose the latter. They hold that excessive individualism and democracy will lead to lack of discipline and disorder which give rise to unmarried teenage mothers, drug addiction and street violence and the high crime rate. They hope to strike a balance between democracy and discipline, between individual rights and social

rights.

The difference on the concept of value is vast between the United States and East Asia. It is wrong for the United States, a post-industrial society, to impose its value system on East Asian countries which have just come out of feudal ages. The presumptions are based on the following three points of cognition :

- a. The value system of a society is deeply rooted in its cultural traditions ;
- b. The development of the value system of a society is compatible with its social development ;
- c. Any change of such a system calls for time.

Robert D. Kaplan warned against the missionary zeal of the United States in establishing multi-party systems in the third world countries. He said, "Its rote prescription for undeveloped and newly liberated nations — elections within one year, followed by stability — is more likely to lead to chaos than to democracy."¹³

III

The United States shall have to overcome its traditional deep-rooted idealism in its approach to East Asian cultural differences. American centrism results in a guarded, even repugnant attitude from the East Asian countries and regions. This is certainly not conducive to the entry of the United States into East Asia. American centrism will at least give rise to the troubles as follows :

1. It will isolate American culture from the rest of the world and make it stand in confrontation with other civilizations ;
2. It will weaken the inherent dynamism of American culture ;
3. It will encourage blind optimism at home and make the Americans unaware of its negative factors such as the problems arising from over-individualism and excessive freedom ;
4. It will fuel domestic arrogance and complacency which is just one of the major reasons for the decline and fall of many an empire in history ;
5. The political rashness in the style of an American footballer

and frequent sanctions will trigger the repugnance of East Asian intelligentsia. For example in China, according to a survey in May of 1995 by China Youth News and the Chinese Youth Development Foundation in the wake of the tiresome and annually repeated debate on China's MFN status, the permission by the United States of the visit to America by Lee Teng-hui, the obstruction by the United States to the entry of China into the WTO and economic sanctions, the respondents who have no good opinion of America account for 57.2% and those who rank the United States as the most unfriendly country account for an overwhelming majority of 87.1%. The difference of opinions is not great between people with different educational backgrounds though people with post-graduate education and above show markedly less repugnance against the United States than those with university education and lower. The survey says that more people feel that the United States is turning to contain China from becoming a prosperous, rich and strong country. It says, "Some of the respondents note that they become more aware of American hegemonism and come to sympathize with the small and weak nations when the United States practises an interventionist policy in the post-cold war world." The survey by the Research Center of Chinese Youth in June to October of 1994 showed that 31.3% respondents think that the United States is the most unfriendly nation to China. The percentage jumped by 25.9% in the 1995 survey. The China Youth News commented "As China is a great nation with a history of 5,000 years, its brilliant civilization has its own value system and identity. It is a natural reaction of the Chinese youth to the unfriendly activity of a nation, and showed an awareness of Chinese assertiveness."¹⁴

A survey among 2,000 young people in Beijing, Shanghai, Shandong, Sichuan, Anhui and Jiangsu from November through December of 1995 by the Chinese Youth Research Center shows that 83.8% of the young respondents say that the United States is ill-intentioned in its criticism of human rights status in China. Among the university students the percentage rises to as high as 89.3%, considerably higher than the working youths (72.2%). 86.9% of

the respondents believe that American criticism of human rights is virtually interfering with China's internal policy. The figure runs as high as 91.8% among the university students, higher than the young workers (79.9%).¹⁵

To deal well with the cultural challenges in East Asia, the United States has to have a mature and consistent strategy which focuses on acknowledging the cultural differences and works to narrow such cultural differences. So, the United States has to take heed of the points as follows:

1. The United States shall have to separate ideology from trade and de-politicize the human rights issue. Constant threats of sanctions based on differences over value-related questions will only bring negative effects. They will hurt the mind of the elites of a nation in particular as I have elaborated above. For instance in China, the annual review of China's MFN status on the basis of American ideas on human rights, among other things, is fairly hurting to the Chinese. It is imperative, I presume, for American pragmatism to meet and accommodate Chinese pragmatism — a common ground — for better relations in the 21st century just as the Chinese describe it as “from a strategically higher plane”. Pragmatism is part and parcel of American value. It should heartily accommodate Chinese pragmatism (seeking truth from facts), the soul of Chinese reform, to exclude all kinds of problems arising from cultural differences on their way to better relations.

2. The United States shall have to establish a formal double-deck “superhighway” (top level and nongovernmental) contact pattern, so to speak, with the East Asian countries and regions. The top-level contact may be in the forms of regular forums and political dialogues (including formal and private dialogue) between national leaders, members of parliament or cabinet ministers; and the non-governmental contact pattern covers bilateral or multilateral meetings and seminars among social scientists — the elites of nations involved, to promote mutual understanding and find common basis such as the annual Kettering symposium with the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Such a double-deck contact pattern may serve as a

vehicle to relieve tension , dispel misunderstanding and lubricate the bilateral relations. David Lampton , the Chairman of the National Committee on United States-China Relations has been well aware of this. He said that it was imperative to strengthen forums and institutions that link up China , the United States and the other Asia-Pacific countries to promote their mutual understanding , transparency and mutual dependence.¹⁶ American former President George Bush emphasized at an international business conference that exchange of visits between leaders is perhaps very important , and there should be more discussions and less confrontation.¹⁷ Michel Oksenberg holds that the American and Chinese leaders shall establish their common understanding through continuous and extensive meetings.¹⁸

3. The United States shall have to recognize that all social changes and evolutions hinge on the maturity of the forces in the society itself. It shall have to acknowledge a pluralistic world in cultural views and the sense of value and accommodate experimentations in social and political reforms according to the given social , political and traditional scenario of a society. The success or failure of these experimentations alike will be of positive importance to enriching the human culture and the understanding of mankind. Political scientists are well aware that the current Western democracy has its own flaws and is not perfect. There is an erratic view in the U.S.A. , i.e. the so-called Wilsonism. This traditional attitude of foreign policy shows that the United States wishes the other countries will adopt the American-styled pattern of democratic administration. It maintains that all countries shall have to copy its system and all societies will evolve naturally and historically into a democratic society like in America. Such a mentality makes it impossible for the United States to accept the pluralist principle and the fact that other social forms and cultures may have some vitality and dynamism. Here appears a special politico-cultural phenomenon , i.e. , the pluralist America can not accept a pluralist world. East Asia is traditionally pluralist with the co-existence of Buddhism (Mahayana and Hinayana , the Great and Little Vehicle) and Islamism. Indonesia with the biggest population of Islam believers and Malaysia with the

most successful economy are all in East Asia. The pluralist East Asia is undoubtedly a challenge to Anglo-Saxon Christian America in terms of ideas and practice.

4. It is important to recognize that the social development in East Asia calls for an evolutionary process. Foreign investment and trade not only brings capital but also new ideas. Only when such new ideas are merged with local culture can they help promote the progress of local society and politics. According to the study by Yoichi Funabashi, most Asian political leaders maintain that the most desirable mode of democratization emerges spontaneously from economic growth, which sparks political consciousness among a middle class.¹⁹ Kishore Mahbubani holds, "The explosion of two-way trade and investment cannot leave the two cultural universes across the Pacific intact. Over time a fusion will take place. When such fusion is perceived by the American body politic as positive and reinvigorating, it will strengthen America's commitment to the region's security."²⁰ Economic liberalization will give birth to a prosperous and liberal middle-class and trigger off a change in East Asia's agricultural society and in the perception of value, laying a foundation for more open and wider representative politics. In terms of confidence building measures (cbms), the best framework is the APEC, through which trade fusion will lead to cultural fusion. I believe that this is the pattern in which America will be able to enter East Asia culturally.

5. The United States should try to find common ground in the perception of value and will not impose its own perception of value on others.

When Bill Clinton administration first entered the White House, it made "promotion of democracy" as one of the three pillars in its foreign policy. Anthony Lake, the National Security Advisor, further expounded in September of 1993 the strategy of enlargement as America's foreign policy point of departure in a world without a clearly defined order. In his opinion, it is surely the strategy of enlargement that may substitute the strategy of containment. He said that the strategy of enlargement means enlarging the free society

composed of democracies that practise free market economy. The core of the strategy of enlargement is to expand the influence of American democracy. This is an outspoken manifestation of Wilsonism in American foreign policy.

In the early period, the Bill Clinton administration did not have a very clear idea about the difference between American civilization and East Asian civilization. Its East Asia policy, especially its China policy, lacked consistency and long-term strategic consideration. It was piece-meal oft with an individual incident affecting the whole scenario of relations between East Asia and America, the scenario of relations between China and America in particular. It was bent on making use of all possible means to play arbitrarily its leading role and promote American-style democracy in the world. It took no heed of cultural and social differences. It failed to recognize that each country must try to find its own way, based on the history, economic situation and culture of each.

Some American scholars pointed out that it is very dangerous for America to bring open pressure to bear on others by linking such problems as labor, environment and human rights with possible trade sanctions. In a recent TV interview, Bill Clinton expressed his agreement with such views. The United States should know how to walk in steps with East Asia and in the East Asian way in the latter's endeavor to march towards its goal. For the United States, it is very important to try to cooperate with, instead of confronting, other nations and develop multilateral relations.

Harry Harding criticized the antagonistic style of American diplomacy which, he said, makes the United States appear like an international baby-sitter if not a despot. He maintains that the Clinton administration should adopt a practical policy on the matter of human rights in Asia. He believes that economic sanctions are ineffective and counter-productive. He suggests that some other measures as expanding academic and cultural interflow, enhancing international radio broadcasts, encouraging non-governmental organizations and supporting the market-oriented reforms be adopted. I think what Harry Harding suggests is the correct way for the fusion

between American culture and East Asian culture.

6. The United States should learn from East Asian civilization. Wise American scholars have discerned the structural deficiencies in American civilization and believe that to make up for such structural deficiency, American civilization must draw on wisdom from East Asian civilization in the 21st century. They show particular interest in the "cultural equilibrium" or cultural harmony in East Asia and maintain that America should learn how to strike a balance between rugged individualism and group needs and between materialism and spirit and between discipline and freedom. Just as David Popenoe points out that the United States could find many more commonalities with East Asia through joint consideration of social change and changing values, East and West. He believes that the over-individualistic United States has moved too far from social order and cultural harmony. He holds that as Asia moves toward somewhat greater individualism, perhaps the United States will adjust, at least slightly, toward more "collective values."² 1 This is a mutual adaptation and accommodation and a more rational behavior in the interaction of human civilizations. In this process there is no room for clashes of civilizations. George Bush, the former U.S. president, said in a speech at a Citibank seminar in Hong Kong that the Americans often say what others may learn from them and talk much about the free market and its democratic system. However, he added, the world is changing and when power and financial strength is diffused, the Americans should and must learn from the Asians. He concluded that it is precisely what is the most hopeful of the time.² 2

In a word, the United States will be able to have good relations with East Asia only when it is ready and fully recognizes the differences between East Asian civilization and American civilization.

Notes

¹ USIA Washington Bulletin, October 24, 1994.

² USIA New York Bulletin, November 1, 1994.

³ USIA Washington Bulletin, November 4, 1994.

⁴ Ronald Brown, speech at the Luncheon of the Asian Annual Meeting in New York on

November 1 ,1993 .

⁵ Kishore Mahbubani ,“The Pacific Way ,” *Foreign Affairs* , January/February 1995 , p.100 .

⁶ *ibid.*

⁷ Yoichi Funabashi , “The Asianization of Asia.” *Foreign Affairs* , November/December 1993 , p.79 .

⁸ Kishore Mahbubani , *op. cit.* p.107

⁹ The Institute of Sociology , CASS , *Study on the Generational Evolutions of the Concepts of Value of Chinese Youth* (Beijing Publishing House ,1993) , p.128 .

¹⁰ USIA Bulletin , “Backgrounder : U . S. Policy on Human Rights ,” May 20 ,1996 .

¹¹ *Study on the Generational Evolutions of the Concepts of Value of Chinese Youth* , p. 140 .

¹² David Hitchcock , *Asian Values & the United States* , the Center for Strategic and International Studies , (Washington D . C . , 1994) , p.22 .

¹³ *International Herald Tribune* , January 1 , 1996 .

¹⁴ *Chinese Youth News* , July 22 , 1995 ; the survey by the Chinese Youth and Youngsters Research Center was carried in *Chinese Youth News* , January 21 , 1995 , p.2 .

¹⁵ Wu Luping , “The U . S . A . in the Eyes of Chinese Youth ,” *Chinese Youth News* , May 11 , 1996 .

¹⁶ *Christian Science Monitor* , February 21 of 1995 .

¹⁷ AP news dispatch from Beijing on September 11 , 1995

¹⁸ *Washington Post* , September 3 of 1995 .

¹⁹ Yoichi Funabashi , *op. cit.* p.76 .

²⁰ Kishore Mahbubani , *op.cit.* , p.108 .

²¹ Quoted from David Hitchcock , *Asian Values and the United States* , the Center for Strategic and International Studies , (Washington D . C .) , pp.28 - 29 .

²² Speech at the Citibank seminar on November 17 , 1993 .

AMERICAN MISSIONARIES AND THE TREND OF “OPENING EYES TO OBSERVE THE WORLD” IN CHINA AFTER THE OPIUM WAR

WANG Lixin

In the decade that followed the Opium War , while most Chinese muddle-headed , conceited literati were still indulging blindly in the myth that China was “the supreme empire” and knew little of what was going on in the rest of the world , a new trend began to appear among some Chinese thinkers. Lin Zexu , Wei Yuan , Xu Jishe , Liang Tingnan and several other intellectuals wishing to study the art of government in order to help rule the country started to take an interest in the situation abroad. They set to compile a number of foreign historical and geographical books with the intention of “opposing the barbarian states ,” i.e. , resisting Western aggression , through getting to know the outside world first. This ideological inclination , entirely different from the blind opposition to everything foreign and closing China's doors to the rest of the world , was the tendency of the times and generally referred to as the trend of “opening eyes to observe the world.” A Gazetteer of Four Continents (Si-Zhou-Zhi) , a collection of translations organized by Lin Zexu , the Illustrated Treatise on the Countries Overseas (Hai-Guo-Tu-Zhi) compiled by Wei Yuan , A Brief Survey of the Maritime Circuit (Ying-Huan-Zhi-Lue) compiled by Xu Jishe and Four Treatises on the Countries Overseas (Hai-Guo-Si-Shuo) compiled by Liang Tingnan , to mention just the four main works , reflect this tendency.

The thinkers of “opening eyes to observe the world ,” under the condition that China had all along closed its doors to other coun-

tries and was ignorant of the world situation, turned their eyes from China to countries overseas, enlightened their countrymen with fairly systematic accounts of world powers and helped them to see a widely different civilization and considerably change their outlook on the world. This marked the beginning of the Chinese people's knowing, and going to, the world and the Chinese thinkers shaking off the tradition and embracing modernity. Its influence lasted for half a century.

A question arises: Where did the material for these books come from? In other words, through what channels did Lin Zexu, Wei Yuan, Xu Jishe and Liang Tingnan obtain the latest knowledge of the outside world? Researches show that they got them, directly or indirectly, mainly from Protestant missionaries in Guangzhou, Macao and four trading ports which opened later. While banning opium-smoking and opium trade in Guangzhou, Lin Zexu called together some people to translate articles from foreign newspapers published in Guangzhou, Macao and the South Sea islands and compiled with them *A Gazetteer of Four Continents*. These newspapers were mostly run by foreign missionaries. The *Illustrated Treatise on the Countries Overseas* used, apart from some material in *A Gazetteer of Four Continents*, mainly the writings of European and American missionaries as well. *A Brief Survey of the Maritime Circuit* borrowed heavily from the interviews with the American missionaries David Abeel (Ya-Pi-Li) and W. H. Gummings (Gan-Ming) and the British consul in Xiamen. This article will analyze the function of the American missionaries in the formation of the thought of "opening eyes to observe the world" through studying their activities in China around the Opium War.

I. American Missionaries - Efforts to Run Cultural Undertakings and Publish Newspapers and Books in China Before the Second Opium War

China, knowing nothing about the West before the Opium War, held itself as “the supreme empire” in the world and regarded the Western countries as barbarian states. This, foreign missionaries thought, was the fundamental cause of China’s closing its doors to the rest of the world. Therefore, soon after they began to flow into China since 1807, they set to promote cultural undertakings with the aim to throw open China’s doors. They proclaimed that they would introduce “the richest fruits of modern inventions and discoveries” and other Western knowledge to the Chinese people and force open China’s tightly closed doors with the “intellectual artillery.” On November 29, 1834, the foreign merchants, missionaries and consuls in Guangzhou organized the “Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge in China (Zai-Hua-Shi-Yong-Zhi-Shi-Chuan-Bo-Hui),” declaring that it would publish such books as might enlighten the minds of the Chinese and communicate to them the arts and sciences of the West¹; for this was an excellent way to show that they were indeed no barbarians.² To give their own civilization its due, this more or less accounts for the true objective of their setting up the society. E. C. Bridgman (Pi-Zhi-Wen), the first missionary ever sent by the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Mission (Gong-Li-Hui) to China to spread Christianity, became its Chinese secretary responsible for handling daily affairs. Later, he was joined by another missionary from the board, Peter Parker (Bo-Jia). The society’s main work was publishing *A General Monthly Record Examining Foreign Countries of the East and West* (Dong-Xi-Yang-Kao-Mei-Yue-Tong-Ji-Chuan) and Bridgman’s book *A Brief Account of America* (Mei-Li-Ge-Guo-Zhi-Lue).

A General Monthly Record Examining Foreign Countries of the East and West started publication in July 1833 in Guangzhou and

put out its last issue in 1837 , with altogether 4 volumes to its credit. It was the first foreign magazine in Chinese printed on the territory of China. A Prussian missionary named D. F. A. Gutzlaff (Guo-Shi-La) was the originator of the magazine. With the founding of the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge in China , the magazine was put in its charge and run jointly by Gutzlaff and Bridgman , with the latter being the main contributing editor. To force open China's doors with the "intellectual artillery," the monthly carried a great number of articles to impart the geographical knowledge of many countries , especially Western colonies in South and Southeast Asia , such as Sumatra , Singapore , Java , Siam and India. The contributors tried to prove that it was inevitable that these areas should be turned into the colonies of such European countries as Prussia , Portugal , France , Holland , Britain and Russia. In his *Illustrated Treatise on the Countries Overseas* , Wei Yuan quoted heavily from this magazine.

A *Brief Account of America* was written by Gao Liwen (the Chinese pen name of Bridgman) . It was first published in Singapore in 1838 . Well received in Guangzhou and other trading ports after the Opium War , Bridgman made some revisions and published a second edition of it in Hong Kong in 1844 under the new title *A Brief Illustrated Treatise on the United States of America* (Ya-Mei-Li-Ge-He-Sheng-Guo-Tu-Zhi-Lue) . As Wei Yuan and Xu Jishe frequently quoted and made reference to the book in their *Illustrated Treatise on the Countries Overseas* and *A Brief Survey of the Maritime Circuit* respectively , its influence grew day by day. Bridgman published a third edition of the book in Shanghai in 1861 under the title *A Brief Account of the United States of America* (Lian-Bang-Zhi-Lue) . This new edition contained a lot of revisions and included many maps and statistical charts.

