Book Review American Studies in China ORIGIN AND MANIFESTATIONS OF SINOª²US HOSTILITY ZHOU Guiyin Shi Yinhong, On Origin of Hostility and Strife: US Policy Towards New China and Sinoª²US Relationship in 1949-1950 (Nanjing University Press, 1945) 1949-1950 was a crucial period in the history of Sinoª²US relations. The failure of the American policy of backing the Jiang Kaishek regime to oppose the Communist Party, the routing of the Kuomintang troops on the Chinese mainland, the founding of new China, the outbreak of the Korean War and the Sinoª²US direct armed conflicts ushered in formally a 20ª²yearª²long cold war and hostility between the two countries. Chinese and foreign researchers of Sinoª²US relations have all been confronted with a fundamental question of this period: Was this hostility avoidable? Or, was the outbreak of the Korean War the decisive factor leading to the rupture of Sinoª²US relations and America¬ðs adoption of the policy of hostility, blocka de and isolation towards China? Most of them have answered, directly or indirectly, in the affirmative. Differing may be in the way of presentation, they are all inclined to think that the United States had adopted a policy of reconciliation or an indeterminate waitª²andª²see attitude towards China before the outbreak of the K orean War, not mainly because US policy makers had differences, but because some other determinants, such as Sinoª²Soviet re lations and the China lobby, were at work. Professor Shi Yinhong¬ðs Origin of Hostility and Strife: US Policy Towards New China and Sinoª²US Relations in 1949-50 pub lished by the Nanking University Press in 1995 basically negates this view. Proceeding from a study of the historical origin of America¬ðs China policy, the author points out that it was inevitable that Sinoª²US relations, having evolved over a long period of time, eventuated in hostility. He expounds this wellª²thoughtª²out argument along these four lines: 1. Sinoª²US hostility had its deep historical roots. After reviewing the United States¬ð attitude and policy towards the Chinese Communist Party from the 1920s to the 1940s, the author concludes that the China policy of the Truman administration was the continuation of America¬ðs policy of backing Chiang Kaishek to oppose the Chinese Communist Party in the 40s, which was engendered from its attitude towards the Chinese Communist Party formed gradually with the development of China¬ðs democratic revolution and world politics (p. 13). In fact, the United States had opposed, and been hostile to, the Chinese Communist Party all along since its founding in 1921, the only exception being in the period of Chinese War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression. It could tolerate neither the Chinese people¬ðs revolutionary lashing against its interests and influence in China, nor the victory of a Communist Party in such a big Eastern country as China (pp. 35-6). The reality is the continuation of history and the result of its logical development. 2. There was no causal relationship between the Truman administration¬ðs attempts to shake off the Kuomintang government and its attitude to new China (p. 10). Trying to "cast off the burden" only proved the bankruptcy of the Truman administration¬ðs policy of backing Chiang to oppose the Communists and the hopelessness of the corrupt, impotent Kuomintang government; it should not be construed to mean that the US government wanted to initiate reconciliation with new China . These two questions reflected two aspects of America¬ðs East Asia policy and China policy, and there was no causal relationship between them (p. 10). Basing himself on extensive and ample historical data, the author clearly shows to the readers that one year and a half preceding the outbreak of the Korean War, the American government had begun to implement an allª²round hostile policy to new China: declining dialogue; rejecting diplomatic recognition; organizing an international front to isolate China; trying a thousand and one ways to aggravate China¬ðs economic difficulties, including strictly restricting trade with China; and drawing up and executing the policy of contain ing China and making it an important link in containing communism in East Asia. These policies and practicess of the United States constituted the basic cause of Sinoª²US confrontation. They were the outcome of weighing various interests and driven by ideological and emotional consideration (pp. 10-11 and pp. 62- 157 of Part Three). America¬ðs concrete hostilities towards China began at the e nd of the summer and the beginning of the autumn of 1949 (p. 10). The conflicts between the two countries in Korea was the inevitable escalation of these hostilities. 3. The change of America¬ðs global strategic thinking as embodied in NSC-68 was the decisive factor bringing about America¬ðs hostility towards China (p.182). Placing Sinoª²US relations within the framework of America¬ðs global strategy, the author perceives keenly the influence this document of April 1950 brought on America¬ðs East Asia policy. It marked America¬ðs shift from postª²war realistic containment strategy to global containment strategy and then to militarism. It gave containing China an extensive significance closely connected with the United States¬ð general interests and provided a stronger psychological guarantee for this policy - the United States might push its containment in Far East without harming its strategic strength in other parts of the world (pp. 182-187). It, therefore, set the minds of American policy makers at ease and prepared the ground for the Truman Administration to adopt the policy of sending troops to Korea and exercising armed intervention on the Taiwan Island. 