Bridgman said he wrote the book for the purpose of propagating American civilization and culture to remedy China's ignorance. This was a translation of the words he used in the "Introduction" of the book :

"I was born in Massachusetts of the United States. . . . I met

some Chinese in Malacca and Singapore and studied the Chinese language for 7 to 8 years. I found that Chinese do not like traveling far, have seen or heard nothing of the splendor and magnitude of the Western countries and know not the existence of the 9 continents beyond the seas or the cause of God. I was stricken with the idea of spreading these knowledge and teachings to them so as to unite people in the 4 seas into one family. Shallow though I am, I have made the global and American maps with names in Chinese and presented an account of the events and customs of these countries. I wonder how those deigning to read it will react when it finally finds its way into China years later: Whether they will beat time with their hands to show their appreciation, or tear it into pieces and burn it, considering it badly organized! But judging by the readers I see here, I might not be laughed at for the book's dealing with only one country.”³

The book consists of four parts:

Part One, consisting of the 1st paragraph, tells how America was discovered.

Part Two, made up of the 2nd and 3rd paragraphs, relates the geographical position of America, its neighboring countries, the colonialist activities of Britain, France and Holland in North America, the British-French war for seizing colonies, Britain's plunder of its North American colonies, the Declaration of Independence, the Constitutional Convention called in Philadelphia and the terms of office of US presidents from George Washington to Martin Van Buren.

Part Three describes how the 18 states joining the confederation came into being, their geographical position, climate, main cities, population, products, commerce and bureaucratic establishments, and the life and customs of the Indians in western America.

Part Four narrates America's population growth, mountains, rivers, climate, products, machinery, foreign trade, political and judicial systems, charitable institutions, education, military affairs, marriage system, dressing and ornaments, customs and food.

A Brief Account of the United States of America is a historical

and geographical book. But Bridgman went out of his way to describe in great detail the excellence of America's political system, the goodness of its rites, music, education and social customs and the briskness of its commercial activities. His purpose was clearly to prove that America, by no means a country in the outer fringes of civilization that can be excluded from consideration, is a prosperous and powerful state growing up under the influence of the advanced Western Christian civilization. The book introduced to China for the first time the Western democratic system and enlightened in many ways the Chinese intellectuals seeking ways to enable China to stand on its own feet and resist foreign aggression.

With regard to America's political system, Bridgman wrote that all leading personnel in the political organs from the bottom to the top are elected. In the local political power, "each state has a governor, vice-governor and an indefinite number of members of the state assembly. Over 10 or scores of people are elected to sit on the state assembly. Each state has a capitol, where the governor, vice-governor and assembly members discuss local affairs. All questions, big and small, must be deliberated by them and carried out after agreement has been reached, by at least 60 per cent of them if not unanimously. The officials of each state are chosen by the people of that state."

In the central government, there is a president and a vice-president, who are also elected. "The president collects taxes from the states each year as the revenue of the country. He is given an official annual salary of 22,000 US dollars and in no position to use the public funds at will. No one less than 35 years of age or born outside America can be elected to this post. His term of office is four years. Upon its expiration, an election will be held to choose a new president. He may be elected for a second term, if no suitable man can be found to replace him. In case he passes away or resigns before the term lapses, the vice-president will take over his office."

Then comes the organization of the US Congress. The book deals in detail the election of the members of the Senate and the House of Representatives, their terms of office, limits of authority

and work. “Each state elects 2 persons to the capital to form the Senate and several persons to form the House of Representatives. On the first Monday of December each year, the Congress meets in the Capitol. The Senate, with 2 members from each state, has 52 members, while the House of Representatives has 243. The term of office for senators is 6 years, and one-third of the senators are re-elected every 2 years. Persons less than 30 years of age are not eligible to be members. The minimum age for members of the House of Representatives is 25, and their term of office is 2 years. An election will be held upon the expiration of their office. The members gather on the first Monday of December each year to deliberate such state affairs as agriculture, employment, conscription, trade, awards and punishments, appointing and accepting envoys and infrastructure building.”

About the US judicial system, the book defines the function of the judiciary as “finding out why people are not abided by law.” It gives a brief account of the organization of the supreme court, appellate court, circuit court and district court as well as the jury system.

The book touches upon the “Separation of Power”, saying that “a judge can not serve as a legislator, and a legislator can not be concurrently a judge either,” and that “if a judge tries a case unfairly, the president can put him right.”⁴

The book also relates the authority of the Congress, the federal system and the system of separation of power.

Bridgman represented the United States as a democratic society governed by law. His purpose was to extol and propagate its political and social system. Though it was hardly possible that China of that time would copy this system, his description easily struck a responsive chord in the hearts of Chinese intellectuals, as the Western democratic spirit has something in common with the Confucian concept of people being of fundamental importance in a country, the autocracy in the late Qing Dynasty was beset with serious problems and the officialdom was corrupt to the extreme. Wei Yuan's affirmation of the “election,” Xu Jishe's admiration of George Washington for his “not overstepping his authority and not passing on the

presidency to his descendants” and Liang Tingnan’s esteem for America because “its law does not change with the change of leaders” all show that Bridgman’s work had great influence on the Chinese intellectuals of the time.

Bridgman spared no efforts to stress the role of technological knowledge and mechanized production in economic development: “Work can not proceed well if there is sufficient man power but no materials, or if there is sufficient man power and materials but no knowledge. Only when all of the three are present, can products be turned out.” By knowledge, he meant science and technology and the industrial art. Bridgman discussed the relationship of the 3 factors with the intention of persuading China to employ Westerners to solve the question of lacking “knowledge” and to do foreign trade to get “materials.” He maintained that China was “unable to carry on” “without knowledge, though it has man power.” The United States, he said, “is different; it invites foreign intellectuals to help if it has the materials but no knowledge, or import materials from abroad if it has the knowledge but not the materials. When it has the knowledge and materials but no man power, it borrows the strength of materials to generate thermal and hydraulic power and utilize draught animals.” He then used the ginning, spinning and weaving machines to illustrate the benefits of machine production. He also wrote that the United States “has a thriving trade with other countries” and that it “has only a few taxes, exacting not much from either import or export,” so its trade “is getting brisker and brisker.”⁵ Bridgman, in fact, pointed out in this book the role of learning from foreign countries, foreign trade and large-scale machine production in developing modern economy. These ideas, though stubbornly opposed by the Qing government, enlightened Wei Yuan, Xu Jishe and others and later became the main content of the new policy for self-survival of the Westernization group. From Bridgman’s narration, we can roughly detect the policy towards foreign powers advocated by Wei Yuan in his *Illustrated Treatise on the Countries Overseas*: “Learning the superior technologies of the barbarian states” and developing foreign trade. Some commentators

held that Bridgman offered the Chinese readers a simple and practical guideline for developing the modern economy.⁶

Under the pen of Bridgman, the United States is a country with not only a glorious history, perfect system and abundant products, but also good rites, music, education and social customs. Its “prohibiting begging,” “procuring teachers to run schools,” “training the dumb and deaf,” “practicing leniency in prisons,” “forbidding excessive drinking,”⁷ good wedding custom and livelihood all show that America is a highly civilized nation.

Chinese intellectuals thought highly of *A Brief Account of America*. Wang Tao said the book “covers the events of the country since its founding and records all of its systems. Its method should be adopted in compiling Chinese history books.”⁸ Liang Qichao included it in his *Bibliography of Western Learning* (*Xi-Xue-Shu-Mu-Biao*), alleging that one must read it if he wanted to acquaint himself with the Western history and geography.

Over long, long years, Chinese people’s knowledge of, and interests in, the West had been concentrated on the ethnological differences between the Easterners and Westerners and the latter’s strange customs; all else were beneath their notice. They took delight in talking about the Westerners “cat-like eyes, eagle beak of a mouth, red hair, white face and great stature,” regarding them savages and coming to form a deep-rooted self-conceit. However, the United States revealed to them by Bridgman was a rich and developed country with a great civilization. *A Brief Account of America* shows that China is not the only rational existence on earth. Independent of it, there is another world no worse than China in civilization and social customs. In fact, Bridgman challenged the idea of “the supreme empire,” which had been in slumber for thousands of years. Once the myth about this perfect “supreme empire” was blown up, doubts and even opposition to the feudal system would probably ensue.

After 1842, preaching Christianity in the trading ports became legal, and, in addition to Guangzhou, 5 other port cities—Hong Kong, Xiamen, Fuzhou, Ningbo and Shanghai—were also made

trading ports. European and American missionaries left the South Sea islands and Macao one after another and poured into these ports to open churches, run cultural undertakings and publish newspapers and books. Among these ports, Ningbo had the largest amount of American missionary educational and publishing institutions. Many publications of the American Southern Presbyterian Union (Chang-Lao-Hui) and the Chinese and American Holy Class Book Establishment (Hua-Hua-Sheng-Jing-Shu-Fang) were very popular with Chinese intellectuals at the time.

The Chinese and American Holy Class Book Establishment was established in Macao on February 23, 1844 and moved to Ningbo on July 19, 1845. It published many books before 1860, as can be seen from the following table⁹:

Year	1844	1845	1846	1847	1848	1849	1850	1851
Copies	39500	7000		52734	164893	75850	66400	
Pages			635400	1819092	3994358	1724700	3000000	
Year	1852	1853	1854	1855	1856	1857	1858	1859
Copies		82000	84700	112018		110800		
Pages		2800000	4012800	4602018		4505600	6175460	7398560

Most of these publications were tracts and sermons, and some were books of astronomy, geography, almanac, meteorology, languages and customs. In the Illustrated Treatise on the Countries Overseas, Wei Yuan cited a lot of material from these books, especially from World Geography with Illustrations (Di-Qiu-Tu-Shuo), A Peaceful Almanac (Ping-An-Tong-Shu) and Astronomy: Questions and Answers (Tian-Wen-Wen-Da).

A. World Geography with Illustrations: The author of this book was Richard Quanterman Way. He was in charge of the Chinese and American Holy Class Book Establishment for some time and founded a missionary school in Ningbo, the forerunner of the Zhi-jiang University in Hangzhou. The first edition was published in 1848, and the second, 1856, under the new title of A Concise World Geography (Di-Qiu-Shuo-Lue). The original copy of World Geography with Illustrations is not available, but its text can be found in the 12th folder of the Geographical Collection of the Xiao-

fanghu Study (Xiao-Fang-Hu-Zhai-Yu-Di-Cong-Chao). It is a concise world geography giving a general account of the 5 continents, and the geographical position, population, products, culture, customs and religions of the main countries and areas. Detailed discussions are given to Britain, France, the United States and other European powers. The book reads smoothly and contains a lot of illustrations.

About the United States, it says, “The country has many schools, and all its boys and girls, rich and poor, are admitted. It therefore has more students than any other country. It has several printing presses, which print thousands of copies of newspapers everyday and publish many books.”¹⁰ Richard Quanterman Way was, in fact, criticizing the Qing court for prohibiting girls from going to school and paying little attention to develop newspapers.

The book describes the American presidential government: “The country has no king; its president, with a term of office of 4 years, performs the duty of ruling the people. The laws are made by the elite of various states at meetings in the capital and not dictated by any sovereign. The presidency can not be inherited. No qualifications are set for candidates, and any virtuous personage can run for the position. When the term of office of the president expires, several representatives elected by each state will gather in the capital and write down the name of the person they have chosen on a piece of paper and put it in a box. The box is opened later, and the one gets most of the votes will succeed the outgoing president as the new president.”¹¹ Brief as it was, the introduction sounded like a fantastic tale to Chinese long cut off from the rest of the world and was a strange talk even to Wei Yuan and others looking at the world with wide open eyes.

Way did not forget his mission of spreading Christianity while writing this book. He reprimanded Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism in China “for being guilty of erecting idols and worshipping them on bent knees and spreading the fallacy of transmigration to mislead the benighted people.”¹²

B. A Peaceful Almanac: This book was written by Davie Bethune McCartee (Mai-Jia-Di), a doctor of medicine and missionary and physician of the American Southern Presbyterian Union. He

came to China in 1844 and wrote the book in 1850 through 1853 while spreading Christianity in Ningbo, finishing one volume of it each year, and completing 4 volumes altogether. Published by the Chinese and American Holy Class Book Establishment of the American Southern Presbyterian Union, the book deals mainly with the astrological and meteorological knowledge, such as the earth, eclipses of the sun and the moon, divisions of the solar year, Western almanac and tidal waves. It contains plenty of illustrations.

C. Astronomy : Questions and Answers : Authored by Andrew Patton Happer, this book deals with topography; the global map; the basis for the assertion that the earth is round; the shapes of the sun and moon; eclipses; the formation of rainbow; rain, thunder, wind and other natural phenomena; planets and stars; and solar, earth and universal gravitation. It also includes some geographical and physical knowledge. This is the first book in Chinese giving a systematic account of the modern astrology.

Before the second Opium War, the American missionaries works in Chinese (written on the South Sea islands and in Macao and the 5 trading ports) revealed an entirely new world to Chinese intellectuals, enabling them to see a civilization totally different from the traditional Chinese civilization. Once this new knowledge was accepted by Chinese intellectuals, in other words, once they stopped looking at the world and the various countries in it from the "height" of "the supreme empire," a revolutionary change would occur. The significance lies not so much in the fact that they had increased the geographical and scientific knowledge and widened their horizon, as in the fact that they acknowledged that civilizations other than China's own did exist. As a matter of fact, the works of Xu Jishe and other Chinese writers exhibited more or less a vague cultural polyphyletism, and the sprout of this polyphyletism marks exactly the beginning of China's walking out of the Middle Ages and marching into the modern epoch.

II. American Missionaries and the Illustrated Treatise on the Countries Overseas

The Illustrated Treatise on the Countries Overseas was completed in 1842 and had altogether 50 volumes. It was expanded to 60 volumes in 1847 and 100 volumes in 1852. Wei Yuan wrote about the sources of the material cited in his book: “One of the sources is A Gazetteer of Four Continents, which is a collection of translations organized by Lin Zexu, Governor of Guangdong and Guangxi Provinces. The other is the annals of various dynasties, the histories of the islands since the Ming Dynasty, and foreign charts, pictures and books by foreigners in recent years. The material was brought together, sorted out, edited and turned into a systematic account.”¹³ The “books by foreigners” coming to China around the Opium War, in particular, helped make the Illustrated Treatise on the Countries Overseas an excellent cartographic writing. These books included mainly A Brief Account of America by Bridgman, World Geography with Illustrations by Richard Quanterman Way, A Peaceful Almanac by Davie Bethune McCartee, A General Monthly Record Examining Foreign Countries of the East and West run jointly by Bridgman and the Prussian missionary D. F. A. Gutzlaff, A Geographical Reference Book (Di-Li-Bei-Kao) by the Portuguese Maches (Ma-Ji-Si) and A Concise History of Foreign Countries (Wai-Guo-Shi-Lue) by the British missionary Robert Morrison (Ma-Li-Xun). Wei Yuan, in fact, put “the reason why the Illustrated Treatise on the Countries Overseas differs from other foreign historical and geographical books” clearly in “The Original Introduction” of the book. “The other books are all comments on foreign countries by Chinese,” he wrote, “while this one is made up of comments on Western countries by Westerners.”¹⁴ A Gazetteer of Four Continents is a collection of translations and also belongs to “books by foreigners” strictly speaking. In the numerous “comments on Western countries by Westerners,” Wei Yuan thought most highly of A Geographical Reference Book and A Brief Account

of America apart from *A Gazetteer of Four Continents*, saying in “The Introduction at the End of the Book” that the two books were “painstaking works of men of letters in that country, and, as they have taken hold of the key link, everything else has fallen into its proper place.”¹⁵ In fact, Wei Yuan cited mostly from the writings of missionaries and other Westerners in introducing foreign countries, especially the Western nations.

Bridgman's *A Brief Account of America* is the most important source of material with regard to the part of the United States in *The Illustrated Treatise on the Countries Overseas*. In citing the material about other countries, Wei Yuan generally put that from *A Gazetteer of Four Continents* first and added the words “written by a European, translated by Lin Zexu and recompiled by Wei Yuan” below. In introducing the United States, however, he put the material from *A Brief Account of America* foremost under the heading “A General Account of America, Part A (Mi-Li-Jian-Guo-Zong-Ji-Shang),” which was followed by material from *A Gazetteer of Four Continents* under “A General Account of America, Part B (Mi-Li-Jian-Guo-Ji-Yu-Nai-Shi-Die-Guo-Zong-Ji-Zhong),” and put last of all the material from *World Geography with Illustrations, A Geographical Reference Book, A Concise History of Foreign Countries* and *A Brief Survey of the Maritime Circuit* under “A General Account of America, Part C (Mi-Li-Jian-Guo-Zong-Ji-Xia).” Wei Yuan explained, “According to the set order, original writings should precede the material compiled. I put material from *A Brief Account of America* first here because it was written by an American and concentrated on the main points.”¹⁶

Some scholar pointed out that Wei Yuan included most of *A Brief Account of America* in his *Illustrated Treatise on the Countries Overseas*.¹⁷ I compared the text in the 100-volume *Illustrated Treatise on the Countries Overseas* with that in the *Geographical Collection of the Xiaofanghu Study* and found that Wei Yuan included the entire text, not “most of” it, in the *Illustrated Treatise on the Countries Overseas*, with just a few omissions or cancellations:

Part One of *A Brief Account of America* has been changed into “A General Account of the Development of the Continent of America

(Mo-Li-Jia-Zhou-Yan-Ge-Zong-Shuo)” in the 59th volume of the Illustrated Treatise on the Countries Overseas. Part Two and Part Four of the book have become “A General Account of America, Part A” in the same volume. Part Three have been divided into two sections: “The 20 Eastern American States (Mi-Li-Jian-Guo-Dong-Lu-Er-Shi-Bu)” in Vol. 59 and “The 11 Western American States (Mi-Li-Jian-Guo-Xi-Bu-Shi-Yi-Bu)” in Vol. 63.

Besides, “Miscellaneous Notes on Western Utensils and Arts (Xi-Yang-Qi-Yi-Zha-Zhi)” in Vol. 94 of the Illustrated Treatise on the Countries Overseas has 2 paragraphs about books, newspapers, almanacs and languages of Western countries. Wei Yuan said they were copied from A Brief Account of America. But it can not be found in the Geographical Collection of the Xiaofanghu Study, which includes the entire text of the book. I suspect they were from A Brief Illustrated Treatise on the United States of America, which is the second edition of A Brief Account of America. The first paragraph talks about the forms, numbers of copies printed, content, varieties and prices of Western newspapers and journals and notices that the Western almanacs “have no particular days of good or ill luck and no particular things suitable or not suitable for doing on certain days.” The second paragraph makes a comparison of the languages of various countries and comments on the merits of the 26-letter English alphabet, saying that “they can make up any amount of words and be used to write huge volumes of books, and even small children can learn these letters.”¹⁸ That is the earliest remark about the English language recorded in books by Chinese scholars.

Wei Yuan made practically no comments in citing A Brief Account of America, but from the entire Illustrated Treatise on the Countries Overseas, one can detect the enlightenments A Brief Account of America gave him.

Wei Yuan took a great interest in the United States defeating Britain in the American War of Independence. He wrote his book right after the end of the Opium War and was feeling keenly the humiliation of China's defeat. To him, America's victory was undoubtedly commendable. He wrote with feeling that “America had no monarch of great ability but only 27 loose states and hundreds of thousands of people. Indignant at the wolfish conducts of Britain,

they rose with a common hatred for the enemy and fought the British like one person. They fortified the defense works, left nothing usable to the oppressors as they retreated, cut the enemy's routes of supply and finally defeated the powerful Britain. They were very brave indeed!" The strategy the Americans used started Wei Yuan's idea of "playing one barbarian state against another." He likened it to the stratum of "associating with the distant countries and attacking the near ones" used in China's Spring and Autumn period (770-476 BC) and Warring States period (475 - 221 BC) and called it a "wise" decision. "France pioneered North America; the barbarian state Britain seized it; and America drove out Britain in indignation with the help of France. America and France are, therefore, hostile to Britain, and Britain does not dare to retaliate. Befriending the distant country while attacking the enemy near home—it is truly a wise decision!"¹⁹ From the above, Wei Yuan realized that Britain, France and America have different interests.

The ideological value of the *Illustrated Treatise on the Countries Overseas* lies in Wei Yuan's approval of America's democratic system. He remarked when he first read *A Brief Account of America*, "North America has state leaders but no sovereign, and its faultless constitution will benefit generations to come," noting that it was something "never heard of throughout the history."²⁰ He also admired George Washington for "not passing the presidency to his descendants and not holding on to his post indefinitely, but having a person of virtue chosen by the public to replace him."²¹ "The country has 27 states in eastern and western America," Wei Yuan wrote, "and elects a president to exercise leadership. The president can not pass his position to his descendants and is replaced after 4 years of office. This arrangement has changed the set system in ancient and modern times, and people live a stable and harmonious life as a result. It is a fair and just practice indeed! In discussing public affairs, hearing cases and electing officials, the opinions of the people are heeded. Whatever the people say goes, and whatever they disapprove of is ruled out. All things are decided by the likes and dislikes of the people. If two-thirds of the people agree to a thing, the rest give up and join others in carrying out the decision. Even delegates at local levels are elected by the public. It is truly a well-

thought-out system !”²² Since the ancient times , it had been a matter of course that the throne should be inherited , and the appointment of officials by the monarch is likewise a time-honored practice. Wei Yuan s view that America s smashing the hereditary system of the monarch “has changed the set system in ancient and modern times” and was “a fair and just practice” and that the election of officials from below to above “is truly a well-thought-out system ” fully showed his appreciation of the American democratic system . The descriptions of the American political system in *A Gazetteer of Four Continents* and the *Illustrated Treatise on the Countries Overseas* were cited from works by Europeans. Wei Yuan s reflections must have been formed after reading *A Brief Account of America* , which is in much greater detail .

What is more , Wei Yuan regarded the United States a “friendly” country not “brutalizing China” and “doing no harm but good” to China. “ America gives Guangdong 400 ,000 a year through trade , while Europe is draining China of its money with opium . The United States , therefore , is doing no harm but good to China , whereas the barbarian nation of Britain is doing no good but harm to our country .”²³ The United States “is a rich nation spending more than a million in China each year to replenish our treasury. Rich and powerful as it is , it does not bully small nations and brutalize China and will voluntarily take up cudgels for us if something rousing popular indignation happens. It is really a friendly country !”²⁴ This , though revealing Wei Yuan s limitation in cognizance , reflected from one angle the profound influence Bridgman s works had on him . Apart from *A Brief Account of America* , the *Illustrated Treatise on the Countries Overseas* has citations from *World Geography with Illustrations* (30 paragraphs) , *A General Monthly Record Examining Foreign Countries of the East and West* (19 paragraphs) and *A Peaceful Almanac*. “On the Earth and Astronomy , V (Di-Qiu-Tian-Wen-He-Lun-Wu)” in the 100-volume edition has been cited entirely from *A Peaceful Almanac*. Wei Yuan said that “this book studies heaven and earth and has been written by McCartee of America .” He cited 12 paragraphs and included in his book 10 astronomical charts²⁵ but made no comments .

III. Bridgman and On the United States by Liang Tingnan

On the United States (He-Sheng-Guo-Shuo) is one of the 4 constituent parts of Liang Tingnan's Four Treatises on the Countries Overseas printed in 1844 - 1846. The Treatise on the Inaccessibility of Protestantism to China (Ye-Su-Jiao-Nan-Ru-Zhong-Guo-Shuo), which refutes the doctrine of Protestantism from the angle of the Chinese culture and deals on the conflict between Protestantism and the Chinese society, The Treatise on the Tributary States Doing Trade in Guangdong (Yue-Dao-Gong-Guo-Shuo) and The Treatise on London (Lan-Lun-Ou-Shuo) form the other 3 parts.

On the United States is the first book relating the history and geography of America written by a Chinese author. It is based on A Brief Illustrated Treatise on the United States of America, the 2nd edition of Bridgman's A Brief Account of America. Liang Tingnan was a famous scholar in eastern Guangdong and had served under several governors of the province. He came across A Brief Illustrated Treatise on the United States of America published in Hong Kong while collecting material for the History of the Custom House in Guangdong (Yue-Hai-Guan-Zhi) he was compiling in 1844 and got the idea of writing On the United States. He said in the preface of this book, "In compiling the History of the Custom House in Guangdong in accordance with the imperial order, I found I had not much material about America, which had been founded not so long ago, and therefore no records had been made of the country by Chinese scholars. The verbal accounts by some foreign interpreters and merchants reaching me sometimes were mixed, disorderly and hardly consistent. I lived in anxiety for 2 years and finally got A Brief Illustrated Treatise on the United States of America written by a national of that country. The author has just learned his Chinese and is not quite familiar with the way of Chinese writings. I edited it together with the material collected before, added the stories of 5 countries and has turned it into the present history book in greater detail than the original."²⁶

On the United States consists of 3 volumes. Volume One gives the names of the states and their geographical locations, accounts the discovery of the New Land by Christopher Columbus, how this land was named, its exploitation by Britain, France, Holland and Spain, the formation of the 13 colonies and finally the war between Britain and France for controlling these colonies.

Volume Two describes the setting up of trading companies by Britain, the increase of British troops in the New Land, the outbreak of the American War of Independence, the merging of the former colonies into the United States at the Continental Congress, the war between Britain and America, George Washington elected president, adoption of the constitution of the United States of America, implementing the system of the presidential government, running schools and poorhouses, developing trade with foreign countries, and the longitudinal and latitudinal position, mountains and rivers of the country.

Volume Three tells of the religious belief of the country—Protestantism; the language it uses—English; its newspapers and journals, people's love of books and free marriage; the complexion, character and customs of the Indians; and charitable organizations, stop-drinking societies, daily etiquette, customs, food, housing, music, painting, machinery, textile, animals, plants and minerals. An account of its trade and climate is given towards the end of the volume.

In the arrangement of content, the book resembles in the main A Brief Account of America.

Liang Tingnan showed great admiration of the American system. He wrote in the “Preface,” “From the system of the United States of America, which has been followed for years without being changed, I have come to realize that the saying -The people is not to be feared- is indeed no absurdity. Since its founding, this country has determined its rewards and punishments and prohibitions and orders according to the decision of the people and then chosen officials to carry them out. The laws of the country, which reflect the wish of the people, had been made before there was a president. The president is changed at regular intervals, similar to the appointment of officials in China. Though there have been good ones qualified to

go on holding the office , the laws have never been changed because of them . The president is so positioned that he can neither hold the office indefinitely nor appoint someone to replace himself , the matter resting entirely in the hands of the people . People support the president as he is elected from the grass-roots . . . and in no position to play the tyrant and hold the office too long . The intangible and immaterial -public opinion- has thus assumed a tangible form and proved to be feasible and practical . The one chosen to be the president , knowing that it will not do to set up a clique for his own selfish interests , endeavors to abide by the laws and do his best to perform his duty in the 4 fleeting years , seeking to win people s good opinion on leaving his office . No president will ever squander recklessly and ride roughshod over the people for a position he can not keep long and hold indefinitely at the risk of being cursed by the people !²⁷

As Liang Tingnan saw it , the intangible and immaterial “public opinion” has proved effective in the United States , and the American system has embodied almost perfectly the Confucian concept that the people are of fundamental importance in a country . The equating of this Chinese concept with the civil liberties of the modern times , though blurring out the essential differences between the two , fully manifests Liang Tingnan s admiration of the American system .

IV. David Abœel and A Brief Survey of the Maritime Circuit by Xu Jishe

A Brief Survey of the Maritime Circuit by Xu Jishe , 10 volumes in all , was first published in 1848 . Earlier , in 1844 , A Brief Research of the Maritime Circuit (Ying-Huan-Kao-Lue) in 2 volumes had been written but not printed . A Brief Survey of the Maritime Circuit , after A Gazetteer of Four Continents and The Illustrated Treatise on the Countries Overseas , is another influential cartographic writing . If A Gazetteer of Four Continents consists of articles translated entirely from journals run , and books written by , Westerners , and The Illustrated Treatise on the Countries Overseas

is mainly a collection of material of the history and geography of Western countries (Wei Yuan added some comments but made no textual research), *A Brief Survey of the Maritime Circuit* can be said to be a book written and compiled by a Chinese which systematically introduces world history and geography, with an achievement surpassing the other 2 books. The material of this book has been mostly cited from works of Westerners, especially from that of the American missionary David Abeel. Xu Jishe related the purpose of writing this book and the sources of the material used in it:

“In the 23rd year of Emperor Daoguang [1844], while I lived in Xiamen performing my official duty, I met David Abeel, a Fujianese-speaking noted American. He carried a meticulously-drawn and printed atlas with him, but I was dismayed to find that I was unable to read the characters on the maps. I had more than 10 maps copied and asked Abeel to translate the names for me. Thus, I managed to know roughly the names of various countries. But as it was done in a hurry, we could not go into details. When I went there again the following year, Department Director Huo Rongsheng bought me two atlases, the bigger one being 2 feet high, and the smaller one, over 1 foot. They were even more exquisitely done than the one Abeel carried with him. I also managed to get a few books in Chinese written by Westerners, which were too slangy for refined taste. I, however, gathered whatever material I could lay my hands on, consulted Westerners about their content when I had chance and gradually formed an overall picture of the topography and general situation of the countries overseas. Then, basing on these maps, I chose more reliable accounts from various books and wrote articles of my own. With the passing of time, they multiplied and grew into volumes.”²⁸

From the above it can be seen that Xu Jishe cited from two sources: 1. The American Abeel and some other Westerners; and 2. The atlases and books in Chinese published by Westerners. Xu Jishe said as much in his book: “The areas, general situation, histories, products and current events of the Western countries have all been taken from printed and hand-copied books and scores of monthlies and newspapers of the Westerners. These writings are mostly ungrammatical and slangy, but the facts are reliable. Sometimes differ-

ent sources differ on some points , and I follow the more dependable ones. Some parts have been written on the basis of the verbal accounts of the Westerners I met with.”²⁹

The Abeel mentioned by Xu Jishe was an American missionary . Dispatched by American Seaman s Friend Society (Hai-Yuan-Zhi-You-She) , he came to Guangzhou together with Bridgman in February 1830 in the first batch of American missionaries to China . He preached among British and American sailors in Guangzhou at first and then went to the South Sea islands in 1831 . He joined the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Mission later and arrived on February 7 , 1842 at Gulangyu opposite Xiamen across the sea . He preached in Xiamen for years . In January 1844 , acting as the interpreter of Henry Gribble (Ji-Li-Bu) , British Consul in Xiamen , he met Xu Jishe , then serving as a commissioner in Fujian , for the first time . Xu made no mention of this meeting in his book , but Abeel described in detail his several meetings with him in his diary , providing us with the first-hand material for our research of this segment of history .

Abeel wrote on January 27 , 1844 : “ For some time past , we have had an imperial commissioner at Amoy [Xiamen] , who was sent principally to fix the limits which are to circumscribe the wanderings of foreigners . Chinese-like , his first proposal was to restrict us to a few of the more public streets of Amoy . As a counterpart the British consul mentioned a day s journey in the interior as a very proper limit . The commissioner gradually opened his eyes , and enlarged his views , but was afraid to sweep so wide a circle as the consul proposed . After exchanging a paper or two , and as many visits , he left the question about as open as it was before . We saw his excellency several times . He is next in office to the lieut.-governor , and bids fair to be the governor-general of this and the neighboring province . He is the most inquisitive Chinese of a high rank I have yet met . After asking many questions about foreign countries , we proposed bringing an atlas and showing him the position and extent of the places which were most interesting to him . To this he gladly assented , and we have given him as much general information as we could compress into part of an afternoon . We promised to send him Christian books , and yesterday I made up a package for him contain-

ing the New Testament and other books.”³⁰ Xu also perused Abeel’s atlas and was deeply impressed with the geographical and Christian books Abeel gave him. His interests in world history and geography grew immensely.

On February 29 of the same year, Xu Jishe came to Xiamen again. Abeel wrote in his diary: “Knowing that his excellency had returned, we called upon him, and had a peculiarly gratifying visit. He said he had been reading the Christian books, and begged to make a number of inquiries, which related principally to the characters and places he had met with. He had evidently read the New Testament with attention, and gave me an opportunity of explaining many most important truths, which I pray God may be impressed upon his heart.”³¹

Xu Jishe’s meetings with Abeel enabled him “to know roughly the names of various countries” and acquire a great amount of material of world history and geography and augmented his determination to write a geographical book. In his later contacts with Abeel, he put the questions he encountered in writing the book directly to Abeel and discussed them with him. Abeel’s diary recorded a meeting between them in May 1844: Xu Jishe was unrestrained and friendly and departed himself properly. Evidently he had acquired considerable knowledge. His wish to understand countries in the world was far more ardent than listening to the truths of the Heaven. His maps were not precise enough. He not only checked the longitudinal and latitudinal degrees to mark the exact geographical positions, but also concentrated on amassing material about the areas of countries, their important political events and commercial relations, especially the commercial relations with China. His study of Britain, America and France went deeper than of other countries.³²

Xu Jishe was not the only one having personal contacts with Abeel and other foreigners. Abeel’s diary of February 20, 1844, for instance, mentioned a sub-prefect. “After spending the morning in conversing with those who called, we resumed our unfinished visits and called on the sub-prefect. He said that the commissioner was much engaged in reading the Christian books. We sat a long time with him, and gave him a full and free discourse on the important truths of natural and revealed religion. It is a great privilege, to

have such opportunities for religious conversation with men of this class. Who that reads this will not put up a fervent prayer that he and the commissioner and the admiral, and all to whom books have been given, may be made to see their need of an interest in that redemption, the knowledge of which has been brought to their minds?³³

The real motive of Abeel was of course spreading Christianity. To further his cause, he deemed it necessary to change the Chinese people's view on the West and make China open its door to Western civilization. But he failed to achieve his aim. His diary shows that Xu Jishe's interest was not in religion, but in the political and economic situation of Britain, America, France and other powers. Xu's purpose of knowing the foreign countries was obviously "playing one barbarian state against another." Though the objectives of the two differed, Abeel's help led to the birth of the first book of modern world geography written by a Chinese.

In July 1844, half a year after Xu Jishe had his first contact with Abeel, Xu finished his 2 volumes of *A Brief Research of the Maritime Circuit*. He frankly admitted that "I got the facts mostly from Abeel and consulted also *Heard and Seen in Maritime Countries* (Hai-Guo-Wen-Jian-Lu) by Chen Ziqi, *Heard and Seen in the West Region* (Xi-Yu-Wen-Jian-Lu) published by the Garden of the Seven Chinese Toons (Qi-Chun-Yuan), the *Lost Gazetteer of the Island in the Sea* (Hai-Dao-Yi-Zhi) by Wang Liurong and some books by Westerners."³⁴ *A Brief Research of the Maritime Circuit* was not printed then, and Xu wrote *A Brief Survey of the Maritime Circuit* in 10 volumes on this basis. Apart from Abeel, Xu also sought advice from such Westerners in China as the American missionary W. H. Gummings, and George Tradescant Lay (Li-Tai-Guo) and Rutherford Alcock (A-Li-Guo), who had served as the British consul in Fuzhou successively. Besides, he consulted *A Brief Account of America* by Bridgman. As no explanation had been made by Xu in his book, we can not trace which material had come from Abeel. However, Abeel's name appeared 7 times in the book, and from these passages we can have a glimpse of his role and influence in Xu's writing of the book:

1. He corrected a number of wrong ideas of world geography in

Chinese annals. The official annals and geographical accounts written by some scholars, for instance, all maintained that the more one goes southward, the hotter he finds the climate, and the South Pole is extremely hot. People continued to stick to this view even when they had seen the maps drawn by Westerners. Xu Jishe gave up this idea after reading Abeel's scientific explanation. He wrote in “The Earth” of his book, “Everybody knows the Arctic Ocean, but no one has ever heard of the Antarctica before. I perused a world map drawn by a Westerner and found the Chinese equivalent of the Antarctica below the South Pole. I suspected it was a mistake due to improper use of Chinese and asked the American Abeel, who said it was correct without a doubt.” Abeel made a specific explanation to him. Xu remarked in his book, “From his explanation, it can be seen that the South Pole is indeed a sea of ice. Chinese ships used to sail just as far as the sea off Fujian and Guangdong and mistook the equator for the South Pole. That is why doubts arise on seeing the new account.”³⁵

2. Abeel corrected mistakes in the geographical writings published in Western countries with the latest findings of the West. Xu Jishe said he had assumed that “Only islands exist south of the southern zodiac; further beyond, there is only water, and not a single piece of land can be seen as far as the South Pole;” and “It was only natural that the earth should stay above and the water, below.” But Abeel put him right with the information that “Two years ago, France, Britain, America and Spain sent 4 boats to explore the South Pole and have found land there, though its size is not yet clear.”³⁶

3. Abeel watched the changes in the world political domains with a developmental view and helped Xu Jishe resolve difficulties encountered in writing the book. In modern times, wars and maneuvers of the Western colonial powers were constantly changing the political maps, while reflecting the true picture of the world situation yesterday might become outdated today due to the change of the suzerain of a colony. Inconsistencies are often found among geographical books and maps published in the West at different periods. To bring things up to date, it was necessary to keep a watchful eye on the ever changing world situation. But this could not be accom-

plished in China, as it had long closed its doors to other countries and knew little of the world. When collecting the material about India, Xu Jishe found that the British and American maps of India had different names for the same places and states. Not knowing which to follow, he asked Abeel what to do. "Abeel replied that this one [the American map] used the old names of the Five Indias. Since Britain seized the country, some new divisions and new changes have been made. This gives rise to the variances." Xu thought that "since India now belongs to Britain, the British map should be used," and introduced the general situation of India according to the British map. But he attached the American map to the book "for reference."³⁷

W. H. Gummings, a doctor of medicine and missionary of the American Southern Presbyterian Union, also provided material for Xu Jishe. He came to China in 1842, moved around in Macao and Hong Kong at first and in Xiamen later and finally landed on Gulangyu on June 7, 1842. He set up a clinic in Abeel's residence and formally opened a hospital in Xiamen in January 1844. In 1847 he went back to the United States because of poor health. Much of the material about Switzerland in *A Brief Survey of the Maritime Circuit* was provided by him. No account of Xu Jishe's contact with him is available. We can only find a passage in the chapter "Switzerland" of Xu's book, saying that "An American by the name of Gummings once visited that country. He spoke highly of its beautiful scenery and unsophisticated customs and said it was a pity that the country was so far away and can not be civilized with rites and books."³⁸ Based on the material offered by Gummings, Xu made an explicit description of the country's geographic position, area, mountains, rivers, lakes, its conquest by Napoleon and 12 districts. From Gummings' narration, he came to the conclusion that Switzerland was a "Land of Peach Blossoms in the West."