4. The hostile attitude of the Chinese Communist Party towards the United States was also an important factor leading to Sinoª²US confrontation. This attitude adopted by the Chinese Communist Party and new China under its leadership was an inevitable reaction to America¬ðs policy of backing Chiang to oppose the Communists and a natural and rational choice of the foreign policy in the cold war period (pp. 53-60). As Mao Zedong has pointed out in his On the People¬ðs Democratic Dictatorship: On international questions, China must "lean to one side," i.e., to the side of the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union. "Sitting on the fence will not do, nor is there a third road." The book has 4 outstanding features: 1. It has a wellª²knit structure. The book consists of 5 parts: (1) The first part, Introduction, relates the research of Chinese and foreign scholars on this subject and the authors views, so that the readers can have a macro understanding and concept of the Sinoª²US hostility. (2) The second part reveals two deepª²level factors of the Sinoª²US hostility, America¬ðs hostility to the Chinese Communist Party and its deepª²rooted enmity, which developed into its adoption of the policy of hostility. (3) The third part relates the historical process of the formation of the hostile policy. In spite of some vacillations, the general tendency remained unchanged. The United States ultimately chose the road of antagonism against China. (4) The fourth part, the most important in the whole book, shows the unique views, ideological profundity and the lively style of writing of the author. He depicts how the United States pushed its policy of containment in the world in general and in Far East in particular. The shift of strategy strengthened the idea of containment. The global cold war logically resulted in the cold war in East Asia. The policy of antagonism against China was finally implemented in full force. (5) The fifth part, Concluding Remarks, sums up the US policy of hostility towards China: It was "a lamentable page in the American diplomatic history" (pp. 155-158). 2. It contains large amounts of data cited from Chinese and American archives. In addition to the writings of the Chinese leaders, the book cites holdings of the Central Archives, the Shanghai Archives and Shenyang Archives. The American documents consist of two kinds: (1) Open documents. They include Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers (FRUS) and Department of State Bulletin of the Department of State, The Pentagon Papers of the Department of Defense, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Truman) and the open documents of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate. (2) Private Papers. They include some unpublished documents the author has collected from the Harry S. Truman Library, such as the Truman Papers, the Acheson Papers, the minutes of the National Security Council, the John Summer Papers and "Oral History, Interview with O. Edmund Clubb." Large amounts of the data have been cited for the first time by Chinese scholars. These wideª²ranging, detailed and accurate firstª²hand data make the arguments of the author more credible and convincing. 3. It integrates the traditional method of historical analysis and the analytical method of international politics. Professor Shi Yinhong makes a threeª²level analysis of the process of policy making in China and the United States and the interaction of the policies of the two countries. The first level involves the international environment, the external conditions of the formation of policies. The second level deals with the state structure of China and the United States, including their national interests, ideologies, public opinion and power groups. These factors constitute the main bases for judging their policy making. The third level involves an analysis of the policy makers, about the influence their characters, ideas and biases had on the making of the foreign policies. The threeª²level analysis enables the author to reconstruct in the main the whole process of policy making in the two countries and their development into hostility. 4. It reveals a question of profound significance. The author, through reconstructing Sinoª²US relations in this given historical period, sets forth a question of farª²reaching import: What does the rise of China mean to the United States? This is not a new subject. History shows that the rise of a big country or a big power usually constitutes a challenge to the existing international system and the hegemonic countries. China meant the same to the Truman administration of the time. The revelation of this important question, I think, is where the weight of this book lies. As the author says in the Introduction, "History will not repeat itself in all its details, but some of its basic features will remain forever. One of the tasks of the historians is to help people recognize these features, so that they can better observe the world situation and rationally determine their course of action" (p. 11). To sum up, the new views, meticulous scholarship and data of Origin of Hostility and Strife show that this book is the latest breakthrough in the research of Sinoª²US relations. Compared with the research of Western scholars, it presents an angle and objectiveness characteristic of a Chinese scholar. The book also indicates that the author has a good command of English. (Translated by Wang Huaiting)