The account of the American political system and the praise of George Washington form the best part of *A Brief Survey of the Maritime Circuit*. "After winning the victory," the book says, "Washington turned over the military command and moved to retire. The people, bearing not to let him go, elected him head of the nation. He said to the people that it was selfish of one to pass the

supreme position to his descendants and the duty of ruling the country should be given to a person of virtue. The former colonies have thus been organized into states, and each state has a president to lead it and a vice-president (or vice-presidents) to help him. The term of office for the president is 4 years (1 to 2 years in some cases). After the expiration of the term, people gather to evaluate his performance. If it is agreed that he did well, he can serve another term (but must step down after serving for 8 years). If he is considered not good enough, the vice-president will be chosen to replace him. If the vice-president is considered improper too, a person from the grass-roots will be chosen. Voters shall put the name of the one they select to be the president on a piece of paper and put it in a box. When the vote-casting has ended, all the boxes will be opened to count the votes, and the one gets most of the votes will be chosen, be him an official or a private citizen, as the new president. The outgoing president will become a common citizen again, no different from other people. A general president is chosen from among the presidents of these states to lead them and decide on questions of war and to conduct warfare, and all states should obey him. The method of choosing the general president is the same as choosing the presidents of various states, and his term of office is, likewise, 4 years, or 8 years if he is elected for a second term. From Washington's time (he died in the 3rd year of Emperor Daoguang [1844]) to the present, 9 presidents have been chosen in the 60-odd years of American history.”³⁹

Xu Jishe's description of the American political system was not as detailed as in the *Illustrated Treatise on the Countries Overseas*. But the treatise is just a transplant of *A Brief Account of America*, while Xu added in his book his understanding of, and view on, the system. The praise he administered Washington in one of the notes, especially, reflected the progressive intellectuals' understanding of the Western democratic system. “Washington was an outstanding person indeed! He was braver than Chen Sheng and Wu Guang in the uprising, and his cause surpassed those of Cao Cao and Liu Bei in achievements. Having won victory through armed struggle, he sought no personal fame and passed not his position to his descendants. He started the election of the president, and the whole coun-

try has lived almost like one family , resembling the piping times of peace during the Xia , Shang and Zhou dynasties in ancient China. Unlike in other nations , he relied on good customs , not force of arms , to rule the country. I saw a portrait of him ; noble , valiant and resolute in demeanor , he was truly a distinguished personality. ”⁴⁰

Xu Jishe wrote further , “ South and North America stretch thousands of kilometers , and the United States of America is the very best of all countries there. Its climate is as good as in China , and its soil is just as fertile. Britain sailed thousands of miles to dominate the territory , where it propagated and accumulated material force for over 200 years , and the colonies became very rich. However , it set to attack and seize the territory , and its relations with the colonies broke and was never restored to the former state. . . . The United States of America is a federal country. It has no princes and dukes and does not follow the hereditary system , and its public affairs are all decided by the public. The country has created a system unheard of past and present ! It is only natural that Washington has been respected as the greatest person in the West. ”⁴¹ According to the study of the Hong Kong scholar Li Zhigang , this view is not borrowed from any writing , but is derived from his discussions with Abeel. ⁴²

The good government during the Xia , Shang and Zhou dynasties in ancient China was the highest political ideal and a perfect sociopolitical mode in the minds of Chinese Confucian scholars. In likening the American society to it , Xu Jishe was expressing a view that shocked his compatriots.

Xu Jishe was the only intellectual of the time who praised the American democratic system and admired Washington's personal qualities , and his views represented the highest evaluation of the American society by the Chinese literati at that period. Therefore , “as soon as the book was in print , an abusive censure followed. ”⁴³ But it evoked no small response from the other side of the Atlantic Ocean. The American government , with the urge of Abeel , its envoy in China , presented Xu with a portrait of Washington. This was one of the important measures Abeel took to further his “policy of cooperation” in China and a reflection at the same time of the vast

influence this book created.

The Chinese trend of “opening eyes to observe the world” at the beginning of the modern times appeared suddenly against the background that China suffered humiliation as a result of the defeat in the Opium War. It was neither preceded by a long period of deliberation, nor prepared by sufficient ideological material. The thinkers of “opening eyes to observe the world” could only rely on the limited amount of books, journals and newspapers written or run by missionaries and other foreigners in China. About this, Liang Qichao commented later, “After the Opium War, noble-minded patriots wrung their wrists in sorrow, regarding the defeat a crying shame and a lesson China could use to clean its cumulated filth. The view of studying the art of government to help rule the country spread fast and wide. What is more, with the lift of the ban on intercourse with foreign countries, the so-called ‘Western learning,’ meaning foreign technologies at first and foreign political systems later, gradually found their way into China. The Chinese scholars, who had lived, so to speak, all along in pitch-dark chambers, did not know anything that existed outside. The opening of a window on the wall of their chambers enabled them to glare at things they never saw before. Looking round, they saw nothing but darkness and the cumulated filth inside the room. Their eagerness to know things outside and disgust of the filth inside thus grew with each passing day.” As a result, “those with a smattering knowledge of the Western learning joined hands with the advocates of ‘studying the art of government to help rule the country’ in the period of enlightenment during the Qing Dynasty and hoisted a banner of confrontation to oppose the orthodox party.”⁴⁴

It was the American missionaries who pierced the “wall” of the Chinese thinkers of “opening eyes to observe the world,” and their writings furnished as the “window” for the Chinese intellectuals to observe and understand the world outside. This segment of history indicates that the missionaries, as the main carriers of “the Western learning introduced to the East” in modern times, would have a lasting influence in the development of the modern ideological trend and China’s cause of modernization in late Qing period.

(Translated by Wang Huaiting)

NOTES

- ¹ Cf. *Chinese Repository*, Vol. 3, p. 382 (December 1834).
- ² Cf. Barnett and Fairbank, *Christianity in China: Early Protestant Missionary Writing* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1985), pp. 95 - 96.
- ³ The Chinese and Japanese Library of the Harvard University, so far as I know, has an original copy of *A Brief Account of America*. It was included in the 11th volume of the *Geographical Collection of the Xiaofanghu Study*, but no "Introduction" has been found in it. The passage here has been cited from an end note in "A General Account of America, Part A", in Vol. 59 of the 100-volume *Illustrated Treatise on the Countries Overseas* published in 1852.
- ⁴ *A Brief Account of America*, *ibid.*, pp. 12 - 13.
- ⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 11 - 12.
- ⁶ Cf. Fred W. Drake, "Protestant Geography in China: E. C. Bridgman's Portrayal of the West," cited from Barnett and Fairbank, ed., *Christianity in China: Early Protestant Missionary Writings*, *op. cit.*, p. 105.
- ⁷ See Note 4, pp. 15 - 16.
- ⁸ Wang Tao, *Miscellaneous Notes on Foreign Countries* (Ying-Ruan-Zha-Zhi, Yuelu Publishing House, 1988), p. 120.
- ⁹ Cf. Gilbert McIntosh, *The Mission Press in China*, American Presbyterian Mission Press (Shanghai, 1895), pp. 13 - 20.
- ¹⁰ Richard Quanterman Way, *A Concise World Geography*, p. 29, cited from the *Geographical Collection of the Xiaofanghu Study*.
- ¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 29.
- ¹² *Ibid.*, p. 1.
- ¹³ Wei Yuan, "The Original Introduction," *Illustrated Treatise on the Countries Overseas*, the 100-volume edition, Vol. 1.
- ¹⁴ *Ibid.*, Vol. 4, p. 43.
- ¹⁵ "The Introduction at the End of the Book," *ibid.*, Vol. 100.
- ¹⁶ *Ibid.*, the 1844 50-volume edition, Vol. 38, p. 1.
- ¹⁷ Cf. Wu Ze and Huang Liyong, "A Study of Wei Yuan's *Illustrated Treatise on the Countries Overseas*," in Yang Shenzhi and Huang Liyong ed., *Research of Wei Yuan's Thinking* (Wei-Yuan-Si-Xiang-Yan-Jiu, Hunan People's Publishing House, 1987), p. 301.
- ¹⁸ See Note 13, Vol. 94, p. 3.
- ¹⁹ "General Preface to the American Continent in the Outer Atlantic Ocean (Wai-Da-Xi-Yang-Mu-Li-Jia-Zhou-Zong-Xu)," *ibid.*, Vol. 59.
- ²⁰ "The Introduction at the End of the Book," *ibid.*, Vol. 100.
- ²¹ See Note 4, p. 3.
- ²² See Note 19.
- ²³ *Ibid.*, Vol. 74.
- ²⁴ See Note 19.
- ²⁵ *Ibid.*, Vol. 100.
- ²⁶ Liang Tingnan, "Preface," *On the United States*, cited from *Four Treatises on the Countries Overseas*, the 1846 block-printed edition.

- ²⁷ Ibid.
- ²⁸ Xu Jishe , “Author’s Note ,” A Brief Survey of the Maritime Circuit , the 1866 revised edition , p. 8 .
- ²⁹ “Guide to the Use of This Book ,” *ibid.* , p. 3 .
- ³⁰ See Note 1 , Vol. 13 , p. 236 (May 1844) .
- ³¹ *Ibid.* , p. 237 .
- ³² Cf. Note 1 . Vol. 20 , pp. 169 - 170 (April 1851) .
- ³³ *Ibid.* , Vol. 13 , p. 237 (May 1844) .
- ³⁴ A Brief Research of the Maritime Circuit , cited from Data of the Chinese Modern History (Zhong-Guo-Jin-Dai-Shi-Zi-Liao-Cong-Bian) , Vol. 79 .
- ³⁵ “The Earth ,” See Note 28 , Vol. 1 , p. 5 .
- ³⁶ *Ibid.* , Vol. 1 , p. 7 .
- ³⁷ “Five Indias ,” *ibid.* , Vol. 3 , p. 7 .
- ³⁸ “Switzerland ,” *ibid.* , Vol. 5 , p. 32 .
- ³⁹ *Ibid.* , Vol. 9 , pp. 15 - 6 .
- ⁴⁰ *Ibid.* , Vol. 9 , p. 16 .
- ⁴¹ *Ibid.* , Vol. 9 , p. 35 .
- ⁴² Cf. Ren Fuxing ed. , Xu Jishe and the Intellectual Communication Between the East and West (Xu-Ji-She-Yu-Dong-Xi-Fang-Wen-Hua-Jiao-Liu , China Social Science Publishing House , 1993) , p. 242 .
- ⁴³ Xu Jishe , “A Letter in Reply to My Dear Friend Wu Sicheng ,” Complete Papers of Xu Jishe (Song-Kan-Xian-Sheng-Quan-Ji) , Vol. 3 .
- ⁴⁴ Liang Qichao , “Intellectual Trends in the Qing Period ,” Collected Works and Essays from the Ice-Drinkers Studio (Yin-Bing-Shi-He-Ji) , Vol. 32 , p. 52 .

A M E R I C A N F I L M S I N C H I N E S E R E V I E W S (1895 - 1949)

W A N G Chaoguang

Since its birth 100 years ago , film , of all arts , has swiftly acquired the biggest influence and won the largest number of audience . This youngest art also boasts of the greatest amount of interchanges and the closest interactions among nations and holds wide influence not only in the field of film itself , but also in the cultural and social , and even in the political and economic domains. The United States , having the most developed film industry in the world , left the biggest impact on the earlier Chinese films. Therefore , it may be of some significance to trace their repercussions in China on the eve of the centennial anniversary of the world film and the 90th anniversary of the Chinese film . An examination of the past may help understand what one sees in China today .

I. Moral Conflicts

Film as an art was introduced into China the second year after its birth , and the United States was one of the first countries that had exchanges with China in this field. In 1897 some Americans came to China to make pictures and some American films were shown in China in the same year . American technicians and Chinese students studying in the United States played an important role in the initial stage of China s film industry .

The Chinese audience was stricken with the novelty of the film when they first saw it. The first Chinese film review related the author s impression of an American “play of electric light and shadow” shown in Shanghai in 1897 . It says , “There are any amount of mirage-like changes in the universe , and so have motion pictures.

With the invention of electricity, strange things never heard of since ancient times have occurred and betrayed numerous mysteries the supernatural force created. In motion pictures, we can see all sorts of people and things existing tens of thousands of li away without going there by the miraculous method of contracting space, and what we see resemble so much the figures, characters, floral designs and drawings on the ancient tripods and quadripods, now appearing and now disappearing. Watching them, one feels indeed like living in a wonderland.”¹ This, in general, was also how the Chinese audience reacted to the earliest US films.

In the 1920s, the Chinese people's response to the US film began to switch from a sense of novelty to criticism, and gradually to a pan-politicalized criticism at that. Film production had been turned into an industry first in the United States since the birth of film, and films had been produced and distributed in, and exported from, this country. This had been made possible because it enjoyed a powerful economy and excellent technology. In that decade, American input in the film industry topped 200 million US dollars, and over 500 films were produced each year. It rose thus to the No. 1 country in the world's film production. From then on, American films had become one of the country's most important exports and poured steadily into other countries. With their intricate plots, magnificent scenes and elaborate manufacturing, these films held attraction for the general audience and found easy access to the screens of various nations. Up to 60 to 90 percent of the films shown across the world in the 20s were made in America. The contradictions and conflicts in the exchange of films between the United States and China developed against this general background.

The Chinese criticism of the American films arose first of all from the ethical conflicts. It dealt with three questions: evil, pornography and humiliating China. Most of the US films imported in the earliest period were scenic pictures and comic dramas. People drew some new knowledge from them, and the scenes of fighting, though meaningless, did no great harm. Around the 20s, large amounts of serial detective films were made in the United States,

and such movies as *The Great Train Robbery* (Tuoche Dao), *The Iron Hand* (Tie Shou), *Robbers in Black* (Heiyi Dao) and *Masked Men* (Mengmian Ren) entered China in quick succession, taking advantage of the drastic reduction in the production of European films in World War I. These films, in spite of their endings of criminals tracked down and brought to justice, depict in detail how the crimes were committed. Robbers, thugs and criminal syndicates seized people's possessions, killed people and committed murders on the screen. Undesirables of all sorts followed suit, and serious criminal cases like kidnapping, killing and resisting arrests were frequently reported in Shanghai. The offenders claimed that they copied these tricks from films. According to the old-timers, a series of robberies would occur each time a film of this kind was shown in a concession in Shanghai. These robberies looked like "reproductions of American films and old American films shown once more."² In 1920 Shanghai was shaken by a serious criminal offense. Yan Ruisheng, the comprador of a foreign firm, murdered a prostitute named Wang Lianying for her money. Yan confessed after his arrest that he got the idea from an American detective film and borrowed the method it used. Some profit-seeking merchants, seeing a good chance of making money, filmed this case as it was, and China's first feature film *Yan Ruisheng* was thus born and shown publicly. This event evoked uneasiness in, and criticism from, people of all walks of life.

Earlier, in 1918, the Commercial Press founded its Department of Moving Pictures. It was the first time Chinese national capital invested in the movie industry. One of the purposes of the press was: in view of the fact that foreign films, "trivial and insidious, are being shown unrestrictedly everywhere and doing great harm to public morals," they hoped Chinese films would be made and "distributed to provincial capitals and commercial ports and shown in selected cinemas, so as to resist obscene foreign films and help in the popular education on the one hand, and to export them to foreign countries to commend our culture, mollify foreigners' scorn of our country and

Some of the titles of the early American films have been retranslated from the Chinese versions of the time, as their original English titles are not available for the time being. For titles of this kind, the Chinese phonetics has been added to indicate the difference.

strengthen the affection of overseas Chinese for their native land on the other.”³ Following the incident of Yan Ruisheng, the Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce and the Jiangsu Society of Education all demanded “banning films detrimental to public morals” with the reason that “if these films are allowed to imbue the Chinese people with their ideas, the effects of years of compulsory education will be offset imperceptibly altogether.”⁴ Hong Shen, who had just returned from the United States, set forth in clear-cut terms his earliest view on the film art: The film is a “sharp weapon for spreading civilization,” it “can popularize education, raise the level of the nationals,” “demonstrate the spirit of a nation and promote friendly relationship among countries.” So no films propagating sex and violence, depicting exclusively the base qualities of the humanity and exposing the shortcomings of our nationals should be produced.⁵

This criticism of the American detective films showed the Chinese people's moral reflection on the onrush of the Western culture. In a country of “loyalty, filial piety, rites and righteousness,” where ethics have always been held in high esteem, the chain reactions set off by the American detective films would, as a matter of course, cause great pains among its nationals and made them think that these films were an “evil,” even saying that “China now has robbers of the foreign fashion that it never had before and has foreign-style robberies that it had never known.”⁶ This is obviously an exaggeration, as we can see now. But it was the common reaction of the Chinese nationals in a sense at the time, which gave rise to the negative criticism of the American movies. It is not at all strange that they should receive such unhappy comments in a non-Western country; “evil,” in fact, was almost invariably one of the first instinctive reactions the non-Western civilizations have towards the Western civilization. What merits our attention here is that it was the Chinese national bourgeoisie and their intellectuals growing up rapidly in World War I who started this criticism. Can it be construed that this had something to do with the Chinese national bourgeoisie's demand for national independence and wish to develop the national culture?

In any case, China's criticism of the American films was neither an artistic nor a commercial one, but a moral one with a pan-

politicalized tendency. This forms a sharp contrast with Europe's artistic and commercial confrontation with the American films. The European Avant-gardists, usually despising movies, had a keen interest in the American detective films; they observed in them an extraordinary, mobile way of expression. From this it can be seen that the underdevelopment of the Chinese film theory and the strong social nature of the Chinese main-stream films after the 30s were no accidental phenomena.

"Pornography" was the second ethical objection the Chinese film reviews held against the American films. They were accused of the crime of "using women, songs and foreigners' extravagant way of life to lure the young people of our country."⁷ The Chinese people have always regarded "pornography" as floods and fierce animals and maintained that a gentleman should not let his eyes wander to where he is not supposed to see and let his ears listen to what he is not supposed to hear. Now that such vivid "pornographic scenes" appeared on the screen, "how could we turn a blind eye to them"? But the word "pornography" has very different connotations in China and the West. Let us look at the advertisement of an American film, *Song of the Broadway* (Baiaohui Zhi Ge), carried on the first page of *Beiping Daily*, April 27, 1930: Two hundred blonde beauties, above 5 feet 2, about 110 pounds in weight and below the age of 20, have been hand-picked as its actresses. Advertisements like this, plus sensational titles willfully translated to attract audience, such as *The Magic Power of Women* (Nuren De Moli), *Wine and Women* (Jiu Yu Nuren), *Love Affair on the River* (Chunshui Qingbo) and *Love in the Palace* (Chungong Yanshi), gave one the impression that the screen was full of "pornography." Some people went so far as to appeal that "Women should be strictly barred from watching movies." To speak objectively, Hollywood did produce some so-called pornographic pictures in the 20s. However, with the publication of the Hays Law by the Motion Picture Association of America in 1930, strict limitations were imposed on producing such pictures. Even performance with sexual appeal was prohibited, to say nothing of "sexual relationships." European artists held that, from that time on, "the American film gradually lost its artistic value" and "became stereotyped,"⁸ deriding it as a child that could never grow up,

whereas in China “pornography” has become a standing feature of the American film.

The ethical negation of the American film was finally ascribed to the resistance of the Chinese culture to foreign cultures and became a banner of the Chinese national film. The Lianhua Motion Picture Corporation, one of the most influential in the days of the Republic of China, stated that the aim of founding the corporation was “to promote the innate merits of the nation and point out the right course forward so as to resist the cultural aggression of the foreign movies” and “to unite with the Chinese-funded motion picture theaters and purchase the foreign-funded ones so that Chinese films can be shown and the infringements upon our rights and interests be avoided.”⁹ In the advertisement of *Dream in the Ancient Capital*, Lianhua's first film, pictures were described as “a revolutionary force to invigorate the Chinese film and the vanguard for resisting foreign motion pictures.” The ethical negation of the American film even won some support from the Kuomintang, which was advocating then the “Eastern culture” and the “innate old Chinese morals.” The film censorship law promulgated by the Kuomintang government on November 3, 1930, stipulated that “No pictures, either Chinese or foreign, can be shown until they are examined and approved according to this law.”¹⁰ Though its spearhead was directed mainly against the movies made by the Left-wingers, the law had a stipulation against films “detrimental to good customs,” and it could be applied to the American films. The film censorship law prohibited all pictures with pornographic, incestuous and suicidal contents and with details of women improperly undressing themselves. Among the 9 movies banned in 1934, 6 were American, including *Invisible Man*, *Dracula*, *Captured* and *The Notorious Sophil Long* produced by American big studios. Cuts were made in some other films, a case in point being *Grand Hotel*, in which the scene of flirtation between the boss and his female shop assistant in the bedroom was deleted. The film steering committee of the central committee of the Kuomintang adopted a decision that year to exercise strict censorship over foreign films and ban those with sensual and romantic contents and to reexamine the bad foreign movies being shown currently in the theaters.¹¹

Resenting and protesting against debasing the image of the Chinese people formed the third aspect of the Chinese ethical criticism of the American film. "Chinese plotters" began to appear frequently on the screen with the showing of the Hollywood serial detective films. These characters were usually played by short, queer Cantonese living in the United States. They were either ferocious, cruel villains killing people to seize their possessions, or slow-witted ignoramuses of wretched appearance, the males usually wearing a long pigtail, and the females, with bound feet. These films, reflecting America's bias against and disdain for China, naturally excited repudiation and resistance from knowledgeable critics in China. In the spring of 1920 Chinese nationals in the United States protested strongly against the showing of a film humiliating China in New York, and the representative of the Guangdong Military Government in America took up the matter with the US government. To challenge these American films, some young Chinese in the United States set up the Great Wall Motion Picture Corporation to make films representing the real situation in China. They returned to China later and made "problem" pictures to "point out prevailing questions and offer salutary advice to alter old customs and habits." They became the "Great Wall Group," which had considerable influence in the Chinese filmdom in the 20s.

The showing of such American films in China evoked widespread indignation, which turned into a disturbance involving various strata of the Chinese people. On February 22, 1930, the renowned Chinese film artist Hong Shen was invited by a friend to see a movie. Not wanting to go to one played by Douglas Fairbanks Sr., who had acted in films humiliating China, Hong and his friend went to the Daguangming Cinema to see an American picture named Undaunted (Bupa Si), only to find it was also one disgracing China. Unable to put up with the disgusting, mean behavior of the Chinese in the picture any more, Hong Shen went on to the stage to "vehemently enumerate the absurdities against the Chinese people and ask the audience to walk out." He was taken to the police station in the foreign concession as a result. This picture had been repudiated as "utterly disgracing the Chinese people" before, and when the incident of Hong Shen was known, the public went into an uproar. In-

numerable people voiced their support for him, and units and personages in the dramatic and film circles issued statements one after the other, denouncing the picture for "making repulsive, misleading propaganda and turning things upside down to befuddle people" and demanding for "the destruction of this movie."¹² At last the Shanghai Film Censorship Committee banned the picture on the ground that it contained "insults to the Chinese people that make one bristle with anger," and the American Paramount Pictures Corporation could not but retrieve this film and apologize.

These activities of opposing films humiliating China made even the Kuomintang authorities feel that the consequence of these American films was serious indeed. Therefore, a stipulation was laid in the film censorship law that no films "detrimental to the dignity of the Chinese nation" were allowed to be shown, and the Central Film Censorship Committee made "watching out for foreign films impairing our national dignity" one of its duties. Apart from this, it sent Luo Minyou, General Manager of the Lianhua Motion Picture Corporation, to the United States "on a tour of investigation," to make China's attitude known to the American film world so as to forestall producing such films again.¹³ In 1934 the American Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc. came to China to shoot *Earth*. The screenplay was examined and revised by the Chinese department concerned, and the shooting was done under Chinese supervision. From then on, American film-makers showed certain restraint in shooting similar pictures.

This moral criticism of the American film did not come by chance; it has its firm roots in the soil of the Chinese traditional culture. Since modern times, China has been experiencing an unprecedented change. Western culture, relying on its economic might, overran the Chinese land, and the conflicts between Western and Eastern culture became inevitable. The Chinese moral criticism of the American film was but a reflection of these conflicts. The Chinese traditional culture stresses the educational role of writings, using them to regulate the relationships between spouses, parents and children and among different kinds of people and to improve morals. They have always had a heavy pan-moral and pan-politicalized flavor. With the invasion of the imperialist powers, writings were re-

quired to assume the additional function of having the practical use of helping rule the country. Intellectuals regarded literature and other liberal arts means of salvaging the nation, as the famous scholar Liang Qichao said, "To imbue people with new ideas, it is necessary first of all to update a country's novels and stories." The film entered China at this stage. With the audio-visual effects and influence the film possesses, though it has been considered a common commodity in the eyes of Americans, it was only natural that in China the film was taken as the product of an alien moral civilization. However, against the great cultural background of the present century, China's moral repulsion of the American film seemed rather impotent, and the pan-politicalized ethical criticism of "evil" and "pornography" was not strong enough to frighten away the Chinese audience. To a certain extent, it did publicity for these movies. Such an antimonial outcome was something the critics did not want to see.

II. Political Criticism

The 30s witnessed the radicalization or extremalization of the Chinese pan-politicalized criticism of the American film: the turning from a mainly moral criticism to a political one.

The repudiation and resistance of the American films humiliating China, though mainly a moral one as far as the norms of judgment go, assumed the form of politicalized criticism. This became a link between the moral criticism and the political criticism and would logically develop into the latter. The basis and motivating force of the political criticism was the rise of the Leftist cultural movement led by the Chinese Communist Party.

Beginning from the 30s, the main stream of the Chinese arts took on a radical turn. This was a natural reaction to the internal and external troubles confronting China and the conservatization of the Kuomintang's politics after the Northern Expedition. The participation and guidance of the Chinese Communist Party swiftly lent this tendency of radicalization a proletarian inclination. "Changes in culture are caused by the ways of the world, and ups and downs are decided by the trend of the times." The film, of course, can not be

an exception to this rule. In September 1931 the Chinese Association of the Leftist Dramatists passed a "Program of Immediate Actions," which said it was to "start a proletarian film movement and wage struggles against the bourgeois and feudalist tendencies."¹⁴ After that, the Communist Party sent cadres to work in big film studios and set up a film group and a film review group successively. A vigorous Leftist film movement soon took shape. As this movement became the main stream in the Chinese film world, the Leftist view on the American film began to dominate Chinese criticism of the American film.

The Leftist film reviewers inherited the basic views of the past criticism of the American film, holding that it was guilty of "evil" and "pornography." They also maintained that "the ways and means used in the American films have been copied by bandits, and the sexual behavior and love affairs in them are being imitated by young people."¹⁵ So the sexy, sensual American films "are indeed intolerable. . . . Young people obsessed with such films all day long will inevitably give themselves up to wide fancies, go astray and land in dreadful straits."¹⁶ The basic arguments of the Leftist reviewers were not based on ethics, but rather, on politics. They held that the American film served the imperialist cultural policy, "trying to replace the priests throughout the world with their movies, so as to redouble their efforts a hundred-fold to spread their philters to poison the minds of the multitude of the weak nations," Therefore, it was necessary to "smash the imperialists film strategy and kick their anesthetics out of the Chinese cinemas!"¹⁷ From this it can be seen that the Left-wingers criticism of the American film had been made part of the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal total revolutionary strategy of the Chinese Communist Party. It was only natural that their attitude towards the American film should fall in line with this strategy and the political judgment, superseding the artistic, commercial and moral ones, became the first criterion in evaluating a film.

The criticism of the American film by the Left-wingers was done mainly through film reviews. From 1932 on, the film pages of big newspapers in Shanghai, such as Shen Bao, Shi Bao, Chen Bao, Da Gong Bao, Shishi Xinbao, were mostly controlled by Left-wingers. The organized theoretic criticism of the American film they

launched swayed the public opinion on movies.

The film reviews of the Left-wingers included Western films into the category of "imperialist films," and their basic assessment of them was that "over 90% of them are meant to assail the colonies and used as the tool of imperialism to poison the people."¹⁸ "Preaching, and poisoning, cheating and seducing people" were the functions of the cultural aggression attributed to the American film, and the task of the Leftist film review was "to take on the task of opposing imperialism in the film domain and to launch magnificent assaults on the imperialist films."¹⁹ Under this prerequisite, they adopted basically the attitude of putting the political criterion first in evaluating the American films. Therefore, they said, for instance, that *It Happened One Night* was "tasteless to the extreme"; *A Song to Remember* "was too ugly and vulgar to be endured"; *The Three Musketeers* was "a poison" and "of vulgar taste"; *Love Parade* was "a philter" which "uses wine, women, songs and dances to poison people's mind."²⁰ The films they had a positive opinion of were all those exposing the darkness of capitalism. *I Am a Fugitive from a Chain Gang*, for instance, "brought to light the darkness of American prisons," "telling people what a weapon the law is for man slaughtering";²¹ *Flames* (Nu Yan) depicted American lynching; and the Chaplin films exposed the economic crisis of American capitalism.

The Left-wingers endeavored to "ascertain by the political content of an American film whether it is good or bad, whether its artistic form, subordinate to the content, serves to coat the poison with sugar."²² The exertion of American films on artistry in presentation and production, consequently, was said to be making "sugar-coated poison." Even affirming only the artistic value of a film was considered "an incorrect tendency," for "the better the artistry of a film, the greater its effects in helping spread the influence of its content, and publicizing the artistry of a film is tantamount to advertising its content" and enabling it to "better cheat and taint the audience."²³ In spite of the fact that the Left-wingers did say "it is not that all films of imperialist countries are to be repudiated," they, in dealing with concrete films, invariably evaluated them with the yardstick of films being "the greatest weapon of the class struggle"

and “embodying , in the final analysis , the world outlook of their own class.” Putting the political criterion first often became making the political criterion the only guideline in film review . This view of content deciding form and putting content ahead of form came from the Marxist theory on arts , but it also had much to do with the Chinese traditional literary theory . This theory regards the content of a writing to be of fundamental importance , and its form , only of minor significance . It demands that content should precede form and writings should carry moral teachings . The moral criticism and the political criticism of the American film were , in essence , analogous , both emphasizing content , social effects and reaction . The difference lay only in the fact that moral criticism unfolded from the society to the film circles , while political criticism , the other way round . So it was not strange that even Zheng Zhengqiu , who was good at making films expressing the Chinese traditional ethics and did not belong to the camp of the Left-wingers , accepted the Leftist group s view on the American film . He raised the slogan of launching “a struggle against three evils ,” meaning imperialism , capitalism and feudalism , in an introspective article , and said the American films were covered with “a cloak of peacock feathers , beautiful in appearance but mostly empty inside .”²⁴

The emergence of the Leftist film reviews had naturally its social and political background and had , therefore , its rationality . What is more , these reviews , having discarded the old way of writing from one s impressions and following just one s bent and an advertisement style , were guided by a clearly defined theory . They had thus raised the level of the Chinese film reviews . But they had the obvious shortcomings of oversimplification and conceptualization . Some people raised the question “Is this a review ?” at the time and said that writings like this were just “essays on socialism ,” “not quite matching up to the term film reviews by any standard .”²⁵ Some reviewers , it was reported , did not understand dialogue in foreign language , but the reviews they wrote tolerated “no argument .” Obviously , such reviews had their subjectivity .

The Left-wingers had met some challenge from the advocates of “the soft film” in the mid-30s . These advocates stressed the recreational function of the film , advancing the “aesthetic view” and

arguing that “film is ice-cream for the eye and sofa for the soul.” The Left-wingers, they contended, “prattled about ideology at every turn,” based their reviews on whether “the European and American films produced in the bourgeois society had a Leftist inclination or not and insistently force them to turn Leftist. As a result, they found none of these films worth looking at.”²⁶ Some of the contentions made some sense. But the whole polemic had been conducted under the background of the political confrontation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, and it was also an indisputable fact that these advocators had likewise an obvious political inclination. Otherwise, they would not have attacked the Left-wingers as using the “shoddy yardstick procured from Siberia” in their reviews and demanded that “the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal work of the Chinese film circles should at the most be undertaken in parallel and cooperation with the Chinese political authorities and other social movements.”²⁷ The few reasonable ideas they had were thus inundated in the polemic of political confrontation and met with the fierce rebuffs of the Left-wingers. Besides, they did not oppose altogether the instructive and propagation functions of films and also accused the American films of money worship and profit-seeking. Therefore, their polemic with the Left-wingers failed to alter the Chinese people’s criterion of judging the American films and ended with the Left-wingers gaining the upper hand. This further affirmed the Left-wingers’ approach to the American film: “making film reviews with emphasis on ideology.”

Since film reviewing had become political criticism, evaluation of the American films could not but change with the change of political environments. During the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, for instance, a moderate praise replaced the former censure of the American films, for “we should oppose only one at present, the Japanese imperialists’ aggression of our country!”²⁸ Under the pen of the reviewers, thus, “even Hollywood, the gay center of US film production, changed its feature. They have mastered out and out this modern art of propaganda and are concentrating their efforts on waging struggle against fascists now.”²⁹ In the review of a Chaplin film, *The Great Dictator*, the author wrote that “Hollywood was called a workshop of dreams before. With heroes and

beauties as the main characters of its films, it created numerous sweet and fond dreams for those folks throughout the world whose will had been crushed by hardships. However, when this weapon is handled by progressive workers of arts, it has changed all of a sudden into a weapon to smash dreams instead of creating them.”³⁰ Obviously, even though Hollywood did change somewhat in war time, such an assessment could only be born out of a political environment, for then the United States had become an ally of China in the War of Resistance.

This political tolerance shown to the American films ended with the ending of the War of Resistance. A severe political repudiation followed. The American films were denounced as “poisonous” stuffs. “Most American films are questionable, and their far-removed-from-realities themes, sentimental, romantic mood and gray, forlorn tone are harmful to the Chinese audience today.”³¹ “Some reservations must be made” even for the film *For Whom The Bell Tolls*, a film based on a novel of the same name by Ernest Hemingway. “As to the so-called recreational films (or what some people call the indirect educational movies) that keep pouring into China from across the Pacific Ocean, they are toxin in our eyes and merit our serious vigilance.”³² The reviewer warned the audience that “if there were an instrument to test the American films with, we would have been surprised by the harm they have done us. They are manufacturing idiots for us every day, using the fascinating colors and easy performance to train unthinking people.”³³ Such reviews pushed China’s pan-politicalized criticism of the American film to the extreme. This extremity, following the Communist Party’s seizure of political power on the mainland, inevitably led to the banning of the American films in the country in November 1950. So the negative image of the American films fixed in the minds of the Chinese people over a long period of time.

III. Failure in Achieving the Desired Effect of the Criticism

On the whole, the American films appeared in a negative light

in the Chinese film reviews beginning from the 20s. In both moral criticism and political criticism, the Chinese reviews showed a pan-politicalized tendency. The general trend being such, study and analysis of the commercial effects and artistry of the American films were reduced to a position of secondary importance. The commercial relationship of the Chinese and American films is another subject worth studying, which I will not go into here. But, starting from the 30s, China's reaction to the US capital's entry into the Chinese film domain and the commercial effects of the American films penetrating into the Chinese market were also categorized in the political domain, and commerce and politics were often lumped together. What people worried most was that the US capital entered the Chinese film domain with the intention to turn it into "a slave training center, obliging you to accept their rule and oppression obediently."³⁴ What is more, the American films' entry into China with the victory of the War of Resistance was imputed to the Kuomintang's "flinging open the gate and bowing in the gangsters" as a result of signing the Sino-US commercial treaty, and the commercial interests that came in its wake were left out of account.

We should remember that whatever political attitude was taken towards the American films, Chinese film workers did not, in fact, reject their cinematographic art and methods. Many screen writers of commercial films imitated and copied the American films, and even a number of Leftist film workers admitted in the privacy of their thoughts that "the American films are indeed a little bit better than others" and said they would "learn from their ways of artistic expression and tricks."³⁵ They studied certain films scene by scene in the projection room, subjecting themselves to the strong influence of Hollywood's film art. Xia Yan, a noted personage marshaling the Left-wing film movement, maintained that "the first influence on the Chinese films came from the American movies," and "the Western films had great influence on the Chinese films, especially in the way of narration, structure and film language."³⁶ He frankly admitted that he had drawn inspirations from the American films in creating his Lunar New Year Gift and Girls. Wu Yonggang, a famous director, was also deeply impressed by the American films' stories, frames, tricks and techniques of direction. The famous saying of

Samuel Goldwyn, the renowned Hollywood producer, about the success or failure of a film depending on its story was often cited by the Chinese film workers. A contradiction appeared, consequently, in the American films standing in China. On the one hand, Chinese reviewers showered moral and political criticism on it, and, on the other, Chinese film workers imitated, in fact, its artistry. Such imitation helped the Chinese audience to become accustomed to the American way of story-telling, thereby unwittingly expanding the influence of the American films and counteracting the effect of the ethical and political criticism. The profit-oriented propagation of the Chinese film merchants, advertisements in the newspapers and comments in tabloids all combined to make the American films popular. The pan-politicalized film reviews underrated or neglected these factors. This, plus some degree of oversimplification and subjectivity on the part of the reviewers, alienated them somewhat from the audience and the realities of film production, so they failed to achieve the results they anticipated. Though the American films were driven out of the Chinese screen for political reasons and the pan-politicalized criticism had its way for years, they have made a comeback as soon as the political pressure vanished. This fact shows that the past practice in this field needs a good summing-up.

The relationship between the American films and China contains several interesting subjects closely associated with realities. This article has chosen certain periods in the history of the exchanges between China and the United States in this field and made an initial study of the Chinese reviews on the American films. It is meant to arouse some interests in the Chinese academic circles and promote the study on this subject.

NOTES

¹ Cheng Jihua, *The History of the Chinese Cinema* (Chinese Cinema Publishing House, Beijing, 1981), p. 9.

² Cheng Bugao , *Recollections of Events in Chinese Filmdom* (Chinese Cinema Publishing House , Beijing ,1983) , p. 39 .

³ See Note 1 , p.39 .

⁴ See *Xin Wen Bao* , March 18 and April 8 ,1923 .

⁵ See *Shen Bao* , July 9 ,1922 .

⁶ See Note 2 .

⁷ *The Lianhua Yearbook* ,1934 - 1935 , pp. 15 - 16 .

⁸ George Sadoul , *Histoire du cinema mondial* (Chinese Cinema Publishing House , Beijing ,1982) , pp. 248 ,285 .

⁹ See Note 7 , p. 20 .

¹⁰ Cited from *The Chinese Leftist Film Movement* (Chinese Cinema Publishing House , Beijing ,1993) , p. 1089 .

¹¹ See Note 7 , p. 53 .

¹² *The Republican Daily* , February 26 ,1930 .

¹³ Du Yunzhi , *The History of the Movies of the Republic of China* (Taipei ,1988) , p. 194 .

¹⁴ See Note 10 , p. 18 .

¹⁵ Tang Na , "On the Enlightening Effects of the Movies and the Chinese Movies," *Shen Bao* , June 30 ,1934 .

¹⁶ Ding Xiaoti , *Annals of Filmdom* (Chinese Cinema Publishing House , Beijing , 1984) , p. 21 .

¹⁷ See Note 10 , pp. 21 - 2 .

¹⁸ See Note 10 , p. 64 .

¹⁹ *Collected Works of Ma Jiliang (Tang Na)* (Shanghai : Eastern China Normal University Publishing House ,1993) , p. 367 .

²⁰ Chen Wu , "Down with All Mind-Blowers and Poisons , Films Must Become Food for the Public ," *Shi Bao* , June 1 ,1932 .

²¹ Situ Huimin and others , "On I Am a Fugitive from a Chain Gang ," *Shen Bao* , April 7 ,1934 .

²² Lin Ho , "The Film Review Group of the Leftist Drama Association and Other Things ," *The Film Art* ,1980 , No. 9 .

²³ *Selected Chinese Film Reviews Written in the 30s* (Chinese Cinema Publishing House , Beijing ,1993) , pp. 696 ,786 .

²⁴ *Ibid.* , p. 616 .

²⁵ *Ibid.* , pp. 707 - 709 .

²⁶ *Ibid.* , pp. 843 - 844 .

²⁷ *Ibid.* , pp. 853 ,850 .

²⁸ *Ibid.* , p. 395 .

²⁹ *Films Shown in Chongqing During the Anti-Japanese War of Resistance* (Chongqing Publishing House ,1991) , p. 480 .

³⁰ Bo Yue , "Creating and Smashing Dreams ," *Xinhua Ribao* , November 23 ,1942 .

³¹ Zhou Xiaoming , *History of the Chinese Modern Film Literature* (Higher Education Publishing House , Beijing ,1987) , Vol. II , pp. 176 - 177 .

³² Liu Nianqu , "From Yesterday to Tomorrow ," *Da Gong Bao* , September 22 ,1948 .

³³ *Ke Ling on Films* (Chinese Cinema Publishing House , Beijing ,1992) , p. 54 .

³⁴ Hong Shen , "Why Have Americans Come to China to Run Film Studios and Shoot Pictures on China ?" *Chen Bao* , July 21 ,1932 .

³⁵ See Note 23, p. 325.

³⁶ Xia Yan, "Answers to the Question by Hong Kong's Association of Chinese Films," *Chinese Film Studies*, Vol.1, Hong Kong 1983.

(Translated by Wang Huaiting)

BROADENING THE INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

CHEN Lemin

Wang Jisi ed. , Civilization and International Politics : Chinese Scholars Response to Samuel Huntington's Theory of " the Clash of Civilization " (Shanghai People's Publishing House , 1995)

International politics seems to have become increasing a "celebrated subject" in China since the end of the cold war. More people have interested themselves in it , and written a great deal. Theoretical survey in China and foreign countries (the latter in particular) and the new approaches from various quarters have attracted wide attention. Animated discussions are going on , and a vigorous atmosphere has prevailed. This shows that students keen on international politics do not rest content with descriptions of events any more , no matter how detailed the depiction may be ; they focus their interests mainly on the possible development of the international situation and the human society as a whole. The old patterns

having been broken , what the new one (if there is going to be one) will be something each country , nation , political force and political-minded person can not but take serious concern in. In this sense , one may say that international politics has become a subject of the general public.

The international politics has thus greatly expanded. Formerly , we used to view the world events mostly from the political meaning , as struggles of a political nature. In the 50s and 60s ideology was usually used as the yardstick to measure the issues between the East and West , and countries and personages were judged by the attitude they took in these confrontations. Such was the standard taken by the East and West alike. In Chi-

na, the political stand of opposing imperialism, revisionism and reaction was firmly urged. Without doubt, Chinese over the age of fifty to sixty still clearly remember "the great polemics in the international Communist movement" in the 60s. The international studies gradually expanded in the 70s, the most significant factor contributing to this being the increasing part of economics in international politics, for a new technological revolution was deepening the interdependence in the economic field. Before people was prepared to it, a sustaining new industrial revolution had begun to give out signals that will have a profound influence on international politics and human society, while all this time China was busy with the "great cultural revolution" resulting in bringing about a historical retrogression in this country. Establishing diplomatic relations with a number of Western countries had not led to opening up new horizons for China, and the globe was still locked in the "life-and-death" political struggle among the several "worlds."

However, the human society has quickened its forward step, and things can no longer be

viewed in the old light. In China reform and opening up have fundamentally changed people's way of judging the world. Students of international problems have managed to catch up with the world evolution in a few years and are becoming to be adept in systematically integrating politics with economics in their studies.

In recent years, since the 500th anniversary of the "great geographical discovery" the Chinese scholars have stridden further ahead in their research and linked their study with the world history. Over and beyond the specific questions they found it necessary to search for an answer to the future of human society. The discussion of the question of "globalization" is an indication of this new development. The research has been extensively broadened, particularly in theorizing. Along what orbit is the history of humanity moving? Where has it reached in this orbit? These questions raised by Chinese and foreign great thinkers in the past have been put forward again with a newer vision and on a much higher level.

At about the same time, Chinese scholars read the article "The Clash of Civilizations?" by

Samuel Huntington, in the American quarterly *Foreign Affairs* (the summer issue of 1993). This article has evoked a wider and deeper response in China even than Fukuyama's *The End of History* a few years ago. The book I am writing this "Preface" for¹ contains part of the response of the Chinese scholars. I will not comment on Huntington's article itself here, for there lack no good points in this book. What draws my interest is that the Chinese scholars have not only noticed the combination of politics and economics, but have taken international politics together with the history of civilization of humanity. Making a historical and comprehensive study of the international politics in the framework of the history of civilization of humanity has not started today in the West, but only in recent years, especially since Huntington's article, have we begun to take an intensive notice of it. That is because we are accustomed to equalizing, wittingly or unwittingly, "international politics" with the "current international affairs" or the practical solutions of specific questions. The question under discussion now is to conduct more in-depth

research, make it more analytical and try to overlook the yesterday, today and tomorrow of the world from the height of the overall world civilization. This will be a new theoretical experience to us. One may feel unnatural at the start to deal with "international politics" in conjunction with "civilization," the "civilization" in even Huntington's article being clearly a politicized (or "ideologized") version of "civilization." Some of the articles in the book mention this point several times. However, since "civilization" has made its appearance in "international politics," we must take a firm hold of it and make a serious study.

I have long held the view that international studies should be put in the framework of world history and that of human civilization. In this bigger framework, the international politics in constant changing is but plays and episodes in history, subtle reflections of the development of human civilization and sprays churned out of the long, great river of human civilization. What relationship civilization (culture) has with international politics needs to be studied from this very "river". A linkage is

required between “civilization” and “international politics,” and only history can serve this purpose. It is civilization that creates history, and international politics is but a “part” of the overall world history. In other words, a given civilization gives rise to a given history. “Civilization,” like an intangible huge hand, remolds the society, props up nations, sways and decides the history of humanity, and thereby influences the international politics in history. (It stands to reason that in the universities of certain countries international politics is a section in the department of history. Nanjing University in China also places international politics under the history department.)

So, indeed, civilization covers a vast area and is omnipotent and all-inclusive. Honore de Balzac said that the hostile groups in society are canceling out the strength of one another, but are leaving their “entire power” to “civilization”—“the great queen” who has replaced the king, “the old horrible image and the picture Saviour humanity has created between the Heaven and himself”! I fairly like the summarization of Francois Pierre Guillaume Guizot, the noted

French historian in the 19th century. He maintained that “civilization” in essence can be interpreted as the principle and synthesis of the social and moral development of humanity; it, therefore, resembles “a stretch of ocean, which creates wealth for a nation; and in which all the factors needed in the life of this nation and the strength this nation’s existence depends on are all held in store.” The duty of historians is “to single out the dominating thoughts, i.e., the principles universally applied, in each century and each form of civilization, for it is them which have brought about fortune or misfortune to generations of people under their sway, the influence of which can affect even the destiny of the future generations.”²

These ideas of Guizot can be said to contain roughly three levels of meaning: 1. Civilization is the sum total of material and spirit. 2. Civilization, as a product of historical processes, is a process itself. 3. Civilization is linked with the growth of nations. Oswald Spengler advanced his cultural morphology, and Arnold Joseph Toynbee expounded this theory and carried it forward. Though different in

their way of representation , they shared the same thoughts. From this , one can infer that , civilization being no universal civilization of humanity that transcends time and space , all civilizations have their inherent basis and laws of natural growth and development. In reference in with the historical conception of the “long-term historical rationality” of Mr. Ray Huang , an American historian of Chinese origin , this generalization should be applicable to the history of civilization as well.

Besides , all civilizations have properties of expansion. The more humanity enters the civilized period , the deeper this expansion will be felt. Different civilizations unavoidably repel or absorb one another when they meet. Mutual repulsion shows that civilizations have individuality difficult to change , while mutual absorption indicates that changes and modifications are inevitable. So no immutable civilization exists in the historical processes , and neither is it imaginable that a civilization should change completely at a definite period. Thinking along the properties of expansion of civilization , one will discover that the mankind has long been em-

barking on the road of “universal interdependence of nations” in place of “the old local and national exclusion and self-sufficiency.”³

The above rambling thoughts can be brought to a guiding thread about the civilizations , and expressed in form of a following “formula” within the world history : civilization — nations — international politics — process of globalization ; which is to show the prospects of human being. This guiding thread coincides with Immanuel Kant’s observation that the human society develops rationally from a lower to a higher stage :

... It (this guiding thread) can serve not only for clarifying the confused play of things human , and not only for the art of prophesying later political changes (a use which has already been made of history even when seen as the disconnected effect of lawless freedom) , but for giving a consoling view of the future (which could not be reasonably hoped for without the presupposition of a natural plan) in which there will be exhibited in the distance how the human race finally achieves the condition in which all the seeds planted in it by Nature can fully develop and in

which the destiny of the race can be fulfilled here on earth.”⁴

Obviously, this guiding thread from low to high is by no means straight. Humanity in its long travel has to experience violent percussion, conflicts and fusions of various civilizations. In many cases, such conflicts are conducted among people or groups of people in different regions under the name of “civilization” for their own interest and power. However, if the political intentions and considerations regardless of civilization are excluded, there will exist only differences and resemblances among civilizations, and differences do not necessarily mean head-to-head conflicts. The “clashes of civilizations” people say today is in fact political conflicts provoked under the pretext of “civilization,” or political conflicts mantled in “civilization,” or in the words of Kant, “the confused play of things.” When all these are “clarified,” one will see that the coexistence, interchange or convergence of various civilizations in different degrees and at different levels conform to the general law of the history of the civilization of humanity, if one proceeds entirely from the very features of the civilizations

themselves or look at their history of development as such.

Some might say that this amounts to advocating the “global culture,” and it is utterly empty talk since it is entirely divorced from realities. To questions like this, categorical answers of either yes or no will not do. It is neither a question of whether someone wants to advocate something. The thing is, judging by the development of human civilization, the portion of universal civilization is bound to increase day by day, and not vice versa. In fact, the spread of science and technology to various regions and nations and the application of the law and mechanisms of market economy in various countries and regions are producing a tremendous impact on interpersonal and social relationship, values and people’s way of thinking, thus gradually but markedly shortening the distance among regions, nations and different groups of people.

Accordingly, two aspects of things must be brought in sight: the aspect of the evolution and that of day-by-day realities. One shouldn’t be blinded by only one of the aspects. As Prof. Li Shenzhi put it, when he spoke about the question of “globaliza-

tion” in a meeting: “We must not see only that the world is beset with confrontation, contention, conquest and slaughter. Humanity has, in fact, entered upon the period of globalization. The convergence of different cultures has begun. From the knowledge humanity has possessed, it has been inferred that human being as a species must have originated from the same sources. In the subsequent tens of thousands of years, they spread to various parts of the world for survival and developed their own cultures separated from one another. This situation seemed to resemble what has been described in the chapter ‘Tien Xia’ (Universe) of the ancient Chinese philosophical works Zhuangzi: ‘The Dao Shu (principles and learnings) has been disintegrated by the world.’ But it has not got to the extent that ‘it has been disintegrated for ever, never to be reintegrated again.’ With the improvement of the means of communication and conditions for survival, the scattered groups of people have gradually come together. Five hundred years ago, Christopher Columbus discovered the New Continent, and people in different parts of the world

came to know the existence of others. But the interchange could increase only slowly. Now, 500 years later, we can say seriously that the epoch of globalization has begun. Personnel, material, energy and information are being exchanged worldwide, on a growing scale and at a faster and faster rate. Such interchange will inevitably bring in its wake conflicts and fusions of different nations and cultures. Therefore, the disintegrated “Dao Shu will be reintegrated again. Qian Zhongshu, a famous contemporary Chinese scholar, made a wise observation when he wrote, ‘East Sea, West sea, people share the same mind; Southern School, Northern School, the Dao Shu is not disintegrated.’”⁵

That is to say, one must see both the disintegration and integration of the culture of humanity as a process. History can bear witness to this. The Western Christian civilization was not originated in the West; on its way from the East to the West, it fused with Greek and Roman civilizations and took root in Western Europe. In the light of cultural morphology, what people call “the Christian civilization” is actually the outcome of

the early convergence of the Eastern and Western cultures. Even in the medieval times, the Greek culture, the Arabian culture and the culture of Asia Minor had infiltrated to Western Europe close by via southern Italy and the southern and northern coasts of the Mediterranean. Averroism was one of the links between them. The Italian Renaissance was a historical event entirely of Western Europe, but its brilliance threw light on the Byzantine Empire's European-Asian boundary and North Africa as well. True, the conflicts and fusions of the Chinese and the Western culture came several centuries later and underwent different courses and took different forms, but it can be said for certain that the history of their separation from each other is gone for ever. Even though "conflicts" have occurred when the two cultures met, the effects of such "conflicts" contain elements of "fusion." The "conflicts" here refer to the extension of differences, and the "fusions" also mean the extension of differences.

This demands that scholars of the history of humanity must have a historical perspective of viewing the world history in its

entirety. This is by no means a new idea. From China's *On Rites*, to the Western utopian communism, to the Marxist law of social development, up to today's "globalization," thinkers of the past and present all study the development of humanity in its totality. True, their ideas contain contradictions, for in the future of the world they tend to see that humanity, in both their minds and theories, can not bypass splits, contentions, fighting and chaos of wars. In his rationalist outlook of world history, Kant did take into account all sorts of manifestations contrary to rationalism. Before "integration" can be achieved, "disintegration" is a stage that can not be got around. It must be admitted, therefore, that integration inevitably manifests itself in a "process" in time and space. This is a question involving historical philosophy, political philosophy and international politics.

So, two levels of meaning civilization and international politics seem to have. 1. Since civilization determines the behavior of a nation, it naturally affects (through the ruling group) its thinking, policies and measures in foreign relations and the mode

of international politics. 2. International politics at different times, judging from the long-range view of the "globalization," is nothing but multi-act plays being acted on the big stage of the history of human civilization (a history of conflicts and fusions) in the final analysis. No matter what performances are going on on the stage, the "plays" are drawing nearer and nearer to the destination of the human civilization. It can be said, perhaps, that the former is a proposition of politics, and the latter, of philosophy and anthropology.

It might not be insignificant to review here the "Utopia" Kant envisaged: Gradually violence on the part of the powers will diminish and obedience to the laws will increase. There will arise in the body politic perhaps more charity and less strife in lawsuits, more reliability in keeping one's word, etc., partly out of love of honor, partly out of well-understood self-interest. And eventually this will also extend to nations in their external relations toward one another up to the realization of the cosmopolitan society, without the moral foundation in mankind having to be enlarged in the

least; for that, a kind of new creation (supernatural influence) would be necessary. For we must also not hope too much from men in their progress toward the better lest we fall prey with good reason to the mockery of the politician who would willingly take the hope of man as the dreaming of a distraught mind.⁶

At that time, Kant could only put his hope on things like "a project of the Nature" and "supernatural influence." With the unceasing progress of science and technology, however, this "supernatural creature" is no longer something mystical and unpredictable, and humanity needs not to seek help from the religious "supernatural power" any more. On the other hand, we should no longer look at all sorts of "Utopia" the past thinkers advanced purely as illusory, for science and technology and the epoch of information have replaced this "supernatural power."

Generally speaking, in dealing with questions of international politics, contradictions and conflicts are the chief concerns for study, and consultation and negotiation are conducted because there exist contradictions or conflicts. Huntington's article

deals precisely with the contradictions and conflicts, only they have been mantled in "civilization." But he discards the very nature of civilizations altogether and defined "the clashes of civilizations" as "paradigm." He, in fact, still focuses his attention on the practical political conflicts of the moment, and no organic linkage his article has shown with the development of the human civilizations themselves (including conflicts and fusions).

However, as I have said at the beginning of this paper, to us students of international politics, the significance of Huntington's article does not lie in the article itself or in the comments it has brought. What is more important is that Huntington gave us a topic for writing, pushing us to proceed from a corner of international politics to the other edifice of the history of world civilization and greatly widening our horizons. Everybody can write, and each in his own way. Huntington made the beginning, but we do not have to follow in his footsteps. We'll see that watching daily happening international affairs in an isolated and superficial way is merely compiling data concerning international political (economic)

events, while international studies, integrated with civilization, becomes a science which will take current events only as long and short plays in the history of human civilization, and one should stop judging them as they stand. Fukuzawa Yukichi, a Japanese thinker in the 19th century, likened civilization to a deer and politics to the shooters. Different shooters have different ways of shooting, but the objective is shooting at and getting the deer.⁷ Civilization being characterized by such unheard-of vastness and immensity, those obsessed with the arrogant and narrow idea that "people from another clan must be double-minded" have obviously but an old brain. World history will undoubtedly develop over and beyond the outmoded ideas opposing the East and West and all sorts of "centerism," no matter where they come from.

Looking back, I sense that compiling a book of this sort will undoubtedly promote our theoretical research in international studies. We often say that international studies is a learning embracing several subjects and linking with literature, history, philosophy, politics and economics. If international studies is to ex-

ceed the level of depicting and interpreting the current affairs and rise to the height of theoretical and analytical study, it simply must take this road in research.

I believe the readers will feel some freshness in reading the articles in this book. The contributors consist of people from all parts of China, most of them young or in the middle age. This shows our research in international politics is entering an unprecedented "golden period." This "Preface" I am asked to write seems like the feet added to the drawing of a snake; it is really unnecessary.

NOTES

¹ Wang Jisi, ed., *Civilization and In-*

ternational Politics: Chinese Scholars Response to Samuel Huntington's Theory of "the Clash of Civilizations" (Shanghai People's Publishing House, 1995).

² Translated from Francois Pierre Guillaume Guizot, *The History of European Civilization* (French edition, Hachette, 1985), pp.30, 31.

³ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Collected Works* (Lawrence & Wishart, 1976), Vol. 6, p.488.

⁴ Immanuel Kant, "Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View," *Kant on History* (The Library of Liberal Arts, Indianapolis, 1984), English edition, p. 25.

⁵ Li Shenzi, "Distinguishing Similarities and Differences and Integrating the Eastern and Western Cultures: Perspectives of the Chinese Culture," *East*, 1994, No. 3, p. 8.

⁶ Immanuel Kant, "An Old Question Raised Again: Is the Human Race Constantly Progressing?" *op. cit.*, p. 151.

⁷ Fukuzawa Yukichi, *An Introduction to Civilization* (Commercial Press, Beijing, 1982), Chinese edition, p. 41.

(Translated by Wang Huaiting)

ORIGIN AND MANIFESTATIONS OF SINO-US HOSTILITY

ZHOU Guiyin

Shi Yinhong , On Origin of Hostility and Strife: US Policy Towards New China and Sino-US Relationship in 1949 - 1950 (Nanjing University Press , 1995)

1949 - 1950 was a crucial period in the history of Sino-US relations. The failure of the American policy of backing the Jiang Kaishek regime to oppose the Communist Party , the routing of the Kuomintang troops on the Chinese mainland , the founding of new China , the outbreak of the Korean War and the Sino-US direct armed conflicts ushered in formally a 20-year-long cold war and hostility between the two countries. Chinese and foreign researchers of Sino-US relations have all been confronted with a fundamental question of this period : Was this hostility avoidable ? Or , was the outbreak of the Korean War the decisive factor leading to the rupture of Sino-US relations and America's adoption of the policy

of hostility , blockade and isolation towards China ? Most of them have answered , directly or indirectly , in the affirmative. Differing may be in the way of presentation , they are all inclined to think that the United States had adopted a policy of reconciliation or an indeterminate wait-and-see attitude towards China before the outbreak of the Korean War , not mainly because US policy makers had differences , but because some other determinants , such as Sino-Soviet relations and the China lobby , were at work .

Professor Shi Yinhong's *Origin of Hostility and Strife: US Policy Towards New China and Sino-US Relations in 1949 - 50* published by the Nanking University Press in 1995 basical-

ly negates this view. Proceeding from a study of the historical origin of America's China policy, the author points out that it was inevitable that Sino-US relations, having evolved over a long period of time, eventuated in hostility. He expounds this well-thought-out argument along these four lines:

1. Sino-US hostility had its deep historical roots. After reviewing the United States attitude and policy towards the Chinese Communist Party from the 1920s to the 1940s, the author concludes that the China policy of the Truman administration was the continuation of America's policy of backing Chiang Kaishek to oppose the Chinese Communist Party in the 40s, which was engendered from its attitude towards the Chinese Communist Party formed gradually with the development of China's democratic revolution and world politics (p. 13). In fact, the United States had opposed, and been hostile to, the Chinese Communist Party all along since its founding in 1921, the only exception being in the period of Chinese War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression. It could tolerate neither the Chinese people's revolutionary

lashing against its interests and influence in China, nor the victory of a Communist Party in such a big Eastern country as China (pp. 35 - 6). The reality is the continuation of history and the result of its logical development.

2. There was no causal relationship between the Truman administration's attempts to shake off the Kuomintang government and its attitude to new China (p. 10). Trying to "cast off the burden" only proved the bankruptcy of the Truman administration's policy of backing Chiang to oppose the Communists and the hopelessness of the corrupt, impotent Kuomintang government; it should not be construed to mean that the US government wanted to initiate reconciliation with new China. These two questions reflected two aspects of America's East Asia policy and China policy, and there was no causal relationship between them (p. 10). Basing himself on extensive and ample historical data, the author clearly shows to the readers that one year and a half preceding the outbreak of the Korean War, the American government had begun to implement an all-round hostile policy to new China: declining

dialogue ; rejecting diplomatic recognition ; organizing an international front to isolate China ; trying a thousand and one ways to aggravate China's economic difficulties , including strictly restricting trade with China ; and drawing up and executing the policy of containing China and making it an important link in containing communism in East Asia. These policies and practices of the United States constituted the basic cause of Sino-US confrontation. They were the outcome of weighing various interests and driven by ideological and emotional consideration (pp. 10 - 11 and pp. 62 - 157 of Part Three). America's concrete hostilities towards China began at the end of the summer and the beginning of the autumn of 1949 (p. 10). The conflicts between the two countries in Korea was the inevitable escalation of these hostilities.

3. The change of America's global strategic thinking as embodied in NSC - 68 was the decisive factor bringing about America's hostility towards China (p. 182). Placing Sino-US relations within the framework of America's global strategy , the author perceives keenly the influence this document of April

1950 brought on America's East Asia policy. It marked America's shift from post-war realistic containment strategy to global containment strategy and then to militarism. It gave containing China an extensive significance closely connected with the United States general interests and provided a stronger psychological guarantee for this policy - the United States might push its containment in Far East without harming its strategic strength in other parts of the world (pp. 182 - 187). It , therefore , set the minds of American policy makers at ease and prepared the ground for the Truman Administration to adopt the policy of sending troops to Korea and exercising armed intervention on the Taiwan Island.

4. The hostile attitude of the Chinese Communist Party towards the United States was also an important factor leading to Sino-US confrontation. This attitude adopted by the Chinese Communist Party and new China under its leadership was an inevitable reaction to America's policy of backing Chiang to oppose the Communists and a natural and rational choice of the foreign policy in the cold war period (pp. 53 - 60). As Mao Zedong

has pointed out in his *On the People's Democratic Dictatorship*: "On international questions, China must 'lean to one side,' i.e., to the side of the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union." "Sitting on the fence will not do, nor is there a third road."

The book has 4 outstanding features:

1. It has a well-knit structure. The book consists of 5 parts: (1) The first part, Introduction, relates the research of Chinese and foreign scholars on this subject and the authors' views, so that the readers can have a macro understanding and concept of the Sino-US hostility. (2) The second part reveals two deep-level factors of the Sino-US hostility, America's hostility to the Chinese Communist Party and its deep-rooted enmity, which developed into its adoption of the policy of hostility. (3) The third part relates the historical process of the formation of the hostile policy. In spite of some vacillations, the general tendency remained unchanged. The United States ultimately chose the road of antagonism against China. (4) The fourth part, the most important in the whole book, shows the unique

views, ideological profundity and the lively style of writing of the author. He depicts how the United States pushed its policy of containment in the world in general and in Far East in particular. The shift of strategy strengthened the idea of containment. The global cold war logically resulted in the cold war in East Asia. The policy of antagonism against China was finally implemented in full force. (5) The fifth part, Concluding Remarks, sums up the US policy of hostility towards China: It was "a lamentable page in the American diplomatic history" (pp. 155 - 158).

2. It contains large amounts of data cited from Chinese and American archives. In addition to the writings of the Chinese leaders, the book cites holdings of the Central Archives, the Shanghai Archives and Shenyang Archives. The American documents consist of two kinds: (1) Open documents. They include Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers (FRUS) and Department of State Bulletin of the Department of State, The Pentagon Papers of the Department of Defense, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Truman)

and the open documents of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate. (2) Private Papers. They include some unpublished documents the author has collected from the Harry S. Truman Library, such as the Truman Papers, the Acheson Papers, the minutes of the National Security Council, the John Sumner Papers and "Oral History, Interview with O. Edmund Clubb." Large amounts of the data have been cited for the first time by Chinese scholars. These wide-ranging, detailed and accurate first-hand data make the arguments of the author more credible and convincing.

3. It integrates the traditional method of historical analysis and the analytical method of international politics. Professor Shi Yinhong makes a three-level analysis of the process of policy making in China and the United States and the interaction of the policies of the two countries. The first level involves the international environment, the external conditions of the formation of policies. The second level deals with the state structure of China and the United States, including their national interests, ideologies, public opinion and power groups. These factors constitute

the main bases for judging their policy making. The third level involves an analysis of the policy makers, about the influence their characters, ideas and biases had on the making of the foreign policies. The three-level analysis enables the author to reconstruct in the main the whole process of policy making in the two countries and their development into hostility.

4. It reveals a question of profound significance. The author, through reconstructing Sino-US relations in this given historical period, sets forth a question of far-reaching import: What does the rise of China mean to the United States? This is not a new subject. History shows that the rise of a big country or a big power usually constitutes a challenge to the existing international system and the hegemonic countries. China meant the same to the Truman administration of the time. The revelation of this important question, I think, is where the weight of this book lies. As the author says in the Introduction, "History will not repeat itself in all its details, but some of its basic features will remain forever. One of the tasks of the historians is to help people recognize these

features , so that they can better observe the world situation and rationally determine their course of action” (p. 11).

To sum up , the new views , meticulous scholarship and data of Origin of Hostility and Strife show that this book is the latest

breakthrough in the research of Sino-US relations. Compared with the research of Western scholars , it presents an angle and objectiveness characteristic of a Chinese scholar. The book also indicates that the author has a good command of English.

(Translated by Wang Huaiting)

FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE MODERN ECONOMIC SYSTEM

LIU Xiaoying

Hu Guocheng , Road to US Modern Economic System (Chinese Economic Publishing House ,1995)

The New Deal introduced by Franklin D. Roosevelt is a hot subject in China's American study. Discussion in the historical circles began in 1980 , deepened in the early 80s and reached a high tide in the mid-80s. As far as I know , about 100 articles have been published on this subject. Early in 1982 , Mr. Hu Guocheng took part in the discussion with his master's thesis *The Main Economic Measures of F. D. Roosevelt's New Deal and Their Significance*. He continued to bury himself in this study in the decade that followed and finally had his new research monograph published in 1995 by the Chinese Economics Publishing House. I was impressed by the book. I am writing this article to share the ideas I have drawn from it with its readers and au-

thor.

There are not many monographs on American history in China. This one , in my opinion , has three outstanding features.

1. It has gone beyond the narrow scope of traditional historical research and extended the study to include the fields of economy and the economic system , which researchers of history attached not much importance to in the past. Originally , history as a time-honored traditional science embraced extensive fields of learning. However , since the rise of the modern social science at the turn of the last century , the domain of history has been continuously encroached upon by other subjects , and the political history has become the chief concern of historical research. The historical circles took notice of

this tendency in the first half of this century, and history began to find its way into other branches of learning and to study their experience. A French historian, pointed out, "If history has a particularity of its own in comparison with other branches of social science, that particularity, to put it exactly, lies in the fact that history has no particularity of social science; it tries to probe into all the dimensionalities of time." Open history has become the main trend in the development of the contemporary history. On the one hand, history's scope of research is continually expanding (not taking back the domain encroached on by other subjects, but taking care of these fields with the special views and methods of historical research). On the other, it is continually assimilating the research achievements and methods of other branches of social science. To be objective, this process has not gone smoothly. This work by Mr. Hu Guocheng is a valuable attempt to reflect this tendency.

Marxism holds that the economic base determines the superstructure, and the superstructure reacts on the economic base. But this fundamental principle has

not been correctly understood and applied by some of the Chinese researchers, who regard economics just a setoff of politics. As far as the New Deal of Roosevelt goes, economy is undoubtedly its chief content. If there had been no economic crisis in 1929 through 1933, if the Roosevelt administration had taken no economic measures and made no economic legislation to cope with this crisis, there would have been no New Deal at all. While many scholars were running after the less important things to the negligence of the important ones, Mr. Hu Guocheng firmly grasped the economic aspect of the question and attained his research fruits in the form of this book. In this book, he makes clear at the outset that "the main task of this book is to probe, through the study of the American economic history from the second half of the nineteenth century to the eve of World War II, how the American modern economic system came into being," and "the emphasis of this study is laid on the connections and relationship between the American state organ and its agency — the federal government — and economics" (p. 1). To combine the study of

history with that of the economics, or to apply the method of historical research to the study of the economic phenomena and activities and their relations with the government — this requires a considerable courage and a certain capability on the part of the researcher. This attempt made by the author has opened a new aspect for the study of American history and a new angle to correctly understand the development of American history during this period in general, and the New Deal of Roosevelt in particular.

2. Because the method of historical research has been applied to the study of economic phenomena, the thread running through the entire book is clearly discernible. On the basis of fully assimilating the Chinese and foreign research achievements in the fields this book covers, the author has arrived at many views and important conclusions of his own. Macroscopically, the book stresses how the New Deal was adopted and how America's modern economic system came into being. But in tracing the origin of the New Deal along the line whether the state intervened the economy or not and to what length it went if it did, the book

finds out some evidences showing that at the close of the nineteenth century some early symptoms of American monopoly capitalism had already appeared. The book analyses the influence of the state intervention and control of the economy during World War I on the adoption of the American modern economic system and elaborates on the efforts to "restore prosperity" after the war and the resurgence of laissez-faire, especially the limited intervention Herbert Hoover was compelled to enforce at the time of the great crisis while adhering to the principle of laissez-faire, thus foreshadowing the momentous historical change, the New Deal. The author makes an all-round analysis in the book and holds that the New Deal discarded altogether the principle of laissez-faire which the American government followed from the period of non-monopoly capitalism to that of the ordinary run of monopoly capitalism and "built a state intervention and control system over the economic life in a width and depth never known in the United States before and turned the American economic system into one of state monopoly capitalism" (p. 11), i. e., the

American modern economic system. He lays bare a clear thread of development: the non-monopoly capitalism (a laissez-faire economy) — the ordinary run of monopoly capitalism (state intervention coupled with laissez-faire) — the state monopoly capitalism (all-round state intervention and the formation of the modern economic system). What merits our attention here is that he consistently views the historical phenomena in the light of economic laws. For instance, he stresses the relationship between the first upsurge of enterprise annexation and the Antitrust Act in dealing with the earlier state intervention and emphasizes, in probing the formation of the New Deal, such background as the second upsurge of enterprise annexation, the economic crisis and the enterprises request for government intervention. Macroscopically speaking, the book has some characteristics of its own. Its all-round elucidation and study of the New Deal, for instance, can be said to have attained the highest level among works by Chinese scholars on this question. His analysis of the state intervention at the earlier stage and his comprehension and

appraisal of the 1937 economic crisis indicate that he is a capable researcher. Microscopically speaking, the author has his own way of doing research. There are a great amount of instances in the book to prove this. In short, the book has an outstanding content, system and thread of presentation and is full of enlightening views.

3. The book has the substantial backing of documentary evidences. A book of no more than 260,000 Chinese characters should have used materials from over 120 Chinese and foreign numerical statements, historical documents, recollections, biographies, monographs and books to support its arguments, and there are as many as 510 notes. References and cross references are given virtually for all the important points. This meticulous approach is indeed rare and admirable and shows a spirit of devotion devoid of worldly-mindedness.

Of course, there is room for improvement on certain questions. A case in point is the analysis and elucidation of the American economic theory and thoughts. True, the United States is a pragmatist country, where practice is rarely guided

by theory, and Mr. Hu Guocheng has pointed out that the formation of the American modern economic system should be attributed to “basically the requirement of the economic development” and “no guidance by any economic theory born really in America” was present (p. 1), but he has said at the same time that, corresponding to this historical process, a main theoretical and ideological thread, “mercantilism — physiocracy and classical economics — Keynesian economics,” did exist (p. 2). However, the book makes no analysis of the relations between these schools of thought and theories and the development of the American economic system and has hardly mentioned them. In spite of the fact that none of these schools of thought and theories — including the neoclassical economics that held sway in Western economics at the end of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century — was born in the United States, they had different degrees of influence on the American economic practice after all. An analysis of this influence would have enriched the content

of this book. Another point is though the New Deal paved the ground for the later establishment of the American modern economic system and enhanced the economic function of the state, can it be said that, under the specific historical condition of the time, the state, while acting as the arbitrator and mediator in the economic operations, involved too much in the actual operations of the market? Also, as a history of “the formation of the American state monopoly capitalism,” this book seems to lack a brief account of the American modern economic system formed later and ends too abruptly. Besides, using an intellectual analytical terminology would have added color to the simple, prosaic style of narration, and attaching a bibliography at the end of the book would have helped those readers who want to read more on this subject.

Notwithstanding these deficiencies, *Road to US Modern Economic System* is a good book worth reading. It is a new achievement in the Chinese study of American history.

(Translated by Wang Huaiting)

A FINE WORK IN US URBANIZATION STUDY

HUANG Keke

Wang Xu , *American Cities along the Pacific Coast* (Northeast Normal University Press , 1994)

Study of American cities began in the 80s in China. Though three decades later than in the United States and Great Britain , it fully indicates that the scope of American studies in our country is being expanded constantly . Among the small number of pioneers , scholars in the Institute for American Studies under the Northeast Normal University have displayed great potential . They were the first to start this research and have turned the institute into a base for the study of the subject . Professor Ding Zemin , having studied the US immigrant and border question for years , inspired his students to take an interest in the US cities and included the subject in the bigger scheme of " The American Civil War and the Gilded Age , " a national research

subject under his direction .

Wang Xu is a student of his and has received his meticulous help all along . Wang has become a professor himself and assumed the directorship of this institute .

American Cities along the Pacific Coast (*American Cities* , hereafter) , published by the Northeast Normal University Publishing House in 1994 , is the fruit of Professor Wang Xu s research of over 10 years . Preceding the publication of this book , he had issued scores of essays on the question of American cities , and *American Western Cities and Exploitation of the West (1860 - 1910)* , with which he won his doctorate , was perhaps the first dissertation on this question in China . In this article he expounds his academic views in clear-cut terms and uses an

abundance of material to support his points. It can be said that this article was, in fact, the embryo of *American Cities*. In his visits to the United States later for attending meetings and making investigations, he continued to glean data, called on scholars specialized in the history of American cities and did field work in cities along the Pacific coast, bringing back abundant information for his book.

The most conspicuous characteristic of this work is that a basic view of his runs throughout the book: the development of the American cities along the Pacific coast has followed a unique road, very different from those of the East and the Mid West. This view is contrary to the general conclusion drawn in the United States. Historians of the American Western cities headed by Richard Wade, one of the founders of the history of American cities, maintain that urbanization in the West began later than other parts of the country, but it soon transplanted the pattern of the East and followed in its footsteps on the whole. Wang Xu points out that this view overemphasizes the similarity between the West and the East, thus neglecting, and even im-

peding, the study of the individuality of urbanization in the West.

Wang Xu refutes this view in his book with convincing arguments. As a Chinese scholar, he is in no position to compete with his American colleagues in data and on-the-spot investigation. It is indeed no easy job to treat history as it was and arrive at objective and fair conclusions. It is perhaps because he has such a scientific research attitude that he has earned the appreciation of his American colleagues. Professor John Findlay, Director of the Center for the Study of Pacific Northwest under University of Washington, and some other scholars read an outline of this book and raised well-founded opinions on it. A concerned department even presented him to the then President Ronald Reagan.

American Cities points out that the peculiarity of the Western way lies in the fact that cities and towns played a pioneering and dominant role in its development. Proceeding from the local historical and geographical conditions, the trail-breakers had not treaded in the footprints of the Easterners, who followed the traditional way of reclaiming

wasteland and going for agricultural production at first and gradually taking up industrialization and urbanization. They simply bypassed the stage of agricultural development. This view has the backing of the objective conditions in the West. First of all, the development of the West began with mining for minerals, and the camps around the mines were the embryonic form of cities and towns. Investors, miners and merchants converged here, and all sorts of trades sprang up to serve the mines subsequently. To maintain order and security, diverse administrative organs emerged successively. A rudimentary urban civilization thus took shape. There is no denying that most camps vanished gradually with the exhaustion of the mining resources and only a small amount of them developed into towns and cities later. The urban civilization, however, has not vanished in the process; it sublimed in the flow and people multiplied, laying a good foundation for the large-scale development of cities in the years that followed.

Secondly, after the Civil War, the US government worked out various preferential policies to encourage railway cor-

porations to build westward railways. These corporations, using the land and loans the government gave them, set up companies under them to select sites to develop towns. Within a short period, a series of cities sprang up along both sides of the United States five main railways running from east to west. American Cities points out that railway corporations, which form a relatively independent economic sector, brought about the all-round development of the West on the basis of the achievements made by the mining industry. Their role was particularly conspicuous after the 1880s. All the big cities playing an important part in the West today excelled themselves in the railway epoch.

The strength of American Cities lies not only in the fact that it puts forward a view. What is even more significant is that it has induced some valuable rules from the deep-going analysis of the Western road. They can be summed up into the following four points:

1. The urbanization of the West is characterized by a sort of jumpiness. The West, due to unevenness in the development of different regions of the country, had only a sparse population

at first and was far from the economically developed regions. What it urgently needed then was building some "pivotal points" to link it to the East, not reclaiming wasteland over scattered areas and going for agricultural production. So, with the backing of the East, which preceded it in industrialization, the West developed its cities at redoubled speed. Some big towns soon grew into medium-sized cities and then into regional central municipalities without showing different stages of development. The author of *American Cities* chose several cities in different parts of the United States for a comparative study and found that the development of a town of 2,000 inhabitants into a city with a population of 200,000 took the Mid West (exclusive of Chicago) 50 to 70 years, the Northeast 130 to 170 years and the West 30 to 40 years. So the West is the fastest in the development of cities of the same size.

2. Cities are concentrated reflections of regional economy. They are joined together through the areas of their "economic radiation" and form a network of regional productive forces. The rise of several regional central

municipalities in the West undoubtedly raised the overall level of its urbanization. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the basic structure of urbanization of the region, with the cities along the Pacific coast as its backbone, took shape.

3. Development of big cities is related to the degree of concentration of monopoly corporations. *American Cities* enlists the "bank kings" and the "big four" in the railway industry in San Francisco to show that the position of this city has been consolidated as a result of the development of big monopoly corporations. Using San Francisco as their headquarters, these corporations controlled the mining industry, key communication lines and even the financial and monetary world. The high society made up of consortiums bribed members of the local parliament, bought over the news media and suppressed the public opinion, manipulating the political situation behind the scenes. The association of the monopoly groups with the state and municipal authorities was an outstanding feature of the economic system with cities as its centers in the formation period.

4. Governmental invest-

ment has played an important role in the development of big cities. This book, in accounting the stimulation the two world wars gave the industries of the Western cities, deals in great detail the investments of the federal government after World War II. It holds that the production of ammunitions and war-time necessities altered the structure of the industry along the Pacific coast. The tremendous national defense expenditures of the federal government and its policy of encouraging the development of high-tech industries bore noticeable results in the cities along the Pacific coast. The rapid growth of the aircraft, ship-building and missile and astronautics industries and the rise of the micro-electronic industry in Stanford University and the Silicon Valley have enabled high technology to become the leading factor in the economy of the Western cities.

A profound conclusion has been drawn from the book's elucidation of the features of the urbanization of the West: Even if the economy of a country, particularly a big country, has developed to a certain extent, its remote and border areas should not merely copy the urbanization experience of the developed ar-

reas; they should proceed from the actual conditions and choose their own road of urbanization to develop the economy, so long as regional difference exists. This conclusion is undoubtedly of great reference value to the ongoing urbanization in China.

It should be said that the challenge this book poses to an American school of thought on the question of the peculiar road of the West proves to be successful. Apart from this, the author has corrected some views in various parts of the book.

It is generally acknowledged that industry and trade are lumped together in the Western cities. Numerous American scholars maintain that this is because these cities are nothing but "agents" of the Eastern cities and occupy only an inferior position in the echelon of US cities. Some even put the West and the South on a par, saying that the West is the colony of the East. Professor Wang Xu points out that these views may have their bases, for the Western cities are younger than the Eastern ones on the whole and, being situated in areas producing raw materials, can not shake off their dependence on the manufactures and capital control of the East.

However, this does not mean that the above conclusion is valid. Firstly, it is not scientific to use the concept "colony" in analyzing the relationship between different parts of a country. Discrepancy in economic development of the two regions can only be the reflection of the fact that they are at different stages of specialized production. Secondly, the process San Francisco, Los Angeles and Seattle have undergone shows that, by the end of the nineteenth century, the economy of the Western cities had matured and the independence of regional economy had been greatly enhanced. Thirdly, the economy of the South is different essentially from that of the West. The Southern cities are purely commercial in nature, counting on the link with the big Northeastern cities for their survival and therefore relying heavily on them, whereas the Western cities have formed a horizontal cooperation among themselves and manifested a tendency of independent development.

It is widely held in the Chinese and foreign academic circles that the gold rush in California set off urbanization in the West, particularly along the American

Pacific coast. Wang Xu maintains that, though this is an undeniable fact, the role of the gold rush should not be overrated. What it aimed at then was the alluvial gold in the rivers. The shallow mining brought in just a limited amount of gold and lasted a very short period, its influence on the urbanization of the West being far less significant than the deep seat mining that came later. The discovery of deep-seated gold, silver, copper, lead and zinc mines led to large-scale mechanized mining. The sweepwashers working on their own could move conveniently after exhausting the gold mineral resources along certain rivers, but they could not afford the capital and technology needed in the deep cutting. The mining corporations, therefore, emerged to meet the requirements. They industrialized the mining processes, promoted the development of the machine-building, energy and service industries and developed towns and cities near the mines.

American Cities points out that Chinese scholars still confine themselves to the study of the American suburbanization at present. The concept "suburbanization," in fact, can no longer ex-

plain satisfactorily the development of American cities following the end of World War II. Metropolitanization, not suburbanization, is the leading trend in the current development of American cities. The book says that suburbanization consists of three stages: the appearance of new residential areas in the suburbs; the outward shifting of retail shops; and the constructing of new enterprises in the suburbs. Around World War II, American central cities linked up with the sub-centers emerging in their suburbs, forming the complex central structure of metropolitans. The book deals in detail the causes leading to the high speed development of the metropolitans along the American Pacific coast and explains the land annexation, communications and transportation, invigorating the central parts of the cities and other important questions. The author says with foresight that the future trend of urban development will be the forming of megalopolises on the bases of metropolitans.

American Cities, as the first Chinese book on the history of American cities, unavoidably contains some inadequacies.

A more obvious case in

point is the difference in structure between the fourth part and the first three. It enlists in the lexical style such items as geographical environment, population, economy, culture and education, scenic spots and city layout under Los Angeles, San Diego, San Francisco and Seattle, thus resulting in a disharmony with the argumentative style of the preceding parts. In fact, these four megalopolises have been the main objects of study throughout the book; the content of the fourth part could have been included naturally in the first three. If it should remain as it is for the sake of emphasizing their position and function at present, a horizontal comparative study would also be better than the case-study fashion of presentation. A comparative study of such questions as these megalopolises function in the regional and national economy, their complementarity and perspectives of development (this section can be shifted from Chapter Sixteen in Part Three) would have brought about the good results of illustrating in depth the argumentation of the first three parts.

It goes without saying that great emphases should be given

to certain sections of a monograph, and less to others, and some points have only to be touched upon briefly in passing. However, an insufficient account of important questions closely related to the subject of a book will make one feel it lacks depth. American Cities points out that the development of communications and transportation has promoted urbanization in the West, but it says little about the role of autos, much less than that of railways. Railways played a tremendous part in the development of the American economy and the rise of cities. However, when expressways were built one after the other in the 60s, railways and trains had fulfilled their historical task, and increasing mileages of them were being

demolished. The auto, with its characteristic convenience and nimbleness, has completely changed the face of the cities of the railway era and is performing a far greater function. In dealing with the urbanization of the contemporary times, more space should be devoted to such modern means of communications as the auto and airplane and the modern equipment of telecommunications.

All in all, American Cities is a book of considerable academic value. Professor Wang Xu, on the basis of the research achievements he has attained, has begun a comparative study of the American cities along the Pacific coast and the Chinese coastal cities. We are looking forward to the publication of his new work. (Translated by Wang Huaiting)

INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON “CULTURAL FACTORS IN THE U.S.-EAST ASIA RELATIONS” HELD

The Institute of American Studies sponsored an international symposium on the cultural factors in the U.S.-East Asia relations in Beijing from July 29 through 31 of 1996.

Participating in the symposium were 24 scholars from China, the United States, Canada, France, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines and Indonesia.

In his opening speech, Wang Jisi, director of the Institute of American Studies said that since Samuel Huntington of Harvard University published his article “Clash of Civilizations?” in Foreign Affairs in 1993 it has aroused wide discussions and debates among scholars of international relations. Chinese scholars published a series of papers debating such topics as “cultural hegemony”, “cultural colonialism” and “post-colonial mentality”. He noted that with the momentous rise of the economy in East Asia in the last few years, East Asia, as a cultural entity different from the Western Culture, poses many a challenge to Western democracy.

The symposium had five sessions on :1. The role of culture — the theoretical theme and central idea ;2. Cultural traditions and foreign relations ;3. Social transition and cultural development and international relations ;4. International justice and international new order ;and 5. Looking into the future.

In her paper “Hundred years of Interflow and Clash of Ideas”, Zi Zhongyun, Senior fellow of the Institute of American Studies believed that the history over the last hundred years indicates that American foreign policy has been consistently tinged with ideological intent. It may soften due to considerations of practical interest but will never be forsaken. She held that in the last hundred years the Americans in their relations with China used to have an impulse to

influence and change China. Though the political regimes in China have changed in the last hundred years, they have a consistent stand in face of the ideological influence as represented by the United States: the patriotic intellectuals are attracted to a different extent to American democratic system and its advanced social organizations as well as its advanced science and technology; however, they are invariably repugnant to the power politics of the United States that hurts the national feelings. Though the governments need American support in complex international relations and practical economic construction, they invariably regard American political system, ideology and cultural influence as a threat to social stability and the regimes themselves.

Wang Yizhou, senior fellow of the Institute of World Economy and Politics in his paper cited cases to show that the Chinese and the Americans have many important and delicate differences in cognition. He maintained that due to the differences in the political system, economic structure and strategic culture, it is impossible for the Chinese and the Americans to reach unanimity on many issues. He believed that it is all the more pressing now to know the differences than to find ways to tackle them.

Allen S. Whiting, professor of the University of Arizona in his paper "Culture, Conflict and Cooperation in American-East Asian Relations" said that genuine conflicts of national interests as defined by the ruling elites can still exist. Nationalism remains a primary frame of reference for determining whether such conflicts exist and how they are to be resolved.

He said that this is true to some extent for all countries, new or old, rising or declining, democratic or authoritarian. Seen in this perspective cultural conflict is a less worrisome aspect of the contemporary world order than is projected by the Huntington hypothesis. He believed that on the positive side, these conflicts of national interest are a somewhat more manageable future than does the forecast of an apocalyptic clash of civilizations.

Mark Juergensmeyer, professor of the University of California, Santa Barbara, in his paper "From Christendom to Modernism to Globalism: America's 'Civilizations' and Their Global Impact" said that if the moralism and naive optimism of Christendom and other

religious civilizations are tempered by the rationality of Modernism , and the Modernist illusions about the invincibility of human knowledge are leveled with a religious sense of limitations of the human condition , then the emerging multi-cultural civilization of the 21st century , Globalism , can provide a cultural basis for both social identity and human harmony. The dismal alternative is a world mired in cultural anarchy and locked in petty tribal disputes. Perhaps it is not too much to hope for a Global civilization that would advance all of the world's communities in a shared responsibility for maintaining and uplifting the common good , he said.

Dr. Emmanuel C. Lallana , professor of the University of the Philippines in his paper “Globalization , Culture and Foreign Policy” believed that globalization will have enormous consequences for the future content of foreign policy , states will increasingly rely on policy coordination , the creation of international cooperative regimes and multilateral institutions to secure their interest. He said that there are questions on whether the state in its present form — the nation-state — will survive. Theorists are beginning to imagine a post-nation-state that is able to effectively provide public goods to its citizens in a globalized context.

He held that not all cultures respond to modern/ Western cultural influence in the same way. Some cultures are better able to resist than others. Other cultures which have taken western ideas and practices have adopted them as their own. But in contemplating this point , it is also important to remember that while a homogenized global culture has yet to emerge , a cadre of transnational cosmopolitans had already been created. The members of these cadre are bearers of modern/ western culture in their respective countries. They are also often the wielders of power in these societies. This trajectory will put to lie the prognosis that we will be witnesses to the clash of cultures , he maintained.

Michael Zielenziger , professor of the Tokyo Bureau Chief of Knight rider in his paper “A Difficult Agenda : the Role of the Press and the Clash of Values between East and West” said “As we move into a global and ‘borderless’ world where technology , commerce and information transcend national boundaries , thus reducing the power of individual governments , recognizing and resolving these

tensions through new and innovative techniques will emerge to become one of the great new challenges of the next century.” he thought that it will become more important for journalists , to discover and promote a new lexicon to help discuss the “cultural” dimensions of emerging global disagreements.

David I. Hitchcock , professor of the U.S. Center for Strategic and International Studies said in his paper “Asian Values and the United States : How Much conflict ?” that the differences across the Pacific are manageable. East Asian watch — and generally admire — U.S. standards of liberty , law , and protection of the individual. But the paths and byways lit by liberty s torch in Asian countries will be fashioned to fit older cultures , other religions and traditions , that may continue to place life s priorities in somewhat different order from that of Americans.

He held that the goals of East Asia are not basically that different from those of the United States ; the challenge is to work more closely for common policies to reach those goals. If the United States demonstrates its appreciation of these gradually diminishing differences ; if Americans place greater emphasis on a need to learn from Asia and to respect differing cultures and priorities ; and if they seek to exchange ideas with East Asians on how best to deal with values in modern societies — then the United States will not only gain a new level of confidence among East Asians in its leadership , but also deepen their respect for its wisdom and maturity.

Kim Kyong-Dong , professor of the Seoul National University believed that it is difficult to establish a completely equal relationship between any two nations. There must be some aspects of the relations which separate the two countries , militarily , economically , technologically , demographically , and so on. He held that a close look at the nature of relationship , therefore , would yield a result that shows some degree of one-sided exchange of culture between the two. He called this as “tilted” acculturation.

He said that as long as such lopsided flow of culture and influence continues , the perceptions and attitudes of one people about the other remains to be distorted or at least incomplete. This incomplete images of each other in turn cause the relations to be swayed easily by immediate national or political interests. He noted that while

deeper cultural understanding of other societies takes some deliberate effort, it is essential in building international relations on a sounder and more meaningful ground.

Richard Madsen, professor of the University of California, San Diego noted in his paper "Changing National Narratives and the Problems of U.S.-China Relations" that in the 21st century, the challenges of U.S.-China relations will once again stimulate Americans and Chinese to develop new master narratives for a new world. This time, he said, the primary dialogue creating such visions will not be between Beijing and Washington, but between a multitude of diverse Chinese and Americans interacting within the fertile spaces on the edges of both societies: in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and multi-ethnic metropolises such as San Francisco and Los Angeles.

He said that within such places are occurring new conversations about the deepest meaning of Asian and Western cultural traditions, fruitful comparisons between American and Chinese assumptions about the relation between self and society, about the legitimate bases of authority, about the proper bond between political and economic life in the rapidly changing conditions of the Pacific Rim. He noted that amid the anxieties and uncertainties of this transitional time, this cultural ferment offers some help for the creation of humane new visions about how Chinese and Americans might create a common home in the intricately interdependent world of the twenty-first century.

Zhu Shida, senior fellow of the Institute of American Studies in his paper "A Cultural Study of the American East Asian Policy" maintained that the rise of the economic power of East Asia will give rise to the following trends: 1. The United States will strategically pay greater attention to the Asia-Pacific region. The motive behind the eastward shift of its strategy is economic interest; 2. East Asia will be one of the three large centers in the world structure after the cold war; 3. East Asia increases its confidence and assertiveness; 4. The world has a better understanding of Confucian culture and comes to believe that it is necessary to draw on wisdom from Confucian culture to solve human problems in the 21st century.

he discussed a series of differences on such issues of human rights and perceptions of values. On the issue of human rights, he

maintained that if people delve into the nucleus and depth of the question they will find the understanding of man in each culture is essentially different and the understanding of right itself is different likewise. the countries with centralized authority and the capitalist democratic countries are different in social system and the rule by man and the rule by law are different.

If the United States attempts to enter into East Asia, he said, it is necessary :1. The United States shall have to separate ideology from trade and de-politicize the human rights issue ;2. The United States shall have to establish a formal double-deck superhighway contact pattern with the East Asian countries and regions ;3. The United States shall have to recognize that all social changes and evolutions hinge on the maturity of the forces in the society itself ;4. It is important to recognize that the social development in East Asia calls for an evolutionary process ;5. The United States should try to find common ground in the perception of value and will not impose its own perception of value on others ; and 6. The United States should learn from East Asian civilization.

Dewi Fortuna Anwar, professor of the Indonesian Institute of Sciences maintained in her paper "the Impact of Social-Cultural Changes on U.S.-East Asian Relations" that with their growing maturity and economic successes Asian states have less reasons to be either apologetic or defensive about what they do, so that they can deal with the former colonial powers in a more equal footing. She said that in turn western powers have also come to recognize the worth and importance of Asia, so that they are learning to be more sensitive and less arrogant in their attitudes and politics vis-a-vis this region.

She said that this reality has an implication for American foreign policy in the region. Despite its status as the sole remaining super power, the United States no longer sets the agenda in Asia. She stressed that increasingly it must deal with other countries as equals and secure their cooperation by adjusting its interests to accommodate theirs.

Daizaburo Yui of the University of Tokyo noted in his paper "Cultural Gaps in the Memories of Asia-Pacific War between Japan and the United States of America" that it will continue to be more

and more unavoidable for Japan to settle the issue of war responsibility, as a sense of community is developing in Asia-Pacific, if Japan wants to be a member of this community in the future.

(Zhu Shida)